



A
SPEECH
delivered by


MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK

A
SPEECH


delivered by

MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK

1927



MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK



INTRODUCTION TO THIS EDITION


With the publication of this translation of a speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1927, the Ministry of Education of the Turkish Republic hopes to be of service to foreign students of Turkish history.

A translation of the same speech published by K. F. Koehler, G. m. b. H., Leipzig, Germany, in 1929 has been extensively utilized in this publication. This first translation, which has been out of print for a long time, has been checked against the original speech, translation errors have been corrected, certain missing paragraphs translated and added, spelling of names of persons and geographical places changed to their current Turkish spelling, and a glossary of terms and names of institutions peculiar to Turkey mentioned in the speech has been added to the book.

The introduction to the first edition has been kept, since it prepares the reader who is not fully familiar with the history of Turkey; also, it reveals the point of view of a foreign editor in 1929. The introduction ends with the following words:

"As yet it is impossible to guess how far Mustafa Kemal Paşa's work will finally be crowned with success. He is still in the prime of manhood. But it is certain even now that Turkey as she has been created by Mustafa Kemal Paşa will forever stand as a monument of ardent patriotic love, of crowning ability and of a titanic will."

The Ministry of Education of Atatürk's Turkey, which publishes this work twenty-five years after his death, leaves the evaluation of the above opinion expressed thirty-four years ago to those who will study present and future developments in Turkey.



INTRODUCTION

This volume comprises a speech which lasted from the 15th to the 20th October, 1927, delivered by Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of the Turkish Republic, at Ankara before the deputies and representatives of the "Republican Party," of which he was the founder and head.

Unconventional as the length and character of this speech is, the subject of it, which is a comprehensive account of one of the most remarkable events in the many centuries of Turkish history, is equally unique. It reveals the activity of the speaker from the time when he first felt himself called upon to take the leadership of his nation into his own hands and guide it from shame and threatened ruin to freedom and power.

Now that danger from abroad has been averted and since the foundations have been prepared in the country on which a revivified State is arising, Mustafa Kemal Paşa is moved to show his people how this new Turkey has been built up, on what foundations she is standing and what are the paths she must tread in future.

The speech was delivered before Turks by a Turk, by a man who from the commencement of his military career was intimately associated with the political events occurring in his country; before men who, like himself, have lived to witness or to share in the two eventful decades of the modern history of his native land. This fact alone will explain that the speaker presumed many a circumstance to be perfectly well known to his hearers with which the reader is not familiar.

The present Turkish State under its new Constitution is an extremely democratic republic, which emphatically declines to be influenced by religious considerations. As an easily to be understood, and we may even say inevitable counter-blast to the close connection existing for many centuries between the most absolute monarchy and a religion permeating every sphere of private and public life, the freedom of the citizen and the complete separation of State from Religion have become the battle-cry of the present day. The most liberally conceived Western ideas are accepted with the most jubilant enthusiasm. Western development, civilisation, progress are the aims and substance of the efforts that were made. But the main object of all the anxiety and all the bitter struggle is the nation itself, the people of Turkey.

In the West the national idea has a long and variable history; in the East it is new, and with all the ardour and the exalted flight of imagination of which an unexhausted people are capable of concentrating on a new ideal, it is seized upon and contended for in the leading circles. It is evident that between these two ideals, the civilising and the national, conflicts and dissensions must arise. Extensive adoption of the western or, at all events, foreign advantages of culture on the one hand, and the maintenance of their own native culture on the other, is the main choice that new Turkey has to make.

Historical development never advances by leaps and bounds, but is the consequence of mutually recognised stages. It is the same in regard to Turkey, but here also, through the prolonged resistance of stubborn elements and the moral pressure exerted from without, the effects of which were felt even in the most remote districts, and, finally, through the appearance of a great leader, the last phase of the development occurred with remarkable rapidity.

During the first half of the 19th century efforts to reform the obsolete political system of Turkey could already be observed. At that time it was the Sultan himself, Mahmut II the "Reformer" (1808 — 1839), who, succeeding Sultan Selim III, was amicably inclined towards reform and who made these attempts. Besides the annihilation of the over-powerful and irregular corps of the Janissaries, the proclamation of reform of the year 1839, known as the Gülhane Hattı Şerifi and published after the death of the Sultan, is of historical importance. But unfortunately this attempt at reform remained dormant from its inception. The successors of Mahmut had neither the understanding nor the strength for leadership. At first they had a retarding influence and afterwards were the declared enemies of every kind of development. While the Turkish Empire, which at one time had made Europe tremble, came politically and economically by degrees more dependent upon the Great Powers, these rulers unswervingly upheld the ancient ideas and antiquated institutions and squandered the revenues of the State and allowed its most important means of power to lie idle. A class of educated men who dreamed of restoring the Turkish Empire to its former glory and who were increasingly influenced by liberal Western ideas in the 19th century, became impressed with the new ideas. Under the leadership of Reşit (1802 — 1858) and later of Mitat Paşa (1825 — 1844) they succeeded, after overthrowing the versatile but politically inept Sultan Abdülaziz, in obtaining the grant of a new Constitution to Turkey in 1876. But already in the following year all the hopes attached to this

event were suddenly destroyed. Abdülhamit II, the second successor of Abdülaziz, had overthrown his brother Murat V and under the pressure of the prevailing conditions had granted a new Constitution. Several months later this was again withdrawn. Mitat Paşa was exiled, and for a whole generation the dark cloud of reaction, of which one could scarcely form an idea in the West, lowered upon Turkey. The figure of Abdülhamit and his activity belongs in a measure to our own time, and the secrecy surrounding this undoubtedly important ruler has added to the interest taken in him. In the country his interest was chiefly directed towards the suppression of any modern or independent movement, and every means was welcome for the attainment of this aim. Drastic control of religion, which was connected outwardly with Panislamic endeavours, a system of espionage to an extent never previously experienced — ramifications of which were intended to serve the purpose of spiritual guardianship and supervision hitherto unknown — were among them and, indeed, they fulfilled their purpose for several decades. Banishments and executions — the latter mainly in secret — which the Sultan inflicted upon his adversaries or those whom, in his fanatical and ever-increasing distrust, he considered to be such, were innumerable. But spiritual development could not be arrested, the counter-pressure against that exercised from Istanbul was slowly growing and expanding. In the nineties there arose in Macedonia, especially at Salonika, the "Committee of Union and Progress" in which undoubtedly important moral forces were at work *.

Kemal Paşa, at that time a young officer on the General Staff, also belonged to this movement. The hour of deliverance arrived in 1908. In July open rebellion broke out against Tyranny. The Sultan, notwithstanding his system of spies, was unprepared for this blow and did not immediately grasp the situation. He gave the impression that he surrendered to the inevitable and granted the desired Constitution, and it is significant of the attitude of the Unionists that in the essential points they were satisfied and still allowed the man who was their bitterest enemy to occupy the throne. But scarcely had Abdülhamit imagined that he could throw off the fetters imposed upon him, than he delivered a counter blow (13th April, 1909), repealed the Constitution and proceeded against the followers of the "Committee of Union and Progress." This time, however, the prudent man had

* From the name of the "Committee of Union and Progress", its members and adherents are often referred to in this volume as "Unionists", while they are often described also as the "Young Turks". It must be observed, however, that these two expressions do not mean exactly the same thing, because not all of the "Young Turks" were intimately associated with the "Committee of Union and Progress".

miscalculated the situation. With surprising rapidity the Macedonian troops reappeared before Istanbul, even before the Sultan's auxiliary troops from Anadolu could reach the spot. After a bitter fight, the garrison of Istanbul was defeated. Abdülhamit lost his throne and his liberty, and Mehmet V was proclaimed Sultan in his stead.

The windows of the old Turkish edifice of State were thrown open amidst scenes of wild enthusiasm.

But the building itself remained the same.

Revolutionary as the beginning of the régime of the Young Turks was, they still remained in their character a party seeking development and not revolution.

This is neither the place nor exactly the proper time in which to pronounce final judgment on the "Committee of Union and Progress." Their rule was short; lasting scarcely ten years, it was by no means free from attack within the country and was constantly threatened by violent storms from without. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the declaration of independence by Bulgaria introduced a chain of political catastrophes affecting foreign policy, and from the time of the Turco-Italian war and during the whole of the World War this decade was almost entirely filled with bitter warfare. If the wise diplomacy of Abdülhamit had been able to steer the weak state financially and militarily through the foreign political dangers threatening it on every side, his less able successors were totally unsuccessful and it was impossible in this short and tempestuous period to eliminate the material and psychological results of the past. But in any case it may be admitted that the revolutionary period of 1908 and 1909 exercised a powerful moral influence. Forces were liberated which hitherto had been able only to work in secret and under constant pressure, or else lie dormant. Side by side with powerful leading figures, who in the realization of their power, their energy and their unscrupulousness in the choice of their methods recall the Italian Renaissance, stand representatives with remarkable minds. Perhaps, even the existing inclination for spiritual experimentalisation with different problems and the long time of forced theoretical preparation were not consistent with the practical activity of the party that had come into power. Ideals, such as the Pan-Ottoman or Turanian that dreamed of a union between all the Turkish tribes in Asia, or like the Panislamic that considered it justifiable to claim the unity of all Mohamedans, or the Osmanli that imagined — as happened in old Austria — that the dynasty could be regarded as a firm link connecting all the tribes peopling the wide Ottoman Empire, were

interwoven in such a manner as to produce a policy that lacked the capability of establishing reforms and had no definite aim to inspire it. The edifice of the State in its essential parts still remained in existence and with it the grave evils of cliquism, of spiritual and material corruption, of religious conservatism and of the fatalist tendency of which the Turkish people had been suffering from for a very long time. All the exalted ideals referred to broke down and were shattered by the inexorable demands on real vital strength, which resulted naturally from the war. It proved that the foreign nations, whether they were Balkans or Armenians, Greeks of Asia Minor or Arabs, felt the same as the Ottomans. It was also proved that English money and the power of the Western States triumphed over the sense of unity among the Mohamedans, and Enver Paşa was vanquished and broken in his fight for the Turanian ideal.

One force, however, was at work during the years of liberation and survived the storm, and this was the conception of the Turkish national ideal. The beginning was made to free literature from foreign example both in form and language. The will to achieve something innately their very own gained ground. Noble spirits felt themselves drawn into the task of co-operation in the common aim, and when, in the year 1910, Hamdullah Suphi Bey founded the national organisation known as the "Turkish Hearth" — an educational community aiming at the development of the national conscience — he planted a sapling which has grown into a powerful tree, with ramifications throughout the country. The wars which undermined the existence of the old Empire also shook the hearts of the people. During the World War the Turkish officer and soldier no longer fought for the Padişah alone, as they had formerly done. The appreciation of the value of, and anxiety for the existence of the country had been awakened. A spark still glowed when in the year 1918 all hope seemed to be sheer madness — a spark almost extinct, yet strong enough to brighten into flame when fanned by genius.

At the end of October, 1918, after eight years of uninterrupted struggle, the resistance of Turkey was broken. Bulgaria had laid down her arms, communication with the Central Powers, who themselves had reached the limit of their strength, was cut. In Palestine and Mesopotamia the English drove the completely exhausted Turkish divisions northward in front of them. The end had come. The leaders of the Unionists, with the Grand Vezir Talât Paşa, Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa, surrendered and fled: Ahmet İzzet Paşa personally assumed the difficult task of carrying on the affairs of the State. A commission under Rauf Bey, the Minister of Marine, went

out to the Allied squadron lying in the Dardanelles. On the 30th October, 1918, Rauf and the English Admiral Calthrop signed the armistice at Mudros. Its terms were severe and inexorable. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, as well as the forts commanding them, had to be evacuated and handed over to the Allies, the Army had to be disarmed and all ships surrendered. The Allies reserved to themselves the right to occupy every strategic point in Turkey should their "safety" require it. Turkish railways were to be controlled by officers belonging to the Allies, all the Turkish harbours were to be thrown open to them, all telegraph lines were to be placed under their control. Turkish prisoners of war were to remain in captivity, Turkish troops fighting far from their homes in the Hedjas, Tripoli, etc., were compelled to surrender. The prisoners of war belonging to the Allies confined in Turkey were immediately to be liberated. It was originally stipulated that all the German and Austrian troops in Turkey were to be considered prisoners of war, but the Turkish Government under Ahmet İzzet Paşa categorically refused to agree to this and obtained their freedom. Their loyalty towards their comrades in arms in such a desperate position shows a remarkably noble side of the Turkish character, of which Germany must always feel proud.

Allied and Greek men-of-war cast anchor before Istanbul, and a terrible fate gathered over Turkey. The maps accompanying these volumes clearly show what were the intentions of the Entente and speak for themselves in eloquent language. The stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres (in the summer of 1920), which Mustafa Kemal Paşa analyses at the conclusion of his speech, prove that the Powers who pretended that they were fighting for the freedom and the selfdestination of the nations had no hesitation in practising the most glaring and unrestrained imperialism with regard to Turkey. They intended, beyond doubt, that it should be a peace of annihilation in the strictest sense of the word. By annexation, placing territories under mandate and influence, besides the erection of new vassal states, nothing was to remain of Turkey except a small district in the interior of Anadolu — an island surrounded as it would be by foreign Powers, in which it would scarcely be possible ever to carry on political life or national power.


Detachments of foreign troops occupied important points in the interior of the country. Foreign officers were ranging through it in all directions. When, on the 15th May, 1919, Greek troops landed at Izmir with the consent of the Entente, treated the Turkish population as a subjugated class and prepared for the erection of a new Great Greece, the curtain had, apparently, risen on the last act of the Turkish tragedy.

But this happened to be the hour of the birth of a new Turkey. The decision had already been made, Mustafa Kemal Paşa was already struggling to reach the shores of Asia Minor.

The events during the following years are related in the pages of this work. They unfold a development of world-historical magnitude and importance. We are made aware in an overwhelming manner of the part enacted by a great leader chosen by fate, who keeps his high aim ever before his eyes unflinchingly, regardless of counsel proffered by those who thought they knew better than himself, who advances on his stormy path, who has the faculty of revivifying the flood pulsating from the heart of his nation that as thought to have run dry, and who presses everything and everybody into the service of a great conception. Of what a nation that does not lose courage but is resolved to the bitter end is capable, is shown once more by his example and, simultaneously, we are afforded an insight into the very soul of the Turkish people who — misunderstood by those not intimately acquainted with them — have never learned how to bend their necks under a foreign yoke.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa's mission is not yet fully accomplished. What he publishes herein is the story of the birth of the new Turkey. Freedom from molestation from abroad, freedom within its frontiers to develop on modern lines and on a national foundation — these are her twin guiding stars. Mustafa Kemal Paşa has pointed both of them out to his people. The preservation of this freedom from foreign interference and of this national development are the tasks of the future, and are fraught with dangers enough in every sphere of political activity. We pointed out at the beginning the great problems presented by the new development, the blending of all that was good, efficient and worthy in life, and at the same time consistent with the inherent character of the people, with all that is new but in so many ways essential. The magnitude of this task can perhaps be estimated when we realise that only twenty years ago the system of Abdülhamit, with its enslavement of the spirit and its demoralising system of espionage, was still flourishing.

As yet it is impossible to guess how far Mustafa Kemal Paşa's work will finally be crowned with success. He is still in the prime of manhood. But it is certain even now that Turkey as she has been created by Mustafa Kemal Paşa will for ever stand as a monument of ardent patriotic love, of crowning ability and of a titanic will.



Gentlemen,

I landed at Samsun on the 19th May, 1919. This was the position at that time:

The group of Powers which included the Ottoman Government had been defeated in the Great War. The Ottoman Army had been crushed on every front. An armistice had been signed under severe conditions. The prolongation of the Great War had left the people exhausted and impoverished. Those who had driven the people and the country into the World War had fled and now cared for nothing but their own safety. Vahdettin, the degenerate occupant of the throne and the Caliphate, was seeking for some despicable way to save his person and his throne, the only objects of his anxiety. The Cabinet, of which Damat Ferit Paşa was the head, was weak and lacked dignity and courage. It was subservient to the will of the Sultan alone and agreed to every proposal that could protect its members and their sovereign.

The Army had been deprived of their arms and ammunition, and this state of affairs continued.

The Entente Powers did not consider it necessary to respect the terms of the armistice. On various pretexts, their men-of-war and troops remained at İstanbul. The Vilayet of Adana was occupied by the French; Urfa, Maraş, Antep, by the English. In Antalya and Konya were the Italians, whilst at Merzifon and Samsun were English troops. Foreign officers and officials and their special agents were very active everywhere. At last, on the 15th May, that is to say, four days before the following account of events begins, the Greek Army, with the consent of the Entente Powers, had landed at Izmir.

Christian elements were also at work all over the country, either openly or in secret, trying to realize their own particular ambitions and thereby hasten the breakdown of the State.

Certain information and authentic documents that fell into our hands later on prove that the Greek organisation "Mawrimira" (Document I), established by the patriarchate in İstanbul, was forming bands, organising

meetings and making propaganda in the vilayets. The Greek Red Cross and the official Emigrants Commission supported the work of the "Mawrimira." The formation of Boy Scouts in the Greek schools directed by the "Mawrimira" were reinforced by the admission even of young men over twenty years of age.

The Armenian Patriarch, Zaven Efendi, also worked in connection with the "Mawrimira." The preparations made by the Armenians progressed side by side with those made by the Greeks.

A society called the "Pontus" at Trabzon, Samsun and other places along the whole of the Black Sea coast, having their headquarters in Istanbul, worked openly and successfully. (Document 2.)

On account of the appalling seriousness of the situation which was apparent everywhere, particularly in all the vilayets, certain prominent personalities had begun to develop countermeasures to improve the situation. This resulted in new organisations being started. Thus, for instance, there were unions or societies at Edirne and surrounding districts called "Trakya - Paşaeli". In the east (Document 3), at Erzurum and Elâzığ (Document 4), the "Union of Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces" had been formed, also with their headquarters in Istanbul. Again, in Trabzon there was a society called the "Defence of Rights" and in Istanbul a "League for the Separation of Trabzon and its District." Through the exertions of the members of this league (Document 5 - 6), sub-committees had been established at Of and in the district of Lazistan.

Some of the young patriots at Izmir, who since the 13th May had noticed distinct indications of the approaching occupation of the town, had held meetings about the distressing condition of affairs during the night of the 14th, and in principle had agreed to oppose the occupation by the Greeks, which at that time was considered to be practically an accomplished fact, designed to end in annexation, and resisted it on the principle of "no annexation." During the same night, those of the inhabitants who were able to meet at the Jewish cemetery at Izmir drew up a protest and spread it broadcast. But as the Greek troops actually landed on the following morning this attempt failed to achieve the desired result.

I would like to give you a short account of the object and political aims of these organisations.

I had already had a conversation in Istanbul with some of the leaders of the "Trakya - Paşaeli" Society. They considered that the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire was extremely probable. In face of the threatened

danger of the dismemberment of their country, their first thought was to save Eastern Trakya and later on if possible, to form a Turco-Mohamedan community that would include Western Trakya. The only way by which they thought they could realize this aim was to put their trust in England or, if this was not possible, in France. With this object they tried to get into touch with certain political personalities belonging to foreign countries. It was believed that their intention was to establish a Trakya Republic.

The object of the "Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces Union," on the other hand (Art. 2 of their regulations), was to use all lawful means to ensure the free exercise and development of their religious and political rights for all elements inhabiting these provinces; to defend, if it should become necessary, the historical and national rights of the Mohamedan population of these provinces; to institute an impartial inquiry for the purpose of discovering the motives, the instigators and agitators implicated in the extortions and cruelties committed in the Eastern Provinces, so that the guilty ones might be punished without delay; to do their utmost to remove the misunderstandings that existed between the different elements in the country, and to restore the good relations that had formerly existed between them; and, finally, to appeal to the Government to alleviate as far as it lay in their power the misery resulting from the war.

Acting on these principles that emanated from the Central Committee in Istanbul, the Erzurum Branch decided to undertake, in defence of the rights of the Turks, to inform the civilised world by means of convincing documents that since the deportation the people had been taking no part whatever in the excesses. Further, that the property of Armenians had been protected up to the time when the country was invaded by the Russians. On the other hand, that the Mohamedans had been compelled to suffer from the crudest acts of violence and that some Armenians who had been saved from deportation had, in disobedience of orders, attacked their own protectors. The Branch were doing their very best to resist any attempt to annex the Eastern Provinces. (Proclamation by the Erzurum Branch.)

The members of the Erzurum Branch of the "Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces" resolved, as stated in their printed report, after having studied the propaganda circulated in these provinces as well the Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian questions, from the scientific and historical point of view, to concentrate their further efforts on the following points:

1. On no account to emigrate;
2. Forthwith to form scientific, economic and religious organisations;

3. To unite in the defence of even the smallest part of the Eastern Provinces that might be attacked.

It can be seen that the headquarters of the "Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces" were far too optimistic in their expectation to succeed through civil and scientific means. They continued to exert themselves indefatigably in this direction. For the purpose of defending the rights of Mohamedans dwelling in the Eastern Provinces they published a French journal, which they called "Le Pays." They acquired the right to publish a magazine called "Hadiyat." They also presented memorials to the representatives of the Entente Powers in Istanbul and tried to send a delegation to Europe. (Document 7.)

From the foregoing statements, it appears to me to be clearly evident that the possible cession of the Eastern Provinces to Armenia was the most important reason for this Society having been formed. They anticipated that this possibility might become a reality if those who tried to prove that the Armenians were in the majority in these provinces, claiming the oldest historical rights, were to succeed in misleading the public opinion of the world by alleged scientific and historic documents and by perpetuating the calumny that the Mohamedan population was composed of savages whose chief occupation was to massacre the Armenians. Consequently, the Society aimed at the defence of the national and historic rights by corresponding methods and arguments.

The fear also existed that a Greek Pontic State might be founded on the shores of the Black Sea. At Trabzon several persons had formed another society with the object of protecting the rights of the Mohamedan population, to safeguard their existence and prevent them from falling under the yoke of the Greeks.

Their political aim and programme is already sufficiently obvious from its name: "The Society for the Cession of the Territory of Trabzon," whose head office was in Istanbul. In any case, they set out with the idea of separating this district from the Central Government.

Besides these organisations, which were being formed in the manner I have described, other societies and enterprises began to make their appearance. In the provinces of Diyarbakır (Documents 8 and 9), Bitlis and Elâzığ, among others, there was a "League for the Resuscitation of the Kurds" with its head offices also in Istanbul. Their aim was to erect a Kurdish State under foreign protection.

Work was going on at Konya and the surrounding district for the for-

mation of a league having for its object the revival of Islam — also with its offices in Istanbul. There were organizations named "Unity and Freedom" and "Peace and Salvation" throughout almost the whole of the country.

In Istanbul there were numerous public and secret organizations calling themselves parties or societies and pursuing various aims.

One of the most important of these, the "Society of the Friends of England" is worthy of special mention. It does not follow from its name that its members were necessarily friends of England. In my opinion, the founders of this society were people who thought, before anything else, of their own safety and their own particular interests, and who tried to secure both by inducing Lloyd George's Government to afford them English protection. I wonder whether these misguided persons really imagined for a moment that the English Government had any idea at all of maintaining and preserving the Ottoman State in its integrity?

At the head of this Society were Vahdettin, who bore the title of Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, Damat Ferit Paşa, Ali Kemal, Minister of the Interior, Adil Bey, Mehmet Ali Bey and Sait Molla. Certain English adventurers, for instance a clergyman named Frew, also belonged to this Society. Their correspondence and operation make it clear that clergyman Frew was their chairman.

The Society had a double face and a twofold character. On the one hand, it openly sought the protection of England by methods inspired by civilization. On the other, it worked in secret and showed that its real aim was to incite the people to revolt by forming organisations in the interior, to paralyse the national conscience and encourage foreign countries to interfere. These were the treacherous designs underlying the work of the secret section of the Society. We shall see later how Sait Molla played just as active a part, or even a still more important one, in this secret work as in the public enterprises of the Society. What I have just said about this Society will become much clearer to you when I enter into further particulars later on and lay before you certain documents which will astonish you.

Certain prominent personalities — amongst them some women — in Istanbul were convinced that the real salvation of the country lay in securing an American protectorate over it. They stubbornly persisted in this idea and tried to prove that acceptance of their point of view was the only thing possible. About this I shall also have a great deal more to say at the proper time.

So that you may clearly appreciate the general situation, I would like to point out exactly where and in what condition the military units were at the time of which I am speaking. Two Army Inspections had been established on principle in Anatolia. Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice the regular soldiers at the front were disbanded. Deprived of their arms and ammunition, the Army consisted only of units having no fighting value.

The distribution of the troops under the second Army Inspection, with its headquarters at Konya, was as follows: The XIIth Army Corps, with its Staff at Konya, consisted of one division — the 41st — at Konya; and another — the 23rd — at Afyonkarahisar. To this Army Corps was attached the 57th Division, stationed at Denizli, belonging to the XVIIth Army Corps, which had been captured at Izmir.

The XXth Corps and its Staff was stationed at Ankara — one of its divisions, the 24th, in Ankara itself and the other, the 11th, at Niğde.

The 1st Division stationed at Izmit, was attached to the XXVth Army Corps, which also included the 10th Caucasian Division.

The 61st and 56th Divisions were quartered in the district of Balıkesir and Bursa and formed the XIVth Army Corps, with headquarters at Bandırma and directly under the command of İstanbul. The late Yusuf İzzet Paşa commanded this Army Corps until the National Assembly was opened.

I was myself at the head of the third Inspection when I landed with my Staff at Samsun. I was to have had two Army Corps under my personal command. One of them, the IIIrd, had its base at Sivas and was commanded by Colonel Refet Bey, who came with me to Samsun.

One division of this Corps, the 5th Caucasian, was at Amasya; the other, the 15th, was at Samsun. The second Army Corps under my command was the XVth, stationed at Erzurum and commanded by Kâzım Karabekir Paşa. One of his division, the 9th, commanded by Ruhi Bey, was in garrison at Erzurum; the other, under the command of Lt. Colonel Halil Bey, was at Trabzon. After Halil Bey had been called to İstanbul, he abandoned his command and hid himself at Bayburt. Another man took command temporarily of the division. One of the two remaining divisions of the Army Corps, the 12th, was near Hasankale, on the eastern frontier, and the 11th was at Bayazit.

The XIIth Army Corps consisted of two divisions stationed in the district of Diyarbakır and was independent, as it was directly under İstanbul. One of its divisions, the 2nd, was at Siirt, while the other, the 5th, was at Mardin.

These two Army Corps were directly under my command and I was also authorized to give orders to other troops lying within the district of my Inspection, in all the vilayets comprised within it and in the neighbouring provinces.

In virtue of the authority vested in me, I had the right to enter into communication and correspondence with the XXth Army Corps at Ankara, with its superior Army Inspection, as well as with the Army Corps at Diyarbakır and the heads of the Civil Administration in nearly the whole of Anadolu.

You might, perhaps, be inclined to ask why those who sent me to Anadolu with the idea of banishing me from İstanbul entrusted me with such wide powers. The answer is, that they did not know themselves what they were doing. They invented the pretext that it was necessary for me to go to Samsun to report on the spot on the unsettled condition of the district and to take the necessary measures to deal with it. I had pointed out that in order to do his I should be given special authority and special powers. There did not seem to be any objection to this. I discussed the question with men who were on the General Staff at that time and who to a certain extent guessed my intentions. These were the persons who conceived the idea of my taking up the position, and I dictated the order giving me full powers. Apparently Şakir Paşa, the Minister of War, after reading them, hesitated to sign them and his seal that was attached to the document was scarcely recognizable.

*
* * *

Let us return to a closer examination of the facts, so that we may rapidly review them as a whole.

Morally and materially, the enemy Powers were openly attacking the Ottoman Empire and the country itself. They were determined to disintegrate and annihilate both. The Padişah-Caliph had one sole anxiety — namely, to save his own life and comfort. The members of the government had the same feeling. Without being aware of it, the nation had no longer any one to lead it, but lived in darkness and uncertainty, waiting to see what would happen. Those who began to understand clearly the terrors and extent of the catastrophe were seeking some means whereby to save the country, each guided by the circumstances that surrounded him and the sentiments that inspired him. The Army existed merely in name. The commanders and other officers were still suffering from the exhaustion resulting from the war. Their hearts were bleeding on account of the threatened dismemberment of

their country. Standing on the brink of the dark abyss which yawned before their eyes, they racked their brains to discover a way out of the danger.

Here I must add and explain a very important point. The Nation and the Army had no suspicion at all of the Padişah-Caliph's treachery. On the contrary, on account of religious and traditional ties handed down for centuries, they remained loyal to the throne and its occupant. Seeking for means of salvation under the influence of this tradition, the security of the Caliphate and the Sultanate concerned them far more than their own safety. That the country could possibly be saved without a Caliph and without a Padişah was an idea too impossible for them to comprehend. And woe to those who ventured to think otherwise! They would immediately have been looked down upon as men without faith and without patriotism and as such would have been scorned.

I must mention another point here. In seeking ways to save the situation it was considered to be specially important to avoid irritating the Great Powers — England, France and Italy. The idea that it was impossible to fight even one of these Powers had taken root in the mind of nearly everybody. Consequently, to think of doing so and thus bring on another war after the Ottoman Empire, all-powerful Germany and Austria-Hungary together had been defeated and crushed would have been looked upon as sheer madness.

Not only the mass of the people thought in this strain, but those also who must be regarded as their chosen leaders shared the same opinion. Therefore, in seeking a way out of the difficulty, two questions had to be eliminated from discussion. First of all, no hostility was to be shown towards the Entente Powers; secondly, the most important thing of all was to remain, heart and soul, loyal to the Padişah-Caliph.

Now, Gentlemen, I will ask you what decision could have been arrived at under such circumstances for salvation.

As I have already explained, there were three propositions that had been put forward:

1. To demand protection from England;
2. To accept the United States of America as a mandatory Power.

The originators of these two proposals had as their aim the preservation of the Ottoman Empire in its complete integrity and preferred to place it as a whole under the protection of a single Power, rather than allow it to be divided among several States.

3. The third proposal was to deliver the country by allowing each

district to act in its own way and according to its own capability. Thus, for instance, certain districts, in opposition to the theory of separation, endeavoured to remain an integral part of the Empire. Others holding a different opinion already appeared to regard the dismemberment of the Empire as an accomplished fact and sought only their own safety.

My above explanations are inclusive of the leading motives of these three kinds of propositions.

I did not think any of these three proposals could be accepted as sagacious, because the arguments and considerations on which they were based were groundless. In reality, the foundations of the Ottoman Empire were themselves shattered at that time. Its existence was threatened with extermination. All the Ottoman districts were practically dismembered. Only the father land, affording protection to a mere handful of Turks, still remained, and it was now suggested also to divide this. Such expressions as: the Ottoman Empire, Independence, Padişah-Caliph, Government — all of them were mere meaningless words.

Whose existence was it essential to save? And with whose help? And how?

Therefore, what could be a serious and correct resolution?

In these circumstances, one resolution alone was possible, namely, to create a New Turkish State, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognised.

This was the resolution we adopted before we left Istanbul and which we began to put into execution immediately after we set foot on Anadolu soil at Samsun.



These were the most logical and most powerful arguments in support of this resolution:

The main point was that the Turkish nation should live in honour and dignity. Such a condition could only be attained by complete independence. No matter how wealthy and prosperous a nation is, if it is deprived of its independence it no longer deserves to be regarded otherwise than as a slave in the eyes of civilised world.

To accept the protectotare of a foreign Power is to admit lack of all human qualities, weakness and incapacity. Indeed, it is impossible to envisage people who have not been humiliated willingly accept a foreign master.

But the Turk is both dignified and proud; he is also capable and talented. Such a nation would prefer to perish rather than subject itself to the life of a slave.

Therefore, Independence or Death!

This was the rallying cry of all those who honestly desired to save their country.

Let us suppose for a moment that in trying to accomplish this we had failed. What would have been the result? — Why slavery!

In that case, would not the consequence have been the same if we had submitted to the other proposals? Undoubtedly, it would; but with this difference, that a nation that defies death in its struggle for independence drives comfort from the thought that it had resolved to make every sacrifice compatible with human dignity. There is no doubt whatever that in the eyes of both friend and foe throughout the world its position is more respected than would be that of a craven and degraded nation capable of surrendering itself to the yoke of slavery.

Moreover, to labour for the maintenance of the Ottoman dynasty and its sovereign would have been to inflict the greatest harm upon the Turkish nation; for, if its independence could have been secured at the price of every possible sacrifice, it could not have been regarded as secure so long as the Sultanate existed. How could it be deemed permissible that a crowd of madmen, united by neither a moral nor a spiritual bond to the country or the nation as a whole, could still be trusted to protect the independence and the dignity of the nation and the State?

As for the Caliphate, it could only have been a laughing-stock in the eyes of the civilised world, enjoying the blessings of science.

As you see, in order to carry out our resolution, questions had to be dealt with about which the nation had hitherto known practically nothing. It was imperative that questions which were considered dangerous to discuss publicly be discussed openly.

We were compelled to rebel against the Ottoman Government, against the Padişah, against the Caliph of all the Mohamedans, and we had to bring the whole nation and the army into a state of rebellion.

It was essential that the entire nation take up arms against whoever would venture to attack the father-land of Turks and Turkish independence. It would undoubtedly have been of little advantage if we had made clear to the public at the very beginning all the implications of a resolution of such

far-reaching importance. On the contrary, it was necessary to proceed by stages, utilizing all opportunities to prepare the feeling and the spirit of the nation and to try to reach our aim by degrees. This is actually what happened. If our attitude and our actions during nine years are examined in their logical sequence, however, it becomes evident that our general behaviour has never deviated from the lines laid down in our original resolution, nor from the purpose we had set out to achieve.

In order to dispel any doubts which might be entertained, one fact is urged upon us for mutual examination. As the national struggle; carried on for the sole purpose of delivering the country from foreign invasion, developed and was crowned with success, it was natural and inevitable that it would gradually, step by step to the present day, have established all the principles and forms essential in government founded on national sovereignty. The sovereign of the dynasty who, thanks to his traditional instincts, foresaw this fatal course of historical events, declared himself from the very beginning the most embittered enemy of the national struggle. I, also from the first anticipated this historical progress. But I did not disclose all of my views although I have maintained them all the time. If I had spoken too much about future prospects our realistic endeavours would have been looked upon as dreams; and consequently from the outset it would have caused the alienation of those who — discouraged by the closeness of dangers that threatened from without — were fearful of possible changes which would be contrary to their tradition, their way of thinking and their psychology. The only practical and safe road to success lay in dealing with each problem at the right time. This was the way to ensure the development and restoration of the nation. This was how I acted. This practical and safe way to success, however, caused certain differences of opinion between me and some individuals reputed to be my most intimate co-workers sometimes in regard to principles, at other times as to the method and the execution of our programme and it even caused friction between us that led to discouragement, and dissension. Some of my companions who had entered into the national fight with me went over to the opposition, according as the limitation of their own mental appreciation led them and their moral courage succumbed in the effort to develop national life, to proclaim the Republic and enact its laws. So that you may be informed, so that the public opinion be enlightened. I shall refer to these cases individually as I proceed with my statement.

To summarize what I have been saying, I may add that it was incumbent upon me to develop our entire social organisation, step by step, until it corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in the soul

and future of the nation and which I kept to myself in my own consciousness as a national secret.

*
* *

My first object now, Gentlemen, was to get into touch with the whole of the Army.

In a telegram in cipher, on the 21st May, 1919, I told the commander of XVth Army Corps at Erzurum that I was greatly distressed at the seriousness of our general situation; that I had accepted my present position in the certainty that it would be possible to fulfil our highest duty towards the nation and the country if we worked together with all our strength; that although I had wanted to go to Erzurum before this, I was obliged to remain for a few days longer at Samsun, because serious events were threatening the position there, which was very uncertain. I further asked him, if he thought it necessary, to keep me well informed about anything I ought to know. (Document 10.)

In fact, the position had been made considerably worse by attacks that had been made by Greek bands against the Mohamedans at Samsun and its surroundings, as well as many difficulties that had been placed in the way of the local government by foreign interference, the former being incapable of rendering any resistance.

Whilst I was undertaking steps to secure the appointment of a person well known to us and from whom we expected a great deal as Mutasarrif of Samsun, I provisionally appointed the commander of the XIIIth Army Corps Governor of Canik. Besides this, we took all steps that were possible on the spot itself: that is to say, we enlightened the population as to the real state of affairs and told them that they need not be alarmed about foreign bodies of troops or their officers being among them, and to do nothing to resist them. The formation of national organizations was immediately undertaken in this district.

On the 23rd May, 1919, I informed the commander of the XXth Army Corps at Ankara that I had arrived at Samsun and would keep in close touch with him. I requested him to inform me about everything he could ascertain concerning the district of Izmir.

Before I had left Istanbul I had turned my attention to the position of this Army Corps. It had been suggested that it should be transported by rail from the south to the district of Ankara, but being well aware of the resistance attending this, I asked Cevat Paşa, the Chief of the General Staff,

during the days preceding my departure from Istanbul to lead the Army Corps to Ankara on foot, in case the transport by rail would involve any delay. For this purpose, I inquired in the telegram in cipher I have already mentioned, whether all the units belonging to the XXth Army Corps would succeed in reaching Ankara. After having added certain information about the district of Canik, I announced that in a few days I would be going with my Staff from Samsun to Havza for some time and that I hoped, in any case, to receive the required information before my departure.

In his reply, which arrived three days later, on the 26th May, the commander of the XXth Army Corps reported that he had not received any regular communication from Izmir; that the occupation of Manisa had been reported by telegraph office employees, that the detachments belonging to the Army Corps stationed at Ereğli had already left on foot as it was impossible to transport them by rail, but that, because of the great distance they had to march, it was uncertain when they would arrive. In the same telegram the commander of the Corps remarked that the actual strength of the 23rd Division at Afyonkarahisar was low and that for this reason all the men that could be mustered had been ordered to join this division. He added that news had recently been received about local unrest in the districts of Kastamonu and Kayseri, and that he would keep me well informed. (Document 11.)

In a despatch dated the 27th May, 1919, from Havza, I ordered the commander of the XXth Army Corps and the Army Inspection at Konya, under whose command this Corps was, to inform me from what sources the reinforcements destined for the division at Afyonkarahisar were being drawn; whether there was any practical possibility of reinforcing them and what in the present circumstances their duty would be. (Documents 12 — 13.)

On the 28th May the commander of the Corps gave me the information I had been awaiting: "In case of any attempt at occupation by the enemy, the 23rd Division will not surrender its position, but if it is attacked it will defend it, recruiting reinforcements from among the inhabitants." (Document 14.)

On the 30th May the Inspector of the Army replied: "While maintaining order and security at Karahisar at the same time, the 23rd Division will resist any attempt at occupation with all the means at their disposition." He reported that he was making all preparations and that he was trying to collect reinforcements at Konya, but that it had no name or title.

In my telegram to the Army Inspector, I had said: "Rumours are in circulation about the raising of an army at Konya which is called the 'Patriotic'

Army'. What is its composition and how is it organised?" I asked this question, because I wanted to encourage it and hasten it on. I received the reply I have already mentioned in response to this question. (Document 15.)

The commander of the Corps had replied to the same question, saying that he knew nothing about the formation of a "Patriotic Army" at Konya.

On the 1st June I informed the commanders of the XVth Army Corps at Erzurum, of the IIIrd at Samsun and of the XIIIth at Diyarbakır of the intelligence that had reached me through my communication with the XXth Army Corps and the Inspection at Konya, as far as it concerned them. (Document 16.)

I had received no information about the troops in Trakya or their commander and had, therefore, I applied to Cevat Paşa, Chief of the General Staff in Istanbul, in a telegram in cipher on the 16th June, 1919, (I had arranged a private cipher personally with Cevat Paşa before I left), asking him to tell me who was in command of the Army Corps at Edirne and where Cafer Tayyar Bey was. (Document 17.) On the 17th June, Cevat Paşa replied: "I have been informed that Cafer Tayyar is at Edirne in command of the 1st Army Corps." (Document 18.)

The report I sent in cipher on the 18th June, 1919, to Cafer Tayyar Bey, commanding the 1st Army Corps at Edirne, mainly contained the following:

"You are aware of the actions the Entente Powers, which strangle our national independence and the way for the disintegration of our country; you have also heard of the servile and apathetic attitude of the Government.

"To confide the fate of the nation to the hands of a Government of this type means to abandon it to ruin.

"It has been decided to set up an energetic assembly at Sivas — which is a safe place — for the purpose of bringing together the national organisation of Trakya and Anadolu, so that they can boldly proclaim the voice of the nation before the whole world.

"The League of Trakya-Pasaeli may have a representative corporation in Istanbul, but they are not provided with full powers.

"When I was in Istanbul I spoke to several members of the Trakya League. Now is the time for us to begin. After you have spoken in confidence to these people you will immediately begin to form the necessary organisations. Send one or two competent men to me as delegates. Before they arrive send me a telegram in cipher, signed by yourself, giving me authority to uphold the rights of the Vilayet of Edirne.

"I have sworn by everything I hold sacred that I shall work loyally and devotedly with the nation until we have gained our complete independence. I have firmly resolved not to leave Anadolu." In order to raise the sprits of the inhabitants of Trakya, I added the following:

"From one end to the other of Anadolu the population is united. All decisions are taken jointly by all the commanders and our comrades. Nearly all the Valis and Mutasarrifs are on our side. The national organisation in Anadolu comprises every district and community. The propaganda aiming at the erection of an independent Kurdistan under English protectorate has been successfully countered and the followers of this movement have been dispersed. The Kurds have joined the Turks." (Document 19.)

*

* *

I had been informed meanwhile that the districts of Manisa and Aydin had been occupied by the Greek army; but I could not obtain any further particulars about the troops that I understood were at Izmir and Aydin. I had sent orders directly to their commanders. At last, on the 29th June, I received a telegram in cipher, dated the 27th, from Bekir Sami Bey, commanding the 56th Division.

According to this telegram a certain Hüurrem Bey had previously commanded the 56th Division at Izmir. He and nearly all the surviving officers of the two regiments at Izmir had been taken prisoners. The Greeks had sent them to Mudanya by sea. Bekir Sami Bey had been sent to take over the command of what remained of these troops. In his telegram of the 27th June, 1919, Bekir Sami Bey reported that he had received both of my orders of the 22nd on his arrival at Bursa. Among other things, he said: "As I am unable to obtain the necessary means for the realization of the national aims and as I consider that I could render better service by reorganising my division, I thought it better to leave Kula for Bursa on the morning of the 21st June. In spite of many obstacles, however, I have still been able to spread the idea everywhere that our national movement is absolutely necessary if we are to save the country." He added that he had full confidence in my intentions and mode of procedure and that he had energetically set to work at once. He asked me, to send further orders to the 57th Division at Çine, as well as to himself. (Document 20.)

*

* *

After I had stayed for a week at Samsun, and from the 25th May to the 12th June at Hayza, I went to Amasya. While I was there I sent pressing circulars to all the commanding officers and higher civil officials, urging them to proceed with the formation of national organizations throughout country.

I must observe that the people had not been fully informed about the occupation of Izmir and, later, of Manisa and Aydin. Neither had they been made aware of the severity and ill-treatment that was being inflicted, consequently there had been no public manifestation of indignation and protest against the dastardly blow that had been aimed at their national independence. Their silence and apathy in face of this unjust conspiracy could only be explained in a very unfavourable light for the nation. The chief thing, therefore, was to arouse them and force them to take action.

For this purpose, on the 28th May, 1919, I gave these instructions to the Valis, the independent Governors, the leaders of the XVth Army Corps at Erzurum, the XXth Ankara, the XIIIth at Diyarbakir and the Army Inspection at Konya:

"The occupation of Izmir and the unfortunate occupation of Manisa and Aydin that followed distinctly prove more than anything else could do how imminent the danger is. More continuity and more power must be given to the national manifestation for the preservation of the integrity of our territory. Such events as occupation and annexation touch the very life and independence of the country, whose entire nation is deeply agitated by these shameful attacks. It is impossible to suppress this rebellion. Next week, from Monday to Wednesday, if circumstances will allow, you will raise the people to hold great and imposing meetings, appealing to justice and demanding the intervention of all the civilised nations and the Great Powers to put an end to this intolerable state of affairs. These manifestations must extend over the whole of the district under you. Energetic and impressive telegrams must be sent to the representatives of the Great Powers and the Sublime Porte. It is important to influence the foreigners, where there are any, by strictly maintaining dignity and order while the manifestations are being held and avoiding any molestation of, or hostile demonstrations against the Christian population. Thanks to the fortunate fact that your own conviction supports these ideas, I feel certain that you will carry this matter to a successful conclusion. Please let me know the result of your efforts."

In obedience to these instructions, meetings were immediately organised in every direction. A few localities only had any hesitation, because they

were troubled with vague fears. For instance, this was notably the case at Trabzon, as could be seen from a telegram in cipher, dated the 9th June, from the officer commanding the XVth Army Corps, which said that although it had been decided that a meeting should be held, it could not take place, because they wanted to avoid any unpleasantness with the Greek elements and obviate incidents that might take place without any cause... and that Strati Polides had been a member of the organising committee.

Trabzon was a very important place on the Black Sea, and it showed weakness to hesitate in such a town and allow Strati Polides Efendi to take part in any meeting that had to do with national manifestations against the Greeks. This attitude indicated that the work was not being taken seriously, and it might have been accepted in Istanbul as a favourable sign and argument that supported our enemies. Also there were some people clever enough to turn my orders against ourselves. Thus, the new Governor of Sinop led all the manifestations in that town himself, drew up the resolutions that were to be put to the meetings himself, pretended to have induced the population to sign them, and even sent us a copy of them. In this lengthy document, which the poor population were urged to sign in the midst of all the turmoil that surrounded them, the following lines were concealed:

"If the Turks have not made any progress, if they could never have been able to adapt themselves to the principle of European civilisation, the reason is that hitherto they have never been under good administration. The Turkish nation can only exist under a Government that is organised under the supervision and control of Europe — naturally, with the provision that it remains under the sovereignty of its Padişah."

When I glanced at the signatures under this memorandum that was handed over to the representative of the Entente Powers on the 3rd June, 1919, in the name of the population of Sinop, the one that I immediately noticed following that of the provisional Müftü showed me the spirit that had inspired and dictated these lines. The signature was that of the Vice-President of the party known as "Unity and Freedom."

Exactly three days after I had ordered these meetings to be organized everywhere — that is to say, on the 31st May 1919, — I received this telegram from the War Ministry:

"I send you herewith a copy of the Note addressed by the English Commissioner to the Sublime Porte and the War Ministry.

"Although according to the last reports there is nothing of special importance to be noted, except the customary robberies in the district of the

IIIrd Army Corps, you will order a special inquiry to be made as to the facts referred to in the recent Note and report the result of your inquiry as soon as possible."

Sevket
Minister of War

Copy.

1. I have to bring to the knowledge of your Highness that I have recently received somewhat disquieting information regarding the situation at Sivas as well as the safety of the Armenian refugees, who are concentrating in the town and its vicinity.

2. I have therefore to request your Highness to give orders to the War Minister to send an urgent telegram to the officer in command, instructing him to do everything that is possible to protect the Armenians dwelling in the district under his command, and, further, to inform him that, in case of massacres or excesses occurring there he will be held personally responsible for them.

3. I specially request that orders to the same effect shall be sent to the civil officials.

4. Knowing how much your Highness is justly concerned about the insecurity prevailing in the interior of the country, I feel convinced that you will immediately do what is necessary.

5. I shall feel greatly obliged to you if you will inform me when these orders have been sent out.

A telegram received from the Vilayet of Sivas on the 2nd June stated that another had been received on the same day, signed by Colonel Demange of which this is an extract:

"On account of the occupation of Izmir, the lives of the Christians at Aziziye are in danger. This cannot be tolerated any longer. In virtue of the authority conferred on me, I draw your attention to the fact that such occurrences will probably lead to the occupation of your province by the troops of the Allies..."

In reality, nothing whatever in the shape of unrest had taken place at Sivas, and it is natural, therefore, that the lives of the Christians had not been endangered. The fact is, that the Christian elements, influenced by the meetings which the people had begun to organise and which they regarded as damaging to their own interests, intentionally spread these rumours abroad

for the purpose of attracting the attention of foreign countries. (Documents 22 — 24.)

I give you the answer that I sent to the War Minister in reply to their telegram, together with the exact wording of the Note.

Intelligence

Extremely urgent. No. 58.

June 3rd, 1919.

To the Imperial Minister of War.

Reply to your telegram in cipher of June 2nd, 1919.

No incident has occurred which could in any way be calculated to disturb the Armenians at Sivas and its vicinity; the refugees arrived there later. Neither at Sivas nor in its neighbourhood is there any cause whatever for uneasiness. All of the inhabitants carry on their business as usual. I am able emphatically to confirm this. For this reason, I must request to be informed what is the source from which the English have obtained the information referred to in their Note. It is quite possible that some people have been alarmed about the meetings that have been held by the Mohamedan population, following the news of the distressing occupation of Izmir and Manisa. These meetings, however, have not caused any ill-feeling at all against the Christian elements. There is no reason to be anxious about the non-Moslem elements, so long as the Entente Powers respect the rights and independence of our nation and so long as the integrity of our country is guaranteed. I beg you, therefore, to be assured that I willingly accept all responsibility in regard to this matter, and believe that you are justified in putting full confidence in me. But, as far as I can see, neither I nor anyone else can possibly suppress the revulsion and indignation that is felt by the nation in face of the threats and attacks represented by the territorial occupation and the various assaults that are delivered against its independence and its very existence. Nor are there any means of prohibiting the natural national manifestations that are the direct consequence of these events. I cannot imagine that there is a single military commander or civil official or any government that could accept responsibility for any events that could arise under such conditions.

Mustafa Kemal

A copy of this Note and my reply to it were communicated in a circular to all the military commanders, the Valis and Mutasarrifs. You are already made aware of a telegram of this date, signed by Sait Molla, which was sent to all the civil heads and in which the nation was invited to join the Society of

the "Friends of England," appealing for the help of Great Britain. You also know of the steps I took with regard to the Government, as well as my efforts to minimize the effect of this telegram (Document 25) by enlightening the people as to the real state of affairs. Among other particulars, the Turkish-Havas-Reuter Agency had published news about a Privy Council to the effect that the ruling opinion at the full sitting of the Privy Council in question was that Turkey must seek the protection of one or other of the Great Powers. Whereupon the Grand Vezir wrote to me saying, "that the nation is determined to preserve its independence; that it is willing to submit to the greatest sacrifices in order to resist fatal possibilities, and that to circulate erroneous ideas about the national conscience is calculated to provoke disquieting countermanifestations." I think I have told you already how I brought this fact to the knowledge of the whole nation.

With regard to the request of Ferit Paşa, the Grand Vezir, that I should go to Paris, I have already given some account of this at the first sitting of the Grand Assembly. In order to explain my own point of view and my procedure in this matter I must read this document to you:

Telegram in cipher. Urgent. Personal.

Havza, 3rd June, 1919.

To Refet Beyefendi, commanding the IIIrd Army Corps at Samsun, His Excellency Kâzım Paşa, commanding the XVth Army Corps at Erzurum, Hamit Beyefendi, Mu-tasarrif of Canik, Münir Beyefendi, Vali of Erzurum, Hakim Hasbi Efendi, Commissioner Vali of Sivas, İbrahim Beyefendi, Vali of Kastamonu, His Excellency Ali Fuat Paşa, commanding the XXth Army Corps at Ankara, His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Inspector of the "Yıldırım" Corps at Konya, Cevdet Beyefendi, temporary commander of the XIIIth Army Corps at Diyarbakır, Haydar Beyefendi, Vali of Van.

From the public communiqué from the Ministry of the Interior and from reports published by the Agency, it is understood that M. Deference, the diplomatic representative of France, called on the Grand Vezir and advised him to go to Paris with the object of defending Ottoman rights at the Conference. The national anxiety demonstrated by the incident at Izmir and the determination expressed by the nation to defend its independence are facts deserving unstinted praise and admiration. Nevertheless, the Greeks were not prevented from occupying Izmir. In any case, there is no doubt at all that the Entente Powers will respect our nation and its rights, for in

future we shall show them that the nation is conscious of these rights and is ready to act as one man in their defence, rather than allow themselves to be trodden underfoot.

His Highness the Grand Vezir will undoubtedly do everything he possibly can to uphold Ottoman interests at the Conference. Among these national interests that are to be defended in the most energetic manner, there are two of vital importance: 1. Complete independence in every possible way of the State and the Nation; and, 2. The majority in the purely national districts of the country shall not be sacrificed in favour of the minority. It is imperatively necessary that there be complete agreement on these points in the minds of the delegates who are preparing to go to Paris, as well as in respect to the formal demands advanced by the national conscience. If this should not be so, the nation might find itself in a very difficult position and, judging from past experience, it might never be able to hold up its head again. The reasons that justify these fears are these:

From the accounts that have reached us, His Highness the Grand Vezir has affirmed that he has accepted the principle of Armenian autonomy, but he has not defined what the frontiers of this Armenia will be. The population of the Eastern Provinces, astounded at this, have felt themselves bound to demand an explanation. Nearly the whole of the Crown Council have insisted on the maintenance of national independence and have demanded that the fate of the nation shall be entrusted to a National Council. Sadik Bey, the leader of the "Unity and Freedom" Society, supported by the Government, was the only one who proposed in a written statement an English Protectorate. From this it can be seen that the national will and the conception of the Government on the questions of a wide autonomy being granted to Armenia and the acceptance of a foreign protectorate are not in accord with one another. We cannot help feeling seriously uneasy about these questions so long as the principles and the programme by which the Grand Vezir and the delegation accompanying him permit themselves to be guided are not laid openly before the nation. In these circumstances, it is necessary that the delegates of the Unions for the Defence of the National Rights and the Anti-annexation Unions in the Vilayets, their branches, and the representatives of those communities where the national organisation has not yet been completed, appeal to the Grand Vezir, and directly to the Sultan himself, insisting upon the conditions that are vital to the nation — that is to say, the preservation of complete independence and recognition of the rights of the national majority — and demanding that the principles of defence on which the delegation now ready to start will lean for support.

be brought officially to the knowledge of the country. By this, the Entente Powers will see clearly what the principles are which the delegates will endeavour to defend and which actually correspond to the wishes and claims put forward by the nation. It is natural that, as a result of this, they will be treated with more serious consideration and that the work of the delegation will be facilitated. In the highest interests of the nation, I appeal earnestly to your patriotism, and beg you to bring these facts to the knowledge of all those concerned. I beg you, also, to inform me when you receive this telegram.

Mustafa Kemal

I have already had the opportunity of explaining to you that on the 8th June 1919, — five days after this telegram was sent — I was ordered by the Minister of War to come to Istanbul, and that in reply to my confidential request I was informed by a high personage all about those who wanted me to be summoned and why the order was sent to me. This personage was no other than Cevat Paşa, who at that time was the Chief of the General Staff. Part of the correspondence that followed is generally known. My correspondence with the Minister of War and direct with the Palace continued until the day of my resignation at Erzurum.

A month had gone by since I had set foot on Anadolu soil. During this period permanent communication with the divisions of all the Army Corps had been kept up; the nation, informed as far as possible about current events, had been aroused; the idea of national organisation was growing. After this it was no longer possible for me to control the whole movement in my position as a military commander. Now there could no longer be any doubt about my having joined the Revolutionary Party. I continued to lead the national movement and the national organizations, but, nevertheless, I refused to obey the order of my recall. Besides, it was not difficult to guess that the measures and procedure which I was determined to carry through would be of a radical and decisive nature. Consequently, these measures and actions had to lose their individual character and be conducted in the name of a corporation or body that represented the unity and singleness of the whole nation.

The moment had come to carry out the programme I had laid down in Trakya on the 18th June, 1919. As you will remember, this was to form a general assembly at Sivas, in which the national organisations of Anadolu and Rumeli were combined, so that they could be represented as a single body and be controlled from one centre. The main points in the circular

note which I dictated at Amasya with this end in view to Cevat Abbas Bey, my A. D. C., during the night of the 21st June, were these:

1. The integrity of the country, the independence of the nation is in imminent jeopardy.
2. The Government is unequal to the task for which it has assumed responsibility; the consequence being that our nation is not considered at all.
3. The energy and the will of the nation alone can save its independence.
4. It is absolutely necessary that a National Assembly shall be formed to protect the country from foreign influence and be independent of all control, so that it will be free to examine the position of the nation and assert its rights before the whole world.
5. It has been decided to convene a national congress forthwith at Sivas, which from every point of view is the safest place in Anadolu for that purpose.
6. Every liva in all the vilayets must therefore immediately send three delegates each who possess the confidence of the nation, and they must start without delay, so that they may arrive as soon as possible.
7. To avoid any danger, this must be kept a national secret and the delegates must travel incognito through all the districts, if it should be considered necessary to do so.
8. On the 10th July a congress of the Eastern Provinces will meet at Erzurum. If the delegates of the other provinces can reach Sivas in time the members of the congress at Erzurum will also start for Sivas in order that they may be present at the general meeting. (Document 26.)

What I dictated had, as you see, the purpose of spreading throughout the whole of Anadolu the decision I had already taken and communicated four days previously to the organisation in Trakya. You will, I hope, readily admit that this decision was no new terrible and secret resolution taken in the dark in the night of the 21st June.

I would like to say a few words about this for your information.

These sheets of paper comprise merely a draft. (The speaker here showed the document to those present.) It comprises four articles. I have already indicated their contents. It bears my signature at the bottom, and following it those of Colonel Kâzım Bey (now Kâzım Paşa, Vali of İzmir),

who was my Chief of Staff, Hüsrev Hüsri Bey (now holding the rank of an ambassador), who was also on my staff and who directed the transport of troops, Muzaffer Bey my A. D. C., director of communications in cipher with the military authorities, and, finally, a civil official who was in charge of the communications in cipher with the administrative authorities. Beneath these there are other signatures.

All of those at the bottom of this draft were obtained through a happy chance.

While I was still at Havza, I received a telegram in cipher from Ali Fuat Paşa commanding the XXth Army Corps at Ankara. It ran: "A certain person whom you know has arrived here with some of his comrades. What shall I tell them to do?" This enigmatic telegram set me thinking very deeply. I knew the person in question: he asked me for instructions. He was at Ankara with a reliable commanding officer who was a comrade of mine, and the telegram was in cipher! Why, therefore, did he hesitate to mention his name in cipher? I thought over this for a long time and then fancied I had solved the riddle. You will admit that it was not a particularly good time for guessing conundrums. But I was very anxious to see Fuat Paşa, because I wanted to talk to him about his official district, his surroundings and his views. Therefore the enigmatic telegram inspired me with the idea of sending him this request: "Come here immediately for a few days. Make your arrangements in such a way that your departure from Ankara will not attract attention. Disguise yourself and change your name. Bring your friends from Istanbul with you."

Fuat Paşa actually came to Havza, as I have already told you, but for pressing reasons I had to leave Havza immediately and go to Amasya. On his way to Havza, Fuat Paşa heard of this and altered his journey in the direction of Amasya. Thus he met me there on the evening of the 21st. The person whose name he had refrained from mentioning in the telegram in cipher was Rauf Bey.

Rauf Bey came to me just as I was getting into my motor-car when I left Istanbul. He had heard from a confidential source that the ship in which I was going would be followed and that it was very likely that she would be sunk in the Black Sea, if I could not have been detained in Istanbul. This is what he came to tell me. I preferred to risk being drowned rather than being made prisoner in Istanbul. So I started off, telling him that if sooner or later he should feel himself obliged to leave Istanbul I would advise him to come to me.

As he wanted to do more work, the idea of leaving İstanbul grew on him and eventually he left, but he did not come direct to me. He thought he would be able to do better at some place nearer the İzmir front, and so he went to the district of Manisa, via Bandırma and Akhisar, to meet his comrade Colonel Bekir Sami Bey, commanding the 56th Division. When he arrived there he saw that the morale of the population had been shaken and that the situation was extremely dangerous and threatening. He changed his name immediately and travelled via Ödemiş — Nazilli — Afyonkarahisar, and then by an ordinary vehicle via Aziziye — Sivri Hisar to Ankara, where he met Fuat Paşa; then he came in my direction. Very well; that was all right, but why upset me by concealing his real name?

Moreover, I wanted at last to send Refet Bey, commanding my IIIrd Corps, whom I had left behind as Governor of Samsun, to Sivas on the Staff of the Army Corps. I had repeatedly ordered him to come, and now he was on the way; but I had received no reply from him to my order. At last, he also arrived on the same day quite by chance.

Now let us return to the question of the signatures.

I wanted my comrades who had just arrived also to sign the draft of the circular we were speaking about. Rauf Bey and Refet Bey were at that moment in my room; Fuat Paşa was in another.

Rauf Bey politely expressed that because he is just a visitor he has no authority or interest to sign this document. I pressed him to sign, assuring him that this document would be of historical value: this induced him to sign.

Refet Bey, however, declined, saying that he could not understand why and with what object we were convening the congress.

I was astounded at his attitude and mentality. It seemed incredible to me that a comrade whom I had brought with me from İstanbul could take such an extraordinary view about so simple a question, especially as he understood perfectly well what we were going to do. I sent for Fuat Paşa, and as soon as he understood my point of view he signed. I told him that I could not understand why Refet Bey had demurred. After Fuat Paşa had reproached him rather sharply, Refet picked up the draft and put some sort of signature to it, which it is rather difficult to make out. This is the document I am talking about. All who are interested in it might like to look at it.

Gentlemen: At first sight this account might appear to be superfluous. I have submitted it to you, because I think it will throw some light on certain dark points connected with subsequent events.

The circular convening the congress had been sent in cipher to the civil and military authorities. It had also been transmitted to certain persons in Istanbul; to the latter I wrote an accompanying letter. They were, Abdurrahman Şeref Bey, Resit Akif Pasa, Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Seyit Bey, Halide Edib Hanım, Kara Vasif Bey, Ferit Bey (then Minister of Public Works), Ferit Paşa, the leader of the "Peace and Salvation" party and who was subsequently Minister of War, Cami Bey and Ahmet Rıza Bey.

I will now go back to the chief points in this letter.

1. Meetings and similar demonstrations can never attain the realization of great aims by themselves alone.
2. They can only have a healthy result when they are directly supported by the spiritual power emanating from the soul of the nation.
3. The most important facts that reveal the situation, already sufficiently serious, as being exceedingly dangerous, are the manœuvres of the opposition going on in Istanbul, as well as the political and anti-national propaganda of every description designed to represent the true aspirations of the nation in a false and injurious way. We experience the frequently dangerous consequences of this at the expense of the country.
4. Istanbul is no longer to rule Anadolu, but be subordinate to it.
5. The sacrifice imposed upon you is of the greatest importance. (Document 27.)

*

* *

I remained at Amasya until the 25th June. You have not forgotton that Ali Kemal Bey, at that time Minister of the Interior, had issued a circular in which he announced that I had been recalled. In it he added that all official correspondence with me had ceased and he gave directions that any orders issued by me were not to be obeyed. This telegram No. 84, is dated the 23rd June and is a document revealing a very strange way of thinking. Here is the complete wording of it:

Copy of a deciphered telegram from the Minister of the
Interior, Ali Kemal Bey, dated 23rd June, 1919.

"Notwithstanding that Mustafa Kemal Paşa is a great soldier, he is not qualified to follow the present policy, in spite of his ardent patriotism and the untiring zeal displayed by him. He has entirely failed in his new position. In accordance with the demands of the English High Commissioner

he has been recalled. What he has been doing and writing since his recall shows his incompetence more than anything else could do. As an administrator, he has aggravated his political errors still more by the telegrams he has continued to send in favour of certain organisations — for instance, the Anti-annexation League — organisations that have been formed without authority and without due consideration, and which in the end only serve the Anti-annexation League — organisations that have been formed without of Karesi and Aydin and extorting money from the inhabitants. It is the duty of the Ministry of War, of which he is a member, to recall him to Istanbul. The formal order, however, which the Ministry of the Interior gives you, in addition to the intimation of the recall of this man, is to the effect that everybody is forbidden to enter into official correspondence with him and nobody is to attend to any request of his regarding administrative affairs. You will surely understand the responsibility you will avoid if you follow these instructions. At this serious and critical moment, when our fate will hang in the balance at the Peace Conference and the consequence of our five years madness will be decided upon, is it not the most imperative duty of every official and all the people, every Ottoman-subject, to show that at last we have become reasonable and are anxious to give evidence of our wisdom and foresight, so that we may be able to save our own lives, our property and the honour of the nation, without distinction of party, religion or race, and avoid the possibility of our country being further discredited in the eyes of the entire civilised world?"

It was only on my arrival at Sivas on June 27th, that I heard of this circular in cipher. On the 26th June, Ali Kemal Paşa retired from the Government, after having rendered great service to the enemies of our country and the Sultan by disseminating this circular note on the 23rd June. It was not until much later that I learnt of his letter addressed officially to the Grand Vezir in which he tendered his resignation, of the other one he had presented personally to the Sultan, as well as the verbal declaration he had made and the reply of the Sovereign to it.

In his letter of resignation — more particularly in the one he presented to the Sultan — Ali Kemal Bey, after speaking of the "unrest and revolts" that had broken out in different parts of the Ottoman Empire, declared that, although it should have been the concern of the Departments to take the necessary steps for the localisation and immediate suppression of the rebellion, "certain of his colleagues, jealous of the Imperial favour and confidence he was enjoying, had furthered the outspread of the revolt for unworthy reasons." He added that, although he resigns his office, he still

offers his loyalty and special services to His Majesty. He presented this petition verbally: "May it please Your Majesty to protect me from the attacks of my enemies, who will regard my resignation as a favourable opportunity to show their malice against me."

The Sultan overwhelmed him with friendly expressions, and replied: "I feel convinced that I can place entire confidence in you. Your fidelity has been a great consolation and a source of great hope to me. The Palace will always be open to you at any time. Continue to work in harmony with Refik Bey." (Document 28.)

We have seen Ali Kemal, whose loyalty inspired the Sultan with such great hope and gave him so much strength, sitting before the Sultan in his ministerial seat as Minister of the Interior. Let us now look at him in the exercise of his real work.

If I am not tiring you, let us just glance through one of Sait Molla's letters to Mr. Frew, the English clergyman: "I have informed Ali Kemal Bey of the regret you have expressed concerning his last misfortune. We must get hold of this man. We must not let this opportunity slip, because this is an excellent moment to offer him a present."

"Yesterday Ali Kemal Bey spoke to a man whom you know. He told him that it is necessary to think a little about what we shall do with regard to the Press. It will not be easy for us to induce intellectual people and journalists to change front after they have been supporting the opposite side. All the official functionaries are for the moment sympathetically inclined towards the national movement. Ali Kemal Bey will follow your instructions to letter. He is trying to work with the Zeynel Abidin party. In short, the state of confusion will be agitated."

The postscript to the letter reads:

"P. S. I have entirely forgotten to mention something I particularly wanted to tell you some time ago. So that we can get Mustafa Kemal to come here in full confidence, we ought to pretend that we have a certain amount of sympathy with him and his followers. Will you kindly think seriously about this. We cannot support his cause in our own papers."

I shall give you further details about these documents as the occasion arises. This will suffice for the moment.

Ali Kemal Bey's circular note about which I knew nothing when I was at Amasya, had actually confused the heads of the officials and the people themselves. Some who are totally unable to appreciate facts and

who are to be found everywhere, devoted themselves to making active propaganda against myself personally.

Sivas was the fertile breeding spot for the most important of these reactionary agitations.

If you will allow me, I will briefly describe them. On the 23rd June, the date of Ali Kemal Bey's circular note, a certain Ali Galip Bey was at Sivas. He was a man ready for anything and was accompanied by about ten of his companions. This individual was a Colonel on the General Staff, who had been sent from Istanbul as Vali of Mamuretülaziz. The people whom he took with him, alleged under-officials of the vilayet, were selected by himself.

Ali Galip stopped *en route* at Sivas and collected influential followers there, which circumstance left no doubt as to his intentions. He began at once to make the necessary arrangements to carry out his mission.

As soon as the order issued against me by the Ministry of the Interior arrived, he began to act. Posters were stuck on the walls in the streets of Sivas, proclaiming that I was "a dangerous man, a mutineer, a traitor." One day he went personally to the late Reşit Paşa, who was then Vali of Sivas, to talk to him about this order that had been sent by the Ministry of the Interior, and asked him what steps he would take about me if I happened to come to Sivas.

Reşit Paşa asked him what he expected he ought to do. "If I were you," answered Ali Galip "I would bind him and arrest him. There is no doubt that you ought to do this."

Reşit Paşa did not think that it would be quite so simple to do it. They discussed the question for a long time. There were so many people who were interested in the question that many of them came to listen, wondering what was going to happen.

All this occurred on the 27th June.

Let us now turn our attention for a moment from this scene and revert to it later. Let us see meanwhile what was happening at Amasya.

On the 25th of the same month I was told of certain suspicious plots that were being carried on against me. On the night of the 25th June I sent for my aide-de-camp, Cevat Abbas Bey, and told him that we would leave Amasya before daybreak and proceed southwards. At the same time I told him to make all the preparations as secretly as possible.

I had privately arranged with the officer commanding the 5th Division and the officers on my Staff what they were to do. The Commander of the 5th Division was ordered to get together in all haste, during that night if possible, a strong detachment consisting of mounted officers and specially selected men. I was to start by motor-car for Tokat before dawn on the morning of the 26th June, accompanied only by my immediate followers. As soon as it was formed, the detachment was to march off, via Tokat, on the road to Sivas and try to keep in touch with me. I ordered that news of our departure was not to be telegraphed to any place, and, as far that would be possible, not to let it be known at Amasya that we had left.

I started from Amasya on the 26th. When I arrived at Tokat I put the Telegraph Office under control and took every precaution to prevent my arrival being announced, either at Sivas or elsewhere. I spent the night of 26th there. On the 27th I left for Sivas. Tokat is about six hours' journey from Sivas.

I sent an open telegram to the Vali of Sivas to announce that I had left Tokat for Sivas. I signed it with my rank as Army Inspector.

I intentionally avoided letting him know the exact hour of my departure, and I had previously arranged that the telegram was not to be sent off till six hours after I had left, and that in the meantime Sivas was to know nothing about my having left.

Now let us resume the narration of the events that took place at Sivas from the point I had left off — namely, the discussion that was going on between Ali Galip and Reşit Paşa about what they would do with regard to myself.

In the middle of the conversation, while they were ardently debating the question, a telegram from Tokat was handed to Reşit Paşa. Reşit Paşa handed it to Ali Galip Bey, saying: "He is coming here now. You must do what you think proper about arresting him." Reşit Paşa, reading the hour I was supposed to have left, took out his watch, looked at it and replied: "No he is not coming or else he would have been here already."

Then Ali Galip remarked: "When I said I would arrest him, I meant to say, that I would arrest him if he were to set foot within the district for which I was responsible." This alarmed all the people who were listening to him. They all exclaimed: "That being the case, we shall go out and welcome him." The meeting promptly broke up.

They hoped that they would have time enough to prepare a brilliant

reception for me, in which the notables, the inhabitants and the troops would take part, while, as a matter of fact, I was actually outside the gates of Sivas. They tried to delay me for a short time at a farmstead in the neighbourhood of the town. The Vali immediately asked Tali Bey, the chief of my Medical Staff, whom I had sent in advance to Sivas to inquire what was going on in the town and who was there, to come to see him. He asked him to induce me to make a halt at that spot, and added that he would come out to us as soon as preparations for my reception were completed.

Tali Bey himself actually came in a motor-car just outside the farm. We got out of our car and sat down in the farmhouse. Tali Bey gave me all the particulars I have just described and said that he was instructed to detain me for a little while. I replied by rising and saying: "Jump into the car quickly. Off to Sivas at once!" I will explain why I said this. It had suddenly struck me that they might have deceived Tali Bey and that under the pretence of gaining time for making preparations for my reception their real intention was to delay me long enough to prepare a sudden attack on me. As we mounted the car, another one approached; it was the Vali's.

Resit Pasa immediately asked me whether I would not prefer to rest for a little while. I replied that I did not want to rest, even for a moment, and that we were going on immediately. I invited him to come and sit by my side.

"Efendim," he said, "please let Rauf Bey take my seat. I prefer to sit in one of the other cars."

"No, no," I retorted, "get in here with me."

You can easily guess what led me to invite him to sit with me!

When we arrived at the gates of Sivas, a dense crowd lined both sides of the road. The troops stood under arms. We got out of our car, and as I walked through them I greeted the soldiers and the inhabitants.

This scene provided strong evidence of the sympathy and devotion which the honest inhabitants of Sivas, as well as the gallant officers and men stationed there, felt towards me.

Then I went straight to the headquarters of the command and ordered Ali Galip Bey and his followers, as well as the villains who, according to the information we had received, were his tools, to come to me. It is unnecessary for me to describe the reception I had in store for them, or to go into details about matters I imagine you are tired enough of already. It will be sufficient if I mention one incident.

This same Ali Galip, after the reception I gave him, wanted to come alone to me in the night, pretending that he had certain confidential communications to make to me. I received him. He tried by all kinds of sophistries to convince me that I ought not to judge from appearances that were so deceptive; that in accepting the position of Vali at Mamuretülaziz he had the intention of serving my plans, and that he had stopped at Sivas on purpose to meet me, so that he could receive orders personally from me. I must admit that he managed to keep me busy till the morning.

*
* * *

When I had given instructions as to the organisations and what was to be done at Sivas to the persons concerned, we left in the direction of Erzurum, on a certain morning during Bayram, after we had spent the night of the 27th June without closing our eyes.

After a fatiguing journey by motor-car for a whole week, we arrived at Erzurum, where we were cordially and sincerely greeted by the whole of the population and the army on the 3rd July. On the 5th July I impressed upon all the commanding officers that they were to do everything that was necessary along the main thoroughfares to watch for and prevent any hostile movement emanating from the Government. (Document 29.)

I entered into communication with the commandant, the Vali and the Erzurum Branch of the "Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces."

Münür Bey, the Vali, had been recalled to Istanbul. He was still at Erzurum, as I had asked him to remain there. Mazhar Müfit Bey, who had given up his post as Vali of Bitlis and who was at Erzurum on his way to Istanbul, was also waiting there to see me.

I thought it just as well to come to a clear understanding with these two Valis and with Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, commanding the XVth Army Corps, Rauf Bey who was accompanying me, the former Governor of İzmit, Süreyya Bey, Kâzım Bey, and the Chief of the Staff at my headquarters Hüsrev Bey, another of my Staff officers, and Dr. Refik Bey. I talked to them about the state of affairs in general and particularly about the present situation, as well as about the main lines it would be advisable for us to follow. On this occasion I went into the most adverse possibilities, the general and personal dangers and sacrifices that would have to be endured in the interests of caution. I pointed out that to-day only the Crown, the Government and the foreigners thought of annihilating all those who ventured

to come forward for the protection of the national ideas. But in regard to this the possibility had to be considered that the entire country had been misled and prejudiced against the movement. The leaders had to decide, if they entered into the struggle, that they would never desert the cause whatever might happen; that they would hold fast and fight till their last breath to sacrifice themselves for their ideal and for the last inch of national territory. It would be far better for those who felt that they were not imbued with this ambition to decline to embark on this enterprise, for if they did they would only be deceiving themselves and their country.

Moreover, the task we had in view was one that could not be undertaken in secret under the protection of the authorities and the uniform. Up to a certain time this could have been done, but now that time had passed. Henceforth we had to go out into the public squares and places and raise our voices in the name of the rights of the nation and win the people, heart and soul, over to our cause.

There is no doubt about my having been called to this cause and having rendered myself liable to the most tragic consequences if my efforts should end in failure. To work with me in public, therefore, is to render yourselves henceforward liable to share a similar fate. Besides, from many points of view, I am not the only person to meet the requirements of the situation in question. However, in any case, it was necessary that a son of the country should be its leader. They might have somebody else in mind who was more fitted to lead them. All that would be expected of him, I told them, would be that he should agree to do whatever the actual circumstances demanded.

As I thought it would not be judicious to come to a decision too hastily, I adjourned the meeting after having rendered this advice, so that they could have a little time in which to think it over and exchange their personal opinions.

When we came together again my comrades expressed their wish that I would be leader of the movement and cordially promised me their support. One of them, Münür Bey, begged that for important reasons he might be excused for the moment from taking part in the movement.

I pointed out that, in spite of my formal resignation from the Army, the essential condition for success was obedience to my orders, exactly as though I were still Commander-in-Chief. After this point was fully accepted and approved our meeting came to an end.

I arrived at an understanding, as I had now done here at Erzurum, with

A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

all the commandants and other officers and official and private persons with whom I had been in contact up to the time of my arrival at Erzurum, beginning in Istanbul with Cemal Paşa and Fevzi Paşa, who in turn had been Chief of the General Staff, and with İsmet Bey, who was engaged in matters related to the coming Peace Commission. You will appreciate, I am sure, the advantages of this course of action.

* *

The question that occupied me during the first few days of my stay at Erzurum was to make all the necessary arrangements for the congress to be held there.

The Erzurum Branch of the League for the "Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces," which had been founded on the 3rd March, 1919, had, in agreement with Trabzon, undertaken to convene a congress of the Eastern Provinces to be held on the 19th June, in Erzurum. When I was still at Amasya this branch sent invitations to the eastern provinces proposing they send delegates. From that time until my arrival, and afterwards, the committee showed extraordinary activity in bringing in delegates from these provinces.

It can easily be understood how great were the difficulties encountered in realising such an aim under the conditions prevailing at the time. Although the 10th July, the day fixed for the congress to meet, was already drawing near, the provincial delegates had not yet been chosen.

It was now of the utmost importance to make sure that this meeting would take place. For my part, I had also done everything I could to help.

While I was sending open communications simultaneously to each of the vilayets, instructions in cipher were sent to the Valis and the Commanders telling them what to do. After a delay of thirteen days we at length succeeded in getting together a sufficient number of delegates.

It was very important indeed for the success of our national movement to get the Army to agree to the civil and military arrangements.

The Division at Trabzon was under the temporary command of an officer. Halit Bey, the Commander, was hiding himself at Bayburt. He had to be induced to leave his place of concealment for two reasons. The first, and the more important of the two, was to raise the moral of the people, and especially of the troops, by showing them that the order from Istanbul and the refusal to obey it need not cause them any anxiety or make

it necessary for anybody to hide himself. The second reason was, that it was very important to have an energetic and fearless commander at the head of the division in case Trabzon, such a conspicuous place on the coast, should be attacked from outside.

Consequently, I ordered Halit Bey to come to Erzurum. I gave him special instructions and ordered him to stay at Maçka, so that he could be ready to take up the command of his division immediately when it became necessary for him to do so.

While we were occupied with this; we had to lose time in giving answers to the misleading telegrams from Ferit Paşa, the Minister of War in Istanbul, and the Sultan that were continually being sent to compel me to return to Istanbul.

"Come to Istanbul," the Minister of War ordered me. "Go on leave for a time," the Sultan suggested at first; "Stay somewhere in Anadolu, and do not meddle with anything." But afterwards they began to shout in chorus: "Return immediately, without further delay."

I replied: "I cannot return." At last the curtain fell suddenly while the telegrams were still being exchanged with the Palace on the night of the 8th July, and the play that had been going on for a month — from the 8th June to the 8th July — came to an end. Istanbul immediately cancelled my official commission. At the same moment — 10.50 p. m. on the 8th July — I had sent a telegram to the Minister of War and another at 11 p. m. to the Sultan himself, in which I announced that I resigned my duties and my commission in the Army.

I communicated this to the troops and the people. Henceforward I continued to do my duty according to the dictates of my conscience, free from any official rank and restriction, trusting solely to the benevolence and magnanimity of the nation itself, from whom I drew strength, energy and inspiration as from an inexhaustible spring.

You can easily imagine that many other persons, among them certain of those who were deeply interested in them, listened to my nightly communications with Istanbul.

I hope you will permit me to lay before you a document that will give you some idea about those who, in these critical moments and subsequently, attempted to describe as tact and ability what I, to use a very mild expression, would prefer to call simplicity and weakness.

No. 140/140

Konya, 9th July, 1919. 6 o'clock

To the first A. D. C. of the 3rd Army Inspection.

Refîk Halit Bey, Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, and Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya, have been in telegraphic communication during the night of the 6th July. I have heard that it was to the following effect:

"Mustafa Kemal Paşa is done for. He will be brought to İstanbul. The same thing will happen to Cemal Paşa."

The Vali of Konya replied: "Thank you."

I beg you to bring this in a convenient way to the knowledge of His Excellency the Paşa.

(Signed)

Hasan

Director of Communications in cipher to the 2nd Army Inspection.

I had, indeed, heard four days previously, very much to my surprise, that Cemal Paşa, Inspector of the IInd Army at Konya, had left on ten days leave for İstanbul. Ever since I had landed at Samsun I had kept up correspondence with him in connection with our co-operation in the national movement and the military dispositions we had to make. I had always received positive and encouraging replies from him.

That a commanding officer who had been in such close relations with me could start on his own account for İstanbul, was scarcely the attitude of a careful and prudent man. I commissioned Selâhattin Bey, commanding the XIIth Army Corps, in a telegram in cipher on the 5th July, to carry out action on these two points:

1. I beg you to inform me clearly and without delay the actual reason for Cemal Paşa's departure for İstanbul on ten days' leave.

2. You are on no account to give up the command of the troops in your district. It is absolutely necessary to take steps to guard against the most unfavourable possibilities, by putting yourself immediately into communication with Fuat Paşa. I beg you to send me short reports daily as to your position.

I sent a copy of this telegram on the same day to Fuat Paşa in Ankara.

In the telegram in cipher that Selâhattin Bey sent me on the 6th July, at the very moment when the telegraphic communication was being carried on between Refet Halit Bey and Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya, he said: "Cemal

Paşa has gone voluntarily to İstanbul for ten days to get into touch with certain persons and at the same time to visit his family there." (Documents 30 — 33.)

It is quite true that Cemal Paşa started, but he could not return. Later on we shall see him as Minister of War in the Cabinet of Ali Riza Paşa. Unfortunately, we heard some time later that Selâhattin Bey, the witness of these events whom we had advised to remain in command of his troops, had also gone to İstanbul. After the bad example shown by Cemal Paşa, I sent the following general telegram of the 7th July:

1. The national forces, which are formed and organised for the preservation of our independence, are protected against any kind of attack or interference. The national will is sovereign in regard to the guidance of the fate of the State and the people. The Army is the willing servant of the national will.
2. If, for some reason or other, inspectors and commanders should be removed from their command, they may transfer it to their successors provided that these have the necessary qualifications to work with them; they should, however, remain in the district where they have any influence and continue to carry on their national duties as before. If, on the other hand, men should be appointed who might have been responsible for incidents similar to those that took place at Izmir, the command is not to be handed over to them, and the inspectors and the other commanders will refuse to recognise such appointments, and declare that they have entirely lost their confidence in them.
3. If, on account of pressure exercised by the Entente Powers for the purpose of facilitating the occupation of the country, the Government should order any Corps or any part of the Army or of any national organisation to be disbanded, such order must neither be taken any notice of nor obeyed.
4. The Army will resist any influence or interference which would produce the weakening or dissolution of anti-annexation societies or unions for the defence of national rights, the efforts of which are aimed at the maintenance and preservation of national independence.
5. The Civil Administration, in the same way as the Army, is the lawful protector of the union for the defence of national rights and anti-annexation leagues in their effort to safeguard the independence of the State and the Nation.
6. If any part of the country is attacked, the entire nation is ready to

stand up for its rights. In that case, each district will immediately communicate with the others in order to insure co-operation and joint action.

These instructions were addressed to each of the Army Commanders and all commanders of Corps in Anadolu and Rumeli, as well as to every other person concerned.

Five or six days after this circular had been sent out, I received a telegram in cipher from Kavak signed by "Refet, commanding the IIIrd Corps," dated the 13th July. This is the text of the telegram:

"Colonel Selâhattin, the Chief of the War Department, has arrived from Istanbul on board an English ship to supersede me. The Ministry has commanded me to return on the same vessel. Selâhattin Bey will work in the interest of our cause. As things are at the present moment, I think I would be doing right if handed over the command to him, and I have sent in my resignation to the Ministry of War. I will give you further particulars in a special message. I am leaving for Sivas. Will you be good enough to send your reply to me through Arif Bey, commanding the 5th Division at Amasya."

I must confess that I was not at all satisfied with Refet Bey's action. Istanbul had been informed of his co-operation with me. If a man who is regarded as a member of this active body arrives on board an English ship to supersede him, it must directly and naturally follow that he is serving the designs of the English.

Even allowing that this is no more than a mere surmise, Refet Bey ought not suddenly to have surrendered his command, but ought at least to have waited until he had heard what I thought about it.

On the other hand, if he had sufficient confidence to hand over his command to a successor, I should have thought that it would have been better if he had remained there for some time longer, so that he could work with him and explain the situation and our own views to him, and at the same time have put himself into communication with me before he left. But as I was now facing an accomplished fact, there was nothing left for me to do but console myself with these two considerations:

Firstly, the expression in Refet Bey's telegram "Selâhattin Bey will work in the interest of our cause," was a definite statement; secondly, Refet Bey had not actually left for Istanbul.

As it was, I sent a message to all the commanding officers, drawing their attention to the fact that "if they made the mistake of going to Is-

tanbul, they would be doing something for which the country might be called upon to pay dearly, and, therefore, in future we should be very careful to carry out our programme strictly." On the same day, the 14th July, I sent a telegram in cipher to Refet Bey containing, amongst other things, this expression: "The news that Selâhattin will take care to carry through our plans has made our comrades very happy indeed and has encouraged them very much."

To Selâhattin personally I sent the following telegram: July 14th. To the commanding officer of the 5th Division at Amasya: For Refet Bey.

"Do you consider it advisable to send the following telegram to Selâhattin Bey?"

Mustafa Kemal

To Selâhattin Beyefendi.

"We are very glad to hear of your departure from the narrow surroundings of İstanbul and that you are taking refuge in the sacred bosom of the nation and can join your companions in their patriotic labours. The Almighty will give us the victory in our united endeavours to gain our sacred aim. I greet you with brotherly feelings." (Mustafa Kemal)

Kâzım
Colonel, C. O. S.,
IIIrd Army Inspection

The first signs of doubt and uncertainty about Selâhattin Bey arose through this same Refet Bey, who had shown his confidence in him when he said that "Selâhattin Bey will work for the cause," and who, after he had handed his command over to him, had left for Sivas.

Refet Bey's telegram from Amasya, indeed, expressed not only doubt concerning Selâhattin, but also contained certain other important things. If you will allow me, I will read it to you.

Urgent. Classified. No. 719.

From Amasya, 15th July, 1919.

To the officer commanding the XVth Army Corps at Erzurum.
For His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

"You know Selâhattin Bey. We must be very careful not to alarm him suddenly. Kâzım Paşa must get into correspondence with him under the pretence of congratulating him, and in doing so he must be very careful what he says. I have heard nothing yet about the recall of Hamit Bey.

Something has happened to detain him. There is scarcely any hope that he will stay here after he has been recalled. Nevertheless, I shall work on him. It is certain that the English will do all they can to induce me to return. But I shall remain here and do what is necessary, as the situation demands. From what I can hear from Englishmen and an American passing through here, Kâzim Paşa is also in danger. Once more, I advise you to be very careful and watch what is going on." (Refet)

Arif

Commanding the 5th Division.

Hamit Bey, who is mentioned in the telegram, was at that time Governor of Samsun. Refet Bey had known him for a long time. He had already recommended him to me soon after we had arrived at Samsun. He was convinced that he was a man who combined in himself the necessary qualifications to work loyally with us in the interests of the cause. We had succeeded in getting him appointed to Samsun by writing to the Grand Vezir and, privately, to Cevat Paşa, Chief of the General Staff.

Could there have been any doubt at all that such a person would sooner or later be dismissed? Refet Bey, however, stated that steps were being taken to detain him. "To detain" him — but where? "Something has happened" — but what? and by whose authority? He added that he did not think that he would remain in that district if he were dismissed from his office, but all the same, "I shall work on him"! But where would he go to? To Istanbul? How? Has he not been working with us till now?

In his telegram Refet Bey says that he considers it certain that the English will exert pressure on the Government to have him recalled, but that nevertheless he will remain on the spot and act according to circumstances. The position, however, was quite clear, and I had indicated in the instructions I had circulated on the 7th July what he was to do (No. 2 of the instructions). No other steps were to be undertaken.

Refet Bey had been able to learn from the Englishmen and an American travelling through that "Kâzim Paşa was also in danger." What did all this mean? To what should we attribute the attitude of these men who should be the very first to give proof of their firmness, and yet who appear to be dreaming of imaginary dangers and put their faith in others who are certainly not our well-wishers and who speak of these fanciful dangers in a tone of conviction?

At the end of his telegram, Refet preaches to us all, including myself, and advises me personally to be "very careful and watch what is going on."

The interpretation of the expression "very careful" I leave to the judgment of sane persons of understanding.

If the person who advised me to proceed carefully would have given me this advice before he had abandoned his post, it seems to me that he would have acted with far greater sincerity.

Hamit Bey had sent me this short telegram on the 14th July, 1919, from Samsun:

"I have learned from a document that I have been recalled. I expect the order to reach me in a day or two. I shall then go to Istanbul."

If I had already regretted that Refet Bey had given up his command, I was very sorry indeed to learn on the very same day that another comrade on whom we had absolutely relied had taken up an incomprehensible attitude on an important question, just as though we were still living under normal conditions.

On the 15th July, 1919, I sent this message to Hamit Bey:

"My dear brother, the news has reached us that Ibrahim Ethem Bey has been appointed to succeed you. I have written to Refet Bey, asking him to accompany you when you go into the interior. I cannot think what can induce you to go to Istanbul. While we are trying to draw our friends who can be useful to us away from Istanbul and bring them to Anadolu, so that we can let the good patriots have an opportunity of co-operating in carrying out our ideals, you want to go into the narrow and dependent environment of the metropolis — to say nothing worse of such a proceeding. We do not approve at all of your attitude. Join Refet. Either stay in the district of Sivas with him or come to us by whatever route you prefer. We are waiting for a straightforward answer from you." (Document 34.)

The telegram we received from Hamit Bey, Mutasarrif of Canik five days later, the 20th July, from Samsun was couched in these words:

"The nation, driven to despair by the ever-increasing scandals in Byzantium, is trusting that a ray of hope will come from the east.

"The people have endowed these places and those who dwell in them with such phantastic shapes and forms that I ask myself whether they are real. I am ashamed of my own indifference.

"Surely we are not asleep. We are eager to do something. But I have

come to the conclusion that we are going to be entangled in theories and that we have chosen the longest road to arrive at our goal. The time and the condition of affairs in the country will not allow us to go on waiting. The situation is getting worse every moment. Therefore, we must decide promptly what we are going to do, and do it at once. These are the things that come to my mind with regard to this matter:

"I suggest that we send telegrams to the Sultan simultaneously from all parts of the country. Let us tell him straightforwardly that the people, seeing clearly the end to which they are being led by the scandals that have been perpetrated for the last ten months under his very eyes and with his own wishes and desires, have decided, at all costs, to take the reins of government into their own hands, and that we shall decline to recognise either himself or his Government unless a cabinet possessing the confidence of the nation is formed within forty-eight hours, and unless within the same time it has been decided to convene a constituent assembly. There is no difficulty in doing this. Let us go forward, sir, and let the nation, traditionally accustomed to accept the predetermined course of events, follow us."

Considering that Mutasarrif of Canik told us five days before that he intended to go to Istanbul if he should be recalled, I think you will find his telegram rather energetically worded, but all the same it shows a decided and active spirit.

The Mutasarrif wonders whether things are really what they seem and whether the nation may look for a ray of hope coming from the east.

He must think us to be dolts and fools, who do not know what we are doing or how to act decisively and quickly. He would have done better if, after having said all this, he had not aired his opinions, which only showed his total incapability of judging rightly.

Gentlemen! History teems with examples showing what a hard fate awaits people whose battle-cry is "Let us go forward and let the nation, traditionally accustomed to accept the predetermined course of events, follow us!" Statesmen, and especially the leaders of a nation, ought never to allow themselves to be carried away by such absurd nonsense. Hamit Bey did not refer at all in his telegram to the advice we had given him about going into the interior with Refet Bey. In our message of the 21st July, we had told Hamit Bey that: "With God's help, everything will turn out just as we wish. But before we can form a Cabinet possessing the confidence of the nation, we must establish the power that is to stand behind it. This result can be

attained only by calling together the congress of the Eastern Provinces and later on the general congress at Sivas."

I will now return to the affairs of the IIIrd Army Corps and take the opportunity to refer to Refet Bey and Selâhattin Bey.

I do so, because the English were spreading rumours to the effect that they were sending a battalion to Sivas. To meet every contingency, military dispositions had been taken all along the different routes leading to Sivas. An order I gave to the commander of the 5th Division at Amasya on the 18th July, contained the following about Refet Bey, who was still at Amasya: "I want to draw the serious attention of Refet Bey to this matter. It is possible that after he has considered the situation, he will prefer to remain at Amasya." The answer of the commander of the 5th Division dated the 19th July, 1919, included these remarkable expressions:

"Selâhattin Bey is still at Samsun. I have not been able to get into touch with him until to-day. As there has not been any correspondence of importance between us, I do not know what his opinions are or what he intends to do.

"Refet Bey, however, had given it to be understood that if he were called upon to do so he would not have the necessary courage to offer resistance to the English.

"Refet Bey left for Sivas on the 18th July. (Document 35.)

Then I sent the following telegram in cipher to Refet Bey:

Telegram in cipher. Personal. No. 151.

19th July, 1919.

To 5th Division Command at Amasya.

To Colonel Ibrahim Tali Bey, Medical Inspector of the IIIrd Army at Sivas.

For Refet Bey.

"Have you handed my telegram to Selâhattin Bey? It is most important to find out what his attitude is. It is a patriotic duty to put an end to a situation that might possibly lead to disaster, which would certainly happen if we begin to hesitate or appear doubtful; it is absolutely necessary to get a straightforward answer from him — yes or no — and to decide accordingly. The only course left for him to follow is from the point where you left off. What has moved me to send you this telegram is the fact that we have not been able to get any positive news for about a week, and we have not been able to form any clear opinion about him since we heard

from Istanbul. Besides, we have heard complaints that before his departure he had a secret meeting with Sadik Bey and is in close touch with him. It is your special duty to look into this and what consequences might ensue from it: for we must think what a very bad impression might be produced in any quarter of the population by the slightest injudicious remark he might make that would not be favourable to the national cause, and the consequences it might lead to." (Mustafa Kemal)

Kâzim

Colonel, C. O. S. of the
IIIrd Army Inspection.

Here is Refet Bey's telegram, which is not only a reply to our telegram but also to very many other questions.

Very urgent. Classified. 1828.

Sivas, 22nd July, 1919.

To His Excellency Kâzim Karabekir Paşa, temporary Chief of the IIIrd Army Inspection at Erzurum.

For His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. I was unable to give your telegram to Selâhattin, because it did not reach me until after I had left.

You know Selâhattin, as everybody else knows him. He is a man of vacillating character. He has apparently come with no intention of staying in this district longer than about ten days. He was very nearly running off to Istanbul without taking over the command. I calmed him down and reminded him of his duty as a patriot. There is no doubt about his love for his country, but he is incapable of any initiative. He is rather more useful than Reşit Paşa, the Vali. He is well informed about military transports passing through the IIIrd Army Corps; he has been successful in organising this business in Istanbul.

He owes his appointment here to Cevat Paşa. Therefore he can do nothing harmful to the cause, or possibly say anything against it. On the contrary, he has promised to work for its success, but only in secret. I cannot believe the news about his relations with Sadik Bey. Moreover, to work without a definite programme, would mean to split up our forces. If, when you spoke to me about the position in the east, you had not allowed yourself to be influenced by exaggerated rumours, I could possibly have arranged matters better and would not have been obliged to leave my command. You will undoubtedly recognise that the men who are called upon to make decisions

on their own initiative must be well informed about what is going on. What have we to gain by frightening Selâhattin unnecessarily and force him to answer in the negative? He is already prepared to run away. Whom could we put in his place? I beg you to give me precise and clear orders. Will you kindly read your telegram referring to Selâhattin over again. From it, which begins stormily and calms down towards the end, I have not been able to guess what you really mean. However, in a few days Selâhattin will return to Samsun. I shall have a talk with him. In any case, I shall try to spare his feelings and induce him to work hard in the interests of the cause.

2. From the conversations I have had with the Englishmen, I gather that the landing of a battalion at Samsun, which at the same time will give them an opportunity to embark the Indian Mohamedans, is specially intended to be a threat against the place where Your Excellency is living, because you are believed to be at Sivas. An English officer called on me at Kavak and tried to convince me that I ought to go to Istanbul. He has spread the report that I have been recalled because I have resisted the English; but his real intention was to undermine you. Another supporter of Your Excellency is Kâzim Paşa. He ought to avoid, therefore, giving any pretext to the English for similar demands. The fact that when he retired, Ferit Paşa asked Kâzim Paşa to represent him temporarily, indicates that some of the people in Istanbul have no evil intentions, but they cannot do anything on account of the attitude of the English. The provisional appointment of Kâzim Paşa is a further proof that Selâhattin Bey has not come here with the intention of working for Sadîk Bey.

3. It is very likely that the English will formally insist on my being recalled to Istanbul, because there is an "official channel of communication" (*sic*) between me and the English. If this pressure should increase, I shall cover up my tracks, so that I shall not put Selâhattin Bey in a difficult position.

4. The rumour about Hamit Bey being transferred has not yet been confirmed. Selâhattin(*), as well as the English, have applied to Istanbul to make sure that he will remain where he is. The attempt to replace him is attributed to his difference with the Ministry of the Interior. It is also not true that Sedat Bey has arrived at Konya to succeed Selâhattin Bey. Although he writes that he has heard that there will be a change of all the commanders, the provisional appointment of Kâzim Paşa proves that there is no truth in the rumour.

(*) This is another Selâhattin Bey.

5. Have you heard anything about the telegram dated 20th July, 1919, that the Grand Vezir has sent direct to all the Valis about the congress that is going to be held at Sivas? It is reported that the officer commanding the division at Karahisar has issued a proclamation for the election of delegates to this congress. Do you approve of this? Ought we not, judging from the German Peace Treaty and the calm that prevails in the East, to maintain a guarded attitude and wait till the situation is clearer? You can have no doubt, at last, that so far as I am personally concerned I have no cause for anxiety. But everything we do without a definite programme before us is liable to injure the cause. We must either be cautious or make our intentions apparent without any delay; but let us do only one of these two things.

But, whatever we do, do you really think that we shall gain any advantage from a congress publicly assembled at Sivas under present conditions? Or, do you not rather think that it is dangerous? An attack against Sivas from the south would be very dangerous indeed and would divide Anadolu into two parts, principally because the population in this vilayet seems to be quite apathetic. As an indication of this, the alleged neutral attitude recently adopted by this vilayet is of the greatest significance.

If it is absolutely necessary to convene this congress, would it not be better if it were held in a town farther to the east, provided that it could be ascertained that the delegates could get there easily?

6. The inhabitants of the towns of Sivas and Amasya are very obscene those in the districts and villages are better in comparison. In future I shall act as I think best, according to circumstances.

7. In a letter I have received from Istanbul I am advised to pacify the English by showing them a manifesto of yours, in which you proclaim that the national movement aims at the salvation and the independence of the nation, but not in accordance with the individual politics of any particular party or person.

If such a manifesto were published, I suggest that it would be advisable for this to be done in the form of a proclamation issued by yourself personally, but at the same time as a supplement to the resolutions passed at the Erzurum Congres.

8. The agencies are talking about parliamentary elections. What is your opinion about this? (Refet)

Zeki
C. O. S. IIIrd Army Corps

Here is the verbatim reply to this telegram:

Telegram in cipher, to be delivered personally by an officer.
Urgent. No. 171

July 3rd, 1919.

To Zeki Bey, commanding the IIIrd Army Corps at Sivas.
For Refet Beyefendi.

1. So that I can read it again, I have been looking everywhere for the telegram about Selâhattin, but I cannot find it. As far as I can remember, the statements about him came from Istanbul. It is seldom that I have the time to re-read all the information that comes to me, much as I might like to do so.

The news that came about the situation in the east is certainly not free from exaggeration, but I am certain that it will not have led us into error.

In making up our minds what to do, we did not rely on what was happening in the east.

Is it likely that the current results could have been obtained from our endeavour to organise and develop the national movement, to express the demands of the people through the means of the Congress, to provide army support for the national movement, and to avoid compromise of the national course, if we had acted differently and provided for greater precaution in making the decision in question with regard to command and arms?

In any case, the present situation is satisfactory all round.

2. The temporary appointment of Kâzım Paşa is very appropriate. He is trying not to give the English any ostensible reason for taking any steps whatsoever against us. It is obvious, however, that we cannot be negligent, either in the question of arms or the resistance to be offered to the landing of troops at Trabzon. Whereas, these reasons will not be in line with what the English would have liked.

3. The English strongly urged the Government and exercised all possible pressure on them to have me recalled to Istanbul. This is perfectly evident from the telegrams that I exchanged for several days with the Government and the Sultan. I will tell you all about this correspondence when I see you. After I retired from the Army, this pressure ceased. Judging by this, I do not anticipate too much of pressure about you after your resignation.

Nevertheless, I would in any case prefer to leave Selâhattin Bey in a difficult position than lose touch with you. The Government and the English

have repeatedly put pressure on Kâzım Paşa, on account of Halit Bey. The latter is actually in command of his division, although he holds no official rank, because Kâzım Paşa persists in maintaining that nothing can be done to prevent this.

4. In his last telegram, Hamit Bey showed a stronger inclination to act with more rapidity than we do ourselves. We have kept him quiet for the moment.

5. I have heard nothing yet of the telegram about the Congress at Sivas. In fact, we may be quite sure that there are extremists whose opinions take a definite shape in some districts, while in others they assume reactionary forms.

I am satisfied that we must proceed so cautiously that our operations will be assured of success, being guided by circumstances as they arise. A definite programme that will be intelligible to everyone will be adopted at the Congress at Erzurum, which has begun its work to-day.

I expect important results from the Congress at Sivas. You will remember that I have anticipated the great probability of an attack being made from all sides, and that not only now, but ever since it was decided that a congress should be held at Sivas, I have urged that the necessary steps should be taken for our protection. We must think out in a practical way what is to be done about the number of delegates who will come to Sivas when the sitting of the Congress at Erzurum is over and when we can see what the probable result of that congress will be and what impression it produces.

6. I quite agree with you about the organisation of the work, but I hope, also, that the inhabitants of the towns will conform to national sentiments.

7. The aims and objects of the national movement will be announced in the way you propose, namely, by issuing manifestos while the congress is in progress.

8. Parliament will be convened, but not in İstanbul. It must meet in Anadolu. This question will be discussed at the congress, and after that the necessary steps will be taken.

We all send you our fraternal greetings. (Mustafa Kemal)

Kâzım
Colonel, C. O. S.
IIIrd Army Inspection.

I think it is now my duty to refer with satisfaction to the deep impression made on me by the confidence and cordiality quite openly and unanimously

shown to me after I retired from the Army by the entire population of Erzurum and the Erzurum Branch of the "League for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces."

In a letter, dated 10th July, the Erzurum Branch of the League proposed that I should act as chairman of the Executive Committee. The names of five other persons were mentioned to me as having been selected to work with me. They were: Raif Efendi, Süleyman Bey, a retired officer, Kâzım Bey, a retired officer, Necati Bey, editor of a newspaper called "Al Bayrak," Tursun Bey zade Cevat Bey. In the same letter I was told that Rauf Bey had been elected vice-chairman of the Executive Committee. (Document 36.)

At this time Raif Efendi was the chairman of committee of the Erzurum Branch. Hacı Hafız Efendi, Süleyman Bey, Maksut Bey, Mesut Bey, Necati Bey, Ahmet Bey, Kâzım Bey were members, with Cevat Bey acting as secretary.

In a telegram which they tried to have delivered at the headquarters of the League in Istanbul, the Erzurum Branch requested them "to telegraph that I had been authorised to act in the name of headquarters." (Document 37.)

Kâzım Bey, the retired officer, and Tursun Bey, as well as Cevat Bey, all of whom had been elected delegates to represent Erzurum at the congress, sent in their resignations to make it easier for them to take part in this assembly.

II

As you all know, gentlemen, the Congress met at Erzurum on the 23rd July, 1919, in a humble schoolroom. On the first day I was elected Chairman.

In my opening speech I informed the assembly as to the real state of affairs and, in a certain measure, the aim we had in view. I emphasized the fact that it was surely impossible to imagine that there was one patriot in the country who was not already perfectly well aware of the dark and tragic dangers that surrounded us, and who was not deeply stirred by them.

I spoke the occupation of the country which had been carried out in total disregard of the stipulations of the armistice.

I told them that history will never fail to recognise the existence and the rights of a nation, and that the judgment pronounced against our country and the nation would surely end in failure. I solemnly laid stress on the certainty that the power that will have the last word to say on the subject of the preservation of the sacred rights of our country, and ensure that their

resolution and determination shall be respected and honoured, reposes in the undaunted spirit that inspires the national movement and which, like an electric flash, penetrates even to the remotest parts of our country.

To raise the spirits of the assembly, I then proceeded to survey the facts regarding the activity exhibited by certain nations to maintain their national rights at the present time. I expressed clearly that the will of the Turkish Nation to be master of her own destiny could only spring from Anadolu, and, as a first step, I suggested the creation of the National Areopagus founded on the will of the people, and the formation of a Government that derives its strength from this same will. (Document 38.)

The Congress at Erzurum lasted a fortnight. Its labours were confined to the drawing up of regulations and deciding upon the wording of a manifesto in which they were to be published.

Apart from certain views and questions of minor importance, so far as their form and matter is concerned, if we examine the contents of these documents within the limitations of time and environment, we can deduce from them a certain number of governing principles and resolutions which are of the greatest value to us.

With your permission, I shall give you some idea of my opinions at this time about these principles and decisions.

1. The entire country within its national frontiers is an undivided whole. (Manifesto Art. 6: section regarding Regulations Art. 3, Art. 1 of the Regulations and the Manifesto.)

2. In the event of the Ottoman Empire being split up, the nation will unanimously resist any attempt at occupation or interference by foreigners. (Arts. 2 and 3 of the Regulations; Art. 3 of the Manifesto.)

3. Should the Government be incapable of preserving the independence of the nation and the integrity of the country, a provisional Government shall be formed for the purpose of safeguarding these aims. This Government shall be elected by the national congress, and, if it should not be sitting at the time, the Executive Committee shall proceed to elect it. (Regulations Art. 4; Manifesto Art. 4.)

4. The chief object is to consolidate the national forces into a ruling factor and to establish the will of the nation as the sovereign power. (Art. 3 of the Manifesto.)

5. No privileges which could impair our political sovereignty or our social equilibrium shall be granted to the Christian elements. (Manifesto Art. 4.)

6. It is out of question to accept a mandate or protectorate. (Manifesto Art. 7.)

7. Everything that is possible shall be done to secure the immediate meeting of the National Assembly and to establish its control over the proceedings of the Government. (Manifesto Art. 8.) Perhaps you will have observed already, or you will do so, that these principles and decisions, although they have been put forward in different forms, can be carried into effect without in any way losing their original character.

Gentlemen, while we were working in the congress to lay down the principles and come to the decision which I have just been talking about, Ferit Paşa, the Grand Vezir, published certain declarations. These declarations deserve to be described as a threat against the nation.

On the 23rd July, 1919, the Grand Vezir announced *urbi et orbi* that:

"Unrest has taken place in Anadolu. Without any regard to the Constitution, assemblies have been held under the pretence that they are parliamentary sittings. It is the duty of the military and civil authorities to prevent such proceedings."

The requisite steps were taken to counteract this order issued by the Grand Vezir. On the other hand, we insisted on our right to assemble a parliament. (Document 39.)

As the congress was coming to an end, on the 7th August I declared to the assembly that we had "passed serious resolutions and had proved in the face of the whole world the existence and the unity of the nation." "History," I added, "will characterize the work we have done at this congress as a wonderful performance that has seldom been equalled." (Document 40.)

I am convinced gentlemen, that time will show that what I said was no exaggeration.

According to the regulations drawn up at the Erzurum Congress, a Representative Committee was formed. In the statement which, in accordance with the Code of Societies and Corporations, was put before the Vilayet of Erzurum on the 24th August, 1919, to obtain the authority for the Representative Committee to meet, the names and rank of its members were the following:

Mustafa Kemal, formerly Inspector of the IIIrd Army Corps, retired from the Army;

Rauf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine;

Raif Efendi, ex-Deputy for Erzurum;
 Izzet Bey, ex-Deputy for Trabzon;
 Servet Bey, ex-Deputy for Trabzon;
 Şeyh Fevzi Efendi, Şeyh of the order of the Nakşibendi, of Erzincan;
 Bekir Sami Bey, formerly Vali of Beirut;
 Sadullah Efendi, ex-Deputy for Bitlis;
 Hacı Musa Bey, Chief of the Mutki tribe.
 (Document 41.)

Let me say, incidentally, that these people never met to work together.

Izzet Bey, Servet Bey, Hacı Musa Bey and Sadullah Efendi never showed up at all. After taking part in the Congress at Sivas, Raif Efendi and Şeyh Fevzi Efendi left — the former for Erzurum and the latter for Erzincan — and never put in an appearance again.

Rauf Bey and Bekir Sami Bey, who were present at the Congress at Sivas stayed with us until they entered the Parliament in İstanbul.

I would like to mention a less important matter while I remember it. As there had been some discussion about my taking part in the Erzurum Congress, there were some people who, when I joined this assembly, showed some hesitation about electing me Chairman.

If we may attribute that hesitation on the part of some of them to their good-faith and sincerity, it was not the case as regards certain of the others. At that time there was no doubt that these latter were very far from being straightforward, but, on the contrary, were carrying on despicable intrigues against me. One, for instance, was Ömer Fevzi Bey, who had come to the congress as a spy of the enemy, after he had succeeded in being elected a delegate for some place in the province of Trabzon. His companions were of the same kidney. The treachery of this man was discovered lately through his actions at Trabzon, after he had fled to İstanbul from that town.

Two or three days before the Congress came to an end, another question was discussed. Some of my confidential associates expressed the opinion that it might be difficult for me to carry on the work publicly as a member of the Representative Committee.

In a few words this is what these people thought: "It is evident that patriotic deeds spring from the heart and soul of the nation and that they are national in the fullest meaning of the word. That being so, these actions

will gain in strength and will not be liable to be misconstrued by anyone; moreover, they will not make unfavourable impressions on the minds of foreigners.

"But if a man like myself is seen at the head of this national movement, who is in revolt against the Government, the Caliphate and the Throne itself and who is exposed to attack from every side, it is possible that his actions will be attributed more to his personal ambition than to purely national considerations.

"Consequently, the Representative Committee should consist of delegates selected from the provinces and the autonomous districts. In this way alone can national unity be expressed."

I shall not attempt to show whether these conceptions were right or wrong. I shall only mention several of those points on which I lean to justify my attitude, which was in contradiction with the above mentioned point of view.

It was essentially necessary that I should take part in the congress and be its leader, for I was convinced of the importance of converting the national will into deeds and urging the nation to do what it will be called upon to do by deeds and arms. I considered it imperative for me to inform, enlighten and guide the people in such a way that I would be able to emphasize this view and induce them to accept it.

As a matter of fact, this is what actually happened in the end. I admit that I had no confidence in the ability of any representative body to carry through the principles and decisions I have described that were adopted by the congress.

Time and events have proved that I was right. Besides, I feel myself compelled to say quite frankly that I was not convinced that anybody could feel assured that we would be able to hold this congress at Sivas, the convening of which had already been decided upon at Amasya and brought to the knowledge of all the people by every possible means; or that such a body was capable of representing the nation and the country as a whole by a single representative body and then, with equally energetic attention and care, give themselves up to finding a sure way to defend and liberate, not the Eastern Provinces alone but every part of the country. If I had thought this possible, I would have found an excuse to delay my departure and wait and see what would be the result of the efforts of those who had resolved to act, and in that case I should not have deemed it necessary to rebel against the Government and the Sultan-Caliph.

On the contrary, like certain hypocrites who fought in both camps, I need not have resigned my positions as Army Inspector and A. D. C. to His Majesty, both of which gave me high dignity and authority.

There was certainly more than one consideration that induced me to place myself openly at the head and assume the leadership of the entire national and military movement. But could this mean otherwise than the liability of incurring the severest penalties, to which I personally, more than anybody else, would be exposed in the event of failure?

As for the rest, can those who call themselves patriots allow themselves to think for a moment about their own fate when the existence of the country and of the whole of a great nation is at stake? If I had allowed myself to be influenced by the imaginary fears entertained by certain of my comrades, two important things would have happened:

1. It would have meant that I admitted I had been entirely wrong in my judgment and decision, and that my character was devoid of energy.

Such a confession would have been an irretrievable mistake from the point of view of the undertaking which I had morally imposed upon myself.

History shows irrefutably that in all great enterprises the *conditio sine qua non* of success lies in the fact that there must be a leader available who possesses special qualifications and untiring energy. At a time when all statesmen have been seized with despair and are paralysed by their impotence, when the nation is plunged into the darkness of night without anyone to show them the way, when people of every possible description calling themselves patriots think and act in precisely as many different ways, is it possible for anybody to proceed with confidence, clear-sightedness and energy, and succeed in the end to achieve one of the most difficult of all aims when he feels himself forced to accept this or that advice, to succumb under a host of varying influences and avoid hurting the feelings of a multitude of other persons?

Can history point to a single group which has had the good fortune to succeed in such circumstances?

2. Could the situation and the object in view be placed in the hands of any representative body that was recruited, in all probability, from such miserable fellows as, let us say for instance, the Seyh of Naksibendi or the Chief of the Mutki tribe, who had never learned anything about governmental questions, politics or the army, and who had never had an opportunity of showing their aptitude for such work? And in confiding this to the hands of such men, should we not have made the grave mistake of deceiving our-

selves and the rest of the nation, after we had solemnly pledged ourselves to save the people and the country? Even if the question had arisen of granting secret support to a representative body of this description, could that have been regarded as a proper way to inspire confidence?

I have no doubt that at the present moment the world will admit the undisputable truth of what I have just said, although it did not appear to be so at that time.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the social and political opinion of the coming generation, I consider it to be my duty to support my assertion by certain events that are still fresh in my memory and by documents relating to the past.

What I have just been trying to make clear is still further borne out by events which I shall now touch upon.

* * *

When the Erzurum Congress was over, an order arrived at the headquarters of the XVth Army Corps, date the 30th July, 1919, signed by a certain man called Nazım Paşa, who, from what we had heard, had only recently joined the War Ministry. It ran as follows:

"As the Sublime Porte has decided to arrest Mustafa Kemal Paşa and Refet Bey immediately, on the charge that they are disobeying the orders issued by the Government, and send them both to İstanbul; and as the necessary orders have already been given to the local authorities, your Army Corps is commanded to execute this order without delay and to report that this has been done."

The officer commanding the Army Corps sent an appropriate reply. I had a copy of this telegram sent to all the commanders, directing their attention to it.

The Manifesto issued by the congress was circulated throughout the country, as well as being communicated to the representatives of foreign countries in a different manner. The Regulations had also been telegraphed in cipher, and some of them to the commanding officers and other trustworthy authorities. A great number of copies were printed in different localities for easy distribution. Naturally, all this occupied several days. On this occasion Selâhattin, commanding the IIIrd Army Corps at Sivas, informed me in a telegram, dated the 22nd August, that in his opinion the publication of Arts. 2 and 4 of the Regulations would be received with some hesitation, and he advised me to have them revised. (Document 42.)

Art. 2 provides for the principle of united defence and resistance, which was unanimously agreed to.

Art. 4 provides for the formation of a provisional Government.

While we were trying to find a way at Erzurum to make the meaning of the decisions that were passed by the congress intelligible to everybody and secure their unanimous acceptance, we received the news that certain circulars, called the "Regulations of the Organisation of the Karakol Society" and "Instructions concerning the General Authority of the Karakol Society," had been distributed among the commandants and officers. In fact, they were circulated everywhere.

All who read them — even the commanding officers who were closely associated with me — were perplexed, because they thought that I was the author of them. On the one hand, they thought that all through the congress I had displayed open and systematic endeavours in a national sense; but, on the other, that I was trying to form a committee of some mysterious and formidable character.

In reality, this propaganda emanated from certain men in Istanbul who, apparently, were acting in my name.

According to the regulations of this "Karakol Society," the names of the members of the committee, their number, the place and manner of their meeting, as well as their election and their objects, were kept absolutely secret.

Moreover, the circulation, even in part, of anything concerning it or any intimation that it was in any way dangerous — or was considered to be so — was punishable with instant death.

In the instructions relating to its general powers a "National Army" is mentioned, and it is clearly expressed that the "Commander-in-Chief" of this Army, the officers on his Staff, the officers commanding the troops, the Army Corps and the Division, with their Staff officers, had been selected and appointed. Their names were not divulged. In the same way, their duties were carried out secretly.

I enlightened the commanding officers immediately by instructing them that they were on no account to obey such orders and instructions. I added that an inquiry had been instituted for the purpose of discovering the origin of this enterprise.

After I had arrived at Sivas I learned from Karavasif Bey, who had come there, that he and his companions were the authors of these circulars.

In any case, they had been acting without authority. It was a dangerous thing to try to make people obey the orders of an anonymous committee, with an unknown chief in command and a host of unknown commanding officers, by threatening them with the penalty of death if they dared to disobey. Signs of mutual distrust and fear began, indeed, to make their appearance among the military forces. For instance, it was not improbable that the commanders of some of the Army Corps might ask with perfect right, "Who is in command of my Army Corps? When and how will he take over the command? What will my position be then?"

When I asked Karavasif Bey who constituted the committee and who were the superior officers and anonymous high person on the General Staff, he replied:

"You and your comrades, of course!"

His answer took me completely by surprise. It had neither reason nor logic in it, because I had never been spoken to about such an enterprise or such an organisation, nor had I given my assent to it in any form.

When we know that this Society tried subsequently to carry on its work, particularly in Istanbul, without altering its name, surely we cannot be favourably impressed with its honesty.

The main thing was to induce the Government in Istanbul not to offer further resistance to the national movement, because such an alteration in its attitude would strengthen and facilitate the success of the cause.

With this idea, I took advantage of the fact that Ferit Paşa, who had returned to Istanbul, had completely failed and had almost been subjected to humiliation, and decided to send him a telegram in cipher on the 16th August, 1919, from which I give you some important extracts:

"Having just heard of the detailed reply which M. Clemenceau has addressed to Your Highness, I am fully conscious of the great weight of sorrow and bitterness that must weigh upon you now on your return to Istanbul . . ."

"I cannot think that there is any sensitive person who would not be stirred to the depths by the irrevocable decision arrived at to divide and annihilate the Empire in such a glaring and humiliating manner. Thank God, our nation is endowed with such fortitude of mind and intrepidity of spirit that it will never sacrifice its life and its historic traditions from a feeling of discouragement, or allow itself to submit to such a sentence of execution.

"I am firmly convinced that Your Highness can no longer look upon the general situation and the real interests of the Empire and the nation with the same eyes that you regarded them with three months ago."

"It is, indeed, very unfortunate from the point of view of the dignity of the nation to be compelled to admit that the different Cabinets that have succeeded one another during the last nine months have all shown gradually increasing weakness, until, unhappily, they have at last exhibited complete incompetence. It is imperative, if we are to appeal with authority to the country itself and foreign nations on matters connected with the fate of the country and expect them to give us a fair hearing, that we shall have their unqualified support.

"As an answer to the candour and seriousness which characterise the ideals of the nation in their struggle for life and independence, the Government prefer to maintain a passive attitude. This is most deplorable, and is liable to drive the people to take regrettable action against the Government.

"Permit me to insist in all sincerity that the nation is capable of enforcing its will in every way. No power can hold it back. Every negative act on the part of the Government is foredoomed to complete failure. The nation, following out the programme that has been decided upon, is marching forward to its goal with rapid and resolute steps.

"Your Highness has already personally taken account of the actual state of affairs and is aware that the counter-measures adopted by the Government will not be crowned with success.

"It is equally against common sense to look for a way out of our difficulties as suggested by the English. Sooner or later, that would be certain to end in failure.

"Moreover, the English themselves are already convinced that the real power lies in the hands of the nation, and at last have arrived at the conclusion that it is totally impossible to have dealings with a Government that is not supported by the people and that is not in the position to accept obligations in the name of the nation and, if they venture to do so, to whom the nation would not render allegiance . . .

"All that the nation desires can be condensed into this: If the Government will abandon its resistance to the national movement, which is quite legitimate, and leans for support on the nation and is in full accord with everything that has been done to fulfil the aspirations of the nation, it must guarantee as quickly as possible that it will convene a Parliament that shall represent the well-being of the nation and carry out its will."

Meanwhile, everything was being done at Amasya to hasten on the election of delegates to the congress we were trying to assemble at Sivas, and we were doing all we could to make sure of the safe arrival of the delegates. All the military commanders and a great number of patriots showed extraordinary enthusiasm. But, at the same time, we were hampered by the reactionary propaganda that was spread in all directions by our enemies, and chiefly by the counter-measures adopted by the Government, which also made our work very difficult. Some districts not only declined to elect delegates but replied to us in a manner that had a very damaging influence upon the people and nearly drove them to desparation. Thus, for instance, the telegram in cipher sent by Omer Halis Bey, an officer on the Staff, on the 9th August, in the name of the officer commanding the XXth Army Corps, contained among other news from Istanbul the following, which is noticing:

"1. Istanbul is not sending any delegates. Although it approves of what has been done in Anadolu, it does not wish to do anything rashly or without full consideration.

"2. It is impossible for us to send delegates from Istanbul. The persons we have spoken to about it, uncertain whether they will be able to work successfully in Anadolu, do not see their way to go there or risk the trouble and expense involved in a fruitless journey. (You are aware that we had specially invited certain men by letter.)"

While we were struggling to overcome obstacles that stood in our way, so that we would be able to rely on the election of delegates in every part of the country, unrest began to show itself in Sivas, the very town we had chosen for the congress to be held in because we believed it to be safest place.

I ought to mention that, although I regarded Sivas as a perfectly safe place from every point of view, I had thought it prudent all the same during my stay at Amasya to take every necessary military precaution and disposition along all the roads leading to Sivas from places in the vicinity, as well as from those situated at a distance.

This is how the news of the unrest that had broken out at Sivas reached me.

When I was asked to come to the telegraph office at noon on the 20th August a long telegram from Reşit Pasa was being received. It ran as follows:

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Erzurum.

Pardon me for troubling you. First of all, let me ask how you are. This is what I want to tell you.

Yesterday morning I returned the visit of some French officers who had arrived at Sivas the day before yesterday from Istanbul and who had called on me in the vilayet. These officers were accompanied by some Jesuits, who had come ostensibly to take over some French institutions, but in reality to see what was happening in this district. Before I left, Major Brunot, the Inspector of the Gendarmerie, who was present, said he would like to speak to me privately, and took me into another room. This is, word for word, what he said:

"I have heard it rumoured that Mustafa Kemal Paşa and the delegates are coming here to hold a congress. I have heard this from some French officers who came from Istanbul. What astounds me is that, in spite of our being in such close touch with one another and the high esteem I have for you, you have told me nothing about this."

I tried to mollify him by saying something that I thought would ease his mind, but at last he said: "I know for certain that we have definitely decided that if Mustafa Kemal Paşa comes to Sivas and attempts to hold a congress here, this territory will be occupied within five, or at the utmost ten days. I am only telling you this because I have so much respect for you. If you do not want to believe me now you will have to do so when what I am saying is an accomplished fact. You will be one of those who will be guilty of the misfortunes of your country.

"The telegram in cipher that came yesterday from the Minister of the Interior seems to give the same impression, although it was differently worded. One of the French officers who arrived recently had a long talk yesterday to the officer commanding the Corps, and tried to draw out from him what he knew about the congress.

"This morning Major Brunot came to tell me that the question of the congress would be discussed at three o'clock in the presence of the French officers but that, on account of our friendly relations with one another, he was particularly anxious to speak privately to me about it beforehand. After we had been talking for a little while, he said:

"I have been thinking a great deal about this matter since yesterday and I have finally decided that if Mustafa Kemal Paşa and the members of the congress do not make speeches or do anything else in a hostile spirit against the Entente Powers, there will be no objection to the congress being

held here. I am going to write personally to General Franchet d'Esperey to ask him to cancel the order for Mustafa Kemal Paşa's arrest. I shall also ask him to induce the Minister of the Interior to request you not to interfere with the congress, but only on condition that you will not withhold anything from me. Our sincere friendship obliges me to speak quite openly to you." He told me that it is important to know when the congress is going to meet.

"I replied that I did not know anything about it, but that if I should hear anything I would let him know, and that on account of our friendship I would not hide anything from him.

"I feel it my duty to trust to your keen judgment to discover what could have led the major to be in this lenient mood to-day after the emphatic remarks he made yesterday about occupying the country.

"It is unnecessary for me to say anything more about it.

"It seems that their intention is to let you come here with all the other members of the congress, under the impression that they have taken up a benevolent attitude towards this meeting, and then turn round suddenly and arrest you and all your friends together. Then they would probably carry out their threat of occupation.

"A telegram in cipher which I received yesterday from the Minister of the Interior was somewhat to the same effect, but couched in different terms. I am giving you the facts exactly as they are and beg you to keep them secret. It is now my duty to advise Your Excellency in view of the net of intrigues and dangers that surround you, as I might say, practically under my eyes. I cannot abstain from sending you this information, and I urgently suggest that you abandon the idea of holding the congress at Sivas. I implore Your Excellency and our other honourable comrades to give up the idea of holding this second congress, unless you consider it to be absolutely necessary.

"If you cannot abandon it, I beg you, for the country's sake, to hold it at Erzurum instead, for that is a place that is not likely to be occupied; or, if you prefer, at Erzincan. In any case, I urge you to give up the idea of Sivas, which is so much exposed from every side. Selâhattin Beyefendi, commanding the Corps, will also send you his views through His Excellency Kâzim Paşa. Rasim Bey, the former deputy for Sivas, who is here with me now, will telegraph himself to Hoca Raif Efendi, the former deputy for Erzurum, and give him his news and views about this.

"They will forward his telegram to Hoca Raif Efendi on his return from Ilica — naturally after you have read it.

"This is the exact state of affairs, Your Excellency. Trusting to your widely-known patriotism, I will not venture to press you further, and meanwhile I am awaiting your orders.

Reşit

Then he quoted Rasim Bey's telegram.

This is the answer I sent to this telegram. On the following day we tried to keep Reşit Paşa quiet by sending him a telegram to the same effect in the name of the Representative Committee. (Document 43.)

Another telegram was sent indirectly to Kadı Hasbi Efendi. (Document 44.)

We also sent a message to the officer commanding the Army Corps. (Document 45.)

I wrote personally to Rasim Bey to calm him. (Document 46.)

20th August, 1919. 1 p. m.

To His Excellency Reşit Paşa, Vali of Sivas.

I am very much obliged to Your Excellency for the information you have sent me and for your remarks upon it. I consider the threatening behaviour of Major Brunot and his colleagues to be mere bluff. The convening of the Congress at Sivas is not a new question. Everybody has known all about it for months past. But it is surprising that the authorised political representative of France in Istanbul should imply that they consider the national movement is justified and legitimate and that they are now ready to assure me in writing that they feel they ought to take into account the claims of the nation and support them, if they are laid clearly before them.

It is quite possible that the change in his tone and the moderate language Major Brunot has employed in his second interview with you are intended to convert me to his way of thinking. The occupation of Sivas by the French within five or ten days is not quite such an easy thing as Major Brunot seems to imagine.

Your Excellency will undoubtedly remember that the English went still further in their threats, and decided to land their troops in Batum at Samsun. They did, in fact, land a battalion there to threaten me; but when they realised that the nation was firm in its resolution to reply to such an attempt by firing on them, they discreetly arrived at the conclusion that it would be wiser to think twice about it, and withdrew, not only the troops that they had landed at Samsun but the battalion that was already there.

The questions we shall discuss are made clearly evident in a manifesto issued by the Erzurum Congress. Therefore, it can easily be seen that there is no idea of the new congress attacking the Entente Powers. Besides, I may say that I am not one of those who would humiliate themselves so far as to agree to a French protectorate or that of any other foreign Power. For my part, it is upon the nation alone that I rely and from which I derive all my strength. The questions as to the opportunity, the time for, and the place of the meeting of the congress, depend entirely on the will of the nation, whose decision is far above any personal opinion of mine. The idea of the French pretending that they will allow the congress to be held at Sivas and then find some excuse for laying their hands on its members, as you seem to anticipate, is in my opinion greatly exaggerated. I have no objection to your telling Major Brunot and his colleagues, word for word, what I am saying to you. Major Brunot and those with him will thus have an opportunity of knowing that it is altogether out of the question that the nation will hesitate for a moment or for any reason whatever to carry out the deliberate decisions that have been taken to safeguard their rights and defend their independence, as we have repeatedly informed their political representatives in Istanbul, and not them alone but the whole world.

Major Brunot must be well aware that if the French were to decide to occupy Sivas, they would have to face a new and very expensive war, which would entail the necessity of their bringing up fresh troops and incurring very considerable expense.

Even if Major Brunot, the honourable Inspector of the Gendarmerie, and his colleagues really contemplate doing anything of this sort, it is most improbable that the French nation would approve of it.

I have read the telegram from Rasim Bey addressed to Raif Bey. I request you to tell him that there is no cause at all for anxiety.

I shall place the information and your observations which you have sent me, as well as Rasim Bey's telegram, before the Representative Committee.

A final decision about the Congress at Sivas will only be arrived at after the Representative Committee has gone into the question. Whatever they decide will naturally be communicated to you. Meanwhile, I must request Your Excellency to take every care that Major Brunot's threats will not become known, because if they are it will excite the people. I beg you, my highly esteemed Paşa, to be assured of my special regards. Please convey my greetings to Selâhattin Bey and Refet Bey.

Mustafa Kemal.

A second telegram from Resit Pasa, which came after I had replied to the first, read thus:

It is my duty to inform Your Excellency what I have been able to ascertain.

I must ask you to pardon me if I have not clearly understood the views expressed by the French representatives in Istanbul and have misjudged the action I thought they might take against you.

Considering your well-known patriotism and the fact that the salvation of the country is at stake, it is for you and the honourable members of the congress to decide what will be the best thing to do after you have thought the matter over carefully.

I shall implicitly obey your orders.

With the expression of my high esteem.

Resit

To make the matter fully understood in the districts of Diyarbakir and Bitlis, I wrote privately to the chiefs of several tribes, some of whom I had met when I was in command of the Army there.

I had already got into touch with some of the chiefs in the districts of Van and Bayazit. (Documents 47 — 53.)

At last, gentlemen, in August, we heard that the delegates had started from all the districts and were on their way to Sivas. Some of them were already beginning to arrive there. These latter were asking me when I thought I would be able to come to Sivas.

This made it necessary for me to leave Erzurum. But as can readily be seen from what I have told you, the Congress of Sivas wanted to link up all the vilayets in the east and the west, as well as those in Trakya — in fact the whole of the country. The eastern vilayets had, therefore, to send delegates to the congress, but it was impracticable to elect delegates in these provinces. It was also discovered that it was impossible to arrange for those delegates who had met at the Erzurum Congress to come to Sivas.

Besides, these delegates had received from their districts only a limited mandate in the name of the Committee of the "Defence of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces," and did not consider that they were authorised to extend that mandate generally. In the same way, it was evident that the Erzurum Congress had no authority to send a delegation to the Sivas Congress in the name of the Eastern Provinces.

It was just as impracticable to go to the trouble of electing new delegates, who would find themselves unnecessarily lost in a labyrinth of theories.

The simplest and most practical thing to do was to bring the Representative Committee of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces" to Sivas.

I knew that the thought of coming down from his mountains would inspire the chief of the Mutki tribe with dread.

Sadullah Bey, the deputy for Siirt, was nowhere to be found.

Servet Bey and Izzet Bey, making some excuse or other, had gone to Trabzon when the congress was over.

Rauf Bey and Raif Bey were at Erzurum. Raif Bey also made excuses. We thought that, perhaps, on the way we might meet Seyh Fevzi Efendi.

I tried to persuade Servet Bey and Izzet Bey, but they did not come. Raif Bey agreed to come with us. Altogether we numbered five members of the Representative Committee; three from Erzurum, one from Erzincan, and Bekir Sami Bey, whom we found at Sivas. Now as we thought that we ought to examine the powers of the delegates who had come to the Congress at Sivas, I drew up a document and sealed it with the seal of the Representative Committee. It ran as follows:

"From the Representative Committee:

Mustafa Kemal Paşa,
Rauf Bey,
Raif Efendi,
Seyh Fevzi Efendi,
Bekir Sami Bey.

"The persons whose names appear above have been elected by the Erzurum Congress to take part in the Congress at Sivas as representatives of the Eastern Provinces.

(Official seal)"

We left Erzurum on the 29th August, 1919.

You will remember an incident that occurred when we were travelling from Amasya to Erzurum, and about which we have spoken already.

Strangely enough, we found ourselves in a similar position when we were going from Erzurum to Sivas.

On the morning of our departure for the west from Erzincan, when we

had reached the Pass of Erzincan, our motor-cars were stopped by some gendarmes and officers, who were in a great state of excitement.

"The Kurds of Dersim have occupied the pass. It is very dangerous for you to go on," they told us.

One of the officers offered to send a message to the chief town in the district asking for reinforcements to be sent, and when they arrived they would attack the brigands, drive them back, and clear the road...

Very good; but how strong are these brigands? Where do they carry on their depredations? How strong are the reinforcements likely to be when they do come?

Before these questions could be answered, I would have had to go back to Erzincan and lose, who knows how many days. But we were in a great hurry. If I failed to arrive at Sivas on the appointed day by covering the distance lying between Erzurum and Sivas in the ordinary time, and if it became rumoured in Sivas and elsewhere that I had altered my mind and for some reason or other was coming by a different route, there would surely have been panic amongst the people, and this would have wrecked all our plans.

In this emergency what ought I to have done? Go on and risk the danger? That was the only thing that could be done. But I thought it just as well to take some precautions.

Therefore, we sent another motor-car in advance, equipped with some light machine-guns, and put some of our loyal comrades in it with Osman Bey, known as Tufan Bey (now commanding a regiment), in charge of the party. Without taking any notice of shots that might come from the right or left, the party was ordered to push forward as fast as possible.

If any chanced to be killed or wounded, they were to be left behind. If the bandits should hold them up, either on the road itself or in the immediate vicinity of it, they were to get down quickly from the car, attack them and force their way through. The survivors were immediately to get in again and drive on as fast as possible. These were the orders I gave.

Many people will probably think that it was not a very prudent or safe thing to do. But we happened to know that just at that very time Ali Galip Bey, Vali of Elâzığ, was ranging through the district of Dersim and that he was doing all sorts of things there, but I cannot say that I really believed that the pass was actually occupied.

From the beginning I thought that this was all part of a plan invented

by certain persons who were kindly disposed towards the Government and who wanted to delay me on my journey. Moreover, even if the Kurds would have blocked the pass it is most unlikely that they would have done more than fire a few shots onto the road from a hill some way off.

So we went on, and crossed the pass and arrived at Sivas on the 2nd September, 1919. Long before we reached the town, the inhabitants came out to meet us and greeted us with great enthusiasm.

Selâhattin Bey, commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, was at Sivas. He and the Vali had shown extraordinary interest in our arrival, and extended the greatest hospitality to us in arranging accommodation for the delegates who were coming to the congress. He also prepared the school, which he had chosen for the Representative Committee to meet in, and the larger halls for the congress.

Refet Bey was not there. Nobody knew where he was; but on the 7th July we had ordered him not to leave the district where the IIIrd Corps was quartered. His presence would have been very advisable, especially while the congress was sitting.

We heard by letter that he was at Ankara. I ordered Ali Fuat Pasa, Commanding the Army Corps at Ankara, to tell him to come immediately, without fail.

He arrived on the 7th September, and I introduced him to the congress as a member of the Representative Committee.

The delegates who had arrived before us had already held a meeting among themselves and had drawn up several preliminary proposals while they were awaiting our arrival. Several private meetings and discussions also took place after we came, and it was even said that some important resolutions had already been passed at them.

If you will allow me, I will tell you something about these characteristic proceedings.

The Sivas Congress was opened on Thursday, the 4th September, 1919, at four o'clock in the afternoon.

Husrev Sami Bey, one of the delegates, whom I had known personally for a long time, came to me in the morning with the following information. "Rauf Bey and several others are rumoured to have held a private meeting at Bekir Sami Bey's house and to have decided that they would not elect you as chairman."

I could not believe it possible that one of my trusty comrades — least of all Rauf Bey — had taken up such an attitude as this. I told Husrev Sami Bey rather sharply not to talk such rubbish, and added that what he said could not possibly be true; further, that he had no business to spread rumours that could only lead to misunderstanding amongst our friends.

I attached no importance to the question as to who should take the Chair at the Congress. As far as I was personally concerned, I thought it far preferable that an older man should be selected.

I asked some of the others what they thought about it. I met Rauf Bey with others in the corridor as we were going into the congress room.

"Whom shall we elect Chairman?" I asked him. Rauf Bey answered at once, though he appeared to hesitate and indecision was written on his face — immediately betraying that he was thinking what he should say: "We do not think that you ought to be Chairman."

This convinced me that Husrev Sami Bey was right and, naturally, I was rather upset about it. It is true that at the Erzurum Congress some people had thought that I ought not to be elected Chairman, but I happened to know something about their characters. Now that my most intimate associates appeared to be of the same frame of mind I began to wonder.

"I understand," I said to Rauf Bey, "this is the conclusion you came to at Bekir Sami Bey's house." Without waiting for him to reply, I left him and walked into the congress room.

When the Congress met, a high personage, who addressed the meeting first, made the following declaration, which I quote literally from the official minutes:

"The first business, naturally, will be to elect the Chairman. I propose that the Chair be taken in turns daily or weekly in alphabetical order, either according to the names of the members or of the vilayets or sancaks which they represent."

It is a remarkable coincidence that the proposer's name began with A, and so did that of the province which he represented. After I had formally opened the meeting with a speech, I provisionally occupied the Chair in my capacity as the founder of this Congress. (Document 54.)

"Why should that be necessary?" I asked.

"Because," replied the mover of the proposal, "it would avoid all personal questions and would make a good impression in the outside world when they see that we respect equality."

While I, in spite of infinite difficulties and obstacles, devoted myself heart and soul to the work which I felt convinced would enable me to find a way to save the country and the homes of each one of us — including that of the mover of the proposal — from falling into the abyss of misfortune that lay in front of us, the next speaker introduced personal questions. He was an old man, for whom I had great esteem but who had only just arrived from Istanbul and, therefore, could naturally have had only a superficial knowledge of the real situation.

I proposed that the motion be put to the vote. This was rejected by a large majority. Then I proposed that the Chairman be elected by secret ballot, and this resulted in my being elected practically unanimously, with only three votes against me.

*
* *

It was agreed that the Sivas Congress should deal with the resolutions and the manifesto already passed by the Erzurum Congress, as well as a certain motion drawn up by the members — approximately numbering twenty-five — who had arrived at Sivas before us.

The first three days — the 1st, the day of the opening, the 5th and the 6th September — were taken up with discussions about the oath we were to take, to show that we were not "Unionists"; also, with the exact wording of this oath, an address to the Sultan, and replies to telegrams that came when the Congress was opened. An important question was, whether the Congress should concern itself or not with politics.

Does not the last one appear very strange, considering that the struggle in which we were engaged was essentially of a political character?

At length, on the 4th day, we reached the principal object of our meeting and began to discuss the resolutions passed by the Erzurum Congress, to which we lost no time in agreeing. The reason for this was that we had already prepared amendments to the main resolution, so that everybody was familiar with them in advance.

I will mention the most important of them, because later on they gave rise to dissensions, lengthy correspondence and bitter opposition.

1. The title of the union, namely, the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anadolu," was altered to the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

2. The phrase, "the Representative Committee is representative of the

"whole of Anadolu" was amended to "The Representative Committee is representative of the whole of the country." Four new members were added to the number of those already appointed.

3. The clause: "Considering that we regard any sort of occupation or intervention as leading to annexation by Greece and the separation of Armenia, the principle of unified defence and united resistance will be adopted," was amended to "The principle of unified defence and united resistance will be adopted for the purpose of resisting any attempt at occupation or intervention, and particularly any movement designed to lead to annexation by Greece or the separation of Armenia."

These two clauses palpably differ from one another in a very important manner. In the first, no hostile attitude and no resistance with regard to the Entente Powers is referred to, while this is clearly inferred in the second clause.

4. The question proposed in Art. 4 led to a long discussion. The wording of it is:

"To decide upon the attitude to be adopted in regard to administration, politics and the military power in the event of the Ottoman Government being forced, under pressure from the Powers, to cede and abandon these territories (namely, the Eastern Provinces)." This question evidently refers to a provisional administration as a body.

In the text of the resolutions passed by the Sivas Congress, the expression "this territory" was amended by the more comprehensive and general phrase "to cede or abandon any part of our country."

Then, at our sitting on the 8th September we passed on to the motion I have referred to. This motion principally relates to the question of an American mandate.

Some persons who had come to Sivas from Istanbul had brought with them an American journalist, named Brown.

Before speaking of the dissensions that occurred at the Congress over this question, I will first of all say something about it for your information. You will be able to understand better from certain correspondence which was carried on at Erzurum and which I shall put before you verbatim:

Very urgent. Classified.

Amasya, 25th July, 1919.

To the C. O. S. of the Inspection of the IIIrd Army Corps, Erzurum.
For Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. Bekir Sami Beyefendi has arrived at Amasya to-day. I have had the honour of speaking to him for a long time. He declares that he has a very high opinion of Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Beyefendi and begs to forward them the following:

2. On principle, independence is undoubtedly preferable and desirable. Nevertheless, it is certain that if we claim absolute independence the Empire will be divided into several zones. If that should be the case, a mandate that will guarantee the integrity of our country is surely far better than independence that would be restricted to two or three provinces.

I hold that the most satisfactory solution for our nation would be to plead for an American mandate limited to a certain time, provided that we preserve our Constitution and our right to send representatives of the entire Empire to foreign countries.

I have discussed this with the American representative. He told me that it would be advisable to appeal to America, not by the voice of a few people alone but that of the whole nation. He proposes that we should lay the following considerations before Wilson, the Senate and the American Congress:

- a) The establishment of a lawful Government;
- b) The extension of public education;
- c) The guarantee of freedom in education and religion;
- d) The abolition of the Capitulation, and
- e) The acceptance of a general mandate over the whole of the Empire by the Government of the United States.

3. Further, the representative of the United States has declared himself willing to take a delegation elected by our congress to America on board a man-of-war.

4. As Bekir Sami Bey will still be here for a few days longer, he requests to be furnished with orders and instructions through me and, above all, that he may be informed of the date on which the Congress at Sivas will be opened. He would like to know, also, what place you think will be the best for him to wait at till then.

Arif
Temporarily Commanding
the 5th Caucasian Division.

Ciphered. Urgent and personal. 196.

Erzurum.

To the C. O. S. 5th Division at Amasya.

For Bekir Sami Bey, formerly Vali, now at Amasya.

1. Your telegram has interested me very much. The Congress of the Eastern Provinces, which is now sitting, is a powerful body comprising prominent persons possessed of great influence and prestige among the inhabitants of their districts. The complete independence of the State and the Nation is strenuously demanded in the discussions that are being carried on at this Congress.

Consequently there are certain drawbacks in bringing directly before the Congress the question of an American mandate, all the more so as the nature and form of such a mandate has not yet been determined upon. Referring to the conversations you have had in Istanbul, we particularly request you to give us further information on these points without delay.

As the news have received from Istanbul hitherto appears to be somewhat vague, we ask you to make these points clear. Similar vagueness can be seen in the communications from Istanbul coming through Refet Bey at Sivas on the 21st July. Consequently, we think it very advisable to demand full particulars direct from Istanbul.

a) You say that, in case we demand complete independence, it is certain that the country would be divided into several zones. What makes you so certain about this?

b) What are we to understand by the expression "territorial integrity"? Does it mean the integrity of the country or its sovereign rights?

c) You consider that the best course would be to accept a mandate, providing that our Constitution throughout the Ottoman territories shall not be impaired, and that we shall also have the right of being represented in foreign countries.

The remarks made by the representative of the United States seem, however, to contradict these terms. For, if the Constitution were to remain intact, the Government would consist of a Cabinet enjoying the confidence of the legislative power and would be directly under its control; but, in that case, the United States would have no influence at all on the composition of this Cabinet.

Then the Constitution would either remain in force and it would be unnecessary to ask America to form a suitable Government for us, or, if we

were to put forward such a request, the Constitution would become an empty word, without any meaning at all in it.

d) What are we to understand by the development and extension of public education? The first thing about it that strikes us is that it means the establishment of American schools in every part of the country. At present we have about 25 educational establishments at Sivas, one of them alone being attended by about 1,500 Armenians.

This being so, how can the extension of Ottoman and Islamic teaching be brought into agreement with this proposition?

e) The paragraph relating to freedom in education and religion is, to a certain extent, important. But what particular signification can it have if the privileges of the Patriarchates still exist?

f) What are the borders of the whole of the Ottoman possessions which the representative refers to in Art. 5? Are we to understand that they are the pre-war boundaries?

If this expression is intended to include Syria and Irak, will the population of Anadolu be entitled to demand a mandate over these provinces in the name of Arabia?

What is the policy of the present Government? Why has Tevfik Paşa gone to London? It is being said that for their part the English are also trying to obtain a mandate, exactly as the Americans are doing. What is the difference between them? What does the Government think about the American mandate? Are they inclined to accept it or not? Why have the Americans given up the idea of a mandate over Armenia? How far are they inclined to accept such a mandate?

2. The meeting of the Congress at Sivas is dependent upon the results of the Erzurum Congress. We are particularly interested in this question. In the meantime, it seems advisable that you remain at Tokat or Amasya.

With the assurance of our highest esteem,

Mustafa Kemal

Strictly private. Very urgent, 93.

Amasya, 30th July, 1919.

To the C. O. S. of the IIIrd Army Corps Inspection.

For Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

We forward you herewith the reply we have received from Bekir Sami Bey:

a) The Council of Four has decided to divide our country into several

parts and force us to accept several mandates, if we continue to demand our complete independence.

For this reason, he has suggested that the best way of avoiding such a possibility would be to ask for a mandate.

b) The preservation of our territorial integrity is founded solely on its sovereign rights.

c) We would not ask the United States to form a government for us. We would only assure America that we will form a lawful government ourselves. We will ask America to help us in our development and on financial questions, only on condition that our Constitution and all the sovereign rights of the dynasty and our diplomatic representation in foreign countries would remain untouched. These are the terms on which we would ask for a mandate.

d) The extension of public education does not infer that we would consent to American Schools being established, even in our villages, but that we would accept America's support in this direction, assuring her that we would do all we possibly could to encourage the extension of national and Islamic education. We want to entrust America with the mandate and not merely the American missionaries.

e) Freedom in education and religion is based on the precepts of Islam; as American opinion has no knowledge about this truth, we want to give positive assurances on the subject.

The borders about which the President of the United States speaks are the pre-war borders. The question as to whether we are justified in demanding a mandate over Syria and other territories, is one for the Congress to decide.

By the way, the American representatives in Syria and Irak have appealed for a plebiscite. The population, while demanding the formation of an autonomous Arabian State in Syria and Palestine, have expressed the opinion that an American mandate would be preferable to that of any other Power.

f) As the Government was formed only a short time ago, its policy is so far unknown. That of the preceding Cabinets was dictated by weakness and servile submission to the commands of the Entente. Tevfik Paşa has not gone to London, but has returned here with Ferit Paşa.

The opinion of the Americans, based on the reports of missionaries who have made inquiries on the spot itself, is that there is no possible way of setting up a Great Armenia before an actual Armenia has been defined. I will send you shortly a detailed letter on the question of the mandate.

g) For the present I shall remain at Tokat and will await further communications from you. I hope that the propaganda that is being distributed in the provinces will meet with success.

I send my best respects to all.

Arif
Commanding
the 5th Division..

Ciphered. Personal.

Erzurum, 1st August, 1919.

To the officer commanding the 5th Division at Amasya.

I beg that the following telegram be forwarded without delay to Bekir Sami Bey with the request that he will reply immediately:

To Bekir Sami Beyefendi.

Reply to your message of the 3rd July, 1919.

We have read your detailed statements concerning the American mandate. In principle, we have nothing to be afraid of. We must, however, draw your attention to another matter.

What advantage can the American Government expect that will compensate them for accepting the burden of a mandate on terms that are so much in our favour?

What, in that event, are the aims and objects that the Americans have in view? We are impatiently waiting to hear further news from you on this subject and what your own impressions are about it.

Mustafa Kemal

Amasya, 3rd August, 1919.

To the C. O. S. of the IIIrd Army Corps Inspection.

I beg to forward you Bekir Sami Bey's reply.

To Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Considering that the negotiations with the Americans have naturally been carried on privately and mean nothing but mere proposals, an exchange of opinions on the terms to be imposed on the parties to the agreement has not yet taken place.

Speaking generally, I think I ought to draw your attention to the necessity

of making arrangements for a congress to be convened and, if possible, to be opened without any delay.

Arif

Lt. Colonel on the Staff.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

The political situation in the country has reached a specially critical point. The time is rapidly approaching when the Turkish nation, having crossed the Rubicon, must take up a decisive attitude that will enable us to determine the course we shall follow.

The situation in Istanbul relating to foreign affairs is this:

Although France, Italy and England have offered a mandate over Turkey to the American Senate, they are trying by all possible means to prevent them from accepting it.

There is no doubt that each of these Powers wants to make certain of their share when the country is divided up.

France, having met with disappointments in Syria, wants to compensate herself in Turkey. Italy, being frankly and openly imperialistic, declares plainly that she has entered the war with the sole object of getting a good share of the Anadolu booty.

The part played by England is rather more complicated.

With an eye to the future, England has no desire that Turkey shall remain united or become modernised or enjoy real independence. A Turco-Mohamedan State, powerful and equipped with all modern requirements and ideas, and particularly with a Caliph at its head, would be an exceedingly bad example to the Mohamedan subjects of England.

If she could get power over Turkey without being interfered with at all, she would soon decapitate and dismember her without any compunction, and would try within a few years to convert her into a loyal colony.

Above all, the religious class has already pursued this idea for a long time, but, as it could not be realised without opposition from France, England cannot advance it.

But if it became necessary to preserve Turkey as a whole — that is to say, if England is satisfied that its partition could only be achieved at the price of great military sacrifices — she would give her consent to an American mandate and support it, with the simple object of preventing Latin nations from coming into the question.

This tendency is already noticeable among English statesmen. Well-known people, such as Morisson, are now considering the possibility of Turkey being placed under an American mandate.

Another solution has been suggested: ostensibly to allow Turkey her freedom so that she would suffocate within her own territory, by maintaining the Capitulations, but at the same time to deprive her of Trakya, Izmir, Adana — yea, even Trabzon and, beyond all doubt, Istanbul.

We who are living in Istanbul consider that a provisional mandate by America, extending over all the provinces of old and new Turkey, would be a minor misfortune for us. The following are our reasons for thinking so:

1. Whatever the terms may be, the Christian minorities will still remain. They will enjoy the privileges of Ottoman subjects and, relying on foreign countries — on some European Power, they will always make trouble. This will continually provide a pretext for foreign interference, and year by year we shall lose a certain degree of our independence in favour of these minorities.

Before we can set up a well-organised government and a modern Constitution, we must sweep away the privileges of the Patriarchates and deprive the minorities of the possibility of perpetually threatening us under the ægis of the Powers. An enfeebled Turkey, reduced in area, would not be in the position to accomplish this task.

2. Instead of the main principles of the governments that succeed one another and do nothing beyond satisfying the ambition of those who live only for profit, robbery, adventure and their own glorification, we must insert a clause that will ensure the welfare and the progress of the nation and transform the people — the peasantry — into a modern nation, sound both in body and mind. We possess neither the financial means nor the special knowledge and power requisite for the execution of such an idea. Political loans merely increase dependence. We do not feel that we are competent to create a state of existence that could produce any other results than the present ruling system, ignorance and vapid discussion.

Even allowing that our Government is incapable of appreciating American statesmen, notwithstanding that America is the only country that understands what the soul of a nation means and how a democratic régime is constituted — the only country that has succeeded in creating modern state machinery operating automatically in a country as wild as the Phillipine Islands — America is, I say, the only foreign Power that is more acceptable to us than all the rest.

It is the only political efficiency existing in the New World that could create a new Turkey within the space of twenty years, which, thanks to the education and mental development that would be acquired by every one of her sons, would enjoy true spiritual and economic independence.

3. We want help that will be capable of protecting our own country from the influences and rivalries of foreign nations. Our only hope to obtain this is from a quarter that lies beyond the boundaries of Europe and that is mightier than Europe.

4. In order to eradicate the evils that confront us and defend our cause with greater energy in the eyes of the whole world, it is imperative that we appeal for aid to a Power that is strong enough to support us. If we can win America over to our side and lay before her a form of mandate under which she could protect us from the thousandfold methods of oppression that are practised on us by imperialistic Europe, as well as its objectionable foreign policy, the solution of the Oriental Question, including that of Turkey herself, would thereby be achieved.

It is quite natural that America, whose mandate we must urgently appeal to her to accept, is not free of disadvantages, for reasons that have just been explained. We must sacrifice a great deal of our pride. The inclination to espouse a religious cause does not, as many people imagine, exist in the official character of America. The America of missionaries, who distribute money among the Christians, do not take any part at all in the administrative machinery of America which is not influenced either by religious or national considerations. It is organised for the purpose of maintaining perfect harmony between people of different races and professing different religious creeds.

America is not inclined to accept a mandate in the Orient and is anxious to avoid incurring any trouble for herself in America. But, in virtue of their systems and their ideals, the Americans consider themselves superior to European nations and treat this question as one that affects her pride.

If any people in any part of the world appeal to America in true sincerity, she takes a pride in showing Europe what an exalted form of administration she is capable of organising for the benefit of such a nation.

A movement that is rather in sympathy with us can be noticed among the prominent personalities in official America. A large number of influential Americans who have come to Istanbul as friends of the Armenians have departed as staunch friends of the Turks, resolved to make active propaganda in our favour.

The secret of official and non-official conception in America is this: She desires to obtain a general and undivided mandate over Turkey, on condition that her old frontiers shall be left to her and that no part of her territory shall be wrested from her.

During the stay of the American Commission in Syria, a public meeting was held for the purpose of asking for an American mandate.

This request met with a very favourable reception in America.

Official America seemed to be disinclined to create an Armenia on Turkish territory. If she were to be entrusted with a mandate, she would carry it out by looking upon the people of all nationalities inhabiting the country as brothers, members of the same nation, living on equal terms with one another. I have had this information from an absolutely reliable source.

But Europe — especially Great Britain — wants at any price to raise the Armenian Question and to see that the Armenians are adequately compensated. In the name of the Armenian martyrs, she does all she can to influence the public opinion of America. The danger that threatens us from Europe occupies the thoughts of all our intellectuals. Reşat Hikmet Bey, Cami Bey, even our diplomats who organised the national union, have all proposed different solutions of the American question. I will inform you officially about this in writing.

We are passing through an exceedingly critical time. America is following the course of events in Anadolu with the closest attention and sympathy. The Government is working hand in hand with England to deceive America with the idea that the Government is aiming at a massacre of the Armenians and intend to bring the "Unionists" into power.

Plans are continually being made to send troops to suppress the national movement. Everything is being done to win the English over to this idea. In prominent quarters the assurance is given that the national movement would find immediate support in America as soon as it made definite proposals and was not influenced by tendencies antagonistic to the Christians.

We are trying to delay the American Commission till the opening of the Congress at Sivas. We might even succeed in getting an American journalist to attend the Congress.

In consideration of what I have just said, and distressed by the fear of the possible dismemberment of the State, I feel sure that we would do well to put our trust in America, without losing this favourable opportunity, and rely upon her to defend our cause. Vasif, will explain to you the points in which we are in agreement on this question himself.

It is quite possible that one or two determined men can save Turkey.

The time for dissension and speculation has gone. We must fight with all our strength to safeguard our future, our development and our unity. Our unfortunate country has lost a great number of her sons on her frontiers. But how many heroes have fallen in the struggle for our spiritual progress and our civilisation?

We want the good patriots of Turkey to become the founders of our future. We are expecting you and Rauf Bey to work together, bearing in mind with judicious foresight the great future that lies before our country, which is shaken to its very foundations.

I send you my highest esteem and all good wishes for success in your enterprise.

I assure you that I, a plain Turkish soldier like yourself, am among the loyal champions of the national cause.

10th August, 1919.

Halide Edip

Karahisarı Sahip, 13th August, 1919.

To the Officer Commanding the XVth Army Corps.

To Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

All the political parties in Istanbul have unanimously decided to send the following resolutions to the American Embassy:

i. The Committee are of the opinion that the Turks in the Eastern Provinces and prominent persons at the head of the Government would be willing to agree to the surrender of part of the territory in the east of Turkey to form, eventually, an Armenian State, on condition that their own welfare and their future development would be duly taken into consideration. They believe, however, that the Turks concerned would not like this proposal to be publicly known, because they have made common cause with the Kurds, who are by no means favourable to the idea of abandoning any territory to the Armenians. Even if they should consent to this, the Turkish majority in these provinces would differ on this point from the Kurds, reserving the following conditions:

1. The integrity of the territory of the Turkish and Kurdish majority and of the other minorities dwelling among them.
2. The guarantee and confirmation of complete independence.
3. The abolition of the Capitulations, which hinder the free de-

velopment of Turkey on its way to progress; to allow her the possibility in the surest way of gaining her independence and her rights as provided for in Wilson's points.

4. . . . (illegible) with the League of Nations, American help in the realisation of these desires and the rapid development of Turkey.

II. Immediate accomodation in their new dwelling places for the Turks and Kurds living in the abandoned districts, with the guarantee of American help, thus securing them the possibility of immediately taking possession of this property.

III. Immediate transportation of all the Armenians who are inhabiting crowded settlements in these districts — specially between Erzincan and Sivas — to the territory of new Armenia.

IV. The cession of territory, the possibility of which we keep in view in the name and in favour of Armenia, shall not be carried out in the name of an independent Armenia, but in that of a modern State to be developed under the mandate of a Great Power; because the cession of territory in favour of an Armenia already in existence would mean the creation of a second Macedonia on the flank of Turkey and a centre of discord in the Caucasus.

V. All the foregoing is still in a state of . . . (illegible). But in order to put all this into a definite shape, it is absolutely necessary to enter into negotiaion with the Commissions now in the country and send a deputation to one of the important officials attached to them.

VI. It stands to reason that this question would have to be laid before the Ottoman National Assembly, so that it could receive legal and proper sanction.

Selâhattin
Commanding
the XIIth Army Corps.

In cipher. Personal. No. 339.

Erzurum 21st August, 1919.

To the officer commanding the XIIth Army Corps.

To the officer commanding the XXth Army Corps.

For the XIIth Army Corps only, referring to telegram in cipher of 13th August, 1919.

The resolutions arrived at by different parties in İstanbul to be communicated to the American Embassy have been received with the deepest

regret by our Representative Committee. In paragraph 1 the question of ceding a part of the territory of the Eastern Provinces to Armenia is mentioned. It is not only practically impossible to-day to cede even an inch of this territory to the Armenians, but it would be dangerous, considering that the overwhelming majority of the population consists of Turks and Kurds, to settle Armenians there *en masse*, even if they cared to dwell there again in face of the violent irritation and thirst for revenge that prevail among these elements. The widest concessions that could be granted to the non-offending Ottoman Armenians would be, consequently, to permit their return to their countries on equitable and equal terms. To contend that a compact Armenian population is dwelling between Erzincan and Sivas, as laid down for in paragraph III, shows complete ignorance of the actual facts. Even before the war, the inhabitants of these districts consisted of a preponderating Turkish majority, an infinitesimal proportion of Kurds, who are known by the name of "Zaza," and an insignificant number of Armenians — to-day there are scarcely enough to be worth mentioning. These committees should, therefore, first of all recognise the limitations of their competence and, if they really want to do something useful, take the trouble to study the statistics and graphic delineations drawn up for the peace negotiations by the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. We beg that you will forward this telegram to Istanbul.

Mustafa Kemal

Strictly confidential.

Ankara, 14th August, 1919.

To the C. O. S. IIIrd Army Inspection.
For Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Your last replies addressed to Istanbul have been forwarded to the proper quarter. In answer to these communications I have received a printed report and two long letters from Karavasif — or rather, from "Cengiz" — and from Halide Edip Hanım, who are both full of ideas that agree with the opinions of many others, like Ahmet Rıza Bey, Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Cevat Paşa, Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa, Reşat Hikmet Bey, Cami Bey, Reşit Sadi Bey and Esat Paşa. I will have a copy of these made for you and will send the originals to Sivas. All these documents plead that foreign help is necessary, and reasons are given why the acceptance of America is the least of all possible evils. The printed report was drawn up in agreement with the leading opinions, after Cami Bey, Rauf Ahmet Bey, Reşat Hikmet Bey, Reşit Sadi Bey, Halide Edip Hanım, Karavasif, Esat Paşa, and all the different

parties and societies had been consulted. According to their opinion there is still time to act. It is only necessary for the Congress to get to work as soon as possible and that the result can be made known before the Americans leave. An attempt is apparently being made to postpone their departure on various pretexts. Will the Congress be able to arrive at a final decision soon? The Americans, in urging this question, show that they are well disposed towards us. You are earnestly begged to hasten on the Congress.

Ali Fuat
Commanding
the XXth Army Corps.

The letters referred to in this telegram were forwarded by telegraph in cipher, which kept the telegraph lines fully engaged for several days. One of these telegrams, which followed one another in rapid succession, was to this effect:

Personal. Strictly confidential.

Ankara, 17th August, 1919.

To Kâzim Beyefendi, C. O. S. IIIrd Army Inspection.
To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

(Continued from paragraph 9 of the telegram in cipher, No. 880, of the 16th August, 1919. From Karavasif, supplementing the particulars communicated in Art. 10.)

1. If we were to take up a favourable attitude regarding American support, and if the Congress of the Eastern Provinces — a national congress — were to inform our Government of this fact in the shape of a unanimous desire communicated by telegram, it would provide Wilson with excellent material to lay before the American Congress. Most of the intellectuals approve of this idea and are preparing something to this effect. They say that it would be a very good thing if Anadolu would do the same. The American mandate would allow us to get rid of all the other scoundrels. We could arrange matters afterwards with the Americans alone, and the struggle would be made all the easier.

The Americans are criticising us severely and hold our Government up to public scorn and our nation to derision. . . . (illegible) the departure of the Plenipotentiaries from Istanbul, their arrival in Paris and the . . . (illegible). They say in addition that you assume that Europe will not dare to do it. You say, for instance, that Europe will not create a Great Armenia. Your Grand Vezir supports the idea of the frontier line running along the

Toros. He wants an Armenia, whereas none of the American Commissions has reckoned with such a possibility. All accounts agree in emphasising the fact that it is impossible to establish an Armenia in Asia Minor — indeed, even autonomous administrative councils. An Armenian population does not exist, nor is there a purely Armenian district. Such an administration, therefore, would be unable to function unless it were supported by a considerable military force. The Armenians do not possess this force. America cannot provide them with one. No other Power would entertain the proposal, except in so far as they would agree to occupy these districts and convert them into . . . (illegible), which is not practicable. Their rivalries are quite sufficient to stand in the way of any other kind of agreement.

This is all the news from Istanbul. Please study it carefully. We still have time. Wilson will soon lay the question before the American Congress.

2. In Istanbul they are continually discussing whether Mustafa Kemal will rally his followers or submit to whatever Istanbul decides to do and support it. Their aim is to secure the unity of the nation, the integrity of the country, its independence and its sovereignty. If Mustafa Kemal Paşa does not rally his followers and does not speedily enter into negotiations with America, England and the other Powers, we shall continue to act independently here. In that case, it is not impossible that something unpleasant will happen. I draw your particular attention to this point . . . (illegible) would be better to undertake this and direct the policy. As regards relying on Mustafa Kemal Paşa and what he is doing . . . (illegible), his declarations and actions are contradictory to . . . (illegible).

3. Hüseyin Selâhattin (the clumsy or one-armed man) is a hypocrite; he must be turned out. We must see that this individual, who is one of Sadik Bey's minions and stands high in his favour, will not be appointed to any official position.

Ali Fuat
Commanding
the XXth Army Corps.

This is the telegram I sent in reply to Karavasif Bey:

In cipher. Personal. Urgent. 152. Erzurum, 19th August, 1919.

To His Excellency Ali Fuat Paşa, commanding the XXth Army Corps.

Reply to your telegram of 17th August, 1919.

1. It is of the utmost importance for you to study minutely the nature of the American mandate and the proposed American help, and find out whether these are in accord with our national aims. Assuming that the object of all that has been done in Istanbul is to secure the unity of the nation, the integrity of the country, its independence and its sovereignty, will the acceptance of the American mandate be the best way to realize these aims?

2. As resolutions that do not agree with the desires of the nation cannot be entertained by it for a moment as being possible of execution, we can not discharge our duty, which consists in conscientiously gauging the future of the country and the conscience of the nation in such a way as to give the impression that we are specially authorised to act in all questions, before the ultimate aims of the nation have been definitely laid down. For this reason, we prefer that our negotiations and relations with foreign countries be conducted in the name of the nation, founded on the proceedings of the Congress. The development and expansion that the national movement, thank God, is showing throughout the country and its strength, which is daily increasing, support me in this opinion.

3. It must not be overlooked, that the only Government that could have the right to come to an understanding with America or any other nation, would be one that recognises the sovereignty of the nation, approves of the national council and possesses its confidence. This being the case, it is essential that all persons who constitute the Government shall combine these qualifications in themselves. Your work there, as well as ours here, must keep these conditions in view as our chief aim.

4. You will soon be informed of the resolutions passed by the Congress.

With brotherly greetings,

Mustafa Kemal

I would like to add that I think I ought to have a personal interview with the American journalist who has arrived at Sivas. He is a very intelligent young man, who has no difficulty in understanding what he is told.

I shall now try as well as I can to give you an account of the debates and discussions that took place in the Congress on the question of the mandate.

Many deputies took part in them. Before I joined in the debate, I said a few words as Chairman, which I quote from the official minutes:

"Before I enter into any discussion on this motion, I would like to draw your attention to certain matters. For instance, the name of Mr. Brown has

been mentioned, and it has been alleged that he has spoken about the arrival of an army of 50,000 labourers.

"Mr. Brown has assured me that he has no official status whatever, and whatever he said was merely in his character as a private individual. He denies that he said that America will undertake the mandate, but, on the contrary, declares that in his opinion it is probable that she will not accept it. In any case, he can speak solely in his own name and on no account on behalf of America. For his part, he has no idea what the mandate would be like. 'I can only suppose that the mandate will be exactly what you want it to be', he told me. The chief subject of this motion is the question of the mandate. Before we discuss it any further, I will adjourn the meeting for ten minutes." (3.25 p. m.)

When we met again I gave Vasif Bey permission to speak. He made a long statement defining the mandate. Then he gave way to others, and later on said: "Let us accept the mandate in principle and leave the details to be discussed later on."

Macit Bey, another delegate, spoke to this effect: "The main question before the meeting is, whether we shall be able to exist in future if we are left to look after ourselves. In what form shall we accept the mandate? And what terms shall we be able to come to with the Mandatory Power? Which of the Powers is it to be? That is the question."

Here the Chairman intervened with the remark: "It strikes me that two points arise from this discussion. One is that the Government cannot and must not abandon their demand for internal and external independence; the other is the question as to whether the Government and the nation, surrounded by enemies belonging to foreign countries, are justified in appealing for foreign support. To me this is very astonishing. If you are also of this opinion, we had better refer the matter again to the Committee for Motions. In any case, we have no intention whatever of losing our internal and external independence."

The next speaker was Bekir Sami Bey, who said: "The task that lies before us is as difficult as it is important. We must not waste a minute in empty discussions. Let us get on with our debate on this motion and pass it without any further delay."

"Allow me to explain this question," I said, "in my capacity as Chairman of that Committee. The motion has been read in Committee and was discussed for a long time. Our discussions did not result in a definite decision. The motion had been previously referred back to the Committee before it

was read in a full sitting. That is why we tried to come to a final decision on the question in Committee, in case the meeting, after having debated the question without arriving at an agreement referred it once more to the Committee."

İsmail Fazıl Paşa (since deceased) also spoke, and said: "I beg to associate myself with the views expressed by Bekir Sami Bey. We have no time to lose. After all, the question is a very simple one. Which are we asking for, full independence or the mandate? The decision we shall come to is limited to these alternatives. Let us lose no more time, or else this important question — perhaps the most important of all — would be referred once more to the Committee, only to be brought up before the meeting later. This would drag the question on indefinitely and our time is precious. To-day, tomorrow or the day after, at latest, we must pass this motion in a full sitting. Do not send it back again to the Committee, for it is a vital question."

Hami Bey followed. After he had declared that he shared the opinion of His Excellency İsmail Fazıl Paşa and Bekir Sami Bey, he expressed himself in these words: "Whatever happens, we must seek help. The elementary evidence of this necessity is that the revenues of the State are barely sufficient to cover the interest on our debt."

The next speaker was Raif Efendi, who opposed the mandate. Instead of simply replying to İsmail Paşa, he started a long discussion, during which Sami Bey spoke again. He said: "I would only like to add a word to what his Excellency İsmail Fazıl Paşa has just been saying and with which I am in complete agreement. It is this: At the Paris Conference in which we took part after the Crimean War — from which we emerged victorious — our Allies imposed certain conditions, of which you are aware. If we compare the ideas expressed in this motion with those conditions, I think that we shall see which affects our independence more powerfully."

Then Bekir Sami Bey, Hami Bey and, following him, Refet Bey, who subsequently was raised to the rank of Paşa, carried on the discussion. This is what Refet Bey said: "While there cannot be any doubt that the mandate will not prejudice our independence, some of our colleagues are putting questions like this: Shall we remain independent or shall we accept the mandate? Before we can answer them, we must know what the mandate will mean to us. But before I say anything more, I think it will be well to explain the meaning of the word itself, which occurs in the report and causes so much alarm. Fazıl Paşa speaks of 'a mandate under the reservation'

of our independence!' The motion proposed by Hami Bey in regard to the mandate is divided into two parts; the first is an explanation of the reasons for it, and the second gives a definition of it. Before I can form any opinion on the question of the mandate, so far as it is referred to in this document, I would like to know whether the actual text of the motion has been discussed in a full sitting or not?"

Ismail Fazıl Paşa then withdrew the motion in these words:

"Three of us, Bekir Sami Bey, Hami Bey and myself, beg to be allowed to withdraw this motion, because it has caused a great deal of misunderstanding and we prefer not to proceed with it."

(They kept the draft and the copy of the motion in their own possession.)

In my capacity as Chairman, I declared that the motion had been withdrawn.

Although the discussion should have terminated, Refet Bey made a very effective speech that filled five or six pages of the minutes. I think it will be quite sufficient if I quote a few passages from it to show what the speaker was aiming at.

He said:

"The object we are striving to reach in preferring an American mandate is to avoid being placed under an English mandate, for this would lead every human community into slavery and suffocate the minds and consciousness of the people; that is why we would prefer America, a nation that is moderate and respects the feelings of other nations . . . The question of money is not all a vital one . . ."

"Ideas concerning the mandate and independence expressed in words are not contradictory to one another. The mandate will strangle us if we are not really firm, and in that case it would injure our independence. On the other hand, let us agree that what we really want is complete internal and external independence; shall we then be strong enough to realize this by ourselves or not? Moreover, would we be permitted to act as we would like? This is a point that we must consider very seriously. There is no doubt that England, France, Italy and Greece want to disintegrate us to-day. But if we make peace under the ægis of a foreign Power, we shall be able in our own interest to revise its stipulations as soon as the conditions are favourable. If the situation grows worse, would we not be liable to be utterly destroyed? . . ."

"In any case, we are compelled to accept the American guarantee. In

the twentieth century it is impossible that a nation with a debt of 500 million pounds, its State property ruined, its soil barely productive and its revenues not exceeding, at the utmost, from 10 to 15 millions, could protect its existence without foreign aid. If in future we remain in this condition without insuring our progress by foreign assistance, we shall probably be incapable of defending ourselves even from an attack by Greece.

"In the event of Izmir remaining in the hands of Greece — God forbid it! — and war should break out between the two countries, the enemy would transport his troops by sea; but what railway line have we that would enable us to bring up our troops from Erzurum? The American mandate, therefore, must be accepted by us as a guarantee and an unavoidable source of assistance." The speaker concluded with these words: "I shall be very well satisfied if I have succeeded by what I have said in preparing the ground for further discussion."

You will have no difficulty in understanding how completely this skillful and brilliant speech was calculated to confuse the minds of all who heard it.

I immediately adjourned the meeting for ten minutes (5.30 p. m.) to prevent the minds of the deputies from being altogether poisoned by other speakers who might follow and who shared the same opinion, and so that I could have a chance to talk privately to some of the deputies.

The concluding passages in this speech are worthy of your special attention. Refet Beyefendi appears to think that the Greeks are only temporarily at Izmir and does not acknowledge that a state of war exists. I am convinced that if the Greeks remain there and war actually breaks out, we should not be able to extricate ourselves from a very difficult position.

At the following sitting Ahmet Nuri Bey, one of the delegates from Bursa, spoke for a long time against the mandate. Hami replied at still greater length. Towards the end of his extremely long-drawnout speech, he emphasised his contentions by adding:

"I shall now say something about one part of the question with which I am particularly well acquainted. As I have been talking personally to competent persons on this matter, what I am about to say is not mere conjecture but precise fact. Before I left Istanbul I called on İzzet Paşa, the former Grand Vezir. His Highness was also convinced that a mandate was the only possibility. He asked me what I thought about it. I explained my own point of view to him. Several days afterwards he sent for me and confided me with this. The members of the American Commission of inquiry, who had arrived in Istanbul after having travelled through the districts of

Syria and Adana, and who are now trying to draw out the opinions of the political parties here, paid a visit to İzzet Paşa at his residence. They expressed their conviction that the national organisation in Anadolu represents the Turkish nation and, looking upon İzzet Paşa as the founder of this movement, they said: 'If you can induce the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses to ask for an American mandate, America for her part will accept it over the whole of the Ottoman Empire'. After having told me this, the Paşa said that the nation had no longer the strength to carry on a new war, and we must not at any price attempt to lay ourselves open to anything of the kind. He advised me, if I happened to go to Sivas, to explain to the Congress the true state of affairs. İzzet Paşa is also convinced that a mandate demanded under these conditions would have a 90% chance of being accepted; but it would be necessary to propose definite terms. The Paşa even added that as America could only accept the mandate if it corresponded to the desires of the nation, the will of the nation to that effect would have to be definitely expressed. It would help America to support this view before the European Powers. I communicated all this to Rauf Bey in a telegram in cipher from İstanbul when he was at Erzurum. All who have more objection to the expression 'mandate' than to its actual meaning are obsessed by undue fear. The word itself is of no importance whatever. The essential point consists in the actual reality, in the nature of the question. Instead of saying that we have been placed under a mandate, we shall rather say, 'we are now an imperishable State'."

Among the replies produced by these words, this is what Husrev Sami Bey had to say: "Our duty is to protect ourselves and prove that we are 'an imperishable nation'." Hami Bey gave the impression in his speech that he was sounding the retreat. Karavasif Bey, who followed him, was still speaking when we adjourned for the day. I quote verbatim some paragraphs from his speech, just as they are recorded in the minutes:

"Even if all the nations agreed to grant us complete independence, we should still need help." (At the beginning of his speech Vasil Bey had proposed to substitute the expression "mandate" by that of "help".) "We owe something between 490 and 500 million pounds. No one can afford to make anybody else a present of such a sum. We shall be asked to pay our debt. Our revenues, however, are not even enough to pay the interest. What sort of a position shall we be in then? It is clear from this that our finances will not allow us to live in independence. Besides this, we are surrounded by countries whose only wish is to divide us up between them. If we agree to do what we are asked we shall perish. What can we do

without money? How can we protect ourselves without an army? While their aeroplanes are gyrating over our heads, we will have to jog along in carts. They send their dreadnoughts against us, while we cannot even build sailing ships. Even if we preserve our independence to-day, they will sooner or later begin to dismember our country." Vasif Bey brought his speech to a close with these words:

"The Americans who are now in Istanbul say: 'Do not be afraid of the mandate: it is mentioned in the original regulations of the League of Nations.' This is why I look upon England as our eternal enemy and America as the lesser of the two evils. If you agree with me, we can write from here to the representative of the United States in Istanbul and ask for a torpedo boat to be sent to take a delegation there secretly."

In the sitting on Tuesday, 9th September, Rauf Bey spoke about the mandate. I quote from the minutes:

"There has been a great deal said and written in the Press and in other quarters hitherto on this mandate question. Although this honourable assembly has agreed in principle to a mandate, it has not yet been clearly shown under whom it is to be. From certain hints and suggestions, we understand that America is referred to. I cannot see any reason why we should not say so quite openly."

This left no doubt that the opinion expressed by Rauf Bey and the conclusions arrived at by the Erzurum and Sivas Congress were divided.

From the statements representing Rauf Bey's point of view, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that they originated from the wording of Art. 7 of the manifesto issued by the Erzurum Congress, as well as by the Sivas Congress. Indeed, the wording of this article seems to have the peculiarity that it tries to agree with those who are going too far on the mandate question and disturb public opinion by the immense amount of propaganda they disseminate. But if we examine the wording of the article logically, it is evident that the idea of a mandate is not even referred to in it, and still less was there anything said about asking America to accept it. To explain this point, I shall quote the wording of this article.

Article 7: "Our nation fully appreciates modern ideals and is fully enlightened about our condition and our needs from the scientific, industrial and economic points of view. Consequently — so long as we preserve our internal and external independence, as well as the integrity of our country — scientific, industrial and economic help from any Power would be warmly welcomed by us, provided that it respects our national feelings and the

frontiers laid down in Art. 6, and exhibits no imperialistic intentions towards us. For the sake of humanity and the peace of the world, the speedy conclusion of peace based on these just and humane conditions is our ardent wish."

Where can we find in this article the shadow of a suggestion of a mandate or that America should accept it? At most, we might gather the idea of a mandate from the phrase, "scientific, industrial and economic help from any Power would be warmly welcomed by us." But it is certain that this is not the interpretation or the object of a mandate. We have always been pleased to accept every kind of help — and shall accept it even to-day — which is accorded to us on the terms referred to. In this spirit, we have accepted with pleasure the scientific, industrial and economic help given to us by a Swedish group in the construction of the railway lines running from Ankara to Ereğli and from Keller to Diyarbakır, and by a Belgian group in the construction of the lines from Kayseri via Sivas to Turhal. We will also accept the help of foreign capitalists who, for instance, would offer to develop the town of Ankara and other towns in Anadolu, and generally to construct and extend all our other railways, our streets and our harbours, on suitable terms. It will be sufficient for us if those who invest their capital in our country have no ulterior intention to destroy our independence and the integrity of our country.

Nor is the slightest hint to be gleaned about the United States from the phrase in the article that I will now quote:

"Any Power that respects our national feelings and exhibits no imperialistic intentions," because, America is not the only nation to honour these principles. For instance, is it not the same with Sweden and Belgium? And then again, if we had any intention to hint at the United States, we would have had to say "the power" or simply "power," instead of "any power." Therefore, it is evident that the favourable reception of scientific, industrial or economic help in the terms expressed in this article, can refer equally to all nations.

Can anybody understand how my point of view on this question of the mandate — a point of view so well known through the many written and verbal discussions that have been going on for such a long time and which you all know about at the present moment — should not yet have been appreciated by a comrade who had been associated with me, day and night, for several months? Consequently, we cannot help believing that, in reality, Rauf Bey did not agree with me and that he had changed his

mind after he had been talking to some people at Sivas who had come from Istanbul. It is difficult for me to say what I think about this. Let us hear a little more of what Rauf Bey has to say. He continues in this strain:

"When the armistice was declared, it was expected that the Germans would not sign the Peace Treaty. English newspapers published certain revelations. The first of them referred to the eventual possibility of Germany signing. They were confirmed by the events. The second related to the dismemberment of Turkey. This latter has fortunately not been realised. Consequently it may be concluded that the districts east of the Kizilirmak should be considered, according to the decisions of the Conference, as part of Armenia under an American protectorate. It was also suggested that Georgia and Azerbeijan would probably be assigned to America. On the other hand, Turkey would comprise the districts west of the Kizilirmak and would have access to the sea through Anadolu, whilst Izmir and Istanbul would be cut off from her. The northern part of this territory would be a protectorate of and administered by Italy and France, and the southern part would be under England. The occupation of Izmir showed that these disclosures were right. Threatened by this danger, we are obliged to accept the help of America, who adopts a most impartial attitude towards our country. I am firmly convinced of this."

I do not know whether you think it necessary to listen any further to Rauf Bey in order to gather what his opinions were like.

The interminable debates that took place, interspersed with lively discussions on this question, resulted in a compromise which brought the partisans of a mandate to silence. It was Rauf Bey who proposed it. The chief point consisted in demanding that a delegation from the American Congress should be sent over to study the country and report upon its real position, in order to counteract the effect of hostile propaganda which had been carried on against us for several years past in America.

This proposal was unanimously agreed to.

I remember very well that a document to this effect was drawn up and signed by the Chairman of the Committee, but I cannot remember exactly whether it was sent off or not. In any case, I never attached any particular importance to it.

We will now leave this subject for a moment.

The official minutes which I have been quoting in support of my statements were drawn up by Sükrü Bey, the delegate for Afyonkarahisar and sec-

retary of the committee, and Hami Bey, whose speech I read just now, from the notes made in his handwriting.

*

* *

The Congress came to an end on the 11th September.

On the 12th, a public meeting was held in which the inhabitants of Sivas took part, and several of them spoke.

The most important questions that had been discussed at the Congress referred to the hastening on of the election of deputies and the necessity of deciding where they should meet. Bu certain others, which I shall refer to, caused us to curtail the proceedings. Later on the Representative Committee went into these questions.

All the information that arrived on the 9th September I laid before the Congress in these words: "The English troops at Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar have been doubled. General Miller has arrived at Konya. Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya, and Muhittin Paşa, Vali of Ankara, are hesitant to be in opposition. It appears that Ali Riza Bey, the new Vali of Kastamonu, is a man of similar character to that of Cemal Bey.

"Knowing that my honourable colleagues were anxious for decisive action, I requested Fuat Paşa to act promptly and energetically. Relying on the confidence of the Congress, Fuat Paşa, acting in its name, ordered that the necessary communications should be made and steps taken forthwith. He begged the assembly to approve of this. Fuat Paşa severely reproved the Valis. He appointed officers of high rank to take command of the national troops in the various districts and invested them with full power to act in the name of the nation."

After the Congress had approved of this proposal, I continued:

"A certain Vali, named Galip Bey, who is already on the way, has apparently been appointed to Sivas. We have not been able to ascertain whether he is Ali Galip Bey, Vali of Harput, or Mehmet Galip Bey, Vali of Trabzon. We have also been informed that Major Nowill, an English officer, had arrived at Malatya, accompanied by Kâmuran Bey, Celâdet Bey and Cemil Bey, a member of the Bedrihani family, escorted by fifteen mounted Kurds. He was received by Halil Bey, the Mutasarrif of Malatya, who is also a Bedrihani.

"The Vali of Harput also came by motor-car, ostensibly to prosecute the brigands who plunder the mail-coaches. On the same pretence, a Division from Hisnimansur was placed at his disposition. We understood that their

real object was to rouse the Kurds and incite them to attack us, promising them in return a constitution for an independent Kurdistan.

"We took precautions to guard against such a possibility. Among other things, we intended to have the Vali and his companions arrested.

"As the Mutasarrif of Malatya for his part had called the Kurdish tribes together in this town, we had also decided to take adequate measures with the assistance of the XIIIth Army Corps. These steps were already completed. A Division of troops was got under arms that very night, and were dispatched to Malatya to suppress this agitation. The officer commanding the Army Corps here did everything that was necessary. Orders were given to Malatya and elsewhere."

Gentlemen, in this way I continually received intelligence while the Sivas Congress was going on. It was quite enough to put severe strain on my nerves. But I was under the impression that it would do more harm than good if told the Congress about it. You have just heard that although it was a very serious matter. I preferred to mention the case of Ali Galip prudentially.

In spite of all the difficulties and dangers that surrounded us, the most important thing in my opinion was to bring the discussions of the Congress to an end as soon as possible, by keeping to the motions before the meeting and putting them in force in the country without delay. I obtained my wish.

We took care that the resolutions passed by the national organisations were published all over the country as widely as possible, as well as the manifesto issued by the Congress, which had been printed.

As unforeseen events were to be anticipated, notwithstanding that the Congress was over, I thought it better to induce members of the Congress to remain at Sivas till the atmosphere cleared. At the same time, I made preparations for convening an extraordinary and still more influential congress if it should become necessary.

However, after the flight of Ali Galip there was no object in detaining the members in Sivas any longer. After the fall of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet there was no more need to arrange for an extraordinary congress. (Document 55.)

With your permission, I will now say something about Ali Galip's case, which was a very important incident in our national struggle.

At the beginning of July, while we were still at Erzurum, we received information that two individuals, Celâdet and Kâmuran Ali, who had been supplied with considerable sums of money by foreigners in Istanbul had

been sent to Kurdistan to agitate and intrigue against us there. We were told that they had already started or would do so at once.

After I had learned this, I wrote, on the 3rd July, to the officer commanding the XIIIth Army Corps at Diyarbakir and Halit Bey, Chief of the Staff, as well as the Mutasarrif of Canik, to the effect that these men were to be watched and arrested on their arrival, but care was to be taken to avoid causing any disturbance.

In an order I gave to the Commander of the XIIth Army Corps on the 20th August, I told him that I had heard that these persons were reported to have started, and advised him, among other things, to keep a sharp look out at the station at Mardin.

On the 6th September, the second day of the Sivas Congress, I made the following announcement:

We have been informed by the XIIIth Army Corps that these "three persons, Celâdet and Kâmurân of the Bedrihani family, and Ekrem, Cemîl Paşa's son, have arrived at Malatya via Elbistan and Arga, coming Diyarbakir, accompanied by a foreign officer who has previously been spreading anti-Turkish propaganda in the Vilayet of Diyarbakir, escorted by armed Kurds. They have been received by the Mutasarrif and Major of town."

The officer commanding the XIIIth Corps further informs us that "Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, commanding the XVth Army Corps, has reported to him in a telegram in cipher, No. 529, dated the 6th September, 1919, that a foreign officer states that he has been authorised by the Government to study on the spot the proportion of Turks, Kurds and Armenians living in these districts, and that, on account of its unsatisfactory strength, the cavalry regiment quartered at Malatya had not ventured to arrest the individuals in question, but had applied to Istanbul for their arrest. I have requested the Vali of Harput to tell me all he knows about the subject, what the purpose of this commission is and how they intend to travel." (Document 56.)

But it happened that Ali Galip Bey was at that time the Vali of Harput. We had already known since the 3rd July the purpose for which these people had come into these districts. The actual strength of a cavalry regiment one would have thought was surely sufficient to deal with five, or even ten, armed Kurds! It was said that they lacked sufficient courage to arrest them and, what appears to be specially astounding, that they had applied to Istanbul to arrest them.

I merely mention these details which seem at first sight to be unimportant, because, they reveal the remarkable differences of opinion that

existed and throw some light on the situation that will make it easier for you to form a clear judgment on the subject.

As I had reason to suspect the attitude of the Commander of the XIIIth Army Corps at Diyarbakır, I turned to the C. O. S. of this Corps in a message in cipher, dated the 7th September, signed by the Commander of the IIIrd Corps and marked "personal," informing him that, to save time, the IIIrd Corps had thought it necessary to order İlyas Bey, commanding the 15th Regiment stationed at Elâzığ, to go personally with sixty men, mounted either on horses or mules, on the 9th September, at latest, to Malatya and arrest the Vali Galip, the Mutasarrıf of Malatya, Halil, Kâmurân Bey, Celâdet Bey, Ekrem Bey and the English major, and escort them to Sivas. The C. O. S. was ordered to march this detachment off without delay. He was informed that officers in motor-cars would be sent to Sivas. (Document 57.)

I received the following reply from the Chief of the Staff in a telegram in cipher, dated the 7th September, from Diyarbakır:

Telegram in cipher, No. 357.

"I have received your order for the arrest of these persons. I do not believe it possible that the officer in question, whose military spirit I am well aware of, will obey this order.

"But I think he will not hesitate to obey an order given by me. We are in correspondence with İstanbul about this matter. In these circumstances, it rests with yourself to do what you think advisable."

Halit, C. O. S. XIIIth Army Corps.

İlyas Bey, commanding the regiment at Elâzığ, on his part, sent the following reply on the 8th September by telegram in cipher after the communication from the IIIrd Corps had been sent off:

"The commandant of the Army Corps has ordered me to postpone my departure.

"As it appears to me to be impracticable to march off without orders from here, I beg you to intervene and see that I receive the necessary orders to leave." (Document 58.)

I replied to Halil at once:

7th September, 1919.

"I have proof of the treachery of the persons concerned. The Government is involved in it by . . . (illegible)."

"If I wait for your orders, it will favour the enemy.

"I hope that I may receive formal orders immediately, without loss of time. If you expect that the commander will hesitate, you must yourself instruct the officer commanding the regiments at Elâzîg and Malatya to obey your orders.

"If it should become necessary, you had better appoint the best man you can find to take over the command of the Army Corps. This is not the time for dallying or trickery. Act promptly on your own initiative, dear brother, and tell me what you have done."

Mustafa Kemal

On the same day I sent the following order personally to İlyas Bey, commanding the regiment:

"The treachery of the persons concerned is proved.

"The Government in Istanbul is implicated in it. It is possible that the officer commanding your Corps will apply for instructions as to what he should do, and will receive no reply. Therefore, I look to you to settle this affair on your own account. I am awaiting your answer.

"When you have performed your duty at Malatya, and if you think it necessary to do so, you may come to us at Sivas."

Mustafa Kemal

The non-ciphered signature to this telegram was that of Zeki Bey, the C. O. S. of the IIIrd Corps.

During the night of the 7th September, I ordered the Commander of the 12th Cavalry Regiment at Malatya to come to the instrument to have a telegraphic conversation with me. From Cemal Bey, commanding the regiment, I was told about the state of affairs in general and about the troops under his command. He reported to me that the escort of the persons who had arrived consisted of "fifteen or twenty" armed Kurds and that the actual strength of his regiment that he could muster was "barely more numerous."

I told him that I considered this number quite sufficient. Strictly speaking, the officers of the artillery and cavalry regiments combined would alone have been quite sufficient by themselves. I only wanted to know exactly what the real position was and what the moral outlook was like.

Our telegraphic conversation was to the following effect:

I said: It is absolutely necessary to lay clever plans to arrest Vali Galip Bey, the English major, Kâmurân Bey, Celâdet Bey and Ekrem Bey this very night and to send them immediately on their way to Sivas. Can you do this? Reinforcements will be sent to you from here and Harput.

Cemal Bey: Is the Vali included among them?

I: Yes, he is the first one to be arrested.

Cemal Bey: As I have already told you, my troops are not strong enough for the purpose. I have been in correspondence with the Commander of the XIIIth Corps about the arrest of Kâmurân Bey, Celâdet Bey and Ekrem Bey. I have definitely received an order that their arrest is not advisable, because the position is very critical.

I could not urge this man further. Therefore, I confined myself to advising him to keep a strict and secret watch over all the persons concerned, assuring him at the same time that an order to his Army Corps would certainly arrive, without fail. If they should leave, I instructed him to inform me by what route and how they would march. (Document 59.)

On the 8th, I asked Cemal Bey in a telegram in cipher "whether these persons were still there and how he thought our plans were going on." I also urged him to send me news twice daily.

On the following day (9th September), in reply to my telegram, Halit Bey told me that the necessary order had been given to İlyas Bey, the officer commanding the regiment at Elâzığ and quoted the text of it. (Document 60.)

Cevdet Bey, commanding the Corps, reported to me that İlyas Bey had marched off on the morning of the 9th September with fifty-two men mounted on mules and with two machine guns, and that he was expected to arrive at Malatya on the evening of the 10th September. In the same telegram in cipher, Cevdet Bey added: "I am sorry I cannot do more, because I am surrounded by reactionaries." (Document 61.)

On the 9th September, besides İlyas Bey's detachment, two squadrons of cavalry from Elâzığ and a squadron belonging to the regiment at Malatya which was then at Siverek, had left for Malatya. (Document 62, 63, 64.)

I wrote on the same day personally to Halet Bey (previously deputy), who was at that time at Kemah and who, I was aware, was in touch with the districts of Elâzığ and Dersim, asking him to proceed to Elâzığ and put himself in communication with Haydar Bey, so that they could counteract

the effect of the propaganda that was being spread in this district by Ali Galip the Vali, and Bedrihanis, and Cemil Paşa's son. (Document 65.)

Towards the end of the month Halet Bey arrived at his destination. But Haydar Bey, Vali of Van, received instructions to leave Erzurum and proceed to Elâzığ to take up his duties there as Vali. He was ordered to get into communication with the commander of the cavalry regiment at Mama Hatun, which was under the command of the XVth Corps, and lead this regiment to Elâzığ if he thought it necessary to do so. He also reported that some officers would be sent by motor-car to Malatya.

As a matter of fact, our comrade Recep Zühtü Bey, holding the assumed rank of A. D. C. to the officer commanding the IIIrd Corps, had left by motor-car on the 9th September with some of his companions in the direction of Malatya, furnished with special orders from me.

Unfortunately, the roads were dirty and impassible; at Kangal the car broke down, so that the deputation was unable to reach Malatya at the proper time. From Kangal they travelled day and night by road, sometimes on horseback, at other times by any vehicle they could procure; they could reach Malatya before the evening of the fourth day after their departure from Sivas. The reports sent to us by Recep Zühtü Bey are very helpful for us to get a general idea of the situation.

On the evening of the 10th September we received this telegram:

Urgent and personal.

Malatya, 10th September, 1919

To the Headquarters of the IIIrd Corps at Sivas.

For His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. "Arrived at Malatya on the 10th September, at 2 p. m.

2. "I am sorry to say that the persons in question had already fled in the direction of Kâhta. Detailed report follows."

Ilyas
Commanding the 15th Regiment.

On the same day, somewhat later than Ilyas Bey's, the following telegram arrived:

Very urgent.

Malatya, 10th September, 1919.

To the Headquarters of the IIIrd Army Corps at Sivas.

For His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. "The Vali of Harput, the Mutasarrif of Malatya, the English major and their accomplices fled at daybreak, immediately they heard that the 15th Regiment had left Elâzığ and that they would be arrested. It is reported that they have gone to Bedir Ağa in Kâhta, and that they intend to raise a band of Kurds there for the purpose of attacking us by surprise.

2. "An order has arrived from the commandant of the Corps that they and the people belonging to the tribe of Bedir Ağa are to be resisted if they attempt a surprise attack. We are on the track of the fugitives. A further report will follow."

3. "The officer commanding the 15th Regiment arrived here at 2 p. m. at the head of his detachment."

Major Cemal

Commanding the 12th Cavalry Regiment.

When these two telegrams that were sent off on the same day are compared, some interesting points become apparent.

Cemal Bey, commanding the cavalry regiment, had been ordered to keep these persons under strict supervision and report twice daily to us.

Notwithstanding this, they had fled on the morning of the 10th September, and yet Cemal did not report this to me until after İlyas Bey had arrived with his troops and had sent in his report.

Besides, Cemal Bey said that the fugitives had heard that troops commanded by İlyas Bey had left Elâzığ. But he Telegraph Office was controlled by Cemal Bey. He also reported that the fugitives were going to raise a band of Kurds and attack Malatya.

All this made me uneasy about the action of the commander of the cavalry regiment.

We heard later that Ali Galip and his accomplices had been kept well informed of all that was going on since the evening of the 9th September. This caused Ali Galip to spend the whole night in the Government Building without going to sleep. On the following day, the 10th September, they all met at the Governor's office, accompanied by some gendarmes and armed Kurds, and broke into the cashier's office, opened the safe, counted out 6,000 pounds, which they wrapped up in a parcel, and left a receipt behind them, worded thus:

"In obedience to orders received, we have drawn 6,000 pounds to cover

the necessary expenses connected with the suppression of Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his followers." 10th September, 1919.

Halil Rahmi, Ali Galip

When confirmation was received that the troops commanded by Ilyas Bey were approaching Malatya, the commander of the cavalry regiment decided to act. He pointed out the Mutasarrif's house to his officers, surrounded it and, after cutting the telegraph wires, entered it.

Halil Bey's family, who since the beginning of the operations had known exactly what was happening, sent a warning to the Vali's office. As soon as the Vali, the Mutasarrif and their companions, who were busy taking the money from the Government safe, heard the news, they were seized with terror and, forgetting everything else, fled, leaving the money and the receipt behind them. In all haste they mounted their horses which were waiting for them and without losing a moment they were off with their escort. (Documents 66, 67.)

It is useless to pretend that the officers commanding the cavalry and the artillery were not aware that the Vali had spent the night in the Vali's office. They knew that it was much more important to capture the Vali than the Mutasarrif.

It was evident, therefore, that gross negligence had been shown in allowing hem to escape.

Even if we look at it from the most favourable point of view, we can only conclude that what induced the people of Malatya to act as they did was the fear of the consequences they might suffer. They were dealing with a dozen armed gendarmes and Kurds, who formed the escort, and they thought it would be safer to put terror into them and let them escape.

The chief orders I sent to Ilyas Bey on the 1st September were:

1. To arrest the fugitives without loss of time.
2. To proceed in such a manner as to destroy the possibility of a separatist movement by the Kurds.
3. To appoint Tevfik Bey, commanding the gendarmerie, Mutasarrif of Malatya, and some honourable man who was an ardent patriot, Vali of Harput as quickly as possible.
4. To obtain complete command over the Government troops at Malatya and Harput, in order to prevent any movement against the country and the nation.

5. To make it known everywhere that any one who ventured to join the fugitives would be proceeded against with the strictest severity; and to inform the loyal elements of the population as to the real situation.

6. To consider what steps should be taken if we were compelled to defend ourselves against foreign troops who threatened our national existence, and to report to me what had already been done in this direction. (Document 68.)

We had to reckon with the fact that the fugitives would undoubtedly succeed in raising a certain number of Kurds belonging to the neighbouring tribes, and that these might even find support from the foreign troops stationed at Maras.

The most urgent thing for us to do, therefore, was to strengthen the dispositions we had already made and increase the number of troops.

To make sure of this, another detachment mounted on mules was despatched to Malatya on the evening of the 9th September, while in the meantime we began to transfer all the troops of the IIIrd Army Corps as far as possible to the south. The XIIIth Corps was reserved for the pursuit.

As it was also important to frustrate the traitors by raising as many troops as we could, the cavalry regiment at Mama Hatun itself had to be pushed towards Harput. Orders and instructions were accordingly sent to the officers commanding the IIIrd, the XIIIth, and the XVth Army Corps. (Document 69.)

Now, while the pursuit is being taken up in the manner we had planned, let me read you some documents that fell into our hands.

As I am sure that they will throw considerable light on what was going on, as well as on the activities of Ali Galip and the perfidiousness of the Government, far better than any criticisms I might make, I cannot refrain from quoing them *in extenso*.

I will first read you the orders that were sent to Galip Bey, Vali of Elâzığ, on the 3rd September, 1919, and which bear the joint signatures of Adil Bey, Minister of the Interior, and Süleyman Şefik Paşa, Minister of War.

We shall then revert to the telegram from the Sublime Porte, relating to the troops to be sent and the sums to be expended on this expedition, that was sent out by the Minister of the Interior.

No. 906.

To be deciphered personally.

Istanbul, 3rd September, 1919.

To Ali Galip Beyefendi, Vali of Elâzığ.

Reply to your telegram of the 2nd September, 1919, No. 2.

The matter has been laid before His Majesty. The trade relating to it will be published later in the day. It may be taken as definitely settled. The instructions are the following:

As you are already aware, some of the persons assembled at Erzurum dignify their meeting by calling it a congress and have passed certain resolutions there. These persons are of no more importance than their resolutions. But, notwithstanding this, their so-called congress has caused certain rumours to be spread abroad in the country, which find an exaggerated echo in Europe and produce a very bad effect.

Although nothing really important has taken place and there are no troops worth mentioning, the English, alarmed by these threats and the effect of them, appear to be very much inclined to land a considerable number of troops in the immediate future at Samsun. It is not improbable that they will be pushed forward afterwards in the direction of Sivas and beyond it, and will occupy very large districts if any incidents occur again in opposition to the orders of the Government — of which you have also been informed.

This would undoubtedly be unfavourable to the interests of the country. From correspondence with persons whom you know and who met at Erzurum, it is clearly evident that they intend to hold another congress at Sivas. The Government is well aware that nothing of real importance can result from a meeting that comprises only five, or even ten, persons in this town; but it is impossible to make Europe understand this. For this reason, it is advisable to prevent this meeting from being held.

The first thing to do is to appoint a Vali at Sivas who enjoys the full confidence of the Government and who can be relied upon to obey to the letter, for the sake of the country, all orders sent to him. We have appointed you to this post. We are confident that you will have no difficulty in preventing this mere handful of men from holding a congress at Sivas. But we have been informed that officers of all ranks and some of the men share the ideas of these people and will do all they possibly can to frustrate the Government, so we think it would be well, in order to carry out our plans, if you are escorted by about 100 or 200 trustworthy men. Consequently, as we have already advised you, if you could manage to arrive at Sivas quite

unexpectedly, without anybody knowing what your intentions are, with about 100 or 150 mounted men recruited from the Kurds in your district, and if you would take over the dual functions of Vali and Commandant, you would be able by skilfully using the gendarmerie and Government troops there — although there are so few of them — firmly to establish your authority. This would be comparatively easy, as you would not have to anticipate any resistance. You will be able to stop this meeting from taking place and arrest those who have already arrived there, and then send them at once under escort to Istanbul.

The authority of the Government having been re-established, the adventurers in the interior of the country would be discouraged. The effect of this in foreign countries would be excellent and the Government would be provided with a good argument to dissuade foreigners from their intention to land their troops and occupy the country.

After making exhaustive inquiries among the leading people at Sivas, we have ascertained that the inhabitants are tired of the intrigues of these people and of the pressure they exercise to extort money from them. They have declared themselves ready and willing to support the Government in any way they can. From another quarter we have learned that it would be possible immediately to recruit as many gendarmes as we may require in this district and that we could rely upon the assistance of influential people.

When you can get together gendarmerie strong enough and absolutely loyal to the Government, you will dismiss your mounted escort, pay them off, and send them to their homes. You are ordered to carry out these instructions.

It is absolutely imperative, in order to ensure success, that strict secrecy is observed. You are forbidden to speak about this to anybody in Sivas or about your commission or your intention to go there — even to those with whom you are closely associated.

You will also be very careful, until the moment of your arrival at Sivas, that those who accompany you know nothing about your object. Your success depends upon this. For the present, you will have to leave your family at Elâzîg and let them understand that you are going on a ten days' journey of inspection among the tribes in the neighbourhood. You will start immediately and take the necessary precautions to arrive unexpectedly at Sivas. When you arrive there, you will inform those concerned of the wording of the accompanying telegram, assume your duties as Vali and Commandant, and proceed without delay to carry out your orders. Go personally to the

Telegraph Office and report to the Ministry, from whom you will receive further orders as soon as they are duly informed of the actual situation. Then, if you want to do so, you may transfer your family and possessions to Sivas. Reşit Paşa, the present Vali, who has by some means been informed that he will be replaced and recalled, has appealed to this Ministry.

We have learned, on the other hand, that the persons whom you know all about will meet very soon. Therefore, it is very urgently necessary that you act promptly and arrive at Sivas without losing a moment.

Let us know immediately you start and how long you expect it will take you to arrive there.

This is the telegram that you will produce at Sivas:

"By an Imperial Irade, approved by the Cabinet, you have been appointed Vali and Commandant of Sivas. You will, therefore, start for Sivas immediately, bring this telegram to the notice of the civil and military authorities concerned, take up your duties as Vali and Commandant, and report to us that you have done so."

Adil
Minister of the Interior.

Süleyman Şefik
Minister of War.

Very urgent.

Sublime Porte, 6th September, 1919.

To Galip Bey, Vali of Elâzığ, Malatya.
Reply to your telegram of 6th September, 1919.

The expenditure incurred in sending troops to suppress the rebels must be covered by the Treasury and be transferred to the credit of the gendarmerie. Inform us immediately by telegram what sum of money will be required, what will be the strength of the expedition and the day of its departure.

Adil
Minister.

Three days later the Minister of the Interior sent this telegram, which appears to be a reply to one from Ali Galip.

Urgent.

Istanbul, 9th Septemeber, 1919.

To the Vali of Elâzığ, Malatya.

Reply to your message of 8th September, 1919. No. 2.

Although we cannot get sufficient and . . . (illegible) news, because there are no reliable agents at Sivas, we are given to understand from what we have learned from an inhabitant of that town who is here, as well as from general information we have received from other places, that:

1. The people are antagonistic to these movements, and
2. The troops are very weak in number. The movement is led by persons who are known to you as well as to some commanding and other officers. These men are trying to attract others to adopt their cause by giving it an apparently national character. But the people are not in favour of these intrigues. As you are on the spot, it will be easier for you to get the required information. Your immediate departure, however, for Sivas is becoming still more pressing, because the papers have somehow referred to your appointment. The stronger the escort that accompanies you, the easier your success will be. Decide as soon as possible about the strength of your expedition and the date of your departure, and report accordingly.

Adil
Minister.

The last telegram sent by Ali Galip Bey from Malatya in answer to the telegrams he had received was as follows:

Very urgent and strictly confidential.

To be deciphered personally.

To the Minister of the Interior.

Everything is ready for my departure from Malatya on the 14th inst. I shall leave with sufficient troops to follow and arrest the rebels. You may rely that, with God's help, we shall be successful on the day that the meeting takes place. I beg you to reply immediately and do all that is necessary.

9th September, 1919.

Ali Galip
Vali of Elâzığ.

From this telegram there is no doubt that Ali Galip, who had passed a sleepless night between the 9th and 10th September in a state of extreme agitation, was still in a bellicose frame of mind on the previous day, the 9th, and full of hope for a happy issue, with the help of God, from the meeting that was to take place.

At that time we thought of sending telegrams to Adil Bey, the Minister of the Interior, and to Sevket Paşa, the Minister of War, informing them of our distrust of the heads of the Civil Administration; and to the commanders who had heard all about the above-mentioned facts and documents. We called the attention of everybody concerned to this matter.

How strangely did Adil Bey's answer to a telegram from Reşit Paşa, the Vali of Sivas, end! This is the wording of it:

"You will undoubtedly see the necessity of conforming with the terms of the Imperial Trade in every particular." (Document 70.)

While these telegrams were being exchanged I chanced to be at the Telegraph Office. I could no longer restrain myself, and immediately wrote out this telegram and told the official it must go at once:

10th September, 1919.

To Adil Bey, Minister of the Interior.

You are cowards and criminals to prevent the people from laying their demands before their Padişah. You are conspiring with foreign countries against the nation. I did not think it possible that you are so incapable of estimating the strength and the will of the nation or their value; but I cannot believe that you can play the part of traitors to and executioners of the nation and country. You had better think well what you are doing. Beware lest the day should come when you will be called upon to render account to the nation for the infamous acts you are committing when you put your trust in the deceptive promises of nonentities like Ali Galip and his colleagues, and by selling your conscience to such foreigners as Major Nowill, who are doing all they can to injure the country and our people. When you will hear some day of the fate of the people and the annihilation of the troops on whom you are leaning for support, you may be sure that you will recognise the fate that is lying in wait for yourselves.

Mustafa Kemal

Appropriate telegrams were sent individually to all the commanding officers.

From the reports that reached us up to the 12th September, we learned that the fugitives had spent the night of the 10th at Rika and hoped to spend the following night with the chief of a tribe in a village half an hour's distance from that place. (Document 71.)

The commanding officers of the XXth, XVth and XIIIth Army Corps were informed of this. (Document 72.)

The exchange of telegrams with Malatya during the 11th September and that night led us to think that, notwithstanding the instructions and orders they had received, the minds of the people of Malatya were not quite free from doubt and uncertainty.

Ilyas Bey, commanding the regiment from Elâzığ, wrote on the 11th September: (Document 73) "A messenger from the Mutasarrif tells us that Ali Galip, the Vali, and Halil Bey, the Mutasarrif, are inclined on certain conditions to return to their posts;" and he added: "I want to know whether in the interests of the country you will accept this offer."

Afterwards, during the night of the 11th, Ilyas Bey sent a telegram in his own name, as well as in those of Cemal Bey, commanding the cavalry regiment, Tevfik Bey, the acting Mutasarrif, Münür Bey, commanding the artillery, Faruk Bey, captain in the gendarmerie, and Mehmet Bey, a major in the Veterinary Corps, who were all together at the telegraph instrument. This is what he said:

From Ilyas Bey, Malatya.

We have just been informed by Faruk Bey, captain in the gendarmerie, a trustworthy man who has been patrolling the district of Kâhta and its surroundings, that a body of Kurds had assembled at Rika, a place five hours distant from Malatya; the Mutasarrif and his colleagues are here now. He states that the Kurds belonging to the tribes in these districts as far as Siverek are ready to join the others, and the tribes of Dersim itself had been summoned to come there in the name of the Kurdish cause. It is reported that the Mutasarrif intends to attack Malatya first and then sack it before marching with all his forces against Sivas, after having killed and dispersed all the Turks in Malatya. Simultaneously, the people of Dersim will march on Harput. It is rumoured that the Kurds regard the expulsion of the Mutasarrif from Malatya as a serious offence against the whole nation. The Vali is said to have declared that he agrees neither with the pillage nor the massacre, but he was unable to oppose the Mutasarrif. It has been decided that after Malatya has been occupied by this force they will hoist the Kurdish flag. The English major is said to have declared that the English Division at Urfa is ready to march, but that Hacı Bedir Ağa does not consent to this. The Kurdish tribes maintain that Malatya belongs to Kurdistan and that the Kurdish flag must be flown there. The Vali is said to have expressed the wish yesterday evening to return to Malatya, but he has been prevented from doing so.

Their conditions are:

1. The Vali to be reinstated.
2. The Mutasarrif to retain his position.
3. The troops from Elâzığ to return to their quarters.

4. Order to be maintained at Malatya when the Vali, who is now on his way to Sivas with a hundred armed Kurds, arrives there.

5. Seven rifles and one revolver, the property of members of the Kurdish tribes, to be returned to them.

I am awaiting further orders from you.

I replied:

To Ilyas Bey, Malatya.

September 11 - 12, 1919.

1. The Congress has discussed the matter referred to in your report. Who are these people who want to impose conditions on you? You are not to enter into negotiations with them. The order is to arrest the Vali, the Mutasarrif, and their accomplices who have been convicted of treason, and to lead those simple people who are inclined to wander on the wrong road into the right one. Consequently, they must be dealt with vigorously. The officers commanding the XIIIth, XVth and IIIrd Corps are trying by telegraph to come into agreement as to the necessary steps to be taken by them. The available troops are marching from all directions. We are satisfied that you have done all that is necessary after carefully considering the question. All the Telegraph Offices must be occupied. We expect to hear from Tevfik Bey, our friend the acting Mutasarrif, that he is exercising all the power and authority of the Government that has been vested in him for their protection.

2. At the present moment petitions are being forwarded to the Padişah from all the important places in Anadolu, complaining about the treason that is being committed. You must send one also.

3. What the English major says is mere bluff. As for the Kurds, they can judge for themselves what prospect of success they can have against our military force, even if they were to combine.

4. It would be advisable to try to win over Bedir Ağa the leader of the Keven tribe, and the leaders of the others who are hostile to the procedure of the traitors.

5. Are you in communication with the squadron that left Hisnimansur and the two battalions from Siverek and Diyarbakır? How far have they marched by this time?

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Members of the Congress
assembled at the Telegraph Office.

As a matter of fact, the members of the Congress had not assembled yet, and therefore they could not have been present at the Telegraph Office. But I thought it just as well to mention the Congress and the interest taken by it in this affair, so as to give moral support to those I was addressing. With the same idea, I sent another telegram, identical in terms with the first one, and merely signed it "The Congress." (Document 74.)

In a second telegram, which was the continuation of the first, I said that a small number only of foreign troops were at Urfa, Antep and Maras, and added:

"The scoundrels who talk to you about a whole Division of foreign troops are trying to weaken your moral by spreading lies that are invented by traitors to the country and to the nation." (Document 75.)

In his reply, Ilyas Bey assured me that "energetic defence was decided upon in case of an attack," and he said: "The troops we are able to dispose of are not strong enough to hold Malatya for a long time if they are attacked by the Kurds. We would earnestly beg you, therefore, to order that reinforcements are sent immediately." (Document 76.)

I ordered Ilyas Bey to carry on his important work and keep an officer at the Telegraph Office to receive any messages I might wish to send him. (Document 77.)

On the 12th September another telegram came from Ilyas Bey, which I will read to you verbatim, because it contains information that is useful in many ways to our officers and officials.

Malatya, 12th September, 1919.

To the Commander of the IIIrd Army Corps, Sivas.

At noon to-day a certain Colonel P. Peel, an English officer, has arrived at Malatya. It is reported that he has come to see the notables and the civil and military officials in the districts of Malatya, Harput and Diyarbakır. He pretends that he knows nothing about the fugitive Major Nowill. He says that the English Government knows nothing about him either, that for his part he would not allow any officer to travel about in these districts and make propaganda, and that he would immediately order him to leave the tribes and come to him.

If he were convinced that Major Nowill had bad intentions, he would arrest him at once and sent him under escort to Aleppo. He also intends to ask the Vali Ali Galip to come here and speak to him. I have told him

that without orders from my superiors I could not permit Ali Galip to come here, but promised to write for the necessary authority. He begged me urgently to exert my influence to obtain this permission. He says that his title is that of "High Commissioner," and added that he is known to the Government in Istanbul. He states that he intends to remain here for two or three days and then go on to Harput. He can produce no official documents. He has been told that we shall regard him as our guest and that we shall treat him with special honour.

Are we to authorise this man to summon the Vali to come here? And are we to allow him to continue his journey to Harput? Two officers have just arrived from Sivas.

Ilyas

Commanding the 15th Infantry Regiment.

Our opinion as to what he should do about it is comprised in this telegram:

Telegram. Very urgent.

Sivas, 12th September, 1919.

To the Officer Commanding the 15th Regiment, Malatya.

Reply to your telegram of 12th September.

1. No foreign officer, whoever he may be, unable to produce official documents has any business whatever on Ottoman territory. Tell him so courteously but at the same time energetically, as becomes a military man, and inform him that he must return immediately to the place where he came. Take care that he is accompanied by an intelligent and capable officer until he is out of the country, to prevent him from holding any political conversations with prominent men or officials.

2. You will further inform him that the fugitive Vali is accused of treason against his country, that he will be handed over to justice as soon as he is caught and that nothing can be done to save him.

Mustafa Kemal

Thus, eventually, Ali Galip's activities were put to an end, thanks to the steps taken to counteract them and mainly to the promptness and firmness we displayed. The tribes Ali Galip and Halil Bey tried to raise in rebellion against us dispersed, and Ali Galip fled in despair, first to Urfa and then to Aleppo. Major Nowill was treated properly but was escorted to Elbistan. The others dispersed, each in his own direction. I do not think

it will be of any interest to you if we follow this incident any farther. When you read the documents which will be published as supplementary to what I have said on this question, I hope you will find them very instructive, both now and in the time to come. (Documents 78, 79, 80, 81.)

*
* *

I am sure that these documents will leave no doubt at all in your minds that Ali Galip's enterprise was arranged with the consent of the Padişah, Ferit Paşa's Cabinet and foreigners. There is no doubt, also, about our action against the originators of this treachery without distinction of persons. But, it was necessary that we should avoid as far as possible such a direct frontal attack at this phase. It was wiser to concentrate our endeavours on a single point and not scatter our forces.

Therefore, we chose Ferit Paşa's Cabinet alone as our target and pretended that we knew nothing about the complicity of the Padişah. Our theory was that the Sovereign had been deceived by the Cabinet and that he himself was in total ignorance of what was really going on.

We wanted to give the impression that we were convinced that he would summarily punish those who had deceived him as soon as he was made clearly aware of the facts.

Our first object was to lay these facts directly and exclusively before the Padişah, trusting that he would assuredly find a remedy for the existing evils by depriving the Government, whose treason was patent, of his confidence.

With this intention, we composed a telegram on the 11th September and addressed it to the Sultan.

After the usual rigmarole of expressions of our devotion, as was customary at that time, our telegram ran as follows:

"Since we, the undersigned officers commanding Army Corps in this district, have duly considered the matter, we deem it to be our duty to lay before you the following facts: The Government has conspired to shed the blood of Mohamedans in a fratricidal war, by planning a sudden attack upon the Congress. It is also proved by certain documents in our possession that they have spent public funds in the attempt to dismember our territory by raising Kurdistan into revolt. In trying to accomplish this and having failed, the agents of the Cabinet have run away in a disgraceful manner. When they have been arrested they will be handed over the avenging arm

of justice. The nation has no confidence whatever in a Government that is capable of organising such crimes and issuing commands like those issued by the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of War."

We continued: "The nation demands that immediate steps shall be taken for the pursuit of this gang of traitors; that they shall be severely punished, and that a new Government shall be formed that will be composed of men of honour. The nation also declares that henceforth all communication and relations with the Government shall be broken off. Under these circumstances, the Army cannot do otherwise than declare itself in accord with the will of the people." (Document 82.)

We thought it advisable that each of the Army Corps should send similar telegrams to Istanbul. Being at the telegraph instrument myself, I sent this circular to the different Army Corps on the 11th September:

"We shall send you the wording of a telegram immediately. It must be signed jointly by the commanders of the IIIrd, XVth, XXth, XIIIth and XIIth Army Corps. You will pay attention to this and hold yourselves in readiness to send it off at exactly the same time as the other commanders send theirs.

Text.

To the Grand Vezir.

"We feel ourselves urgently and directly obliged to lay before our Highest Chief and Glorious Caliph a matter of the most serious importance. We beg you not to put any obstacles in our way if you do not want personally to accept the heavy responsibility for the serious consequences which will inevitably ensue — a responsibility which would lie solely on the shoulders of Your Highness."

The Army Corps, etc., etc.

The serious consequences referred to were none other than those mentioned in the telegram to the Padışah, which I have already mentioned.

During the day of the 11th, and particularly during that night, all the Telegraph Offices were occupied by the Commanders of the Corps, who tried to come into connection with Istanbul for the purpose of sending off the telegrams as agreed.

But the Grand Vezir seemed to have disappeared. He did not reply. But we remained at the instrument and did all we could to send off the telegrams to the Grand Vezir, and awaited his answer to them.

After lengthy negotiations with the officials of the Chief Telegraph Office in Istanbul, one of them sent us the following:

"The message addressed to the Grand Vezir has been forwarded on to him by telephone."

The answer sent by the Director of the Telegraph Office read:

"The wording of the telegram has been forwarded to His Highness the Grand Vezir. His Highness has replied that telegraphic communication can only be conducted in the regular manner and that messages cannot be brought before high authorities unless they are sent in the proper way." (Document 83.)

Then the following telegram was handed in at the Telegraph Office at Sivas.

11th September, 1919.

To Ferit Pasa, Grand Vezir.

"It is evident that by your regardless actions and enterprises, that have been conducted in the most inconsiderate manner, you have trodden underfoot the rights of the nation and all that it holds sacred, while at the same time you have outraged the dignity and honour of His Imperial Majesty. The nation has completely lost confidence in your Cabinet and in yourself. It retains confidence in its Sovereign alone. To him alone, therefore, will it disclose the real state of affairs and present its demands. Your Cabinet, fearing the fatal consequences of their unlawful actions, try to erect a wall between the nation and its Padisah. If you persevere in your stubbornness one hour longer, the nation will consider itself free to proceed in any manner that it considers right, and will forthwith break off relations throughout the country with the lawless Cabinet of which you are the head.

"This is the last warning we shall give you. The attitude that the nation will take up in future will be explained to the representatives of the Entente through the mediation of the foreign officers who are now among us."

The General Assembly of the Congress.

Simultaneously, we sent the following order to the Director of the Telegraph Office at Sivas by telephone:

"We understand that Istanbul refuses to receive a telegram that a delegation of the Congress will bring you to transmit.

"Inform your superior that if, within an hour from now, you are not

granted authority to send this telegram, we shall see ourselves obliged to cut all the telegraph lines between Anadolu and Istanbul."

The General Assembly of the Congress at Sivas.

We also sent the following circular telegram to each of the officers commanding the Army Corps:

Sivas, 11th September, 1919.

To the Commanders of the XXth, XVth, XIIIth, IIIrd Army Corps.

"The Director of the Chief Telegraph Office in Istanbul refuses to transmit certain messages from the Congress to be laid at the foot of the Imperial Throne. We have informed him in reply that, unless within an hour connection with the Imperial Palace is open, we shall cut all the telegraph lines between Anadolu and the metropolis. As this lawful demand by the Congress has not been acceded to, we beg you to suspend all telegraphic communication with the head offices at Ankara, Kastamonu, Diyarbakir, and Sinop, except telegrams that are sent by the Congress. At the same time prohibit the reception of all telegrams that are sent from Istanbul, and disconnect the line running through the gorge of Geyve, or suspend it temporarily if it will not prevent us from communicating with western Anatolia. Report to us the steps you have taken for this purpose.

"All telegraph officials who refuse to obey these orders are to be put immediately before a summary court martial, and they are to be dealt with most severely. The officers of the XXth, XVth, XIIIth and IIIrd Army Corps are commanded to carry out these orders. Please report receipt of this."

The General Assembly of the Congress.

The orders contained in this message were supplemented by further telegrams. (Document 84, 85.)

Following the circular sent during the night of the 11th September, we issued the following order:

"Military commanders, heads of the Civil Administration and others concerned are requested not to leave the Telegraph Offices during the night until they have succeeded in getting satisfactory results."

The General Assembly of the Congress.

This was sent to the Telegraph Offices:

"Continued from last message: As we want to carry on telegraphic

communication between ourselves, when the office of the Congress has received the information that this message has actually been transmitted we request you to leave an official permanently in the Telegraph Office."

The General Assembly of the Congress.

It was evident that the head office in Istanbul would not open communication with the Palace within the prescribed limit. Therefore, on the 12th September we circulated the following information among the commanders and the Vilayets: "Within an hour, the following message will be telegraphed to the Grand Vezir in the name of the General Assembly of the Congress. Will you, therefore, immediately send a telegram to the same effect and report that you have done so."

The General Assembly of the Congress.

This circular was transmitted to all concerned at five o'clock, and a copy of it was sent to the Grand Vezir, marked: "For your information."

1. As the Cabinet continues to prevent any communication between the people and their beloved Sovereign and stands in the way of their expressing their desires, and as they also persevere in their malicious schemes, the nation has decided to break off all official relations with the Government, as well as all telegraphic and postal communication with Istanbul, until it is succeeded by a lawful Government. In agreement with the military commanders, the civil officials of the provinces will see that the necessary steps are taken to give effect to this and inform the General Assembly of the Congress at Sivas of the result.

2. This has been communicated to all commanders and the heads of the Civil Administration. 12th September, 1919.

The General Assembly of the Congress.

The result of this was that all communications and relations with the Government were broken off on that date. Later on I shall explain which localities in particular wanted to offer resistance and what discussions we had with them on the subject.

If you will allow me, I shall first make some remarks on a question that you will consider very important. As you probably know, Ferit Paşa's Government had given formal orders for the election of the legislative body. But up to that time, that is to say, the 12th September, at the moment when the rupture between Anadolu and Istanbul took place, this order had not been carried out. You will understand that after the turn of events that had

taken place, it was urgently necessary for us to concern ourselves with this question. We began to do so on the 13th September. (Document 86.)

Instead of going into lengthy details, it will be better if I place before you the general instructions we issued for this purpose. Here they are:

Telegram.

13th September, 1919.

To the XIVth Army Corps at Balikesir, to the XIIth at Konya, to the XIIIth at Diyarbakir, to the XVth at Erzurum, the XXth at Ankara, to the 17th Division at Bursa, the 58th Division at Çine, the 61st Division at Bandırma, the 1st Army Corps, via the 61st Division, the 11th Division at Niğde, and the Vilayets and autonomous Sancaks and the authorities in towns where there are Branches of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights."

On account of the reactionary attitude of the Government and in order to secure the defence of our rights in these most dangerous days through which we are passing, the election and speedy meeting of a National Assembly is our most urgent duty to undertake.

The Government has deceived the people and has postponed the elections from month to month. In the same manner, on different pretexts, it has postponed the execution of the order it had eventually issued. The Note which Ferit Paşa has just laid before the Peace Conference shows that he will surrender our vilayets beyond the Toros.

His next step, which will be to make the frontier line pass through the Vilayet of Aydin — after having previously come to an agreement with the Greeks — distinctly shows his intention of giving up the territory already occupied by the Greeks.

Last of all, the thoughtless and malicious policy pursued by him in other occupied parts of the country, enables us to foresee in a similar way that he will expose the country and the nation to dismemberment and confront them with an accomplished fact by signing the Peace Treaty before the National Assembly can meet.

In these circumstances, the General Assembly of the Congress urges the Army and the people to be watchful, and declares that it is in the vital interest of the nation to proceed as rapidly as possible in the following manner:

1. The town authorities and the "Unions for the Defence of the Rights" must immediately set to work to complete all the necessary preparations for the elections to take place in the shortest possible time that the law sanctions.

2. The number of deputies must now be fixed in proportion to the number of the inhabitants of each sancak, and the Representative Committee must be duly informed in advance.

The question of the candidates will be settled in later correspondence.

3. Any difficulties that may arise that will be liable to postpone the preparations for the elections must be guarded against immediately, so that the elections can take place as quickly as possible.

You are requested to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the authorities of the different towns and the committees for the "Defence of the Rights" in your district, and assist in hastening on the arrangements.

The Representative Committee.

Ferit Paşa's Government remained obdurate. It persisted in its obstinacy, as you know, till it was overthrown. But it seemed exceedingly dangerous to leave the country without guidance for an indefinite time. So, during the night of the 13th September, I drafted the following resolutions, which I circulated first in the form of an inquiry intended to produce expressions of opinion, and later as an order, without taking any notice of certain objections:

I beg to inform you in the following statement of certain proposals that have been considered by the Congress.

They will be laid before the General Assembly for discussion and will be carried through after you have expressed your opinion on them. We hope to be informed of that opinion before the evening of the 15th September.

The General Assembly of the Congress feels itself obliged to break off all relations with a Government which interprets the will of nation in an unsatisfactory way, which regards the national actions and the national proceedings as unlawful, and which, although we have never ceased in a legal and legitimate manner to prove our unfailing fidelity to the Padişah-Caliph, interposes like a solid wall between the nation and its Sovereign, and which arms the citizens to fight against one another and tear each other to pieces.

In these circumstances, the General Assembly considers it to be its duty to inform you of the resolutions they have arrived at:

1. The official business of the State will in future, as hitherto, be carried on strictly according to the laws in force and in the name of His Imperial Majesty. The lives, property and honour, as well as the rights of all citizens, without distinction of race or creed, will be protected.

2. The State officials will continue to exercise their offices; adapting themselves, however, to the legitimate wishes of the nation. But those who are not willing to do so will *ipso facto* be considered to have resigned their posts, and will be temporarily superseded by other qualified persons.

3. Those officials who work actively against the aims of the nation and the national movement, will render themselves liable to severe punishment, for the sake of the security of the people and their religion.

4. Whoever, whether he be a discharged official or a private individual, does anything that is contrary to the national resolutions or makes propaganda that is calculated to spread confusion among the people, will likewise be very severely dealt with.

5. The welfare and happiness of the country and people can only be secured by right and justice, and by the maintenance of order throughout the country.

The Assembly trusts that the Commanders of Corps, the Valis and the autonomous Mutasarrifs will adopt measures to effect this.

6. In anticipation of the moment when, after we have succeed in laying the demands of the nation before our Sovereign, we shall also have succeeded in forming a proper Government possessing the confidence of the nation, the Representative Committee of the Sivas Congress will remain in office and continue to conduct the affairs of the nation.

7. These resolutions are to be communicated to all the general committees of the national unions and to be publicly circulated.

Mustafa Kemal

*

* *

I will not disguise the fact that this declaration gave rise to a great deal of criticism, sometimes of an insignificant kind but at others it was rather violent, and we had to encounter active resistance and face hostile demonstrations and threats. The criticisms and objections, by the way, were not directed solely against what I have just read to you.

At the same time they applied to other points also, and to give you a clear idea of this I must ask you to let me give you a short account of some correspondence that was exchanged on the subject.

On the 14th September, the Committee of the "Defence of Rights" at Erzincan telegraphed to us: "We have unanimously resolved that it would be advisable to grant the Government a final extension of forty-eight hours

before putting our decision into execution." After all, this was rather a harmless proposal. (Document 87.)

I will now quote from a long telegram in cipher, dated the 14th September, that we recived from Cevdet Bey, commanding the XIIIth Army Corps at Diyarbakir:

"If we break with the Government completely and appoint the Representative Committee of a congress to act as the leading authority, our opponents and all those who entertain political ideas will construe it to be a revolt against the Caliph, and this will confuse the minds of some people.

"Has the question of providing for the requisite expenditure been considered, and has anything been done to cover the cost of the pay and food of the officials and the Army, in case the situation will be prolonged for any length of time?

"The Government is under the tutelage of England. No pressure, no effort on our part, could bring a Government into power that would act differently. If the English, with the consent of the Cabinet, were to get the idea into their heads of carrying out an extensive programme of occupation, have you decided to take up arms against them? And how far do you feel assured of success in the event of our being forced to do that?

"Would it be in the highest interests of our country to carry our obstinacy as far as this?" (Document 88.)

In their telegram of the 15th September, the committee at Erzurum expressed the opinion "that we will have to obtain the consent of the general committees and to insert a special clause in the regulations before the 6th clause of the resolutions can be carried out" — that is to say, the one relating to the establishment of the Representative Committee as the highest authority in the land.

Ilyas Bey telegraphed from Malatya on the 15th September that "in his opinion, while reserving his acquiescence, he thought the right thing to do would be to postpone the matter until the population of the Vilayet of Elâzığ had been fully informed of the aims and objects of the Congress, thus giving them time to think it over." (Document 89.)

The General Committee in the town of Sivas itself, where we were living at the time, sent us a long account, which began by saying, "it is evident from the whole of the resolutions arrived at, that the intention is to proclaim a provisional administration." It further drew our attention to the fact that "this did not seem to be supported by the regulations of the union or by any

clause in them." In the end, it advised us "to confine our proceedings within a reasonable compass and seek for proper means to put them into execution before we laid our considered demands calmly and sincerely before His Majestiy." (Document 90.)

Servet Bey, a member of the Representative Committee, who, in spite of our invitation and pressing, had declined to join us and had invented all kinds of excuses for not taking part in the Sivas Congress, sent the following non-ciphered message to us on the 15th September, beginning with the devout religious expression: "Selâm-in Aleykûm."

"We have received the manifesto issued by the Sivas Congress and your other communications. We have submitted our reply to it to His Excellency at his own request. In the first place, it appears that the Sivas Congress has taken up the position of a General Congress and has created a Representative Committee, contrary to our resolutions.

"The Sivas Congress had no authority to provide for the possibility of introducing its members into our Executive Committee.

Banning of communication with the Government became an accomplished fact before anything could be done about it. It will produce a very bad impression that the Representative Committee has been appointed the highest authority in the land. This procedure should be banned.

"The Sivas Congress is not competent to alter the regulations passed at Erzurum. The Congress must be subordinate to the representative body of the Eastern Provinces.

"You may be certain that public opinion, which has been passing through a period of agitation caused by the resolutions passed at Erzurum, will regard all other decisions with suspicion."

Servet Bey closed his message with this protest:

"We cannot agree to any measures which exceed the scope of the resolutions agreed upon by the Erzurum Congress." (Document 91.)

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, commanding the XVth Army Corps, telegraphed to us on the 15th September: "I have read the document which Servet Bey, İzzet Bey and Zeki Bey, members of the Trabzon delegation — persons whom I know intimately and in whom I have the greatest confidence and the highest opinion of — wish to send in reply to the question put to them by the Sivas Congress. I understand and share the actual ideas on which they have based their remarks."

Then he laid down his opinions about the details of the different points, and said: "The Erzurum Congress met in the name of the Eastern Provinces. As for the Sivas Congress, it represents the entire nation and, therefore, it is natural that it should be represented by a special body. But the Representative Committee of the Eastern Provinces has been automatically abolished by this. Nevertheless, it still exists at the present moment. At the utmost, it could only include those persons who have become members of the Representative Committee of Sivas and who already were members of the Representative Committee of the Eastern Provinces, if any were to be asked to resign from that committee.

"The Sivas Congress represents the interests of the whole nation; the representative body of the Eastern Provinces confines itself exclusively to defending the special rights and interests of the latter.

"As for the highest authority and the competence of the Representative Committee, this is the chief question in this affair. I am absolutely of your opinion that nothing should be done rashly. With regard to Arts. 1 to 5 of the proposals of the Representative Committee, I think that it is superfluous not only to make them a question to be voted upon, but also to publish them in the form of a proclamation or as an expression of opinion." (Document 92.)

*
* *

I will now read you the telegraphic reply we sent to Servet Bey at Trabzon and our answer to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa.

The former was worded thus:

To Servet Bey, Trabzon.

We have not yet received a reply from the committee at Trabzon to our question. We asked His Excellency Kâzım Paşa for his opinion also on this question.

Naturally, we cannot understand the necessity of bringing these two opinions into connection with one another.

I will answer your remarks in their proper order.

Firstly, it is generally known that the Sivas meeting was in the nature of a General Congress. You are the first man who has told me that it had been suggested it could have any other character.

As to the question of the Representative Committee, it is essentially the same as that elected by the Erzurum Congress.

Rauf Bey, Békir Sami Bey, Raif Efendi and Seyh Haci Fevzi Efendi are here with me at Sivas at the present time.

Although four of our colleagues are still away, the majority of them are doing their duty. We have no doubt that you know all about this, because, feeling how important it was, I had asked you while I was still at Erzurum to come to Sivas, and I told you then that I was leaving with the others.

After it had been fully discussed and decided that a general congress at Sivas was empowered to increase the Representative Committee by the addition of new members — under Art. 8 of our regulations — there had been no further question concerning this, but, on the contrary, we had found that this provision would ensure that the committee would be fully representative.

We did nothing more about it at the Sivas Congress. With regard to the rupture with the Government, it cannot be considered as an infraction of Art. 4 of our fundamental resolutions.

The cause of it is the treason of the Government, a possibility that could not be provided for in these resolutions, because it had never entered into the mind of any one.

After all, we are not responsible for the actual fact, but the Government themselves. It is irrevocable that we carry out the terms of our telegram in cipher. We cannot depart from them in any particular.

We thought it right to take the initiative in obtaining your consent to this. You must decide whether you will join us or not.

I should like to draw your attention to this:

To-day, when the whole of Anadolu and the whole of Rumeli feel compelled to march forward on the road they have both chosen to take, it is absolutely necessary for us to identify ourselves with the views of the majority rather than with those of the minority, and afterwards convert the latter to views of the majority.

If you have any better proposal to offer about our work and our qualifications for doing it, I shall be glad to hear of it.

When you carefully examine to-day the attitude which we thought it right to assume, you cannot help seeing that it is accurately in accord with the programme laid down in the fundamental resolutions accepted by the Erzurum Congress. I cannot see a single point in which we have exceeded them.

I must, therefore, ask you to define what we have done contrary to these regulations to cause Your Excellencies to hesitate to join us.

The only thing that we have not been able to prevent is the wretched attitude of the Government, which timidly confides the destiny of the country and of the nation to the caprices of . . . (illegible) and has sacrificed them to their own personal interests. If there is any possible way of meeting the situation by taking a different course than the one we are now following, I shall be greatly obliged to you if you will let me know what it is.

Mustafa Kemal

The introduction to the long reply we sent to Kâzim Karabekir Paşa reads as follow:

"We have received the open telegram sent by Servet Bey and İzzet Bey to the Representative Committee on the questions that the General Committee of Trabzon had referred to them. The Representative Committee considers that it should not have been sent open, because its circulation might give rise to some doubt, considering that it reflects no more than the personal opinion of these gentlemen. The Representative Committee in their circular letter had not asked for the opinion of İzzet Bey and Servet Bey, but for that of the Trabzon Committee.

"However, I think we ought to give you some information about the private telegram which shows you the view held by İzzet Bey and Servet Bey, as well as your own, which, as Your Excellency indicates, had been communicated in reply to these gentlemen and to the Representative Committee.

"A. Firstly, it is unfortunate that the Representative Committee was not able to discover the real motive that induced these two gentlemen to make the remarks of which you are aware.

"B. Art. 4 of the declaration gives the reasons for the establishment of a provisional administration and the way in which it is to be established. The steps that have been taken on account of the recent events, which are known everywhere and reveal the treason, have never for a moment aimed at creating a provisional administration. Consequently, there is no reason to try to find any connection between this and Art. 4. The object of these measures is to discover a way to give the Sultan directly a description of what is going on and to ask him to form a legitimate Government.

"C. The Sivas Congress by resolution has elected a special body, which is entitled to act in the name of the delegates of the western districts of

Anadolu and the Erzurum Congress, which would represent the entire Eastern Provinces. In creating this body, it has apparently assumed the character of a General Congress representing the whole of Anadolu and of Rumeli, and is, therefore, representative of the whole nation.

"This Congress has adopted the resolutions of the Erzurum Congress and the organisation created by it *in toto*, but has considerably widened them. It follows that the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anadolu" consolidated and at the same time extended itself under the more comprehensive title of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli." This, after all, was the realisation of the highest aim which Art. 3 of the regulations and the fundamental resolutions of the Congress laid down as an unalterable object.

"The General Congress at Sivas has confirmed its full confidence in the Representative Committee elected by the Erzurum Congress in the name of the eastern unions and has recognised it in its entirety as representative of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

"Evidently there is no question of regarding the resolutions passed by the General Congress at Sivas, those by the Erzurum Congress, the Representative Committee of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anadolu" and the Representative Committee of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli" as totally different things. To make such a distinction between them would be extremely fatal to the chief object of the union which we are all striving to attain as our sacred ideal.

"Therefore, when we look at matters from this point of view, there are no representative bodies which annul one another, nor members who should be called upon to retire if they happened to belonged to another committee.

"The only representative body belonging to our union, which to-day comprises the whole of Anadolu and Rumeli, is at Sivas, where it continues to carry on its functions with the co-operation of five, out of the nine, members who were elected in the usual way by the Congress of Erzurum.

"To leave Western Anadolu, whose rights, interests and privileges are not in any way less important than those of the Eastern Provinces, in a subordinate position and ignore her rightful and well-founded claims and proposals, is a proceeding that our reason forbids us to tolerate.

"It is because our Representative Committee was called upon to deal with this, that it was enlarged by the addition of six new members." (Document 93.)

This telegram, which contained references to many other matters, was also communicated verbally to the Trabzon Committee. (Document 94.)

These questions involved further extensive correspondence.

It happened even that telegrams antagonistic to us were sent from Trabzon to other vilayets with the forged signature of the Trabzon Branch of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights." (Document 95.)

At length, after a fortnight had passed, we received another telegram from Trabzon, but this time it was not from Servet Bey.

I had better quote this telegram verbatim, so that you may get a close view of the situation then prevailing.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa. For the Representative Committee at Sivas.

The following telegram from the civil authorities of Trabzon is now being sent to Istanbul.

A copy of it has been handed to the officer commanding the XVth Corps.

Ali Riza
Commandant.

1st October, 1919.

Copy of the telegram.

To His Highness Ferit Paşa, Grand Vezir, Istanbul.

The inhabitants of Trabzon, with the dignity and calmness that are their natural characteristics, have heard the national cry of protest that is being raised throughout Anadolu. The people have come to the end of their patience.

If Your Highness possesses the slightest patriotic sentiment, you can no longer remain at the head of the Government.

Hüseyin
President of the Town Council.
Hüsni, Mehmet Salih, Mehmet
Avni, Ahmet, Şefik, Mehmet,
Temel, Members.

*

* * *

On the 17th September, 1919, I received a telegram in cipher from Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, addressed personally to myself.

This telegram, which was couched generally in exceedingly cordial and brotherly terms, contained several warnings.

"Paşa," he said, "the communications and circular notes coming from Sivas are sent sometimes in the name of the Representative Committee and at others in your own. An example of the latter was when you sent those communications and warnings addressed to the Government in Istanbul on the 10th September. Will you believe me when I tell you that the communications signed in your own name are the cause of friendly and sincere criticism, even by those who love and honour you most? You can yourself judge what consequences and reactionary feelings can be produced by them. Therefore, I beg you to send all the resolutions arrived at by the Representative Committee and the Congress signed merely in the name of the Representative Committee."

This was the ending of the telegram:

"It is in the interests of the nation that Your Excellency, whatever happens, will not appear prominently.

"I am sure that you will accept these 'requests' that we think it right to send you in a friendly spirit. I have not yet been informed what persons or bodies have been interrogated and who are stated to be united.

"I kiss your hands." (Document 96.)

Surely it is necessary to explain and discuss the circumstances which apparently could have led Kâzim Paşa to express his sincere doubts and objections.

As I do not wish the opinion I held at that time to be affected by what occurred subsequently, I prefer to give you the exact wording of the reply that I sent:

"To His Excellency Kâzim Paşa, commanding the XVth Army Corps.

Reply.

19th September, 1919.

"My dear brother, the friendly language you employed when you informed me of your conviction, the deep sincerity of which I do not for a moment doubt, can only help to strengthen the brotherly bonds that unite us and afford me the most cordial satisfaction.

"Be assured that I perfectly understand your anxiety. No communication was sent to the Government on the 10th September signed by myself.

"I happened to be at the Telegraph Office on a certain day and acciden-

tally noticed that Adil Bey, the Minister of the Interior, was handing in some messages. Remembering the stupid answers he had sent to Reşit Paşa, Vali of Siyas, I turned round to him in quite a personal way and remonstrated with him rather sharply — you know how I can do this.

"The conversation was quite of a private character. All the messages we sent to the Government or the Sovereign or to foreign countries were signed as coming from the Congress itself or the 'Representative Committee.' One letter only, addressed to the American Senate and which you know all about, was, according to the resolution of the Congress, signed by five persons including myself.

"In the same way we continued to use the signature 'Representative Committee' in all non-ciphered correspondence with the authorities of Anatolia. But we found out that this gave an unfavourable impression and produced a feeling of distrust in certain quarters.

"In fact, the names of persons and the authority they represented, that were included in this indefinite term, were not disclosed; therefore, it was not publicly known who was responsible for these messages. From Kastamonu, Ankara, Malatya, Niğde, Canik and other places, people began to put themselves into telegraphic communication directly with me.

"Signs of doubt began to appear. I was asked whether I was actually working in conjunction with the persons who were hiding their identity under the title of the 'Representative Committee.' Servet Bey at Trabzon, who had received the messages from the Representative Committee in very bad part and had drawn many erroneous conclusions concerning the character and the composition of this committee, asked me to come personally to the telegraph instrument. After we had discussed the matter by telegraph, he declared that all this misunderstanding was due to the fact that the title chosen for the signature suggested that somebody was posing as the 'Representative Committee.' All this caused us, even before your brotherly warning came, to consider very carefully this question of the signature. As the Representative Committee was not the executive committee of a secret society, but comprised the representatives of a lawful union which had been formed in a legal manner with the official consent of the people, we considered it to be obligatory for us to follow the usual practice laid down by law, by having all our resolutions and communications signed by a responsible person. We thought that any doubt that existed about our lawful position that would fall on the Representative Committee if their communications and publications were signed in the name of a fictitious authority, would

certainly considerably counterbalance the prejudice that could possibly arise from a signature that might be exploited by the hostile propaganda circulated by the enemies of the national movement. In the end, we unanimously decided that all our communications should be signed personally by somebody. In spite of their previous decision, when I received your friendly warning I proposed to the Committee to bring this question up again. My colleagues, however, again decided unanimously, being influenced by the foregoing reasons and considerations, to mention in the text of all such documents that it had been drawn up by the special resolution of the Representative Committee. As I was involved personally in this question, I considered it correct for me to remain neutral during these discussions. After the principle of a personal signature had been adopted, a discussion arose as to whether somebody else should not take my place. My colleagues raised the following objections to this suggestion.

"The whole world knows the part I am playing in this movement. If we begin to-day to let the correspondence be signed by someone else and if my name ceased to appear, it would immediately be concluded that discord and dissension reigned among us, and, whoever might be appointed to sign in my stead, it would immediately be thought that I am in an unlawful position that prevented me from coming conspicuously forward, and that the national movement is tainted by some illegality. But apart from this, even if we were to decide to empower another person possessing general confidence to sign, the same doubts that are raised to-day about myself would certainly be attached to my successor. He would find himself obliged to hand over his authority to someone else, which would lead to perpetual change and which would eventually reduce us to a condition of weakness. I cannot imagine how such a result as this could appeal to you.

"It is true that we calculated, particularly at first, that my own person would present a target for attack from every side. These anticipated attacks were actually delivered from within the country itself, as well as from abroad, but hitherto they have turned out, with God's help, completely in my favour. The Government and certain evil-disposed opponents have been overthrown in all their assaults. As for foreign countries, very close relations have been established with Americans, French and English. Their Plenipotentiaries came to Sivas and arrived at a good understanding. We know, with absolute certainty, that they have sent reports to their Governments that prove that the national movement to which we belong is far from having been instigated by two or three persons, but, on the other hand, bears the stamp of a truly national and general character.

"You are aware that, on account of the characteristic mentality of our country, it is impossible to prevent the calumnies which certain despicable people invent and circulate about those who are taking more or less leading parts as pioneers in a movement of this kind. But, after all, the same thing occurs in every country. The only thing we considered would be effective against such obstacles would be to go on, without hesitating a moment, and tread the road we had chosen in a spirit of unshakable unity and concord.

"You are surely convinced that I prefer to proceed in my acts and in affairs of public interest with the unanimous and loyal consent of my honourable colleagues, instead of following my own personal opinion. Nevertheless, I would be glad to hear your friendly observations on the subject. I greet you cordially and respectfully."

*
* *

Between the 12th September, the date on which we suspended intercourse with the Government in Istanbul, and the overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, we repeatedly sent messages to the Sultan, to the representatives of Foreign Powers, to the Prefecture of Istanbul and the whole of the Press. (Document 97.)

No doubt you will recall that on the 20th September a Proclamation was issued by the Sultan, with a supplement to it by Damat Ferit, the Grand Vezir. (Document 98.)

I would like to bring to your recollection once more the main points of it:

1. The policy followed by the Government resulted in the tragic events at Izmir having attracted the sympathetic attention of the civilised States and nations of Europe.
2. A special delegation has begun to institute an impartial inquiry on the spot. Our clear rights are beginning to be recognised by the civilised world.
3. We are not confronted by any decision or proposal intended as an attack against our national unity.
4. Some people speak of so-called dissension, which is supposed to exist between the people and the Government.
5. The present state of affairs can only lead to the postponement of the elections, which we desire to carry through as soon as possible in accordance with the regulations laid down by law, as well as the meeting of

the Chamber of Deputies, the existence of which is more necessary than ever, because the peace negotiations will very shortly take place.

6. I expect complete subjection to the orders of the Government from all my people.

7. The sense of fair-play on the part of the Great Powers and the spirit of justice exhibited by European and American public opinion, strengthen us in our hope for a speedy peace which would save our own dignity and our position in the world.

As you see, the publication of this Proclamation took place at a time when relations and communications between the country and the Government had already been interrupted and while we persevered in maintaining this rupture.

If our orders and instructions had been taken into due consideration this message ought not to have been brought before the eyes of the public anywhere in Anadolu.

I shall read you a telegram which will show you that, in spite of our orders and in opposition to our point of view, this publication had been circulated in several localities:

To the Commandant of Trabzon.

The officials and inhabitants of the town must be informed immediately about the Proclamation which His Majesty has deigned to issue to his people, so that everybody shall be aware of the shameless presumption shown by the present Cabinet of traitors, who continue to deceive our good ruler — in case there are any who may still be ignorant of this.

What stands out most conspicuously in this Proclamation and shows how His Majesty's heart is overflowing with love and anxiety for his nation and country, is the fact that the petition presented by the people, in which they complained of the treason of the Government, has not yet been laid before the Sovereign.

The sincerity of expression which characterises this Proclamation provides beyond doubt that His Majesty would not permit the members of the Cabinet to remain for a moment longer in office if he knew that they employed the weapon of treachery against the people.

It is on the people, therefore, that the duty rests at the present moment to manifest their unalterable devotion and loyalty to their glorious Padishah, and to make certain that the assurance shall reach the steps of the Imperial

Throne that the Nation and the Army, united in striving for the same object, will work together to protect the unquestionable rights of His Majesty, as well as the very existence of the country and the nation; and that, in opposition to them, this Cabinet of traitors conceal this legitimate movement of his faithful subjects from him, and only bring it to his knowledge in quite a different light.

We enclose the text of the telegram that will be sent by the inhabitants of Erzurum. 21st September, 1919.

Kâzım Karabekir

Commanding the XVth Army Corps.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa informed me about this telegram and added:

"Has Your Excellency anything to say about this? This Imperial Proclamation provided the nation with a new reason for bringing the truth before the eyes of the Padışah. The inhabitants of Erzurum will take this opportunity to denounce once more all the crimes perpetrated by the Cabinet. I shall also communicate the text of it to your honourable Committee, so that they may take notice of it, and, if they think fit, also send a telegram."

Kâzım Karabekir

We went to the Telegraph Office and sent off this reply:

Undoubtedly you are aware that we were unable to distribute the documents about the treachery of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet as widely as we wanted to do in the smallest towns and villages. Even if we had succeeded in doing so, it would not have been at all certain that the people would have arrived at the truth by comparing them with our messages.

Having been informed beforehand that the Sublime Porte was drawing up such a Proclamation, we thought it would be well to prevent its circulation from confusing the minds of the people.

Considering that all official relations with İstanbul had been broken off, we thought that this Proclamation, emanating not from the Palace itself but from the Sublime Porte, accompanied by some remarks made by Ferit Paşa himself, not having reached Sivas, Ankara, Kastamonu and certain places, had also not been received elsewhere. Before this Proclamation was issued to the nation, the people ought to have had an opportunity of laying their petitions and complaints before the Sovereign.

That is why we did not think it advisable to aid the circulation of the Proclamation; but as soon as it had been read by the persons interested in

certain places, like Erzurum and Sivas, it clearly became necessary, as you suggest, to send telegrams from every office to Istanbul.

Mustafa Kemal

To counteract as far as possible the effect which the Imperial Proclamation would surely produce in certain minds, the only thing we thought most advisable to do was to draw up a reply to the Sultan, rejecting the assertions made in this Proclamation, and to publish and circulate it so that the people could have a chance of studying it. This is what we did. (Document 99.)

I had come to the definite conclusion that there were some at Trabzon who, without the people being aware of it, were themselves very patriotic and loyal and had assumed the right personally to represent the national conscience in this district; thus we did not succeed in carrying on the national movement and the resolutions arrived at as satisfactorily in this town as we would have wished.

I had no doubt about the fact that a certain Galip Bey, who was Vali of Trabzon, was somehow involved in this hostile movement. I considered it advisable to commission Halit Bey, who was at Torul, near Trabzon, and had not yet taken over the command of his division, to organise the national movement in Trabzon and its vicinity. We wrote to this effect to the Commander of the XVth Army Corps.

In his reply, which he sent on the 20th September, he put forward certain suggestions, one of which was that "at this critical moment it would, perhaps, be impossible for us to improve the difficulties that might arise if Halit Bey took up his official duties, for we are concealing his presence here from the English." Later on he said: "If Halit Bey should send you any communications without my knowledge, I beg you to take no notice of them." (Document 100.)

We replied to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa in a telegram in cipher on the 22nd September, telling him that the English danger was non-existent, so far as we could see. But, as he appeared to think we ought to take a strong hand, we asked him to do whatever he thought necessary to meet the situation in Trabzon. (Document 101.)

While this correspondence was being carried on with the Commander of the XVth Corps, Lt. Colonel Halit Bey, of Torul, began meanwhile to put himself into direct communication with us. As we did not wish to leave his messages unanswered, we kept him informed about the position. On the 27th September, we received a telegram in cipher from the Commander of the

XVth Army Corps, which to a certain extent was a reply to ours of the 22nd September. After he had told us that he had carried through his principle, the result of long experience, which consisted in informing and enlightening the people first and then arresting those who appeared to be refractory, he informed us that he had sent Rüştü Bey, commanding the 9th Division, with his Chief of Staff, to Trabzon to take over the command of the 3rd Division temporarily, because Halit Bey did not appear to him to be the right man for Trabzon. He then expressed the conviction that "with regard to our conception of the English question, I hold the opinion that we must avoid showing any open and active hostility to them as long as possible." (Document 102.)

In my private and personal reply to him on the 29th September, 1919, I said:

"We are now perfectly well informed as to the public opinion prevailing in the Vilayet of Trabzon. We are in correspondence with all the kazas and livas in this vilayet, with the exception of Trabzon itself. But after the arrest and removal of the Vali, some doubts have been disseminated. (At a signal from me, Halit Bey had arrested the Vali and had sent him under escort to Erzurum.) I shall now tell you the reasons I had in my mind when I sent Rüştü Bey to Trabzon to take over the temporary command of the 3rd Division.

"In the first place, it was Halit Bey who had arrested the Vali. If Rüştü Bey were sent there a few days afterwards it would appear to evil-minded persons in the place to be a criticism of the attitude taken up by Halit Bey.

"Secondly, Halit Bey, who was waiting to take over the command of his Division in difficult circumstances, might be astounded to find somebody else replacing him in the critical and historical period through which we were passing. I ask you, therefore, to abandon your plan. At the same time, I am very loth to interfere with the military matters of your Army Corps." (Document 103.)

On the 2nd October, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa wrote to me telling me in detail what had been done at the request of Halit Bey, and said that he had been ordered to go to Erzurum to have the situation fully explained to him. (Document 104.) Now, Cevat Abbas Bey, my senior A. D. C., had received a private telegram in cipher on the 1st October, signed by Tarik, the adjutant of the 3rd Division. The last sentence of it read:

"Yesterday the commanding officer demanded from the Army Corps that the conditions under which the command of the 3rd Division is now being carried on should be altered. If the Army Corps does not accept this proposal,

I have to inform you that, whether I receive the order or not, he will take over the actual command of the Division, he will detach himself from the Army Corps according to previous intentions, and will recognize the Congress itself as his sole and immediate superior authority. Will you inform His Excellency the Paşa about this in due course." (Document 105.)

About two weeks later I received the following telegram, dated 17th October, from Kâzım Karabekir Paşa:

"In order to carry on the national movement within my command, it is absolutely necessary in my opinion to enforce strict discipline in future, so that the military spirit and the principle of subordination shall not be weakened. Experience proves everywhere and in all undertakings that where firmness is not combined with foresight the aim in view is fraught with danger, however brilliant it may appear to be.

"Respect for the principle of subordination and a cautious attitude are specially necessary at Trabzon, where there are representatives of England and France.

"It unfortunately happened that, in disobedience of distinct orders given to him, Halit Bey went personally in uniform and arrested the Vali, a proceeding that immediately gave rise to all kinds of criticisms that were passed from mouth to mouth, as a result of his strange attitude." (I have already mentioned the name of the person who had instigated Halit Bey to take this step.) "If Halit Bey is going to act like this during the elections, the English will be certain to repeat their procedure in regard to him and this will lead to difficulties."

(We asked Halit Bey and a number of others to whom we could appeal to help us quite privately in setting the elections on foot and to secure their agreement with the will of the nation. As far as I am personally concerned, I am quite at a loss to understand what difficult situation could inevitably arise from anything the English might do.) "Consequently I ask you not to carry on any correspondence with him, but give your orders to him through me. I further beg you to give me your opinion about the election of Halit Bey as deputy for any particular district, and whether you think that his personal attitude would lead to any adverse criticism."

I simply replied to this on the 19th October by saying: "I cannot say anything about the election of Halit Bey as a deputy, because I know nothing about his views."

There was no end to the questions that cropped up during the following days, before the overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, and the difficulties we

had to encounter were equally numerous. It would tire you too much if I attempted to tell you all about them, so I shall confine myself to mentioning a few only, which will be supplementary, I think, to what you know already.

On the recommendation of Ali Galip, Osman Nuri Bey had been appointed Mutasarrif of Dersim by the Government, and when he arrived at Sivas on the 8th September we detained him.

Muhittin Paşa, Vali of Ankara, whose treachery against the national movement was fully substantiated, had gone on a circular tour for a special purpose and on the 13th September happened to be at Çorum. We ordered the Commanders of the Army Corps at Ankara and of the 5th Caucasian Division at Samsun to arrest this official and send him under strong escort to Sivas. He was actually brought a prisoner to Sivas. I had a personal interview with him. After I had warned and advised him, I sent him, because of his advanced age, to İstanbul via Samsun. Samih Fethi, Mutasarrif of Çorum, was also privately requested several days later to come to Sivas.

On the 16th September we ordered the officer commanding the Division at Niğde to arrest the Mutasarrif of that place, the Collector of Taxes, and the Commissioner of Police, who had shown themselves antagonistic to the national movement, and to send them, also under escort, to Sivas.

Ibrahim Bey, Vali of Kastamonu, was known personally to Colonel Kâzım Bey (my C. O. S. when I was an Inspector in the Army). This is the reason we had entrusted him with all manner of secrets and carried on correspondence with him in cipher. The Government ordered him to return to İstanbul. Instead of directly refusing to obey this order, for some unexplained reason he left Kastamonu and went to İstanbul, where he was immediately arrested. İstanbul had appointed somebody else, who had arrived at İnebolu on the 16th September, to take his place. We gave the requisite order to the competent authority in that town to arrest him. An interesting little incident followed, about which I trust I may speak at some length. After I had personally observed certain symptoms of hesitation and uncertainty in the Vilayet of Kastamonu and at Kastamonu itself, I requested Ali Fuat Paşa, who was at Ankara, to send a capable and trustworthy officer there. Fuat Paşa sent Colonel Osman Bey as Commandant of the place. Osman Bey arrived at Kastamonu exactly on the 16th September. We expected him to arrest the Vali, who had simultaneously arrived. After having given him orders to this effect, I waited at the Telegraph Office for news. Night had fallen and I was unable to speak to anybody at Kastamonu who could give me the information I required. During the night, Colonel

Osman Bey, Commandant at Kastamonu and the district, came to the Telegraph Office and sent me the following message:

"I have arrived at Kastamonu to-day. Through the machinations of Government agents, the provisional Vali and the Commander of the Gendarmerie, I was arrested in my house. I have only just been liberated by some of our officers, who are all the very soul of patriotism. I have promptly retaliated by arresting both the provisional Vali and the Commander of the Gendarmerie. I have taken possession of the Telegraph Office. The position is very serious. I beg the Congress to send all their resolutions here to enlighten the loyal population of this town. I hear that the new Vali has landed at İnebolu. What shall I do about it? I shall wait at the telegraph instrument until I receive authority from the Congress to appoint a temporary Vali and the other officials."

My exchange of telegrams with Osman Bey then continued thus:

I asked him: "Are you really master of the situation there? How many men have you at your disposal? Who are the really trustworthy persons among the leading officials in the vilayets? What is the name of the new Vali who you have heard has arrived at İnebolu?"

Osman Bey replied: "I am complete master of the vilayet. All I want is the support of the Congress and to be kept well informed of all that is going on. The Vali is said to be a discharged official who was at one time Vali of Konya. His name is Ali Riza. My troops consist of a battalion of 250 men and a machine-gun detachment with four machine-guns. I have been unable as yet to get into touch with the inhabitants. Among the high officials of the vilayet is Ferit Bey, the General Treasurer."

I gave Osman Bey the following order: "You are authorised immediately to take up your duties temporarily as Vali and to take the entire civil administration and the armed power into your own hands. Be ready to arrest the Vali immediately on his arrival. Do not hesitate to use force against all those who offer resistance to your authority. If the General Treasurer of the vilayet is the same Ferit Bey whom I met at Diyarbakır, he may be relied upon to help you. Inform the Mutasarrif of Bolu immediately of your authority and of the attitude you are taking up. Command him in our name to adopt the same attitude towards İstanbul. Issue the same orders, as coming direct from me, to Mazhar Tevfik Bey, the Mutasarrif of Sinop. What cipher are you using?"

Osman Bey replied: "I shall transfer the office of acting Vali to Ferit Bey, the General Treasurer. I cannot take it myself. Ferit Bey is the same

man you know. The Mutasarrif of Sinop is also a man whom you know. He has been dismissed. We have appointed Remzi Bey, commanding the gendarmerie, temporarily in his place. I have been informed that Mazhar Tevfik is at Sinop. The cipher key is in the possession of the Commander of the Gendarmerie who is under arrest I shall order him to hand it over to me and will inform you of the result."

Our telegraphic conversation proceeded in this way:

Question: "Have you another cipher key? Where is Ferit Bey at the present moment? Has he been told about the position of affairs?"

Answer: "No, he has not yet been informed. I had sent for him and he has just come. I have not brought any cipher key with me, because I hoped that I would be able to use the official cipher here."

Question: "Who commands the gendarmerie battalion there? What is the strength of the Division? Is it under your own command?"

Answer: "Emin Bey, commanding the gendarmerie, is here with me now. He is working with me. The gendarmerie numbers about thirty-five men. Halit Bey, chief of the police, is also at my side now and is working with me. He can dispose of over forty men. As Şerif Bey, in command of the infantry battalion, is a rather foolish man, we thought it advisable to arrest him. Emin Bey, commanding the gendarmerie battalion, holds the rank of captain. Ferit Bey, the General Treasurer, has just arrived; he is standing by my side."

Question: "Will you be good enough to tell me something about Emin Bey?"

Answer: "He is Emin Bey of Üsküp, whom you know and whose commission dates from 1902. He greets you."

Then I dictated the following to the telegraph clerk: "Thanks, I remember Emin Efendi very well indeed. Have you explained the position to Ferit Bey? You can send important news to us by the official government cipher. If the Commander of the Gendarmerie who is acting Mutasarrif of Sinop is not reliable, you must look for some other man to take his place. Do you want any help?"

To this he replied: "I shall be able to see a little later on whether I shall require reinforcements or not. The Commander of the Gendarmerie battalion is quite a new hand and I have not yet been able to form any opinion about him."

After I had asked Osman Bey whether there was anything more that

he wanted to say and whether he had yet spoken to Ferit Bey about the situation, and after I had received his reply to these questions, I sent him the following official telegram:

16th September, 1919.

To Osman Bey and Ferit Beyefendi.

"I wish you success in all your undertakings. We are awaiting further information about the situation and would like to hear that you have arrested the Vali, who must surely arrive at any moment."

Mustafa Kemal

Some days after Ferit Bey had become acting Vali and Osman Bey Commandant of Kastamonu and its surroundings, I ordered them to come once more to the telegraph instrument, and asked them for further news.

They informed me that they had sent telegrams to the desired effect to the Office of the Government in Istanbul, signed by all of them, and that these messages had also been published in all the vilayets and sancaks. Then they asked me several other question: "Paşa, the people are very anxious to know, 1. Whether the public opinion of the other vilayets is favourable to us or not? 2. How long you think this abnormal state of affairs will continue? 3. What you intend to do if the Cabinet persist in their resistance? We beg you to answer these questions."

It was easy to see that these questions were asked by the people who were troubling the acting Vali and the Commandant. It was worth while to answer them.

I sent them a long message, that kept the telegraph line between Sivas and Kastamonu occupied for many hours. What I said may be condensed into this:

1. The national movement, full of energy and glowing with enthusiasm, is actively going on even in the remotest parts of the country. The inhabitants, even of the smallest villages, and the Army, down to the smallest units, are responding loyally to our efforts and cheerfully follow our instructions in complete unity

2. The position which you describe as being abnormal will change automatically on the day when the population of Kastamonu abandon their miserable pessimism, which comes from their habit of looking upon the present state of affairs as abnormal, and will stand firm to the last, determined to realise our common ideal.

It is natural that the Cabinet will persist in their attitude. Before thinking how we can overcome their resistance, we must first carry through what we have decided to do in every direction and by all possible means.

What, for instance, has been done at Bolu? Can we be certain that all official communication between Istanbul and all the towns lying this side of Bolu has actually been cut?

We are still awaiting news that they were told to send us here. In my opinion this is the first step that would destroy the Cabinet's power of resistance if it extended as far as Istanbul. But if the Cabinet continue to show their misguided obstinacy, there would surely be other and still more effective ways left to us.

Later it became apparent from the information given by the Vali and Commandant: "The new Vali who had embarked at İnebolu to return to Istanbul had received on his arrival at Zonguldak the following order from the Minister of the Interior: 'Bolu and its surroundings are free. Disembark at Zonguldak and get into communication with the places in your vilayet. Remain there until you get further orders.' The new Vali actually landed at Zonguldak, and began to send out threats from there. Ferit Bey and Osman Bey had commanded the Mutasarrif of Zonguldak to arrest the new Vali and send him overland to Kastamonu. The Mutasarrif had disobeyed this order, but the new Vali, who heard of this, did not feel himself safe any longer and returned to Istanbul." (Document 106.)

I have already mentioned that Ali Fuat Paşa, commanding the XXth Corps at Ankara, had followed certain instructions and taken steps in the name of the Congress.

Ali Fuat Paşa had been appointed by the Congress to the rank of Commander of the National Forces in Western Anadolu. As, from the standpoint of the national movement, he regarded Eskişehir and the surrounding territory as a military zone, he appointed Atif Bey, Lt. Colonel in the cavalry, commander of this zone, and Ömer Lütfü Bey, commanding the 23rd Division, commander of the Afyonkarahisar zone.

I have already indicated that we had to pay particular attention to this Division from the first days we arrived in Anadolu.

The Government in Istanbul had appointed Hamdi Paşa to succeed Ali Fuat Paşa, and had sent him to take up his duties.

Hamdi Paşa got as far as Eskişehir. On the 16th September he was told to return to Istanbul.

The English ordered Atif Bey, commanding the national forces in the Eskişehir zone to be arrested, and he was sent to Istanbul. An officer commanding the national forces ought to have known better than to fall so easily into the hands of the enemy. This lack of foresight on his part led to a great deal of trouble in Istanbul in the effort to obtain his release.

As you are probably aware, at that time there were English troops in Eskişehir.

Fuat Paşa himself, with all the national troops he could muster, had gone to Cemşit, a place near Eskişehir, and had surrounded the town.

General Sally-Clade, in command of the Allied Troops at Eskişehir, wrote a letter to Fuat Paşa which contained expressions that could only be regarded as an insult to the honour and dignity of the national troops and the officers commanding them. We were satisfied that the General had exceeded his authority, and forthwith sent a protest to the foreign representatives in Istanbul.

The General sent a deputation, consisting of a staff officer and an officer belonging to the English Control Commission at Eskişehir, which arrived on the 25th September. They were received by Fuat Paşa and they gave him every assurance that the English had no intention of interfering in any way with our internal affairs and our national movement.

At the same time, the English tried to find out whether it would be more agreeable to us if they withdrew their troops from Merzifon. We promptly gave them to understand that we would be very pleased indeed if they would do so.

They actually proceeded to withdraw their troops from Merzifon with all their munitions and baggage, marching to Samsun and embarking for Istanbul.

After we had become masters in Eskişehir, we thought of sending Fuat Paşa to the districts of Bursa and Bilecik.

Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya, had become one of the most important supporters in Anadolou of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet. The impossibility for Cemal Paşa, Army Inspector at Konya and who had been in Istanbul, to return to Anadolou, and the hesitating attitude of Selahattin Bey, commanding the Army Corps at Konya, who had suddenly left for Istanbul without telling anybody he was going, had made Cemal Bey undisputed master of Konya and the surrounding district. It was necessary that we should send someone there who was well acquainted with our plans.

We chose Refet Bey, who was with us at Sivas, and he started at once. When the news reached Konya that the Representative Committee had sent a military commander there, the patriots were roused. To counteract this, Cemal Bey tried to form a bodyguard for himself by setting free all the criminals, murderers and other jail-birds, and arming them.

The loyal population of Konya rose against such an infamous act, determined to perform their patriotic duty.

As soon as Cemal Bey saw this, he fled to Istanbul on the 26th September. (Document 107.) The people, who had assembled in the Town Hall, elected Hoca Vehbi Efendi as acting Vali.

I remember a strange incident that occurred at this time and which I cannot help relating to you. On his way from Sivas to Konya Refet Bey sent me a telegraphic message.

In it he told me that, in order to secure the success of his commission in the district of Konya, he ought to hold the rank and authority of Inspector of the IInd Army Corps.

Later on, after Refet Bey had been sent into the district of Bolu from Ankara to quell a rising there, he sent me a telegram in cipher in which he applied for the dignity of Paşa to be conferred on him, giving as his reason for making the application that it would make a very good impression on the people.

I need not tell you that I had no authority to gratify Refet Bey's ambition. He ought to have known better than anybody else that I could not do so. He could not have expected that I would intervene with the Government on his behalf to obtain his request. The whole world knew beyond any doubt that I had not only resigned my post as an Inspector in the Army and had retired from military service, but that my name had been struck off the list and that I had been condemned to death by the Padisah and the Government.

My activities were confined to my work in the Committee which had been elected by the Congress and which I carried out in the name of the Committee. I was not entitled, nor had I the authority officially vested in me as the leader of the national struggle.

It was surely evident to everybody who knew anything about my position that it was useless to apply to me for any title or privilege.

When we sent Refet Bey to Konya we had instructed him to do all he could to help us. It was his business to show what he could do in this direction.

While we were trying hard to establish the national movement and organisation all over the country, it happened that we received threatening and intimidating telegrams from certain heads of the Civil Administration, who were partisans of the Government. One of these, a certain Ali Riza, Mutasarrif of Urfa, telegraphed to us with reference to information he alleged he had received from foreigners with whom he had been in touch, to the effect that the national movement was regarded by the Entente Powers as an organisation directed against them, and that, consequently, they intended to put an end to the Turkish Government by militarily occupying the whole of Turkish territory.

There can be no doubt that this telegram was dictated to the Mutasarrif by foreigners. You can well imagine that naturally he received from us the reply he deserved. (Document 108.)

You must remember that at this time the American Government had sent a Commission, under the leadership of General Harboard, to study our country and the Caucasus. This Commission also came to Sivas. On the 22nd September, I had a long conversation with General Harbord on the question of the aims of the national movement, its organisation and the main factors that would contribute to the establishment of national unity, and about our feelings with regard to the non-Moslem elements, and concerning propaganda and the hostile acts committed by certain foreigners in our country.

The General asked me some strange questions, such as: "What will you do if, in spite of every imaginable effort and sacrifice made by the nation, it should all end in failure?"

If my memory does not deceive me, I replied that the nation that exerts every imaginable effort and makes every possible sacrifice to secure its freedom and independence cannot help being successful. But if we failed, we would have to admit that our nation is dead. The possibility of failure, therefore, cannot be dreamed of in the case of a nation that is full of life and capable of making every kind of sacrifice.

I did not trouble to attempt to ascertain what could have been the General's real object in putting this question to me. I only mention the matter, incidentally, to tell you that he respected my reply.

On the evening of the 25th September I received the following telegram from Mahmut Bey, acting commander of the XXth Army Corps at Ankara:

"Last night Fuat Paşa was asked to go to the telegraph instrument by the Telegraph Office in Istanbul. A telegram in cipher was dictated

according to the cipher-key which the Ministry of the Interior usually uses when communicating with the vilayet. The contents may be summarized as follows:

The country could certainly be saved if the wise provisions of the Padişah's Proclamation were to be observed. The national movement is understood by cultured public opinion to be pursuing fatal aims. The estrangement between the nation and the Government must lead to foreign intervention. The existence of such oposition at a moment when the Conference is deciding our fate cannot be accepted as a promising sign of success or salvation.

"Then a proposal was made that the leaders of the national movement and high personalities should meet at a place to be decided upon; they appeared to take it for granted that we would agree to such a meeting. As time is pressing, we are waiting impatiently for a reply. Promises are made with repeated assurances that the freedom of individual opinion and the dignity of those taking part in it will be respected.'

"The sender of this telegram is Abdülkerim Paşa, a staff officer holding the rank of brigadier-general. The answer was to be given in the same cipher-key to Hadi Paşa, *per* the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture.

"It is evident by this that Abdülkerim Paşa wanted to make the impression on the public mind that this step originated from our side.

"As you are there at the telegraph instrument, would you let me know as soon as possible whether we are to receive them and what answer we are to give them. Fuat Paşa has also been informed about this." (Document 109.)

At 7 o'clock in the evening on the same day I was at the telegraph instrument and telegraphed to Mahmut Bey: "Tell Kerim Paşa and Hadi Paşa that Fuat Paşa is officially detained outside Ankara, but if they have anything they want to say they may telegraph in any way they wish to the Representative Committee at Sivas and communicate directly with Mustafa Kemal Paşa, who is a member of it. Be sure that you use the words 'if they have anything that they want to say'." (Document 110.)

Mahmut Bey sent us a copy of the telegram Kerim Paşa had sent to Ankara. Its content comprised what Mahmut Bey had summarized for us. (Document 111.)

It was now about a fortnight since our rupture with the Government
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

began. The places that had shown a disinclination to join us in the national movement had either to join us voluntarily or would be obliged to do so by force. All the officers faithful to the Government had fled or were compelled to submit. Thousands of telegrams from all parts of the country were sent to Istanbul every day, demanding the overthrow of the Cabinet. Officers and representatives of the Entente Powers who were travelling about in Anadolu publicly declared everywhere that they were neutral regarding the national movement and that they had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the country.

I think that we cannot be mistaken if we come to the conclusion that the Padişah and Ferit Paşa had at last realised that under these circumstances there was nothing left for them to do but to come to an understanding with the leaders of the national movement, and that they had begun to seek for some means to bring about such an understanding, provided that their own position would be safeguarded.

The late Abdülkerim Paşa referred to was one of my oldest comrades. He was a very honourable patriot, with a straightforward and loyal mind. We had worked together in the same office at Salonika when I was an aide-de-camp there and he held the rank of major; we had been intimate friends for many a year. His personality and manner of speaking gave the impression that he might be a member of some religious order. He had been seen visiting certain convents. But nobody had been able to say what seyh he was a follower of.

In his conception of the world, as an anthroposophist, he actually considered that he held the dignity of "Hazreti Evvel" or "Büyük Hazret" ("Chief, or First Exalted Excellency" or "Grand Excellency").

According to the merit he considered due to them, he bestowed upon his intimates various titles, such as Hazret, Kutup, and others. He honoured me with the designation of "Kutbülaktaş". We shall meet similar allusions in the conversation which I shall refer to directly.

Kerim Paşa had also a distinct individual manner of speaking and writing. These he did with sincere eloquence, that had procured him a great reputation in his time. He was also credited with possessing a rare gift of persuasion. When he was Commander and Inspector in the Army at Salonika, Hadi Paşa had known Kerim Paşa and also knew that he was loved and honoured by his comrades on account of the qualities I have described.

Now, Hadi Paşa, a member of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, wanted to utilise

an appropriate situation to come to the help of the Padışah and his chief Ferit Paşa in the difficult dilemma in which they found themselves.

Kerim Paşa had also met Ali Fuat Paşa at Salonika.

During the night of the 27th September, an hour before midnight, I found myself suddenly in direct communication with Kerim Paşa. This is how we greeted one another:

Telegraph Office at Sivas. "Mustafa Kemal is at the instrument; he wishes Kerim Paşa to know that he is ready to speak to him."

İstanbul: "Is His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa — my Soul — there?"

I: "Yes, my dear and venerable Kerim Paşa."

Then Kerim Paşa began to dictate at the other end of the wire the following address: "To His Excellency Mustafa Paşa, at Sivas," and added as a kind of password, "Tell the Paşa that Hazreti Evvel is here: he will understand."

Then followed:

"I hope you are in good health, my brother."

I quote Kerim Paşa's introduction literally so that you may understand the way İstanbul Government had captured him by playing on his simplicity and the nobility of his character.

"For the good of the people, I want to converse with the great patriot you are, my brother, and with my honoured brethren of the Representative Committee.

"I sent a telegram through Fuat Paşa which was meant to reach you personally. Following that telegram, which you will have received, I hope by the grace of God you may attain happy success. Thus Divine Mercy will help our country through this critical time, so full of seriousness and unrest, which it has to pass through.

"Guided by our earnest desire for freedom, let us act for the sake of the country in such a way that we may understand one another.

"Do you not think this very necessary, my very learned and wise brother? What do you think about it, O my Soul? Let us destroy the calumnies that our enemies — May the earth swallow them up! — continually circulate about our beautiful country, as well as their publicly declared criminal designs. Let us unite in bringing the Nation and the Government into concord for the sake of the common weal, so that they can work together under the same

Head: for is it not true that the sacred aim of both is identical? Let us set aside all hindrances and open a still wider field for our patriotic manifestations, which are of inestimable value for the protection of our beloved country.

"To find a way to this end, let us — you and I, my dear brother — exchange views with one another. I am hoping to see you, my brother. I must add, my Soul, that the Government shows the best intentions in this undertaking."

This conversation with Kerim Paşa, which began in the night of the 27th September at 11 o'clock, lasted exactly eight hours, till 7.30 o'clock in Kerim Paşa's message. I shall reproduce the text of our telegrams in the large sheets of paper.

I fear it would strain your indulgence if I were to inflict you with the reading of the whole of this tremendous rigmarole.

So that all may read the gentle wording and the high-sounding periods in Kerim Paşa's message, I shall reproduce the text of our telegrams in the documents which I am going to publish, although it must be admitted that the matter is unfortunately supported neither by well-grounded opinions nor very logical deductions.

Allow me to say something about one of these phrases, so that I may give you a clear idea, especially in the face of results, of the essential point from which we started regarding the aim we had in view.

You will observe that in my reply to the first telegram from Kerim Paşa, I adapted myself somewhat to his style.

I, too, began my reply to him with the words; "Tell His Excellency that Kutbülaktaş is here. He will understand." And after this opening, I said: "I am answering at once:

"To His Excellency Abdülkerim Paşa, my highly honoured brother with a pure heart.

"My health, thank God, is excellent. I am happy to find that our great and noble nation thoroughly recognises its legitimate rights and is working with all its soul to preserve and protect them. I thank you sincerely for your wish that we should exchange our opinions

"We have received the telegram you sent through His Excellency Fuat Paşa.

"Even from a cursory perusal of the contents of the Proclamation on

which Your Excellency relies, it is easy to recognise that it is no more than a reproach by Ferit Paşa and his colleagues.

"The circumstances and events which have filled the heart of His Majesty with such deep sorrow are not due to any acts of our nation but those of Ferit Paşa, Adil Bey, Minister of the Interior, Süleyman Şefik, Minister of War, and their collaborators Ali Galip Bey, Vali of Harput, Muhittin Paşa, Vali of Ankara, Galip Bey, Vali of Trabzon, Ali Rıza Bey, Vali of Kastamonu and Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya.

"If the treacherous incident that occurred at Malatya, the criminal conspiracy at Çorum, the desperate strategem at Konya, have not been represented to you in their true light, it is pardonable that Your Excellencies have failed to estimate rightly the consequences from the very beginnig . . .

"It is perfectly true that foreign countries begin to look upon us more favourably. But this development is by no means the fruit of the policy followed by Ferit Paşa's Government. It is the immediate consequence of the determined stand the nation has taken on its own initiative to maintain and give evidence of its existence.

"It is exactly on this very point that the Sovereign has been deceived.

"The sole means of salvation and the only support of our existence are based on the fact that the national strength shall become the ruling factor and the will of the nation the sovereign power. To depart in the slightest degree from this firm and lawful basis would — May God forbid it! — mean a source of disappointment to the State, the people and the country.

"It is an unfortunate and an undoubted fact that there are many evil-minded persons — May the earth swallow them up! — who have no scruples about falsely describing and representing our noble national enterprise publicly before the world.

"But what is extremely sad, is the fact that at the head of these accursed evil-minded people there are political personalities in our immortal State, such as Ferit Paşa, the Grand Vezir, Adil Bey and Süleyman Şefik Paşa, who are Ministers.

"These are the wretches who announce officially and spread rumours that the Bolsheviks are invading our territory in bands and that the national movement is in reality a Bolshevik movement. These are the misguided persons who officially and openly publish to the world through the mouths of foreign journalists that our noble national movement is nothing but a desperate enterprise of the Unionists and that it is supported by their money.

"And these are the badly-informed men who officially spread the news through the various agencies that Anadolu is a theatre of unrest, and who, referring to the special stipulations of the armistice, try to surrender our beloved country to occupation by our enemies.

"And finally, these are the depraved creatures who intend to incite the Mohamedan population of Malatya and Sivas to butcher one another.

"These are the traitors who, so that they would be able to stop the national movement, would like to see Sivas and all the other places where the awakening of the national feeling is developing occupied by foreigners.

"But, notwithstanding this, it is our most sacred duty (as you, my brother, also suggest) to annihilate the calumnies which evil-tongued people are spreading abroad throughout our beautiful country, as well as the criminal machinations in which they are publicly engaged; to condemn them to impotence in their hidden lurking places, and to bring the actions of the Government, in their effort to save the country, into accord with the aims of the nation.

"Thank God that our nation, on its road to its goal, has overcome all the attempts of the malicious people, whoever they may have been, and has begun resolutely to move forward with renewed courage.

"As for the foreigners, they understand how great the strength of the nation really is and how fixed its purposes are. They recognise how powerless the Government is in comparison; it is without character and entirely out of touch with the people. They have evacuated Merzifon and have also begun to evacuate Samsun. They declare that they are neutral in regard to the national movement and have declined to interfere in our internal affairs. This is the first result attained by our national movement, which is striving for our independence.

The national movement will reach success by bringing about the adherence of Istanbul to the stipulations of the constitution. Let me assure you that it is quite a mistake to believe that the present Government is inspired with good intentions.

"Before I left Erzurum, I wrote to Ferit Pasa and explained the true state of affairs to him, telling him that no power on earth can stand up against the national will and the national strength, and at the same time warning him against further persistence in his opposition.

"But this misguided man, instead of answering me, announced that the national movement was being conducted by merely a few individuals.

"Instead of listening to my patriotic and unselfish warnings, he preferred to depend on misleading reports from certain Valis who, blinded by their anxiety about their own private interests and led away by their ignorance, imagined that they would be able to save the situation by proceeding guardedly with both parties at the same time.

"Now that the Government has sunk to the lowest depths of scoundrelism, treachery and impotence, and the nation has plainly recognised the true condition of affairs, it is clearly our duty to see that a new Cabinet, representing the will of the nation, shall come into power as soon as possible.

"In case the members of the present Cabinet should be anxious about their own persons or their lives, we hold the opinion that the highest interests of the nation should stand far above such paltry considerations, and we are prepared to give them all the assurances and guarantees they desire.

"But if they remain obdurate and continue their course along the evil road they have chosen, the responsibility for the consequences that might result therefrom will fall entirely on their own shoulders.

"We feel quieter in our own minds now that we have at last been able to lay all we wanted to say before exalted personages, thanks to the opportunity afforded to us by the benevolence of Your Excellency — by you, my brother, Abdülkerim Paşa — whose heart is beating and overflowing with loyalty and affection for our Padişah and with true love for the country and the nation, and of whom I shall always preserve the most affectionate memories."

The words I have just quoted embody the gist of a very long message.

After I had said this: "The national movement is forcing its way onward towards İstanbul and is gaining considerably in strength; Ferit Paşa and his colleagues are well aware of this fact. Will you on your part gather all the information you can about it and confirm the truth of what I say?" I went on to give Abdülkerim Paşa further details by telling him all I could about the movements which had so far been perfectly successful. I added that, "to check this movement there is only one way possible, namely, to put a man at the head of the Cabinet who is subservient to the national ambition in the fullest meaning of the word and who can grasp its real objects and act accordingly. If you have any brotherly observations to make on what I have said, I earnestly beg you to be kind enough to do so." And then I attached this signature: "Mustafa Kemal, in the name of the Representative Committee of the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

Then Kerim Paşa opened a second stage of our exchange of telegrams with the following introduction: "First, I beg you to be kind enough to present my greetings and respects to all the honourable persons who are with Your Excellency." Then Kerim Paşa continued: "Your Excellency has covered the questions I referred to. Twice you excused me on account of errors made in the directions given. You will understand how very difficult it is for me to act as intermediary without knowing all the particulars and local conditions. But we are really anxious to protect the interests of the country and this anxiety is the only guiding star that illuminates our path.

"In these days, when the destiny of the country is being determined, I would like to express my earnest hope that consideration may be given to the possibility that success can be achieved through bringing about a close cooperation between the Government and the nation.

"It is possible that I am wrong in my interpretation of the Imperial Proclamation, as you pointed out at the beginning. Allow me, however, to explain fully to you the meaning of what His Majesty said in the Proclamation, which we regard as the soundest foundation for the settlement of the question. It appears to me that His Majesty —"

Here I interrupted Kerim Paşa, and said:

"Your Excellency, superfluous explanations can only lead both of us away from the main question. More than that, it is quite unnecessary to try to explain the Imperial Proclamation to us in detail. Let us keep to the main point."

Kerim Paşa answered:

"Yes, we shall keep to the main point. Allow me to continue."

"Let us come to it and keep to it," I said.

"Yes," was the reply, "we are coming to it."

"Your Excellency," I interrupted, "we can no longer suffer our legitimate acts or the manifestation of the national will to be misinterpreted or exposed to criticism and correction. In particular, we cannot admit that the counter-proposals of a Cabinet convicted of treason should serve as a ground for reproaches. Representing the formal desire of the nation, we made our position quite clear. Is it necessary to repeat it?

"If, instead of answering this national demand which categorically insists on being realised, you attempt to intervene in favour of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, so that he may continue to defile the supreme dignity of the Empire, your

efforts will not lead to any satisfactory results. Besides, I am afraid that the friendly regard we entertain for you may be shaken by such an attempt.

"If Ferit Paşa immediately hands over his position to an irreproachable person and if you are convinced that he will do so, there is no question left to be settled. If he is not prepared to do this, your mediation can have no other result than to do you harm and lead to unnecessary trouble.

"By his obstinacy in remaining in power, Ferit Paşa is exposing himself to an unfortunate fate. This is our last word. We intend to make this truth known to the Padişah. If you will undertake this noble task, it will be the only way by which you will be able to fulfil the religious and national duty which the nation expects from Your Excellency."

Although Kerim Paşa had commenced by saying that the main thing was not to make the conversation too lengthy, he himself dragged it out a great deal farther than was necessary. His long speeches ended with the following words:

"The task we have assumed in the interest of the country will be looked upon as pure by the Almighty, and will also appear to be the same in the eyes of the nation. The Good God who guides our destiny will undoubtedly show the leaders the best way to save the nation and the country. I send you my brotherly greetings."

It was 4.30 in the morning when my turn came to reply.

I could not leave the questions raised by Kerim Paşa unanswered. After having explained my views to him, I concluded my message by saying: "What must be the aim of patriots like ourselves? Is it to seek the impossible by endeavouring to reconcile the nation to Ferit Paşa, from whom the nation can expect nothing in the future but mischief? Or, is it to attempt to convince the Padişah of the necessity of confiding the reins of Government, without loss of time, to a new Cabinet which will appreciate the needs and destiny of our country and nation?"

"If you will do me the kindness of answering "yes" or "no" to these questions, we shall, at least so far as we ourselves are concerned, have fulfilled the noble task whose settlement you have taken upon yourself and which undoubtedly will receive the highest reward from God and from the nation."

Instead of replying clearly, Kerim Paşa answered again with long circumlocutions.

By some of these phrases, however, he gave me to understand that the Sovereign had not been deceived, but that he was fully informed about

everything that was going on. These were some of his expressions: "In the antechamber of the Imperial Throne Room sits the Superior Council who examine all questions and discuss them. In a lawful government this antechamber may be compared to an altar to which the eyes of all the people are turned. His Majesty has told me that he knows all about the petitions that have been presented to him from Anadolu; not a single one of them has escaped the knowledge of His Majesty, our Sublime Sovereign, who is the Pole where all the affairs of the country centre and to which all the highest desires converge."

Continuing for a long time in his peculiar strain, Kerim Paşa said:

"The Almighty will bestow upon us the grace to discover the way out of this difficult question and will inspire us. It is sure that His decisions are sublime and that their manifestations are near at hand. His hand is over all others. Thanks to His Divine benevolence, my beloved Soul, everything will turn out well in the end and will correspond to the great merits of the nation."

It was I who introduced the third phase of our telegraphic conversation, although it was then 6.10 a. m.

I began by addressing him as "Büyük Hazret," which I knew would please Kerim Paşa: "It is just because it is the highest altar of our nation," I said, "that we have not failed to lay the wishes and complaints of the nation before His Majesty. We must add, however, to guard you from falling into serious error, that the nation is not so absolutely sure that His Majesty the Caliph has taken any notice of the wishes of the whole of Anadolu, for it cannot help feeling that, if the Sultan really knew them, he would not listen to certain individuals convicted of treason in preference to the entire nation."

To the other points emphasised by Kerim Paşa, I answered in these terms:

"We implore the most Gracious and most Merciful God to reveal His sublime manifestations, which are so near at hand, for the salvation of our unhappy and noble nation, and we trust that the obstinacy exhibited by certain interested people in Istanbul, where the political horizon is veiled by perpetual fog, will disappear. The noble heart of the nation is beating in harmony with this desire."

"I must beg, however, to be permitted to point out once more that the questions I am urging you to answer with "yes" or "no" have unfortunately remained unanswered. Undoubtedly, my most venerable Paşa, "the Hand of God is over all others," but it is none the less a fact that those who try

to find a way to solve this question and overcome all the difficulties that encompass it must have a fixed aim . . .

"The nation will act according to the Divine Will and, as you have said, its desires will come to a happy issue. I beg you, also, to give us your blessing on the future that lies before us. Man proposes, God disposes."

Mustafa Kemal.

I was fully convinced that Kerim Paşa was fatigued. He declared: "Only two more words, my Soul", and continued, "the most sincere aspirations are included in the demands of the national movement in the hope that those principles will be honoured and respected and that the decision in the end will be guided by God's hands and thus be accepted and obeyed."

At last he wanted to retire, and said: "Good bye; we shall speak to one another again at another time." But we would not let him go; we wanted to have the last word.

"I want to say something more to you," I said, "and beg you to keep it in your mind. The nation is strong, conscious of its rights and firm in its resolutions. The movement is spreading very rapidly. It is now time that His Majesty the Sultan deign to come to a decision and settle this question." (Document 112.)

As the result of this exchange of telegrams Ferit Paşa's Cabinet could only hold out for three days longer.

From what my friend Kerim Paşa — who has since died without my having been able to see him again — told certain people, it is said that he had succeeded in showing the Sultan the text of our telegraphic conversation, and that then all further resistance was broken. Kerim Paşa refers to it in a letter he wrote to Karavasif Bey on 8th October, 1919.

Here is a question from this letter:

"In consequence of the deep and lasting impression produced by the interchange of the last telegrams, the late Grand Vezir clearly understood the necessity of his resignation. He lost all power of resistance and retired. . .

"This is the splendid work carried out by a single man on behalf of the country, by simple and loyal firmness, without any fuss.

"I would like to remark that I have written all of this down with my own hand. And that it was only following this exchange of telegrams that the late Grand Vezir and our sublime Padişah made up their minds, after having taken everything possible into consideration. This incident and this

document, which comprises questions of such magnitude and reproduces faithfully and impartially the true course of events, will undoubtedly perpetuate a great event in the history of the nation."

What has led me to go at length into these details is that the never-to-be-forgotten Kerim Paşa had added at the end of his letter: "If you will have the kindness to send a copy of this document to the Representative Committee, you will contribute to the propagation of these exalted truths." This letter was actually given to me in the original and not a mere copy of it. I shall include it among the documents I am publishing. (Document 113.)

On the day following the exchange of these long telegrams, extracts were circulated by telegrams in cipher among all the Army Corps.

We have seen that in his first telegram to Fuat Paşa, Kerim Paşa of imperishable memory spoke of a meeting between high personalities in Istanbul and the leaders of the national movement at some place to be mutually agreed upon. Another proposal of a similar kind, suggesting that we should ourselves go to Istanbul, had previously emanated from Trabzon.

Let me speak about this, just for a moment.

On the 18th and 19th September, Galip Bey, Vali of Trabzon, was travelling in Ardase. His intention was to meet Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, who was also travelling there for the same purpose. On the 19th, we telegraphed to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa on the subject. A telegram that came from Trabzon the day before was the ostensible pretest for this communication. It ran as follows:

"We cannot accept the six articles because they is against the interests of the nation. (These articles relate to the order given to break off all communication with Istanbul.)

"In regard to the question of laying our complaints before the Sultan, we think this could be done by sending a delegation to Istanbul. (Document 114.)

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa then told me in detail about his telegraphic conversation with the Vali. The Vali expressed certain views in the form of questions, which Kâzım Karabekir Paşa had answered in a fitting manner.

The telegram said, "The Vali has proposed to send a delegation, which he has offered to accompany personally, for the purpose of laying the

petition at the foot of the throne." So he said; but he immediately abandoned this idea.

It was then proposed to send a delegation with Zeki Bey, the deputy for Gümüşane, who is well informed about the opinions prevailing in the Palace.

Strangely enough, two days later, on the 21st September, a telegram in cipher from Halit Bey, Kaymakam of Torul, also suggested that a delegation should be sent.

Referring to Zeki Bey's declarations, he said in his telegram that it would be a good thing, to send a secret deputation to Istanbul, so as not to drive the Sultan — who was the victim of groundless fears — into the arms of foreign countries and Ferit Paşa. Indeed, from what he had heard from Zeki Bey, he himself and Servet Bey would willingly join this deputation. (Document 116.)

In my reply, on the 22nd September, I told Halit Bey that it would not be wise to send a delegation as he proposed with Zeki Bey and Serve: Bey.

Halit Bey telegraphed to me on the night of the 24th that he fell obliged to send Galip Bey, Vali of Trabzon, the founder of the opposition who had appeared there during the night of the 24th September, under escort to Erzurum, as he had not obeyed an order of the Army Corps and the Vali of Erzurum to go there. (Document 117.)

By a strange coincidence, the first telegram sent by the late Kerim Paşa, in which he offered his services as mediator, was sent on the day following the arrest of the Vali of Trabzon, that is to say, the 25th September. It was the same day that the Vali, Zeki Bey, and Servet Bey and others whom they had won over as their followers, had tried and failed to prevent the rupture with Istanbul, as their plan to go there secretly as delegates had also failed.

It was only in the night of the 27th September that they felt it necessary to appeal to us.

As can be seen from the correspondence that we received, a telegram came on the 27th September from Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, in which he told us that the Vali Galip Bey, who had arrived at Erzurum, had spoken to him again about sending a deputation to Istanbul. The Paşa telegraphed to me to ask my opinion about it.

In my reply on the 28th September I said:

"Will you be good enough to refer to the quotation from the correspondence with Kerim Paşa and tell me whether in your opinion the proposed step is advisable or not? If, however, you decide that it will be necessary, I beg you under no condition to let the Vali of Trabzon join the national movement, because there is no difference between him and Adil Bey, the Minister of the Interior, in their hostility to it." (Document 118.)

In his reply on the 30th September, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa recognised the justice of my remarks "with regard to the refusal to allow the Vali to join the deputation," and he reported at the same time that the situation in the district of Trabzon had been improving for a long time, as we had anticipated it would. (Document 119.)

In connection with these last statements, I would like to shed a little light on another incident. Galip Bey, Vali of Trabzon and Zeki Bey were in constant touch with Ferit Paşa and the Palace. There is no doubt that these gentlemen, who wanted to form part of the deputation to be sent to Istanbul, had no desire to further the national cause but rather to inform those who held high authority in Istanbul about the situation, to advise them what to do and to give them new instructions. In fact, Zeki Bey, who went later on to Istanbul, was sent back with special instructions about the formation of counter-organisations in the districts of Trabzon and Gümüşane. He was also promised money and ammunition when he returned there. I had him arrested at İnebolu and escorted to Ankara. He admitted everything I have been telling you. He added, however, that he had deceived Istanbul and that he had intended — so he said — to hand over to me all the money and arms he might have received.

Can we imagine that anybody, then or now, would be so foolish as to believe his statements? Nevertheless, in consideration of the part he took in the Erzurum Congress I set him free and merely gave him some advice and warning.

We sent Sait Paşa, who had been appointed to the command of the Army Corps at Konya by the Government, back to Istanbul on the 30th September. Then, thanks to the steps we had undertaken, with the help of XXth Army Corps and the 11th Division at Niğde, we succeeded in parrying the first blow Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya, had prepared at Bozkır before his flight, and thereby frustrated the designs of Istanbul.

Towards the end of September, the national organisations we were trying to form in the districts of Ereğli, Bolu, Adapazarı and İzmit began

to show extreme restlessness. The leaders of these organisations reported that were ready to march on Istanbul if the Cabinet persisted in its stubbornness.

In a circular letter we informed the whole the country, naturally including Istanbul, about this on the 28th September.

But on the 2nd October, we found ourselves face to face with a new difficulty at Izmit that might be described as a reactionary movement. The Mutasarrif of the town at that time was a certain Suat Bey.

We asked him to come to the telegraph instrument; we inquired whether he had received all the messages we had sent recently and whether he had done everything that he had been instructed to do.

The Mutasarrif replied:

"I have received your messages. To prevent dissension and unrest I have considered it very advisable to allow the people complete freedom, and have listened to what they had to say.

"Unsatisfactory rumours have been circulated in the town.

"The inhabitants have decided to demand explanations form the Representative Committee, and wish to be informed as clearly as possible whether or not there is any intention of reviving the Unionist Government in its old form.

"Being a more impartial man than anyone else, it is my duty to maintain order and security. I do not consider it right to drive others into ventures the end of which cannot be seen, whatever their object or personal interests may be.

"My wide experience leads me to believe in moderation and caution."
(Document 120.)

I give you my answer verbatim:

Sivas, 2nd October, 1919.

To Suat Bey

Reply.

Your most important duty is to prevent the existence of the slightest difference of opinion or confusion in the minds of the people.

This was precisely the object of my special request to you.

We have no longer any doubt whatever that in the very clear manifestos and letters we have already published and will yet publish, whether

addressed to Your Excellency or a number of people at Izmit or to the whole world, we have made it evident, even to our most malicious enemies, how perfectly justified are the aims and character of our national organisation and our national movement. We can no longer allow that our resolutions be accepted under the influence of gossip that is nothing but mere talk of the populace.

Moreover, if the people want information, why do they not turn directly to us and learn the facts?

It seems that Your Excellency prefers to remain neutral.

But if you want to do your duty you cannot remain neutral, for if you pretend to remain neutral towards the legitimate movement of the nation you are merely a tool in the hands of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, which, on account of its treason, is an unlawful body that is not recognised by us.

You are in the position to judge from our actions that we do not belong to those nonentities who trouble their heads about the revival of Unionism.

I declare to you quite sincerely, and at the same time most emphatically, that if you have no more confidence in Ferit Paşa's Cabinet you must tell the Minister of the Interior so.

But if, in opposition to the considered judgment and wish of the nation, you continue to put your trust in this Cabinet, you must immediately resign your office and go to Istanbul, so that the loyal inhabitants of Izmit may act in complete freedom to carry out the legitimate intentions of the nation.

I believe conscientiously that it is my duty to warn you frankly that, if you do not choose one or the other of these two alternatives, you will yourself be responsible for whatever may result from your conduct, and you will personally have to bear this responsibility.

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee.

His reply began: "Listen to me calmly, Your Excellency; I have not expressed myself properly. There cannot be any doubt about the pure and legitimate character of your aim." And he ended with these words: "Give me till the hour of prayer of Friday. You look askant at me, although I have so often attacked Ferit Paşa with my pen." (Document 121.)

In answer to this, I told him that we would wait till the time he mentioned, and added:

"You are quite wrong in imagining that I am looking askant at you, because the judgment we shall form about you without hurting our conscience will depend entirely on actual events that may occur." (Document 121.)

At that time, Colonel Asim Bey was commanding the Division at Izmit.

I was at the telegraph instrument for several days sending messages to him, but failed to get any reply to them.

On the 2nd October I told him to come to the telegraph instrument and I had a conversation with him.

I told him that: "I am certain the Cabinet will soon be overthrown, if it has not been so already. Therefore, the nation is imbued with a firm determination to hesitate no longer." Then I informed him that I was waiting for his final opinion and decision. (Document 123.)

The actual meaning to be gleaned from Asim Bey's reply, which was full of long explanations and excuses, may be summarised thus: The reason why he had not replied to me was that he was himself waiting for an answer from the Commander of his Army Corps in Istanbul to his request for orders, so he would decide definitely on the following day at the hour of Friday prayer. (Document 125.)

We then gave him special advice and encouragement and, among other things, I told him that Ferit Paşa would probably resign on the following day. I asked whether in this event he would send messages to the Sultan (and, if the new Cabinet had already been formed, to its new head) to the effect that the Cabinet must comprise impartial men who are loyally devoted to the desires of the nation; further, that it is confidently expected that these hopes will be realised. I ended:

"Furthermore, as we shall have to work together with the new Cabinet for a considerable time, I beg you to go on with your organising work and pay particular attention to the questions I have just put before you and which are based on the resolutions arrived at by the Representative Committee." (Document 126.)

While I was sending this to Asim Bey — on 2nd October at 3.40 p. m. — an unsigned telegram arrived. It ran:

"Your Excellency, I have just heard from confidential friends, and it appears also in all the evening papers, that Ferit Paşa is reported to have

resigned for reasons of health. It is said that Tevfik Paşa has been entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet.

"Rumours were in circulation about this during the morning, but the news was not confirmed then. Now at this very moment it is officially confirmed."

I inquired who was sending me this telegram, but the message continued:

"We, the telegraph operators of Ankara, send our respects to His Excellency the Paşa. We congratulate him on having succeeded in overthrowing the Cabinet that was a scourge to the nation. Will you communicate this to him."

The telegraph line was interrupted.

It was true that Ferit Paşa's Cabinet had been overthrown, but it was not Tevfik Paşa who was to form the new Cabinet; it was Ali Rıza Paşa, a General commanding a Division and a Senator.

Let me take this opportunity to tell you that the unselfish service that all the telegraphists placed at the disposal of our national movement and our operations will hold a high place in the history of our nation. It is my pleasing duty on this occasion to thank them publicly for their services.

III

Gentlemen, I told the entire nation in a circular letter, dated the 3rd October, that Ferit Paşa's Cabinet had been overthrown and that Ali Rıza Paşa had been asked to form a new Cabinet. I sent a copy of this document to the new Grand Vezir, marked: "For your information." (Document 127.)

On the same day we tried to get into communication with the new head of the Cabinet. He promised to speak to the Representative Committee when the Cabinet Council met on the following day.

The points I referred to in my circular letter were:

1. If the new Cabinet will recognise the organisation formed by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the aims decided upon by them, the national forces will support it.
2. The new Cabinet will not undertake anything of a binding character regarding the fate of the nation until the National Assembly has met and actual control has been permanently established.

3. The delegates who will be sent to the Peace Conference must be selected from among those who are cognisant of the aims of the nation and who enjoy its confidence.

After I had laid stress in this circular letter on the fact that the new Cabinet was invited to accept the above fundamental points, I expressed the wish that I might be informed, as quickly as possible, before noon on the following day, of all other matters of importance.

I sent a telegram to Ali Riza Paşa, the Grand Vezir, on the 3rd October, in which I said:

"The nation has been painfully affected by the proceedings of the Cabinets that have hitherto succeeded one another, including acts that were in contradiction to the Constitution and the demands of the nation.

"For this reason, the nation has emphatically resolved that its legitimate rights shall be recognised and that its destiny shall rest in capable and reliable hands.

"In endeavouring to ensure this, it has taken the most energetic action that it considered necessary. The regularly organised troops have taken the power into their own hands and insist that the will of the nation shall be made known everywhere.

"The nation has no desire to place Your Highness and your colleagues, who enjoy Imperial confidence, in a difficult position

"On the contrary, it is ready in all sincerity to assist you.

"However, the presence in the Cabinet of Ministers who have been working with Ferit Paşa obliges us to ascertain to what degree the policy of your Ministry agrees with the national aspirations.

"Until the nation has regained confidence, it is impossible to delay its demands for reform and be satisfied with half measures.

"Therefore, we must insist on being informed clearly and definitely whether you share these views or not.

Having expressed ourselves in this manner, we repeated the three main points set out in the circular. Then I announced that, with the object of alleviating the present abnormal situation, we should bring forward certain considerations of secondary importance as soon as we had come to an agreement on the essential points already mentioned. (Document 128.)

We were told that Ali Riza Paşa had gone to the Palace that day

to take his oath of office, and so we would receive an answer on the following day.

But, judging from certain events, we had come to the conclusion that a considerable amount of uncertainty was reigning in Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet, and that a good deal of confusion prevailed in the minds of some of those who were members of the Cabinet. For this reason we thought we ought to take certain steps.

So, on the same day we published another circular, in which we stated that we deemed it necessary to maintain the rupture of official correspondence as we had done hitherto until an agreement had been reached between the views of the Government and the demands of the nation. (Document 119.)

In addition, we sent certain confidential despatches on the 3rd October to all the officers commanding Army Corps, as well as to those Valis who supported the movement, summarising all the proposals and questions we had received from all parts of the country.

I think you would prefer me to lay before you verbatim all the documents relating to our first negotiations with the new Cabinet, to help you to understand our position towards one another. I shall also read the correspondence that was carried on, if you allow me to do so:

Telegram in cipher.

Sivas, 3rd October, 1919.

To all officers commanding Army Corps and to the Valis and acting Valis who belong to the national movement.

Will you be good enough to address the following telegram to the Minister of War and the Minister of the Interior and report to us that you have done so.

"We demand the immediate arrest of Cemal Bey, Vali of Konya, Ali Galip Bey, Vali of Elazığ, and Halil Bey, Mutasarrif of Malatya; and we demand their trial by court martial on the charge that they have armed the population and have attempted to produce massacres, being themselves tools of the villainous machinations of the Minister of the Interior. Further we demand that Galip Bey, Vali of Trabzon, Ibrahim Bey and Ali Bey, formerly Valis of Kastamonu, and Muhittin Paşa, Vali of Ankara, shall not be permitted to hold any post whatsoever. Also that Reşit Paşa, Vali of Sivas, who was recalled without notice because he did not oppose the legitimate rights of the nation but, on the contrary, rendered assistance to

the movement and the rightful claims of the nation, shall be reinstated in his office; and, finally, that Mashar Müfit Bey, formerly Vali of Bitlis, and Haydar Bey, formerly Vali of Van, shall immediately be appointed to the office of Vali where there are vacancies."

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights
of Anadolu and Rumeli."

Telegram in cipher.

Sivas, 3rd October, 1919.

To all Valis, officers commanding Army Corps and autonomous
Mutasarrıfs.

Will you be good enough to send the following communication to the
Grand Vezir, and report to us the result:

"In the name of the sacred character and the inviolability of the law, we demand that steps shall be taken to prevent the flight of Ali Kemal Bey and Süleyman Sefik Paşa, the former Ministers, as well as of Adil Bey, Minister of the Interior, who have taken it upon themselves to arm the Mohamedan population and incite them to massacre one another; who have given orders with the object of breaking up the Army and leaving the country defenceless; who have betrayed military secrets by endeavouring to steal the cipher-key; and who have interfered with the private correspondence of the people, who are protected by the Constitution against such procedure. When the National Assembly has been opened the above-mentioned persons shall be brought to justice.

"For the same reason, we demand that Refik Halit Bey, Director General of the Telegraph Administration, shall be arrested and brought to trial."

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights
of Anadolu and Rumeli."

Cemal Paşa, the new Minister of War, on the occasion of his appointment had, naturally, to address an official circular note to the Army. We gave the officers commanding Army Corps to understand that they should first, in answer to this circular note, send him the telegram which I shall quote.

Telegram in cipher.

To the Officers Commanding the IIIrd, XXth, XIIth, XVth and XIIIth Army Corps.

To Fuat Paşa, Commander of the XXth Corps (special).

To Refet Bey, Konya (special).

Will you be good enough to send the following telegram to Cemal Paşa in reply to the first circular issued by the Minister of War:

We are fully aware that Your Excellency, in the firm belief and deep conviction that inspire you, has been at the head of the legitimate national movement since the beginning of the operations.

We have received with satisfaction the news of your appointment as Minister of War.

The whole of the Army and all the national organisations will do everything we can to ensure Your Excellency's success. It is solely to this end that we beg you to see that the following will be carried out as quickly as possible:

- a) That you will do all you can to have Cemal Paşa or Fevzi Paşa, formerly an Army Inspector, appointed Chief of the General Staff;
- b) That Şevket Bey of Galata or Yusuf İzzet Paşa will be appointed Commandant and Corps Commander of İstanbul, respectively. Yusuf İzzet Paşa might be appointed Commandant and Colonel Şevket of Galata Commander of the XVth Army Corps;
- c) That Colonel İsmet Bey will be appointed Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of War;
- d) That Lt.-Colonel Kemal Bey, commanding a Division, will be appointed Director-General of the Police;
- e) That those officers who were previously dismissed, and who for certain political reasons and without the approval of the National Assembly were re-appointed, shall, on account of the bad impression produced thereby in the Army and the discredit that has consequently fallen on the Ministry of War, be again dismissed and the important and responsible post given to reliable men;
- f) That, as Colonel Refet Bey, formerly commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, has been forcibly compelled to resign without any reason being assigned, his resignation shall be cancelled and he himself be appointed to

the command of the XIIth Army Corps at Konya, where he is at the present moment. It would also be of great importance to let Fuat Paşa remain in command of the XXth Army Corps and to quash the proceedings that have been instituted against him;

g) That Hamit Paşa, who was appointed to succeed Fuat Paşa, and Sait Paşa, appointed to the command of the XIIth Army Corps, shall promptly be reinstated in their former commands;

h) We consider that it would be appropriate, on the first opportunity that presents itself, to re-establish the Army Inspection and to entrust the group of Army Corps in East Anadolu, including the XIIIth, to the command of Kâzım Karabekir Paşa; and that of West Anadolu, including those of Istanbul and Edirne, to Ali Fuat Paşa. We think, however, that it would be advisable to restrict ourselves for the moment to re-establishing these two Inspections.

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee.

Eventually we received the reply from the new Grand Vezir that we had been waiting for.

It ran:

Very urgent

Sadaret, 4th October, 1919.

To the Representative Committee of the "League for the Defence of the Rights," Sivas.

Reply to your telegrams of the 2nd and 3rd October.

The Cabinet has not been informed about the character of the organisations and the claims drawn up and passed by the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas, referred to in Your Excellency's telegrams.

Please wire me immediately the resolutions passed by these congresses, so that we may be in the position to consider them and keep them for reference.

Ali Riza,
Grand Vezir.

Is it not surprising that the Grand Vezir and his colleagues should pretend that they had known nothing up to the day of their taking office about the character of the national movement, when the same Cemal Paşa, as we shall soon see, declared in his capacity as a delegate of the national forces that he was a member of the Cabinet?

It is still more remarkable that they asked for information about the resolutions passed at the congresses so that they might be able to decide whether they would take the aims of the national movement into consideration or not.

Could it be imagined that they were not perfectly well informed about the resolutions passed by the congresses which had attracted so much attention throughout the country, resulting in the overthrow of the late Cabinet?

I had no doubt whatever that their object was to gain time and, while disclaiming any obligation towards us, to devise some new devilish schemes to deceive the nation and shake its solidarity.

But if it should actually come to a rupture, I decided, as far as I was personally concerned, to reveal all their nefarious schemes to the nation. So, I set to work to conform to the request of the Grand Vezir and his colleagues.

In a telegram, dated the 4th October, I sent them, word for word, the Manifesto issued by the Congress and extracts from the essential points of its regulations regarding the organisation. (Document 130.)

Circular notes were again distributed in all directions confirming the order to abstain from all official correspondence. (Document 131.)

On the same day we received the following telegram:

Sadaret, 4th October, 1919.

Reply.

"The Cabinet is in perfect agreement about taking energetic action, in accordance with the wishes of the nation. In order to secure the welfare of and save the country, there is no doubt that the maintenance of Ottoman unity, national independence, and the throne and Caliphate can only be secured by leaning for support on the strength and the will of the nation, as provided by the Constitution. It is understood that the well-defined aim of the present Government must be to keep all the territories that belonged to the Empire at the time of the armistice, on the principles declared by Wilson, under the immediate sovereignty of the Ottoman State; to prevent the dismemberment of its territory remaining within these frontiers and inhabited by a Mohamedan majority; and to act in such a manner that a just and equitable decision will be arrived at, which will safeguard the historical, ethnographical, religious, and geographical rights which we possess in these districts.

"It is perfectly clear that no formal obligation of a binding nature regarding the fate of the nation can be undertaken until the Assembly has met.

"The delegates to be chosen for the Peace Conference will be selected from among experts who are worthy of confidence and capable of understanding the demands of the nation.

"As, according to the Constitution of this country, the nation is a sovereign power, the present Government — recognising that it cannot come to any decision without first appealing to the will of the nation — will make the necessary provisions for holding the elections as early as possible, and thus hasten the opening of the Chamber of Deputies.

"The programme of the present Government aims at bringing all its acts into agreement with the stipulations laid down by law and preventing and checking any action that is contrary to this.

"Any abnormal and unlawful situation might, if it continued for any length of time, result in a separation between the Metropolis and Anadolju, which could produce very grave consequences; it might — may God forbid it! — endanger the Metropolis and lead to the occupation of different parts of the country.

"The Government, therefore, requests you forthwith to evacuate the State buildings which you now occupy, to remove the obstacles that are placed in the way of business being carried on in the State offices, to respect the authority of the Government, which will not submit to any interference, to desist from entering into political relation with foreign countries, and, lastly, not in any way to restrict the freedom of the people in carrying out the Parliamentary elections."

You will notice that this telegram has no address and no signature. It is evident that it was sent by the Grand Vezir, and it is also clear that the persons who had written it had refused to recognise the Representative Committee as having any authority to enter into formal correspondence or an official exchange of views.

But the President and the members of the new Cabinet believed that the resolutions passed by the Congresses were natural, and they expressed their intention to consider these proposals.

They pretended that they would carry out the provisions and principles of these resolutions.

After the telegram had begun by pointing out that the Government

would be guided by law and by declaring their duty to prevent any illegal action, it referred to the abnormal and illegal character of our movement. It adds that such a state of affairs, if continued, would lead to a separation between the Metropolis and Anadolu, and suggests the dangers that would ensue.

In fact, the Cabinet shows its hand. It demands that we should bind ourselves to evacuate the State buildings occupied by us, not to interfere with business being conducted in public offices, to respect the authority of the Government, not to enter into political relations with foreign countries, and in no way to restrict the freedom of the voters during the elections for the Chamber of Deputies.

In short, it implies that their intentions is to rid themselves of our presence and, at the same time, ignore our movement.

Before I enter into further details I must remark, while I remember it, that we had not occupied any Government building whatever. The Vilayet of Sivas alone had received the Representative Committee as guests in the principal school in this town, and that was during the holidays. The State building referred to in the telegram could only have been this school.

The first business of the Cabinet was to expel the Representative Committee, so that it would be discredited in the eyes of the public. Following this telegram, which indicates neither the sender of it nor his address, a conversation began between the Telegraph Office at Sivas and that of Istanbul, in these terms:

Very important.

To the Head of the Government.

As the message sent from the Telegraph Office in the Sadaret bears no address or signature, the Representative Committee of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli" declines to receive it.

We shall keep a copy of it in our office.

Please inform the sender of this.

Telegraph Office of the Congress.

Then followed this telegraphic conversation:

"The Keeper of the Great Seal handed in the telegram with this heading, 'Reply of His Highness the Grand Vezir.' A copy of the telegram is lying at the Telegraph Office. Be good enough to give it to the Paşa ."

"It is not addressed to the Representative Committee. The name of the sender also is unknown."

"As it was not signed, it has not been accepted."

"The Cabinet have just concluded their sitting."

"When the Cabinet will give me further particulars in writing about this, naturally the matter will be cleared up. This answer was given to us by the Ministers when they were leaving."

"From that moment we have not received anything more."

"Perhaps the Grand Vezir will write when he gets home. The telegraph in our head office ceases work immediately the Cabinet rises."

"Inform the Keeper of the Great Seal what we said just now."

"He has also gone away. I am here alone."

"Tell him about it by telephone."

"There is no telephone here belonging to the Telephone Company. Keep the telegram as it is. To-morrow morning we shall get something official in writing."

"Telephone to the Grand Vezir."

"But, brother, we cannot get into communication with the Grand Vezir."

Very urgent.

Sublime Porte. 4th October, 1919.

To the Telegraph Office of the Congress, Sivas.

"We have been trying to speak by telephone to His Highness the Grand Vezir, who lives at Erenköy, but we have not been able to find him although it is 9.25 p. m. We cannot put this exchange of telegrams before him until to-morrow morning."

Hüseyin Hüsnü,
Director of the Telegraph Office of the
Sublime Porte.

Very urgent.

Istanbul, 4th October, 1919.

Telegraph Office of the Congress.

Reply.

"In the same way that the Director of the office of the Sublime Porte

has now communicated, at 9.25 p. m., we also have not been able to receive a reply from the Konak of the Grand Vezir, although we have been trying to get into touch with him by telephone. I shall try again a little later. If I receive a reply, I will let you know immediately. If not, we shall have to wait till to-morrow morning."

Tevfik,

Director of Telegraphs, Istanbul.

On the following day, the 5th October, we were told that the unsigned telegram was sent by the Grand Vezir to the Representative Committee and that it represented his reply. Although it was not an official and signed message, we considered it neither expedient nor necessary to continue to dwell on so unimportant a point. We considered it better to send a reply to the Grand Vezir.

This is a summary of the main points in our long telegram to him:

After having drawn attention to the fact that we had understood that our proposals had been approved of and accepted in full, we continued to express our opinion from the point where we were asked to bind ourselves, and said that the driving power and source of the abnormal and unlawful situation was Ferit Paşa's Cabinet. "This situation will disappear automatically if you take decisive steps to put an end to the consequences produced by the unlawful acts of that Cabinet. Before our movement can declare its loyalty to the present Cabinet and give its support to it, the Government must first declare, in concise and definite terms, that it has friendly feelings towards our national organisation.

"If this is not the case, it is exceedingly doubtful whether we shall be able to succeed in establishing mutual sincerity, the result being that they would probably encounter active opposition."

The unsigned telegram from Ali Rıza Paşa contained the following phrase: "According to the Constitution of this country, the nation is the sovereign power." Our answer to this was that undoubtedly this is a fact; but the Constitution likewise stipulates literally that the Chamber of Deputies must be elected within four months after its dissolution, and up to the present day the registers of voters even had not been compiled. And we said that this procedure of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet was a blow directed against the Constitution and a formal infringement of the constitutional character. It is the solemn and natural duty of every Constitutional Government which recognises the sovereignty of the nation and believes itself legally

bound to obey the law, to look upon such actions as a crime, according to the corresponding clause of the Penal Code, and to apply the provisions laid down by law as widely as possible in dealing with those who are found guilty.

Then we put forward the following proposals:

1. To publish an official manifesto and declare that rest and order prevail throughout the country and that the national movement is justified and legitimate; to show thereby that the Government is in sympathy and accord with a united nation.

2. Some of the higher officials constituted themselves agents of the Government that has been overthrown and have aided them in their treachery. These must be tried by competent courts of law. It must be laid down that certain ex-Valis, who have resisted the national movement, will be debarred from any further state service.

Certain officials who have been dismissed because they have served the national movement shall be reinstated in the offices they formerly held.

3. All those who have been reinstated in their former offices and have not been recognised by the National Assembly, because such reinstatement was due to the false policy of the Government, must be dismissed again.

All important military posts shall be filled by capable men.

4. Until the former Ministers, Ali Kemal Bey, Adil Bey, and Süleyman Şefik Paşa have been handed over to the State Court for trial after the National Assembly has met, we demand, in the name of the inviolability of the law and the sacred character of the national rights, that they shall be prevented from leaving the country; we also demand that Refik Halit Bey, Director of Posts and Telegraphs, shall be arrested immediately and made to stand his trial before a competent court of law.

5. Any kind of persecution or molestation of persons who have participated in or have favoured the national movement shall immediately cease.

6. The Press shall be free from foreign censorship.

Having set forth these considerations and proposals, of which the foregoing is a summary, we concluded our telegram to this effect:

"Guided by the resolutions arrived at by all the vilayets and autono-

mous Sancaks and the places under their jurisdiction, we declare emphatically that until you give us a clear and definite reply to our demands and desires in a form that will satisfy the nation, we feel ourselves compelled to maintain, as we have been doing hitherto, the attitude adopted by the nation, in order that the national aims shall be safeguarded."

(Signed) Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights
of Anadolu and Rumeli." (Document 132.)

As soon as we had finished our exchange of telegrams with Istanbul,
I immediately informed the country in this communiqué:

Circular Note.

To the Press.

As His Highness the Grand Vezir has declared that he finds the essential resolutions passed by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the aims pursued by the national organisations to be natural, and as some points in his remarks require explanation, we have sent a reply to him and have put forward certain proposals, based on the collective opinions of all the chief places, for the purpose of establishing a real understanding between the Government and the nation.

We give you herewith the literal wording of the reply and the proposals referred to in a circular note. We shall inform you immediately we receive an answer and the decisions we shall arrive at concerning it.

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights
of Anadolu and Rumeli."

We have now reached the fifth day of government by Ali Riza Pasa's Cabinet. So far, we had not come to any understanding. The official relations and correspondence between the country and Istanbul were still interrupted. His Highness the Grand Vezir did not reply to our proposals; you will see directly that he never had any intention of replying. None of the members of the Cabinet had any intention of coming to terms with us.

On that day, the 6th October, Yunus Nadi Bey, after having been invited to do so, paid a visit to Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, in his office. Cemal Paşa spoke to Yunus Nadi Bey about the situation and particularly about the fact that no agreement had yet been arrived at between the Government and the Representative Committee. It appears that the Minister pointed out to him that we were in the wrong; that the Cabinet itself was prepared to accept and carry through everything; and that, in any case, the Representative Committee was responsible for the conflict and continued in its obstinacy. He seems also to have asked Yunus Nadi Bey, of whose personal relations with us he was well acquainted, to act as mediator in bringing about an understanding between us.

Yunus Nadi Bey willingly accepted his proposal. From the contents of the telegram I shall refer to in a moment, it can be seen that he relied on the information he received from Cemal Paşa, believing it to be true, and on it based his view of the situation.

The exchange of telegrams between Yunus Nadi Bey and ourselves is very important because it was an effort to reach at least an apparent understanding between us and the new Cabinet. For this reason, I will give you some particulars about it.

I was asked to come personally to the telegraph instrument, and was told that Cemal Paşa, the War Minister, wanted to speak to me. I went there; it was inside our offices. This was our conversation:

Istanbul: "This is the Telegraph Office of the War Ministry. Yunus Nadi Bey wishes to speak to Your Excellency." Then somebody said, "I am at the telegraph instrument."

I asked: "Who are you?"

The telegraph official answered: "Yunus Nadi Bey is here and Cevat Rifat Bey, the Minister's aide-de-camp, is standing by his side. Would you like to speak to the Minister?"

When we were about to begin our conversation I was told that the Minister had asked me to come. Therefore I asked: "Has the Minister requested me to come or have you?"

Yunus Nadi Bey: "I am authorised by the Minister, and through the mediation of his aide-de-camp we have asked the Chief Telegraph Office of the War Ministry to get into touch with Your Excellency. That is how the misunderstanding has arisen."

I: "Thank you; Go on."

Then came the message from Yunus Nadi Bey. He began with these words:

"I have been hoping that on account of the change in the Cabinet, which is due solely to the fact that the will of the nation has succeeded in realising its sovereignty, an understanding and agreement between the Government that has been formed here and the national movement will now soon be arrived at. As far as I can see, there remain only two points on which there is any difference of opinion. Being satisfied myself that the postponement of an agreement would lead to regrettable consequences within the country itself, as well as abroad, I feel it my duty to submit some considerations to you."

Then he began at first to make statements which are contained in the following summary:

1. There is no reason for looking with displeasure on certain members of the Cabinet because they belonged to Ferit Paşa's. Abuk Paşa took part in overthrowing the latter's Cabinet.
2. Rıza Paşa's Government is only a temporary one. It can only hold office until the result of the elections for the legislative body become known.
3. Nothing done by the present Government could leave any doubt that they were favourable to the adoption of all the claims and aims of the nation and were fully resolved to realise them.
4. People like Cemal Paşa and Abuk Paşa must be regarded without any hesitation as guarantors and delegates of the national organisation within the Cabinet.

The next subject Yunus Nadi Bey touched upon was quite personal. Sharing our feelings entirely in this regard, he said: "I venture to advise you to act with moderation," and he developed his point of view that it would be very important to prevent the good effects produced by the success of the national cause appearing in the eyes of certain persons as being tainted with a spirit of revenge.

Yunus Nadi Bey continued:

"From my association with the members of the present Cabinet, I am satisfied that they are determined to further the claims of the national organisation in their entirety." He added, "Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, has declared that this idea has been sufficiently clearly expressed in the manifesto which will be published to-day, but, as it has been drawn up

in official language, it is not advisable to lay too much emphasis on purely formal expressions, which have been used to meet so many contrasting opinions."

After Yunus Nadi Bey had assured us of the sincere desire of the new Grand Vezir and his Cabinet to receive a deputation appointed by the leaders of the national organisation immediately, so as to obviate any misunderstanding, he crystallised his observations in this sentence: "What I consider to be the most urgent thing to do at the present moment is to prevent the postponement of this crisis, which is fraught with so much confusion and uncertainty."

Yunus Nadi Bey said that he was waiting to hear my views, and I sent him this reply:

Sivas, 6th October, 1919.

To Yunus Nadi Beyefendi.

Have you studied the essential, as well as the minor, proposals which the Representative Committee has laid before the Grand Vezir, and His Highness's answer — particularly the last paragraphs of it?

Judging from your last remarks, we have come to the conclusion that you have never set eyes on these documents and that you have merely been told of their contents by people who have not completely understood the sincerity of my proposals.

For this reason, we find it very difficult to enter into an exchange of opinions with you concerning the main point of the question.

We will give you some of our opinions in their proper order and throw a little light on some of your remarks, which seem to represent your own personal opinion.

We also thought that there would soon be harmony between the new Cabinet and our national movement.

The cause of the delay is not to be attributed to our side, but to the hesitating and vacillating attitude the new Cabinet has displayed during the last four days.

We have not even yet been told by them that any difference of opinion exists between them and ourselves. Without casting doubt on the honour of the former Ministers who have now joined this Cabinet, it is still a fact that, consciously or unconsciously, they have been taking part in the treacherous actions of the late Cabinet, and this is an important point that we must be careful not to lose sight of.

We are not unmindful of the part which Abuk Paşa played in the overthrow of the last Cabinet. But we also know very well what power really brought about this result.

Our aim is not, as you seem to think, to look upon this Government as a temporary one.

Our desire is quite the contrary, namely, that it will be a very stable Government with the power to consolidate the nation and conclude peace.

In all that affects the vital interests of the nation, everything that does not emanate from us has no importance whatever in our eyes. We are among those who condemn the weak-kneed policy that forces us to proceed on the lines indicated in empty speeches which are antagonistic to our ideas.

We know the internal and external situation very intimately. Our standpoint has not been adopted haphazard. Our method of procedure is based on complex considerations, on a firm foundation, on the true force of the nation as a whole, consisting of a regular organisation and the firm will of the nation.

The nation is resolutely determined that its full sovereignty shall be recognised by the whole world. We have taken the necessary steps everywhere to ensure this. We demand that the present Government shall accept the national claims and shall do everything in agreement with us to achieve success.

If it will not do this, it will be unable to govern the nation. We do not know about Abuk Paşa, but with regard to Cemal Paşa we expect only one thing from him, namely, that he shall be the representative of our national organisation.

(I must explain, Gentlemen, that Cemal Paşa was not our representative and, after his behaviour of which you have heard, there was no reason for putting him in that position or entrusting him with such a commission. But Yunus Nadi Bey, having said in his telegram that there was no reason for us to entertain any doubt making Cemal Paşa our representative, we trusted his opinion and did what he wished.)

We hoped that as soon as he became a Minister he would keep in touch with us, so that we would be well informed as to the actual state of affairs, and then act as the intermediary to bring the ideas of the Government and those of the national organisation into agreement.

But now it seemed as though he were trying to avoid coming into close touch with us.

The proposals and demands which we addressed to the new Cabinet had in no way the character of personal and arbitrary opinions. They were the essence of all the proposals collated by our Representative Committee to avoid placing the Cabinet in a difficult position. These proposals had been put forward by all the vilayets and autonomous sanaks and the places under their administration, by the five commanders of Army Corps and by all the heads of the Civil Administration who are faithful to the national organisation. They do not suggest any of the doubts such as those you anticipate and speak about.

If the Government will sincerely and seriously enter into communication with us for the purpose of exchanging opinions with us, nothing else will be left for us to do but to fix the time when our proposals and demands will be fulfilled and the form they will take.

The concluding paragraphs of the Grand Vezir's telegraphic reply to our Representative Committee, on the 4th October, deserve very careful attention.

There is no doubt that there can be no unity so long as the conception exists that our lawful national organisation and their leader are illegitimate and unlawful.

If the manifesto, the publication of which you announce will take place to-day, will for any reason or in any manner speak disparagingly about our national organisation and our national movement, if only by some formal expression, we shall immediately come to the conclusion that there will be no possibility of our arriving at any understanding.

Moreover, we shall not allow the Government's manifesto to be distributed anywhere before the Government has come to a definite understanding with the Representative Committee. Its publication will be limited to decorating the walls of Istanbul.

Our Representative Committee is a national and legitimate body elected by the General Assemblies of Erzurum and Sivas, consisting of representatives chosen by the free vote of the nation in all the vilayets and autonomous livas. Its capacity and power of representation are evident from its actions. It is essential that the Representative Committee continue interest in the destiny of the nation and the country until the National Assembly actually meets and takes over this responsibility.

It is evident that the Government will strengthen its position and its authority by keeping in close connection and sincere relations with our Committee.

It is equally clear that the interests of the country and the nation will suffer if different courses of action are taken.

We wish to avoid what we have experienced before, namely, that certain persons whom we are convinced will be useful to the country and the nation in the present Cabinet should become the victims of the tactics employed by the Cabinet which aim at elbowing them, one by one, out of their offices.

(Gentlemen, you will see by what follows that this is exactly what did happen.)

The Representative Committee assembled at Sivas is prepared to enter into sincere and direct relations with the Government. It does not possess the power of delegating its authority to anyone else. If a perfect understanding with the Government can be reached, then we can consider taking further steps that will facilitate and firmly establish our unity.

In short, to put an end to the present state of confusion as quickly as possible, the Government must publish a manifesto in terms similar to those we have proposed and demanded, which will not consist merely of empty words, but will be expressed in sincere language. In addition to this, the Grand Vezir must give us a straightforward answer, in which he will declare that he has favourably received our other proposals and that they will be carried out.

But as our telegrams and manifestos have been controlled, stolen, and waylaid hitherto by Refik Hail Bey, it seems very strange indeed to us to hear anybody speak about the sincerity of the Government.

If the Government persists, even for a few days longer, in their vacillating attitude, it will be entirely their own fault if the nation fails to have the confidence in them which so far it has not had time to experience. We are receiving telegrams from all parts of the country asking us whether confidence can be placed in the new Government or not.

I assure you, dear brother, of my esteem.

Mustafa Kemal.

From the communications that passed between Yunus Nadi Bey and ourselves and from the information I gave him, he was able to get a good idea of the real position. He did not consider it necessary to continue the subject.

On the contrary, he was apparently trying to advise the new Government, and Cemal Paşa in particular, what was the right thing for them to do.

In fact, as I shall explain to you, some kind of understanding — perhaps, only an apparent one — seemed to be arrived at.

The 6th October had now passed. We sent a circular note ordering that the attitude we had taken was to be strictly maintained and that special attention was to be paid to our directions. (Document 134.)

At last, on the next day after our exchange of telegrams with Yunus Nadi Bey, we received the following telegram from Cemal Paşa — although no reply had yet arrived from the Grand Vezir.

From the Ministry of War.
7th October, 1919. 12.7 p.m.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasa.

The correspondence hitherto exchanged can be summarised thus:

1. The Cabinet is in accord with you and recognises that the will of the nation is sovereign. It is only afraid that it will be looked upon as a Government of revenge. It shares your opinion that those who are guilty must be punished in the manner prescribed by law.
2. It pledges itself unreservedly to prevent any further punishments being inflicted on those Valis who have been injured in their rights and to indemnify them for what they have suffered; to select and appoint worthy and suitable persons to fill Government offices; to restore dignity and order in the Army.
3. It will rely on the national will and the Representative Committee to restore the authority and prestige of the State in the eyes of foreign countries.
4. In my position as the delegate of the Representative Committee, I declare to you in full sincerity and with deep esteem that the Cabinet is desirous that the Representative Committee should support it, but must not assume supreme authority in matters relating to internal affairs or foreign policy.

It is aware of the advantage that would accrue from such a great power. Above all, it considers that it would be well if telegrams were exchanged freely between the two parties; that it should be possible for Valis

and Military Commanders who are newly appointed or reinstalled in their former offices to take up their posts immediately; and that the recently sanctioned electoral law should be circulated and published throughout the country.

5. I pledge myself personally to the effect that all acts directed against the national will shall cease; the only point that remains open for discussion is the fixing of the time and the manner of carrying out the details, about which I feel sure we shall easily come to an agreement.

So that we shall be able to work together hand in hand at once to realise our aim, which is the liberation of our country, I earnestly beg you not to insist on details but grant me your support.

I express to Your Excellency and your honourable colleagues my sincere esteem.

(Signed) Cemal,
Minister of War.

We sent the following friendly and sincere reply to this telegram.

Telegram in cipher.

Sivas, 7th October, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

Reply.

Your Excellency will find in the following the answers, point by point and in their proper order, to the proposals contained in your telegram:

1. We thank the Cabinet in the name of the nation for having declared themselves ready to accept the sovereignty of the national will in complete accord and unity with us.

We, also, would feel great anxiety if the Cabinet, the Representative Committee and the whole of the national organisation were to be suspected of pursuing a policy of revenge.

On this point we are perfectly in harmony with the Cabinet; also in regard to the necessity of punishing those who are accused before the law.

2. We also thank you specially for the conclusion contained in the second point. We had thought it necessary in our preceding telegram to enter into details about this question.

We were afraid that if certain Valis and commanding officers who were deprived of office by the people on account of their opposition to the

national movement and the national activites were to be reinstated — even temporarily — on the ground of observing due forms, they would not return to their duties, and this would injure the authority of the Government, who thereby would lose prestige.

3. We are specially grateful to you concerning the third point. Let us trust that, with God's help, we shall be able by our joint efforts to secure the welfare and freedom of our country and our nation.

4. We declare in all good faith and assure you that, in return for the sincerity and earnestness shown by the Cabinet, the Representative Committee will never assume the position of being a supreme authority, either in the country itself or in regard to foreign relations. On the contrary, the Committee consider that it is their duty, for the sake of the country and the nation, to support and uphold the authority of the Government within the limits of the principles adopted by common consent.

We desire to convey the solemn assurance that we make no reservation whatever in this matter.

That, in accordance with Art. 8 of our regulations, Your Excellency is a member of the Cabinet as the delegate of our Representative Committee is a fact that has given us the greatest satisfaction, all the more so because it ensures perfect harmony between the actions and decisions of both parties.

When, in the future, in alle the question pending between the Cabinet and our national organisation, harmony and mutual interpretation will be arrived at, there will, naturally, be no further interruption in our communication with one another.

As, however, the Representative Committee must necessarily still keep in close touch with the organising centres of our movement throughout Anadolu and Rumeli, we urgently request that we may be permitted to carry on our telegraphic communication in an official way as we have hitherto been doing.

We would like to take this opportunity, also, of putting the following matter before you: As it is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the authority of the Government that, from the moment it begins to issue its orders, it shall not encounter any opposition, we request you to grant us a delay of 48 hours to enable the Committee to transmit the necessary instructions to the principal places.

We earnestly request you to send us in confidence, before its publication, a copy of the manifesto that the Cabinet is going to issue, which

we had asked for, so that the instructions sent out by the Representative Committee may be founded on it and thus we may inspire the nation with confidence.

For, in all loyalty, we must point out to you that if a single inappropriate word were to creep into this manifesto it might cause misunderstanding in the minds of the people and might put the Representative Committee in a very difficult position in the eyes of the nation.

After we have received it we shall immediately send you a copy of the address which we shall present to His Majesty expressing our thanks, as well as a copy of the manifesto we shall address to the nation.

Any remarks that the Cabinet may desire to make about it will be taken into our respectful consideration.

Kindly inform us what particular idea inspired you when you drafted the new electoral law, so that we shall be able to make our comments on it.

5. Having arrived at a complete agreement on the main points, no doubt can exist any longer as to Your Excellency's sincerity and that of your honourable colleagues, and it is quite natural that perfect harmony should exist between us concerning the details.

My colleagues and I beg you to feel assured that we shall work with all our strength, in all sincerity and with all possible energy, to assist the work carried on by Your Excellency and the Cabinet of which you are a member, so that it will be crowned with success and lead to our country's attaining its freedom as soon as possible.

I send you our greetings and the esteem of all my colleagues, who are present with me here.

(Signed) Mustafa Kemal

During the same night Cemal Paşa replied to this telegram. He told us in it, "that it had been felt necessary to expedite the publication of the manifesto and that the points we wished to be specially emphasised had already been duly taken into consideration." (Document 135.)

To show our politeness, we replied immediately during the same night. (Document 136.)

But, as we had been given to understand that the Government did not want us to see their manifesto before it was published, we published our

own manifesto to the nation without consulting the Government, and the same thing applies to the telegram we addressed to the Sultan.

Our manifesto of the 7th October showed the people that we were right in all we had been doing hitherto and that this would lead us to success. We explained why it was necessary for us to continue to act in perfect unity as we had been doing till then. In fine, this manifesto was intended to raise and strengthen the morale of the population. (Document 137.)

The telegram that we sent to the Sultan expressed our thanks on behalf of the nation. (Documents 138, 139.)

*
* *

I would like to divert your attention here for a moment to tell you that in trying to enforce the universal will of the nation upon the whole of the country, our Committee was at the same time in direct communication with Izmir, which was occupied by the enemy. On the 7th October, while we were engaged in impressing our opinions on Ali Riza's Cabinet, we also sent the following telegram to Izmir.

Urgen:

Sivas, 7th October, 1919.

To the Vilayet of Izmir.

We beg you to let us know immediately whether the messages and instructions we have hitherto sent you have reached you or not; if they have done so, whether they have been attended to. If you have not received them, we would like to know what has prevented you from having done so.

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights
of Anadolu and Rumeli."

We were undoubtedly very well informed about what was happening at Izmir, about its Vali and the general conditions prevailing there. Even if they had received our instructions, it was certainly quite impossible that they had been obeyed.

But at the same time we thought it just as well to let our enemies see that there was some power and authority watching over the destiny of the whole country which refused to recognise the occupation.

Having touched superficially on the facts and events of that time, let me explain to you another circumstance.

In his telegram of the 8th October, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa advanced these ideas:

"I believe that Your Excellency, Rauf Bey and other persons of equal importance in the Representative Committee, being deputies, should remain conspicuously at the head of the parliamentary party without being involved in any way in the affairs of the Government, and that it would answer the purpose quite as well if you were to continue to assert your authority and your influence, no matter what the form or composition of the Government, or the importance or character of its Ministers, might happen to be. I consider this to be an essential condition for success and for coming to a decision which it is indispensable should be put into effect. Whenever persons who have represented a party or an ideal in a prominent way have exceeded the limits of their own particular sphere of work and have meddled in the affairs of the Government, the National Assembly has thereby lost strength, has been tossed hither and thither by the varying currents, swirled into a wrong course, and has ultimately been shattered on the rocks. At this time, when the chief question concerns the complete liberation of our country and nation, I respectfully urge Your Excellency to proceed so that we shall be able to recognise your definite decision on the matter we had the honour of laying before you."

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa had already expressed the same opinion to me before I left Erzurum. I thought it all over in this wise:

First of all it is necessary clearly to emphasise the fact that the will of the nation is paramount and that its representation in the National Assembly must be firmly insisted upon. This can only be done by giving the whole country a stable organisation with a national ideal before it and by forming a party in the Chamber which is supported by it. This must be the chief aim of the most influential members. As far as our experience had led us hitherto, all those who had discovered that they possessed some merit themselves were seized with ambition and tried as quickly as possible to get into power without paying the slightest attention to this vital point. As governments that had been formed by such men could not find any support from a strong party connected with the national movement in the Assembly, nothing was left to them but to lean on the authority of the Sultanate and Caliphate. Consequently, the Legislative Assemblies could not represent the national power and dignity in the proper manner, nor

could they express the desire of the nation and its claim that it was resolved to realise. Our essential and fundamental principle, therefore, was in the first place to establish a national organisation in the country, and after that to work in Parliament at the head of a party which was supported by that organisation. It is of no avail to do everything that is possible to form a government or to try to join any ministerial combination or coalition, for such a government is doomed, either immediately to fall without having done anything at all for the nation or State, or else to take up a position against the Assembly — and, consequently, the nation — and lean on the sovereign for support. In the first case a very serious state of uncertainty would arise, whilst in the latter case it would lead gradually to the disappearance of the sovereignty of the nation. As you are aware and as events have proved, we formed our national organisation first and then called in the Assembly; we first formed an "Assembly-Government" and then a Government in the real meaning of the word.

Meanwhile, we never allowed an opportunity to pass without declaring to the nation in our manifestos that we had no intention of joining any Cabinet, that our sole aim was the realisation of the great national ideals, and that our efforts hitherto were consistently directed to concentrating the forces of the nation and bringing them into agreement with one another."

After having mentioned and agreed with my ideas and the statements based on them, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa added in his message that "he sincerely hoped that this good resolution would be carried through as far as possible in the face of the experience and the results gained in our country." (Document 140.)

As Kâzım Karabekir Paşa had said at the end of his telegram, as I have explained already, there was surely no justification for demanding the formation of any government or taking part in it at the moment when our first thought was the liberation of the country — a country in which there was neither proper organisation nor a Parliament; nor had any party appeared in the Assembly with any ideal or programme which was supported by the organisation and full strength of the nation. Such procedure, which would have been inspired rather by personal interests than any desire to serve those of the country, was, as far as I could see without wishing to be unjust, nothing but ambition or ignorance.

The fact, however, that the most influential members of a political party organised in Parliament shall indefinitely dominate, control and supervise the Chamber, whatever might be the power of the Cabinet or the

character and personal merit of the individual members who formed it, cannot be regarded as the most important factor for success or for coming to a decision which it is "indispensable" to carry out, as Kâzım Karabekir Paşa constantly persisted in declaring.

The principle recognised and customarily observed in civilised States, governed on the principle of the sovereignty of the nation, is that the administration of the State is confided to the hands of that political party most powerfully representing the general tendency of the nation and most ably serving its demands and interests with greatest authority and power: thus the responsibility is entrusted to the most prominent leaders of the nation.

A government which does not combine all these conditions could never fulfil its task. It could not reasonably be conceived that a weak government composed of second-rate elements chosen from a powerful party could carry on such a government by relying on the advice and instructions given to it by first-rate leaders belonging to the same party. The tragic results of such a system became evident in the last days of the Ottoman State. Can we enumerate the untold miseries this nation had to suffer, whether under the Grand Vezirs — who were merely puppets in the hands of the leaders of the "Committee of Union and Progress" — or through the actions of the governments led by these Grand Vezirs? It could never happen that a party with the upper hand in the Assembly could delegate the power to an opposition that was in a minority. In theory as well as in practice, it is the party representing the majority of the nation that assumes the responsibility of forming a government and carrying out the aims and policy of the country.

When I refer here to a generally known truth and dwell on it — one with which our own actions are entirely in accord — I do so for the purpose of calling the attention of the nation and awakening it and the generations to come. I want to protect them from the specious fallacies imposed upon them in the guise of patriotism, of morals, of human perfection and similar virtues.

I have no doubt that Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, who has given me the opportunity to make these observations, was, on the whole, of the same opinion as myself. For surely Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's intention could never have been to prevent me and some of my colleagues on the Representative Committee from forming a government or taking any part in it. As Kâzım Karabekir Paşa when referring to this question mentioned

in his message the names of Rauf Bey and myself and spoke of "high influential personalities of importance" and as, naturally, he had included himself among them, it was evident that he personally could not decline to put these principles into force.

However, if I remember rightly, the question of forming the new Cabinet arose at the time when Kâzim Karabekir Paşa was a deputy in the Assembly and there was a change in the state of affairs. So that we could exchange our opinions about this, I called together Çankaya Fethi Bey, Fevzi Paşa, Fuat Paşa, Kâzim Paşa, Ali Bey, Celâl Bey, İhsan Bey, the members of the Cabinet, as well as ten or fifteen other colleagues; among them also was Kâzim Karabekir Paşa. Before the latter came, he went into the Chamber to see Recep Bey, who was at that time general secretary of the party, and told him that I had invited him and would probably offer him the Prime minister's office. He asked Recep Bey whether he had any information that would help him to understand the situation and, if so, whether he would give it to him.

Those who were present found that during the meeting and the discussion that followed the attitude of Kâzim Paşa was very characteristic. During the debate, quite correctly and at the right time, Kâzim Karabekir Paşa declared "that he would not refuse to serve the nation, even in this way." The debate had concentrated on a certain question. The question was, to decide whether Fethi Bey or Kâzim Karabekir Paşa was to be the leader of the future Government. When the discussion on this began, Kâzim Karabekir Paşa no longer declared, as he had written on the 8th October, "that he regarded it as an infallible decision to remain permanently an element of control and supervision within Parliament, whatever the Cabinet and the importance and character of the members that formed it might be." On the contrary, his present attitude showed us that he preferred that he should be entrusted with the formation of the Government. Nevertheless, we were still groping in the darkest and most tragic days of a period when the salvation of the country and the nation was trembling in the balance.

I adjourned the debate, and during the interval I took His Excellency Fevzi Paşa into the garden. I begged him to come to an agreement about the election that was pending between Fethi Bey and Kâzim Karabekir Paşa for the Prime Minister of the future Cabinet. I asked him to get them both together and, after having explained to them that it was not a personal matter but that the responsibility they had to take upon themselves

was an onerous one and of patriotic import, beg each of them honestly to consult his own conscience and decide which was the better fitted to fill this office worthily and say quite frankly what opinion he had arrived at.

We reassembled. "It seems to me from the discussions," I said, "that the Government is to be formed either by Fethi Bey or Kâzim Karabekir Paşa. I move that we appoint His Excellency Fevzi Paşa as arbitrator." This proposal was accepted. The Paşa asked Fethi Bey and Karabekir Paşa to come into the garden with him. It turned out exactly as I have been telling you. Fethi Bey is said to have declared that he considered that he was the better fitted of the two for the position. Fevzi Paşa agreed with him, and so Fethi Bey was elected and the question of Kâzim Karabekir Paşa being called upon to form the Government was abandoned.

* * *

Let us now return to the question of the relations which we had induced Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet to adopt towards us.

I have told you that, as the result of the Government in Istanbul not having communicated the contents of their manifesto to us before its publication, we considered it right to publish our proclamation without previously consulting them.

Following this, the Government informed us through Cemal Paşa on the 9th October, that they considered it necessary to bring the following four points to the knowledge of the country by every possible means:

1. That there was no connection between the national movement and the "Committee of Union and Progress."
2. That the intervention of the Ottoman State in the World War was wrong; that it is essential to draw up accusations against those responsible for this mistake, mentioning their names so that they could be brought to justice and punished by law.
3. That those guilty of committing crimes of any description during the war should not escape the punishment laid down by the law.
4. That the elections would take place with perfect freedom.

After mentioning these four points, Cemal Paşa declared that these statements would obviate certain misunderstandings in the country itself, as well as in foreign countries, and specially asked us, for the sake of the best interests of the country, to receive these proposals with favour. (Document 141.)

These requests can serve as a criterion to enable us to understand the indecisive manner in which Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet faced facts and the weakness the foundation of their decisions. These unfortunate persons were incapable of gauging the depths of the terrible abyss into which the State was plunging, and they deliberately shut their eyes so that they could not see what was the true way to salvation, because if they had seen it they would have been still more appalled. The narrowness of their understanding and the limits of their horizon were sufficient to account for the weakness and indecision of their character.

Was it not quite natural, after the Sultan-Caliph had degraded himself practically to the position of a servant, that the power derived from his servility was merely a sign of his impotence?

What else could Ali Rıza Paşa, as Ferid Paşa's successor, and those of his colleagues who were transferred from the previous Cabinet do but continue to work from the point at which Ferit Paşa had left off and carry on their hostile schemes? We were perfectly well aware of this. But for reasons and considerations of various kinds, which you will quite appreciate, there was no other prospect of success lying before us except to appear perfectly passive towards certain things and be patient and forbearing.

So that we may get a clearer view of the initial stages of the differences of opinion that prevailed at that time between the new Cabinet — with whom we had thought it advisable to appear to be in perfect accord — and ourselves, I must ask you to read once more the text of the reply which contains our observations regarding these four points in the proceedings of the Grand National Assembly. (Document 142.)

Meanwhile, the journalists of Istanbul had founded a society, and in the name of certain newspapers, the *Tasviri-Efkâr*, *Vakit*, *Akşam*, *Türk Dünyası* and *Istiklâl*, they put forward certain questions on the 9th October, and begged that they might be inspired with some news to guide them. They were put in possession of the actual state of affairs and were given all the information they desired. (Document 143.)

Among the telegrams we received, was one from Velit Bey, chairman of this Press Society, that referred to certain questions which are worthy of notice. I told my aide-de-camp to attend to them. (Document 144.) You will find particulars about them among the documents.

The correspondence that passed between Cemal Paşa, a member of the new Cabinet in Istanbul, and the delegates of the Representative Committee, which was still actually going on, has prevented me from speaking

before to this honourable Assembly about Damat Mehmet Şerif Paşa, who was at that time Minister of the Interior. While we were trying to find a basis on which to build up an understanding with the new Cabinet, Şerif Paşa had been doing all he could for a long time to poison the spirit of the nation.

If you will go back to the first circular note he sent out on the 2nd October, announcing his entry into office, you will find it contains this:

"As the real interest of the State demands that there should be complete concord between all persons who constitute the nation, it is exceedingly regrettable that signs of discord should appear in the interior of the country, for these can have no other effect than to increase the difficulties . . .

"As success . . . can only be achieved if the injunctions of the Government are respected and all actions contrary to the interests of the nation cease, you are requested to send urgent instructions to this effect to all the principal towns and those under their administration." (Document 145.)

Damat Şerif Paşa, who was thought to be a more reasonable man than Damat Ferit Paşa, had begun his work in a very clumsy manner.

At that time writers of fiction in Istanbul described me as being a common mutineer and a bandit. But Damat Paşa, in his distorted mind, apparently considered us to be nothing but arrogant boasters and dummy leaders.

However, we soon detected the criminal intent of the Paşa and consequently became more cautious.

Şerif Paşa recognised in our actions and proceedings, as well as in all that the nation had been doing to hasten the overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, evidences of rebellion and anarchy, and he seemed to be very dejected about it.

He evinced much zeal in trying to get the people to submit to the wishes of the Government and do nothing at all that would be antagonistic to its policy.

Now let us go through some of the phrases and expressions contained in the manifesto that bears the signature of Mehmet Şerif Paşa, Minister of the Interior: (Document 146.)

"The present Cabinet is united." This is very true. Clearer light will be thrown on this by subsequent events.

"It is unanimous on all vital questions."

"It is not in connection with any party."

"It has even no partiality for any particular political party."

"It depends for moral support on every party."

The meaning of these phrases is perfectly clear. The Government is neither on the side of the national organisations nor of the Representative Committee that leads them. It has no partiality for either. It expects from us exactly what it expects from the party of the "Union of the Friends of England," the "Kızıl Hancer" and "Nigehban" and other similar unions.

There is not a word of truth in any one of the telegrams that were sent to us through Cemal Paşa, which were only intended to mislead us.

Look at this sentence: "Our chief aim is to see that the destiny of the country is in the hands of the real representatives of the nation."

This means that certain individuals have assembled at Sivas and speak in the name of the nation. They are interfering with the fate of the nation. They describe themselves as the "Representative Committee" and meddle in the affairs of the country without having any authority whatever to do so. Take no notice of them, because they are not the representatives of the nation at all.

On the question of peace, the Government declares itself in its manifesto thus:

"We shall not fail to take any steps that we may think necessary to secure the maintenance of the Ottoman State as an independent and united State with its Sovereign at the head of it, in conformity with the principles of Wilson, as our perfect right."

And to show that it is confident of success, the Cabinet introduces this argument to support it:

"The sense of justice exhibited by the Great Powers and the moderation shown by them, which is becoming more and more evident in the public opinion of Europe and America, inspire us with confidence."

Do not these sentiments agree literally with the wording of the proclamation issued by Ferit Paşa's Cabinet and purported to have emanated from the mouth of the Padışah? Has not the publication of such a manifesto the object of lulling the nation to sleep and leading it astray?

Where is the justice they refer to? Where is the moderation they talk about? Is there the slightest ground for either? Is it not clear that what the Powers are doing within the Empire, beginning at the Metropolis, strongly contradicts such a contention?

Was it not the fact that Wilson had actually retired from the stage with all his principles and had taken up the position of a mere spectator while the occupation of the territories in the Ottoman Empire, including Syria, Palestine, the Irak, Izmir, Adana, and all the other places, was quietly going on practically under his eyes?

Is it conceivable, in face of so many distinct signs of collapse, that any person possessed of reason and conscience and capable of discernment could allow himself to be so completely led astray? If people are really simple enough to deceive themselves to such an extent, can those who are reasonable and able to appreciate the tragic reality possibly be suffered to control the destiny of the country?

If we may suppose that these individuals know the true state of affairs and are not deceiving themselves, to what must we attribute the indefatigable energy displayed by them in misleading the nation and driving the people like a flock of sheep into the clutches of their enemies?

I leave it to public opinion to probe this problem and come to a right judgment about it.

In spite of the nonsense and misstatements appearing in the Government's manifesto, we resolved on the 7th October, in the name of the Representative Committee, to support the new Cabinet. We announced to the people the glad news that complete unity had been arrived at between the new Cabinet and the national organisations.

We took the necessary steps everywhere to prevent any interference with the affairs of the Government and to support its authority and its actions.

We took up an attitude that should prove by events relating to matters of internal policy, as to foreign countries, that real and complete unity existed. In short, we tried to do everything which in our judgment men should feel themselves bound, in soul and conscience, to do if they were considering the welfare of their country in all sincerity and punty of intention. We pressed the people to elect their deputies as quickly as possible. But there was one thing we did not do: *We did not suppress the national organisations —we did not dissolve the Representative Committee.* This was the only error that we committed.

We gave them to understand that, after Damat Ferit Paşa, we would not allow any other Damat Paşa in his capacity as Grand Vezir and Minister to surround himself with a handful of weaklings and execute without hinderance the criminal fancies of a craven Sovereign.

Our delegate Cemal Paşa continued to try by every means to win our good opinion of and confidence in the new Cabinet.

He called Ahmet İzzet Paşa as his witness in favour of this Cabinet and advised us through him to suppress our organisation.

On the 7th October, we actually received the folowing telegram from Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, which was also signed in cipher by Ahmet İzzet Paşa.

7th October, 1919.

Ministry of War.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

I have been talking to my old faithful colleagues who constitute the majority in the new Cabinet. I asked them to give me their opinions, and I discussed the situation with them.

Through some facts that have come to my knowledge, I hasten to let you know the following, because I am anxious about certain vital matters concerning the nation our comradeship in arms, and the ties of friendship that bind us.

Everybody knows the advantage of the work performed by the national troops and organisations, which was intended to counteract the danger of an invasion and the breakdown which threatened our country for several months. People with foresight, however, believed it to be an incontrovertible fact that, in order to reap the fullest advantage from these measures, our first aim in the future should be to establish a wise and proper administration. In my humble opinion, it is urgently necessary and imperative that an end should be put to this dissension between the people and the Government, and that perfect unity should exist between them. I am sure that everybody is convinced of the honesty and spirit of moderation shown by the members of the Cabinet.

It is superfluous to point out the fatal effects which internal dissensions, making it impossible for any Government to carry on their work, may have on our foreign policy.

The Imperial Government undertakes immediately to hasten the election of the deputies and the convening of the Chamber.

As you can easily judge from to-day's manifesto, the leaders know perfectly well how to appreciate your brave endeavours and noble intentions, and I am firmly persuaded that an agreement in view will mutually be arrived at in perfect sincerity.

A trustworthy and well-informed personage to whom I have spoken to-day has informed me that certain regrettable incidents have taken place in the districts in Kütahya and Bilecik. You will undoubtedly recognise that provocations can easily arise from the interior as well as from abroad and that certain things might happen that would drive us into discord and anarchy.

On the other hand, according to a telegram from the acting Vali of Kastamonu which a member of the Cabinet showed me yesterday, it seems that there was an intention, amounting practically to dictation, of ordering the Government to appoint certain officials and to punish others.

Such events would be attributed to bad government, which has already brought the State into its present positions. We notice with satisfaction in your statements and in the written wording of your undertaking to what extent you do not agree with them. Therefore, I rely on your tact and your well-known discrimination that they shall not be afforded an opportunity of behaving in that manner again.

In short, I hasten to urge and sincerely beg that, at last, you will restore unity in the country and enter into relations with the Government according to the laws of the land.

(Signed) Cemal,
(Signed) Ahmet İzzet. Minister of War.

We considered it best to send a moderate and even reassuring reply by trying not to express any particular opinion or give any special impression about it. It ran as follows:

Ciphered.

Sivas, 7th October, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War

Reply to your telegram of 7th October.

To His Highness Ahmet İzzet Paşa

Your remarks have been appreciated as they deserve to be. We thank you for your good opinion about the success of the national movement. We beg to assure you that in the future, as hitherto, the same wisdom in the guidance

of our national activites will prevail and that we shall work with all our strength to bring about the restoration of a regular administration as far as that will be possible; for this is exactly what we are striving for — the establishment of a lawful régime.

Since the Government and the nation are, with the help of God, perfectly united in their opinions, the mutual sincerity and complete unity, which we are convinced will be of lasting duration, wil in the future secure the highest interests of the country and people. The fact that the nation has not obeyed Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, the criminal actions and policy of which are publicly known, and that it has not taken part in his activities and intrigues, has, nevertheless, instead of injuring our foreign policy, resulted in our present political position, which on the whole may be regarded as rather statisfactory in that it has destroyed the fatal impressions produced by Ferit Paşa's Cabinet.

There is no doubt that our understanding with the new Cabinet, which enjoys the confidence of the nation, will allow our home policy to influence our foreign policy very favourably and effectively.

Unfortunately, under the abnormal conditions now existing, some regrettable, but at the same time unavoidable, incidents do take place in certain localities. If we consider for a moment the humiliating oppression that weighs heavily upon some districts, such as Kütahya, Bilecik and Eskisehir and their innocent and suffering citizens, we can easily find justification for the acts of which we complain. If, on the other hand, we realise that the deplorable and heartrending state of affairs in these districts can be traced directly to the pitiful conduct of the late Government, I am convinced that it would be unjust to make the national movement a target for criticism and reproach. I ask you, also, to excuse the acting Vali of Kastamonu for the telegram that was shown to you. Messages of this description have arrived not from Kastamonu alone but from other places as well, and if the former attitude of the Government, which appeared to be hesitating in the beginning, had lasted for another day or two, similar communications would have poured in from all parts of the country. However, we shall take all the requisite steps and exert the desired influence energetically to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. As Your Highness advises, we shall try in all good faith to secure complete unity and enter into sincere relations with the Government in accordance with the law of the land.

I respectfully kiss your hands.

Mustafa Kemal.

While I was reading the warning letter from Ahmet İzzet Paşa and the answer we sent to him, I was reminded of something I ought to mention, so that it may be put on record and find a place in history.

One day Ali Rıza Paşa called on Ahmet İzzet Paşa, and after having abused me freely, exclaimed in the course of the conversation — just as though he had made a sudden discovery: "You will proclaim a republic — a republic!"

To tell you the truth, it was by no means improbable that the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Armies of the Ottoman Empire, who had caused countless hosts of Turkish heroes in Macedonia to be decimated and annihilated and who had given priceless Macedonian territory as a free gift to our enemies, possessed all the necessary qualifications to make himself the slave of the designs of Vahdettin in the most critical hours of the Empire; nor was it improbable that the first thing this notorious Commander-in-Chief of the Army would think of doing when he came into power would be to put his most skilful collaborator, his Chief of the General Staff, in charge of the War Ministry.

But why should he not be congratulated on his sagacity in having guessed so quickly and so easily that the real aim of the national movement was the creation of a republic?

This story was related to me by a very honourable colleague who is present here now and who heard it from the lips of İzzet Paşa himself.

Cemal Paşa told us in a telegram in cipher on the 9th October, that they had decided to send Salih Paşa, Minister of Marine, to restore direct communication with the Representative Committee. Cemal Paşa, after having explained that it seemed advisable, owing to the bad state of Salih Paşa's health, that the rendez-vous should be as near as possible and that he would travel by sea, asked me what members of the Representative Committee would be there and where the meeting would take place.

We replied on the 10th October that the place would be Amasya, and we told him at the same time that Rauf Bey and Bekir Sami Bey had been chosen by the Representative Committee to go there to meet him. We requested him to let us know in good time when Salih Paşa would leave Istanbul and when he might be expected to arrive at Amasya.

We continued to do everything we could to extend the national organisations and consolidate them. We worked simultaneously to arrange for the elections and hasten them on. We informed all the people concerned

of our views on this question and suggested candidates wherever it seemed to be necessary. Although adhering to our principle that the union should not put any candidates in the field, we ardently hoped that those candidates who had accepted the programme and decisions of the Committee for the "Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli" should stand, and we let it be understood that they came forward voluntarily as representing the policy of the union.

On the 11th October, 1919, we repeated these orders. (Documents 147, 148, 149.)

From some districts we received protests in which cases were quoted where certain officials who were loyal to the national movement had been transferred, while other officials still remained at their posts, notwithstanding that they had been expelled by the people on account of their hostility to the national movement. In each of these protests we were asked in what way and to what extent our understanding with the new Cabinet was to be accepted.

On the 11th October, we wrote to Cemal Pasa with the object of drawing the attention of the Government to these facts.

You are aware also that an intrigue society called "Askeri Nigehban Cemiyeti" had made its appearance in Istanbul, at the head of which, according to information we had demanded, were the following: Kiraz Hamdi Paşa, Refik Bey, Colonel on the General Staff, whose name at one time had been struck off the Army List on account of embezzlement, Major Kemal Bey, member of the former Halaskâr group, Hakkı Efendi, a Major in the Artillery and formerly head of the railway service at Bandırma, Nevres Bey, a degraded major on the General Staff, about whom it was uncertain whether or not he still belonged to this union, — all of these persons had been expelled or dismissed from the Army on account of serious offences — as well as a few others who were notorious for their vices and immorality.

In No. 8,123 of the "İkdam," of the 23rd September, 1919, this society had published an article in which they had constituted themselves "Protectors of the Country and Nation." While Cevat Paşa was a member of the War Ministry, this society was persecuted, but this ceased as soon as there was a change in the Ministry.

The officers became anxious about the existence and activities of this society, and their complaints began to reach the Representative Committee.

On the 12th October, 1919, I asked Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, in

his own interest to suppress this centre of rebellion, to punish all of its members severely and to publish a circular note informing the Army of the fact.

On the 14th October, Cemal Paşa sent me a clear and detailed telegram, in which he said: "This has been officially decided upon." (Document 151) and I made this known to the whole of the Army on the 15th of the same month. (Document 152.)

But I have no recollection of this formal decision of Cemal Paşa's ever having been in any way carried out.

You will remember that the English had successively left Merzifon and Samsun. To celebrate this event, which happened simultaneously with the overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, the citizens of Sivas had arranged a torchlight procession and manifestations to express their joy. Appropriate speeches were delivered and, while the people were rejoicing, some shouts were heard in the crowd of "Down with the Occupation!" The newspaper "The National Will," published at Sivas, gave a retailed account of this event. In a communication to the Vilayet of Sivas, Damat Şerif Paşa, Minister of the Interior, referring to this publication, observed that articles like this and such exclamations were not in accord with the present policy of the Government.

What did that mean?

Were the Government carrying on a policy that regarded the occupation as a circumstance not worth objecting to? Or, did they believe that an outcry against it might lead the enemy to extend the occupation still further?

Did the Government believe that it was reasonable and politically correct that the people should remain passive and docile in face of the occupation and should not express their unhappiness about it?

Could such erroneous and foolish notions underlie a policy which we looked up to for the liberation of the Empire, which was already goaded to the verge of the abyss and found itself threatened with collapse and extermination?

On this occasion in a telegram dated 13th October addressed to Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, I said that "we considered it to be absolutely right and understandable that the people, after having seen the evacuation of part of their territory, should express their feelings in this way — indeed, it was surprising that they had not done so still more emphatically"— and

that "we had thought that the Government, actuated by the true sentiments of the nation, would in their official diplomatic language have condemned the unjust occupation and would have protested against the wrongful interventions which even at this moment are still persisted in, in defiance of the stipulations of the Armistice." Moreover, I told him that they should have claimed indemnities.

I added: "I wish to take this opportunity of asking you whether there are any points in the policy of the Cabinet which have not yet been made known to the Representative Committee and, if so, what they are." (Document 153).

The reply from our delegate Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, is very interesting. (Document 154.)

Special attention must be given to this reply, which bears the date of 18th October. Here is what he said:

"The Government, having assumed the responsibility for the management of affairs within the limits of the nation's demands, finds itself obliged to act according to political exigencies and to adopt a more moderate and hospitable attitude."

Rıza Paşa's Cabinet and the Minister holding the portfolio of the War Ministry are receiving foreigners as their guests — foreigners who are occupying our beloved country and trying to pierce the heart of the nation with their bayonets. They consider that they are compelled to treat them amicably and hospitably!

What a remarkable ideal! What strange mentality! Did this behaviour represent the sentiments comprised in the national movement?

Besides, the Minister of War expressed the following conviction: "You will recognise that the guarded attitude about which I am speaking is by no means out of place when the attempt to represent the meaning of the national movement has not yet died out."

This implied that the national activities had been somewhat injurious to the country's cause, and that the steps taken by the Government to compensate for this alleged evil are not inappropriate.

He concluded his telegram thus:

"It is absolutely necessary that the Government, possessing the confidence of our noble nation and having proved their political ripeness in deeds, will be able to secure a hearing in the outside world with all the

greater authority the less they are hampered in their actions. Therefore, I ask the Representative Committee to accept now and henceforward the acts of the Government in a favourable manner."

Here Cemal Paşa touches very important considerations. Firstly admitting that the nation has reached maturity, he gives us to understand that it is superfluous for us to take an active and leading part in its name, and that, in consequence, he looks upon us as persons who are interfering on their own account in the affairs of the nation, without having any authority whatever to do so.

He further asserted that in not allowing the Government to act freely we were preventing it from being listened to by people abroad.

What revealed the maturity of our noble nation were the meetings of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the resolutions passed at their sittings; the national determination and unity which resulted from these resolutions having been put into force; the overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, which had attempted to put those who had held the Congress at Sivas out of the way — all of these facts being of the highest importance and bearing witness to the unceasing watchfulness of the nation. To stop here, to cease to do our conscientious duty by continuing to lead the nation as we had been doing, and to allow the Government unrestrained freedom in their actions was only possible under one condition: namely, that we were guaranteed that a national Government, supported by a National Assembly that had proved itself capable of acting independently, would seriously accept the responsibility of the destiny of the nation.

Could it be expected that prudent and reasonable people and patriots would be content with remaining spectators of the stupid, inexperienced and disgraceful proceedings of a gang of obstinate men, among whom were traitors and others devoid of feeling and conscience, who had tried to stifle an outburst of indignation on the part of the nation, like "Down with the Occupation?"

Furthermore, Cemal Paşa was guilty of making glaring misstatements; for instance, when he spoke of "the present Government possessing the confidence of the nation." It was very far from being the fact that the people had confidence in the new Cabinet. Such a thing could only be said after the Cabinet had been accorded a vote of confidence by the National Assembly. But the members of that Assembly had not even yet been elected!

At the moment when the Minister of War said this, he only possessed

the confidence of one single person. This was Vahdettin, the traitor who polluted the highest office in the State by his presence.

If these people accepted it as a sign of the confidence of the nation that the Representative Committee had felt that they ought to come to an understanding with them — if this was really their idea — what need had they then to attempt to suppress the very body through which they would be able to gain the confidence of the country?

* * *

The overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Government produced a good effect on the spirits and minds that were still hesitating in some places. Work for the national movement was everywhere doubled under the leadership of high civil and military officials.

Ali Fuat Paşa personally undertook to look after nearly all the western provinces. He travelled through all the districts of Eskişehir, Bilecik and, later on, Bursa, and put himself in touch with all likely persons. Colonel Kâzım Bey (now Kâzım Paşa, President of the Chamber of Deputies), who was at Balıkesir, energetically took charge of the national organisations and the military forces in that district. On October 8th, Colonel Bekir Sami Bey sent the Vali of Bursa, who was a creature of Ferit's, back to İstanbul; he began to put in force the resolutions of the Congress and also formed a local committee. The same zeal was exercised about the national organisations and the elections to the Chamber.

The principle of bringing all the national organisations simultaneously into connection with the Representative Committee was applied to the whole of the country. We took steps to reinforce the organisations in the districts of Eskişehir, Kütahya, and Afyonkarahisar, and to facilitate the connection between the districts of Aydın, Konya, Bursa, and Karesi.

With regard to the Western Front, we were doing our best to let the Ministry of War know what was being done and to interest the Government in it by asking them what they proposed to do there.

We considered the necessity of sending a commanding officer to the different parts of the front at Aydın, which was under the leadership of the Efes. On the 14th October we wrote to Fuat Paşa and Ömer Lütfi Bey, commanding the 23rd Division at Afyonkarahisar, and asked them to form national organisations secretly in the occupied districts.

We were clear about the fact that our intentions had not been altogether understood in certain places.

For instance, the Anti-annexation League published communications on their own account, and on the 10th October 1919 we were told in an anti-annexation document, bearing the signature of the president, that a great congress would meet on the 20th of that month. The provinces were asked to send two delegates each to attend it, and they were urged to carry out certain matters.

On the other hand, we learned that the "Karakol Society" was very busy in the vicinity of Istanbul, in the Bursa district.

We did everything that was necessary to avoid any confusion and sent instructions to this effect to Ali Fuat Paşa, to Kâzım Paşa (at Belkesir), to Bekir Sami Bey (at Bursa) and to the local committee at Bursa. (Document 155.)

We also heard that the committee of the "Liberal Understanding" had sent seventy-five persons to Anadolu to form a counter-organisation there in conjunction with the enemy. We called the attention of the Army Corps to this fact. We decided to work secretly in Istanbul. We gave instructions to Trakya to develop the organisation there with the assistance of Cafer Tayyar Bey.

While we were preparing for the elections to take place, we considered which was the best place for the Chamber to meet. You will remember that in answer to Refet Paşa's telegram at Erzurum on this question, I had said that the Chamber ought to meet in Anadolu, not in Istanbul.

I could imagine nothing more impracticable or futile than to convene the Chamber at Istanbul.

But it was impossible for us to come to any decision about it before we had consulted the people and learned the opinions in the chief quarters about the question. Above all, it was necessary for us to show how inconvenient it would be to meet in Istanbul. With this object and through the mediation of the Minister of War, we drew the attention of the Government to what Ali Kemal Bey and Mehmet Ali Bey were doing and how they were trying to represent our movement in the eyes of the Greeks and other foreigners, as being directed against the Christians, and that they had held a secret meeting with the Armenian Patriarch, as well as having been associated with the Society of "Liberal Understanding."

On the 13th October we queried through Cemal Paşa to ascertain what the Government considered the "Union for the Defence of the Rights" ought to do after the Chamber was opened; we asked him what political

guarantees they thought could be obtained after the meeting of the Chamber in Istanbul.

On the same day we asked Colonel Sevket Bey, commanding the fortress of Çanakkale, who belonged to our head organisation in Istanbul, what was being done to maintain order and secure protection for the Chamber in Istanbul and what he personally considered ought to be done in this direction.

*
* *

You will remember that a meeting with Salih Paşa, Minister of Marine, was arranged to take place at Amasya. As it was most probable that the main outlines of the foreign policy and the home administration, as well as the future of the Army, would be discussed during our conversation, I considered that it would be well to know beforehand what the commanders of the Army Corps had to say about this.

In a circular in cipher, dated October 14th 1919, I requested the officers commanding Army Corps to give me their opinions on these subjects. You will find their reports among the other documents. (Document 156.)

Salih Paşa left Istanbul on the 15th October, while we started from Sivas on the 16th and arrived at Amasya on the 18th.

We had given special instructions to all our organisations to give Salih Paşa a particularly cordial reception at every place and to welcome him on our behalf. (Document 157.)

We received him personally at Amasya, amid the great enthusiasm of the people.

We began our discussions with Salih Paşa on the 20th October and they came to an end on the 22nd. At the end of this conference, which lasted three days, five different minutes were drawn up.

Three of the minutes which Salih Paşa kept were signed by us, and he signed those that remained in our possession; two other minutes which were regarded as confidential, were not signed at all.

The resolutions arrived at during this meeting at Amasya were communicated to the Army Corps. (Document 158.)

I would like to take this opportunity of emphasising one point. It was essential that we obtained confirmation that the National Organisation and the Representative Committee were one, officially recognised by the Government; that our negotiations had an official character; and that both

parties had taken upon themselves the solemn obligation towards one another to regard the results of the discussions as binding. For this reason, it was important to have these results accepted in the form of minutes and to have the documents signed by the Minister of Marine in his capacity as the delegate of the Government.

It may be said that the contents of the minutes of the 21st October consist almost entirely of suggestions made by Salih Paşa, which we had had no hesitation in accepting. (Document 159.)

The second minutes, dated 22nd October, 1919, contained a summarised account of the long discussions that took place.

When the preliminary introduction, containing a clear statement of mutual assurances with regard to the Caliphate and Sultanate, was over, a discussion of the articles contained in the manifesto issued by the Sivas Congress on the 11th September, 1919, took place.

1. We agreed that it would be necessary to maintain the frontiers mentioned and set forth in the first article of this manifesto as our minimum demand.

We deemed it appropriate to cut short the intrigues which had been hatched under cover of the independence of the Kurds.

The conversation turned on certain proposals to separate Cilicia, which at that time was part of the territory occupied by foreigners, from Turkey and convert it into a buffer-state lying between Turkey and Arabia.

We were unanimous on the principle that we could not consent to this district, which was purely Turkish and which constituted one of the most productive and fertile districts of Anadolu, being torn away from us on any pretext whatsoever; a similar and equally decisive agreement was reached on the question of the Vilayet of Aydin. As for Trakya, we reckoned with the possibility that this province would also proclaim itself a free and independent State — in reality, a foreign colony — which would practically mean that the whole of the territory up to the line Midye - Enez in Eastern Trakya would be robbed from us. We agreed that under no condition would we consent to the cession of Edirne and the territory on this side of the Meric, even if it were proposed that these territories should be annexed to and incorporated with an independent Mohamedan State. We agreed, however, in respect to the terms of this article, that the ultimate decision would rest with the legislative body.

2. A long discussion arose over the fourth article of the manifesto,

which lays down that the adjudication of such privileges as might encroach on our political sovereignty and our social stability to non-Mohammedan elements would not be accepted. It was declared that this point had to be regarded as an absolute demand for the purpose of safeguarding our independence effectually, and that the slightest sacrifice that we would make in this direction would be exceedingly dangerous.

As an aim that could be realised, we accepted the resolution that no unreasonable privileges should be conferred on the Christian elements, as laid down in Art. 4 referred to above.

Regarding this, however, as well as our other claims concerning the defence of our right to exist, it was mentioned that the opinion and decision of the National Assembly would be binding, as laid down at the end of Art. I.

3. The question of satisfying our technical, industrial and economic needs, on condition that we are granted our complete independence, as provided for in Art. 7 of the manifesto, was also discussed.

In the event of any country desiring to invest a considerable amount of capital in Turkey, it was agreed that, being unable to foresee from the beginning the advantage of our public finances being controlled (which would certainly be demanded), the decision of the National Assembly on this question should be accepted after experts had exhaustively studied the details and formulated some scheme that would not endanger our independence or our real national interests.

4. The remaining articles of the resolutions passed on the 11th September by the Sivas Congress were approved of in principle, provided that the Chamber of Deputies gave their consent to them.

5. The discussion also turned on the regulations of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli," which formed the subject of Art. 11 of the resolutions passed by the Sivas Congress on the 4th September, touching the question of organisations and the manner and extent of their future activity.

This article contains a special provision that the actual character of the activities of these organisations shall be fixed by the decision arrived at by a congress after the National Assembly, which will restore the sovereignty of the national will, has been assured that it can safely and freely exercise its right of legislation and control, and after they have satisfied themselves that this state of security actually exists. It was added that there

would be no necessity for the congress just mentioned to be held as a special congress of a similar description to those of Erzurum and Sivas.

As those deputies who accept the programme of the union may be regarded as the deputies provided for in the regulations, a special meeting which they might hold could not be treated as a congress. It was further declared that the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul could only assemble on condition that they performed their duties there freely and in complete security. An examination of the prevailing conditions was made, to discover how far this would be possible. It was generally considered that Istanbul, being under foreign occupation, was not a very favourable spot for the deputies to carry on their legislative duties unmolested.

In the same manner as the French had done at Brodeaux in 1870—1871, and as the Germans quite recently at Weimar, we agreed that it would, be far better that we should sit in some safe place in Anadolu, selected by the Imperial Government, until Peace was concluded.

How far the National Assembly could be considered secure could only be ascertained after it had begun its work, and, therefore, it was agreed that, when safety was assured, the question of dissolving the Representative Committee might be considered, and that the new aim and purpose of the existing organisation would be definitely settled at a special meeting which, as we have already said, would supersede the congress.

As the Government had ordered that the election of the deputies should take place in perfect freedom, the assurance was given that the Representative Committee would not in any way influence the elections. The opinion was expressed, however, that, by way of a discreet canvass, advice could be given with the object of preventing members of the "Union and Progress" party or compromising military people, who might sneak in among the candidates, from being elected. This manner of procedure by the Representative Committee was settled in a section of the third minute. (Document 160.)

The fourth, which was not signed because it was considered confidential, related to the following questions:

1. Alteration and withdrawal of the Imperial Trade and sundry orders concerning the dismissal of certain commanding officers and charges against a certain number of officers to be tried by court martial.
2. Taking the necessary steps for the repatriation of the exiles who were arrested by the English, from Malta to Istanbul, so that they could be tried by their own competent courts of law.

3. Also, changing the venue of the trial of Armenians who were accused of cruelty, to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sending a new protest by the Government against the occupation of Izmir, this protest to be accompanied by a demand for evacuation; if necessary, secret instructions should be given to the people inciting them to hold meetings.
5. Dismissal of the Commander of the Gendarmerie, the Commandant, the Director of Police and the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior. (This referred to the Ministries of War and of the Interior.)
6. The Society of the "Friends of England" were to be prevented from canvassing from door to door to obtain new members and signatures.
7. An end should be put to the activity of the Societies and the injurious publications in the pay of foreign countries (special prohibition against officers and officials joining such Societies).
8. Strengthening of the national organisations at Aydin; facilities and safeguards for their supply of provisions (to be regulated by the Minister of War). The amount of money required for this might be taken from the TL 400,000 allocated to the Navy.
9. Officials who had taken part in the national movement should not be transferred until general rest and security have been restored. Before the officials who had been dismissed and discharged by the nation on account of their hostile behaviour towards the national movement are appointed to new offices, the Representative Committee should be privately consulted.
10. The transport and removal of the refugees from Western Trakya to be safeguarded.
11. Acemi Sadun Paşa and his associates to be assisted in an adequate manner.

The fifth memorandum, which was unsigned, contained the names of persons eligible as members of the Peace Delegation. But the Government would not be hampered in their choice if they acted according to the principles laid down.

Delegates:

His Highness Tevfik Paşa, President. His Highness Ahmet İzzet Paşa,
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Military Delegate. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Delegate. Reşat Hikmet Bey, Diplomatic Delegate.

Expert

Hamit Bey, Finance, Colonel İsmet Bey, Army, Rasit Bey, Political Affairs. Muhtar Bey, engineer, Public Works. Ali Riza Bey, Captain in the Navy. Refet Bey, Statistics. Emirî Efendi, History. Münür Bey, Legal Adviser.

An expert, Commercial Affairs.

An expert, privileges of the various Religious Communities.

Secretaries

Reşit Saffet Bey, formerly Financial Adviser to the Government. Sevki Bey, Salih Bey, Orhan Bey. Hüseyin Bey, Professor of Turkish at Robert College.

I presume that among all the details of this conference, the question of the eventual meeting place of the Chamber of Deputies will have specially engaged your attention.

We persuaded Salih Paşa to agree with our original contention that Istanbul would be an inconvenient and impossible place for the Chamber to meet at. Although Salih Paşa shared this opinion, he only agreed on condition that his personal opinion should not be taken as binding on the rest of the Cabinet.

He promised to do everything in his power to convince his colleagues and lead them to the same opinion, and he declared that nothing would be left for him to do but leave the Chamber if he should be unsuccessful in his mission. Salih Paşa did not succeed in this.

I will now conclude my account of the meeting at Amasya and then return to the question of the meeting place of the Chamber of Deputies. I will just say one word more.

Just as we were leaving Sivas for Amasya, a rather regrettable incident occurred in this town. I think I ought to tell you something about it.

On our arrival at Amasya, we heard that the members of the "Liberal Understanding," together with some foreigners, were carrying on intrigues which practically amounted to treason. I immediately spread this news by sending out a circular note. I also heard at Sivas that they intended to send

a telegram to the Sultan about myself, but I did not believe it. However, I felt sure that the watchfulness of our comrades on the Representative Committee, the officers at our headquarters, the Valis and others, would undoubtedly prevent it.

But it appears that three persons, Şeyh Recep and his two companions, Ahmet Kemal and Celâl by name, through the good services of a telegraph operator who was one of their adherents, had discovered a way to send the telegram they wanted to transmit.

The following telegram addressed to Salih Paşa was actually brought to us from the Telegraph Office at Amasya:

16613 K 82

Sivas, 18th October, 1919.

To His Excellency Salih Paşa, Minister of Marine.

To His Excellency Naci Bey, A.D.C. to His Imperial Majesty.

In the interest of the country and the nation we beg you to do us the favour of coming to the chief town in the vilayet, so that you may understand the actual conditions that have been prevailing in our country for several months and obtain a clear view of the state of affairs.

For the same reason we beg you to come to the telegraph instrument.

Recep Kâmil, of the tribe of the Şemsettini Sivasi.
Zaralı Zade Celal.

The original bears 160 seals of ülema, notables, merchants and tradesmen.

Ilyas Zade Ahmet Kemal.

For my part, I received the following telegram on the 19th October.

To Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Amasya.

Our people cannot consider that the existing discord has been allayed until they have received from Salih Paşa himself or some other trustworthy person a statement as to what the Padişah and the Government think about the matter. Therefore, we inform you that you have to chose one of the two alternatives.

Ilyas zade Ahmet Kemal
Recep Kâmil, of the tribe Şemsettini Sivasi
Zaralı Zade Celal.

While we were energetically trying to enlighten the country and to show the people how it could be saved, our enemies succeeded in corrupting some of the people who were in a position to aid them in all directions in the criminal execution of their nefarious designs — even in the town of Sivas, where we had our headquarters and in every way were complete masters. The relaxation of their watchfulness by the leaders at Sivas, after my departure and in spite of all my warnings, can only be regarded as a typical instance of the negligence which was in some degree almost universally apparent.

On the 19th October, our colleagues at Sivas dispatched the following telegram, which was signed by the Representative Committee.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasa, Amasya

The following is the complete text of the telegram which Şeyh Recep and his companions have just this moment handed in at the Telegraph Office for transmission. Kemal Bey, Major in the Artillery, is attending to the matter.

Then followed a copy of the telegram I have mentioned.

On the same day the Director of Telegraphs at Sivas sent me this message:

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasa.

19th October, 1919.

I humbly forward you the telegram signed by Recep, of the tribe of the Semsettin Sivasî, İlyas Zade Ahmet Kemal and Zarahî Zade Celal. These telegrams were brought here at night and were sent off by our officials under threats. Undoubtedly everybody has the right to send telegrams, under certain conditions. But, nevertheless, no person whatsoever has the power to force his way into the telegraph room and intimidate and threaten officials while they are performing their official duties. It is surely an unlawful proceeding to act in such a manner as to injure the authority and dignity of the Government. I have brought this matter to the knowledge of the Vilayet. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency about it also as you are engaged in securing order in the country.

I beg Your Excellency to receive the expression of my deep esteem.

Lütfu, Chief Director.

I replied:

To the Director of the Chief Telegraph Office in Istanbul.

Any person who intercepts telegrams sent by people with the request that they may be forwarded to high quarters in the interests of nation and the country is a traitor to his religion and to the State. Such act might easily lead to bloodshed. We are determined that our message shall be delivered to His Majesty. We await your reply.

To the General Secretary of the Imperial Court.

"For the sake of the country and the nation we are waiting at the instrument for the reply to the petition which we had the honour of presenting to His Majesty the Caliph, through the general secretary of the Imperial Court.

"Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Chairman of the Congress which has been held in our district of Sivas under the title of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli," by circulating the report that he is provided with letters from Your Majesty, and with the aid of a small number of followers who are endeavouring to conceal their criminal actions in the country, tries to proclaim himself the representative of the will of the nation.

"Actuated by our religious duty, however, we are in every way subject and entirely devoted to our glorious Caliph and our dearly loved Sovereign. We have been informed that Salih Paşa, Minister of Marine, and Naci Beyefendi, Your Majesty's A.D.C., had been sent to Sivas. We have been unable to obtain a reply to the telegram we had addressed to you, signed by 2,000 ülema, notables and tradesmen praying you to alleviate the indignation felt by the people. We pray Your Majesty, urgently and respectfully, to send this Commission to Sivas, in order that they may personally convince themselves of the actual state of affairs prevailing here.

"We have the honour to be at all times Your Majesty's devoted and obedient servants."

Our enemies attributed a really important part to Seyh Recep.

In a letter to Mr. Frew, the English clergyman, on the 24th October — of which I shall speak at the proper time when I am referring to the documents — Sait Molla asked: "What do you think about the incident at Sivas?" He added: "There is something wrong here with the organisation, but it will gradually improve."

It was surely significant that the dispatch of the telegram could be accompanied by threats, trying to prove that all the inhabitants of Sivas were in a state of revolt against the chairman of a body that had been speaking everywhere about the unity and concord of the nation and the outspread of the national organisation. A body which, acting on the unanimous desire of the people with the support of national and military organisations, had overthrown the Cabinet and which at that very moment was about to enter into negotiations with the delegates of the present Government, having on that same day started from Sivas for this purpose.

Even if the population of Sivas itself, in the midst of whom the Representative Committee was established, showed such an antagonistic attitude, it was indeed difficult to prove that the whole nation shared the same feeling and opinion.

Would it not clearly show the weakness of the support behind this body that so feebly represented the people and behind its chairman?

You can imagine how important our enemies regarded this voice from Sivas and how it helped them.

When Salih Paşa arrived at Amasya, I had the telegram that had arrived for him handed to him. But I demanded that Şeyh Recep and his companions should be punished by the Government, and on the 19th October I asked the members of the Representative Committee at Sivas the following questions:

1. Have you seen the telegram addressed to the Imperial Palace, signed by Şeyh Recep, Ahmet Kemal and Celâl?
2. Is there no officer in charge of the Telegraph Office?
3. How can such impertinence be possible when you are all there at Sivas?

This seems all the more impossible as you are so well aware of all the plans and intentions of these idiots. We had heard here that they had prepared a telegram signed by these three people to be sent to Salih Paşa and Naci Paşa. Did you not hear anything about it?

4. Has my circular note which I issued yesterday regarding the criminal and subversive intrigues of members of the "Liberal Understanding" with foreigners reached you?
5. Why did not the telegraph officials, after having been threatened and intimidated, immediately inform the competent authorities, including

the Vali, about it? How could the officer in charge be guilty of such carelessness and negligence?

6. What has been done about the communications from the Director of the Telegraph Office?

Mustafa Kemal.

Having learned that the Vilayet had handed this matter over to the military authorities, I wrote to Zeki Bey, Chief of the Staff of the Army Corps:

"Has this affair been handed over to the Army Corps because the Vilayet had exhausted every possible means to arrest and punish those who are guilty, or are the available means considered inadequate? Or, has the Vilayet hesitated to do anything against such impudence?"

"It would be better not to do anything decisive until the matter has been cleared up."

Mustafa Kemal.

To those who were at Sivas I sent the following orders:

1. The Telegraph Office is to be put completely under control. A detachment of troops under the command of an officer will be stationed there. Everything shall be done to prevent the possibility of traitors being allowed, as has happened in this instance, to take possession of the Telegraph Office, intimidate the officials, stir the people up against national unity and disturb public order.

In such circumstances, whenever they occur, arms are to be used without hesitation against any person who breaks the law and attacks the troops.

2. In accordance with the report of the Chief of Staff concerning the maintenance of order, necessary proceedings shall be taken without delay against all who are guilty of such careless acts, before they have time to escape; and the result must be communicated to us within two hours. It is a matter of regret that in this extraordinary case there was no one at Sivas who was willing to take the initiative and act immediately, instead of waiting for orders.

This order has been forwarded by Cemal Cahit Bey to the officer commanding the 5th Division and the officer commanding the battalion belonging to the division at Sivas. I urgently request you to attend to this immediately.

3. You will continue to keep a strict watch. All those concerned will act promptly and with severity in maintaining order at Sivas.

Mustafa Kemal.

I gave the following instructions privately to Osman Turan Bey and Recep Zühtü Bey:

"We have informed the competent authority what is to be done in the case of those who offer resistance to the national movement. It will be your duty to watch the situation carefully and see whether our orders are obeyed to the letter or not. In case of any negligence, you will interfere personally and arrest those who are under suspicion and restrain their accomplices. As the occasion may require, you will not hesitate to do anything you consider necessary against any person."

Mustafa Kemal.

After having told us of this incident in detail, Vali Reşit Paşa wrote to us on the 20th October that "this incident, which might have led to further developments, has been checked and we may be sure that, owing to the quick and energetic dispositions that had been adopted, similar events would not occur again in future." (Document 161.)

You have naturally concluded that the Government did not punish Seyh Recep and his accomplices. We shall witness later on many offences that were committed by this low and dishonourable Şeyh who had allowed himself to be made a tool of by the enemy — this individual who signed himself "of the tribe of the Semsettin Sivasi."

The situation which had developed while we were still at Amasya was not marked alone by the incident at Sivas. Another similar occurrence took place in the district of Adapazarı. With your permission I will also say a few words about this.

A certain Talustan Bey, who haunted the country of Akyazı in the district of Adapazarı, and Bekir Bey, who had arrived with funds and instructions supplied from Istanbul and who had promised to pay those who were willing to serve at the rate of thirty Turkish pounds to mounted men and fifteen Turkish pounds to those on foot, and, thirdly, Beslan, a tax-collector from the village of Avcar near Sapanca, met and prepared an attack on a small place in Adapazarı at the head of a certain number of armed men, mounted and on foot, whom they had recruited in the neighbourhood.

Tahir Bey, Kaymakam of Adapazari, heard of it, and with a major, who had been sent from Izmit with about twenty-five mounted men whom he succeeded in mustering, marched out to meet those who had planned to attack the town. The two bands met near the village of Lütfiye. The attacking gang were asked what they wanted. They replied: "We want to go to the Telegraph Office at Adapazari to find out whether His Majesty is alive or dead, and whether he is still seated on the glorious throne of the Caliph or not. We cannot acknowledge Mustafa Kemal Paşa as the successor of the Padişah . . ."

According to detailed reports which Tahir Bey made concerning this verbally to the Mutasarrif of Izmit, these individuals declared that they were in communication with influential persons in Istanbul and that the Sultan was fully informed about their enterprise.

This occurs in the official report:

"Bekir declared to the men belonging to this gang that they had been granted by Istanbul a limit of one week to finish this business, five days of which had already elapsed, and that as, therefore, only two days remained, they had to act promptly." (Document 162.)

The commander of the division at Izmit had to send a detachment to Adapazari and Ali Fuat Paşa had also to dispatch sufficient troops to Düzce.

On the 23rd October, we wrote to the commander of the division at Izmit, informing him that Bekir had been sent by our enemies outside our movement and by the "Liberal Understanding," and urging him to suppress his revolutionary intrigues. On the same day I ordered Tahir Bey, Kaymakam of Adapazari, directly "not to hesitate to take prompt and rigorous steps against Bekir and his gang, to render them harmless, and to inform us of the result." (Document 163.)

In a telegram in cipher, dated the 23rd October, we told Cemal Paşa Minister of War, of the information we had gathered regarding the operation, the persons involved, and the characters of Bekir and his accomplices, and we added that in case the Imperial Government would not take adequate steps at the right time against revolutionary intrigues and operations of this kind, we would consider ourselves justified in resorting to the most extreme measures as soon as the national organisations became involved in them. (Document 164.)

The national military detachment that had started from Izmit and had obtained reinforcements *en route* had succeeded in dispersing the gang

of miscreants, which meanwhile had been considerably reinforced and showed signs of being still more so. Beslan, the taxcollector, and his brother had been taken. Bekir, who had arrived a week earlier furnished with instructions and the necessary funds from Istanbul, had taken to flight. This Bekir was formerly an officer who had been expelled from the army; he was a native of Manyas. (Documents 165, 166.)

Then, in obedience to the orders we had given, the persecution began of an individual named Ingiliz Ibrahim, who was one of the originators of the movement at Izmit, and sundry other men of a like description. (Documents 167, 168.)

On the 26th October 1919, I wrote to Cemal Pasa, Minister of War, from Amasya, informing him that on account of the steps that were taken on the spot Bekir's enterprise had been wrecked, that Bekir had fled, but, as in all probability he would return to Istanbul and continue his offensive activity, that it would be necessary to keep a sharp eye on him and follow him. (Document 169.)

On the 27th October, 1919, we heard by telegram from Haydar Bey, Mutasarrif of Bolu, that Bekir, accompanied by two officers and forty armed men, was engaged in inciting the inhabitants of the villages of Abaza against the national movement, that he was spending large sums of money with this object and that the report they had made to the Ministry concerning this had met with no response. (Document 170.)

I cannot think that these warnings we sent to the Government with the intention of exposing their behaviour and requesting them to perform their duty could be regarded as interference with their affairs.

Considering the various schemes planned in Istanbul under the eyes of the Government by our enemies at home and abroad, and considering how the Padişah knew and, as far as we could see, approved of them, it was perfectly unjustifiable to expect us to wait until these machinations and been crowned with success, in the puerile hope that the Government would put a stop to them.

The news we received on the 20th October, at the moment when we were opening our negotiations at Amasya, may be summarised thus:

The "Liberal Understanding" party and the unions of "Nigehban" and the "Friends of England" formed one party. They continued, with the help of individuals like Ali Kemal and Sait Molla, to incite the non-Mohammedan elements against the national forces. The Greek and Armenian patriarchs

turned to the representatives of the Allied Powers in an attitude that was hostile to the national forces. In a letter published in the "Neologos," Zaven Eriendi, the Georgian Patriarch, states that the Armenians are emigrating again on account of the national operations. A man called Hikmet, a brother of Kâzim who had been hanged, acting on instructions received from Istanbul, had began to collect armed men in the vicinity of Adapazari. We shall come across this name of Hikmet again in another important document. Also at Değirmendere, in the neighbourhood of Adapazari, mercenaries had been collected. The rumour was spread that those who had been brought together and formed into bands were preparing to invade the district of Geyve. It seems that the same thing was happening at Karacabey. Raids were reported from the country around Bursa that were carried out against the national troops by gangs organised by, and in the pay of Gümülcineli Ismail. The "Nigehban" adherents who were in prison were all set free on the same day.

The appearance of bands organised by our enemies against the national troops, the undisguised activity of the opposition party, the hostile attitude of the Director of Police in Istanbul, the inclusion in Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet of Ministers who were opposed to us — all these circumstances were liable to produce discouragement and pessimism in our organised centres, especially in Istanbul itself. (Documents 171, 172.)

The Government was incapable of showing any sign by which we could feel that they were, speaking generally, following a clearly defined aim. On the other hand, they merely approved of the energetic reactionary activity of Şerif Paşa, Minister of the Interior. These facts were enough to provoke criticism and cause uneasiness.

In this connection, Ankara was the first place to show unrest and indecision.

Accompanying a telegram in cipher signed by the late Hayati Bey, I received on the 22nd October at Amasya another telegram, also in cipher, that was sent by Yahya Galip Bey, the acting Vali of Ankara, to Sivas on 15th October.

15th October, 1919.

I: ran:

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Your Excellency, we cannot confide the fate of the nation to the hands of a government that understands nothing whatever about it, nor to the very first persons they send to us as Valis. As the indications which we

repeatedly had the honour of addressing to Your Excellency have not been attended to, the Government has become bold. As preliminary evidence of this mental attitude, we observe the appointment of Ziya Paşa, formerly Vali of Bitlis, who had been appointed at that time by the notorious Cabinet of Ferit Paşa but could not be sent to take up the post as Vali of Ankara, and the appointment of Suphi Bey, who could never show the slightest capability in the whole of his administrative career, to Konya. At length we were driven to demand that no new official in Anadolu, who was a stranger to the place, should be chosen from elsewhere until the Chamber of Deputies had been opened. If the present Government intend to send a new Vali to Ankara, it can only be with the object of stifling the national movement that is so strong there. In the same way as Your Excellency retired from the Army and decided to work as a simple citizen, so has your servant made up his mind to retire from his office and dedicate himself to the service of the nation.

I beg Your Excellency to be kind enough to let me know to whom I shall hand over the management of affairs until the arrival of the Vali.

Yahya Galip,
Acting Vali at Ankara

The next day, the 23rd, I received this telegram, dated the 21st October, from Cemal Paşa:

No. 419

Kadıköy 21st October, 1919.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Amasya.

The Civil Administration and Müftü of Ankara announce that they do not want to accept a Vali who is a stranger to the place, and demand that the Vali appointed to this province shall be chosen from Ankara itself. Similar claims, which are advanced practically everywhere, place the Government in a very difficult position. Our enemies and others explain this fact in different ways. Relying on your promise to assist the Government, I beg you to prevent a repetition of such resistance. You will naturally agree that the departure of the Vali, whose appointment has been confirmed by Imperial Trade, is out of the question.

Cemal, Minister of War

With the Müftü at their head (His Eminence Rifat Efendi, at present at the head of religious affairs), the population of Ankara had actually addressed a protest to Istanbul.

I went to the telegraph instrument and sent a great deal of good advice to Ankara that was calculated to allay their anxiety, and I begged them to refrain from doing anything that could injure the authority and influence of the Government. But, at the same time, I could not help recognising that Ankara was in the right. At last, I wrote to Mahmut Bey, the provisional commander of the Army Corps at Ankara, and recommended him to proceed quietly till I received an answer to the telegram I had sent to the Government through Cemal Paşa.

There is one more fact that must not be overlooked. We, the Representative Committee, had very accurately grasped the situation and the mentality of the Government. We understood that some of the Ministers regretted that they had consented to join the Government and were looking for an excuse to retire. On the other hand, it did not escape us that our enemies at home and abroad were, in agreement with the Padişah, resolved to put another Cabinet in power to succeed Ali Rıza Paşa's Ministry — a Cabinet that would be capable of carrying out their designs openly and rapidly. For this reason, we regarded Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet as the lesser of the two evils. We had also to consider the advice given to us during the four or five days' negotiations that followed the overthrow of Ferit Paşa with the intention of bringing about a speedy understanding with the new Cabinet.

Consequently, we felt it necessary to make further sacrifices if need be to gain our end.

I had drawn attention to this matter in my telegram in cipher to Mahmut Bey. (Document 173.)

This is my reply to Cemal Paşa:

In cipher.

Amasya, 24th October, 1919.

Strictly confidential.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

Reply to telegram in cipher of 21st October. No. 419.

There is no doubt that the demand made by Ankara regarding the Vali was the result of the following:

From reliable information received from Istanbul, it was evident that the English there, in combination with the Union of the "Friends of England" and the members of the "Liberal Understanding" and the "Nigehban," were working in conjunction with the Christian elements; that they had undertaken to send a great number of the followers of the op-

position to Anadolu with the object of breaking up the national organisation and eventually overthrowing the Imperial Government; that these agitators had actually started for Adapazari and Bursa. Moreover, certain signs of their activity had been observed recently at Adapazari. All these facts and circumstances were quite sufficient to produce unrest.

This uneasiness increased when it was rumoured that a statement had been made to Refet Bey by Suphi Bey, the new Vali of Konya, who had quite recently arrived there, to the effect that he was himself a member of the administrative council of the Society of the "Friends of England" in Istanbul.

Although no objection can be raised as to the character and the honour of Ziya Paşa, who has just been appointed to the Vilayet of Ankara, and no doubt can exist as to his importance and capability, they have hesitated to agree that a Vali who has not yet given sufficient proof of these qualifications should be put at the head of a province like Ankara, which was the centre of the national organisations and operations, until the situation had improved and quiet and confidence had been completely restored.

Whereas, as the result of the correspondence that had passed between the Representative Committee and the acting Vali, as well as the military commandant of Ankara, it has been taken as natural that the orders of the Government were to be obeyed (and this has actually been the case), the people themselves — considering that the guarantee against the dangers is inadequate — have thought it necessary to appeal direct to the Government and request that the present acting Vali, who is regarded as being devoted to the national movement, should be allowed to remain at his post until complete confidence has been restored. Touching this last request, we had again exchanged opinions with the competent authorities at Ankara and we tried to ensure the reception of Ziya Paşa — even if that should be fraught with difficulty — solely because we had no desire to impair the influence and authority of the Government. But we have failed to convince the people, who are alarmed at the possible dangers which the revolutionary intrigues and the anarchical agitation we have referred to could produce.

Surely His Excellency the Paşa, the Minister of the Interior, will not fail accurately to estimate the importance and the difficulty of the present situation and to notice the indefatigable and fiendish behaviour on the part of our enemies. Considering that he has only been in office for a short time, it is natural that we should excuse him for not yet knowing which of the officials can be trusted, as well as the additional fact that Keşfi Bey, who was Under Secretary of State under Adil Bey, is still at his post. That it

behoves us to be very careful in the election of a higher official can easily be appreciated.

Consequently, we beg Your Excellency to exercise your influence to postpone for the time being the dispatch of Ziya Paşa and inform us that you agree to this.

Mustafa Kemal.

On the 28th October, 1919, Ali Fuat Paşa transmitted the contents of a telegram in cipher which our organisation in Istanbul had addressed personally to myself. The information in this telegram was important.

This incident, which happened at Çerkez Bekir, has been looked upon as the beginning of a revolt of the people at Adapazarı and its vicinity against the national forces. A Council, consisting of His Imperial Majesty, Ferit Paşa, Adil Bey, Sait Molla and Ali Kemal Bey, had discussed how they could gain advantage from this incident and had erected a mountain of conjectures out of it.

This telegram also contained information about the man Hikmet, whom we have already heard about. This individual had left Amasya two months earlier and had gone to Adapazarı. He noticed that all those who were hostile to his family and his person in this district had joined the national organisations. He declared that he came from Amasya, that he knows me, and that he alone had any right to form a national organisation; further, that he had tried to get into touch with Sivas. He met with opposition; whereupon Hikmet formed a counter-organisation. Sait Molla, who heard about this, discovered a way to win Hikmet over. He incited him to persecute the Christians.

I beg you not to look upon as being a waste of time the information I am giving you about Hikmet and the intrigues of our enemies to cause an anti-Christian movement, because these details will make it easier for you to understand certain events which we shall see later resulted from them. (Documents 174, 175.)

In this connection I would like to draw your attention to a telegram I sent to Cemal Paşa:

Ciphered.

Sivas, 31st October, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

Your Excellency will surely be aware of what has been happening in the district of Adapazarı in opposition to the Government and the national

forces. Although this incident, thanks to the will of the united nation and the appropriate and decisive steps taken by the Imperial Government to counteract it, has been nullified, germs of discord and anarchy still exist in this district. There is no doubt whatever that the national movement will succeed in suppressing them also. It has, however, been reported that Damat Ferit Paşa, the former Minister of the Interior, Adil Bey and Kemal Bey as well as Sait Molla, are among the originators and organisers of this revolt. Besides their treason against the country, these persons have committed another serious and dangerous offence by spreading the base rumour that His Imperial Majesty has presumably been well informed about their criminal attempts.

We urgently beg the honourable Ministerial Council to acquaint His Imperial Majesty of this in such manner as appears to them most desirable. The nation and the organisations surely cannot credit these calumnies. We consider that it is of the greatest importance to dispel any kind of distrust by publishing an official *démenti* on the spot in the name of the Imperial Government, and qualify such actions on the part of these agitators as falsehoods disseminated to sully the reputation of the national unity; also to institute the necessary inquiries about these malicious individuals with the view of taking legal proceedings against them.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the
Representative Committee.

In have explained to you in a few words why we thought it necessary to uphold and assist Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet as far as possible, in spite of our opinion of the people who comprised it.

After my return to Sivas from Amasya, at a meeting of the Representative Committee at which others of our colleagues were also present, I entered into the most detailed particulars about the meeting that had been held at Amasya, as well as other matters. At this meeting we arrived at the following resolution, which is literally shown on the page recording our conference on the 29th October:

"Considering that all the members of Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet, with the Grand Vezir at their head, are weaklings incapable of acting with decision and have no higher ambition than to make themselves popular with and welcome to His Imperial Majesty; that some of them are favourably inclined towards and others antagonistic to the national movement; that His Majesty would be ready on the first favourable opportunity that presented

itself to replace them by a Cabinet that will be strong enough to uphold autocracy — the Representative Committee determines and resolves that it is in the interest of the country and the nation to keep this Cabinet in power until the National Assembly has met and commenced its legislative duties."

We actually passed this resolution. Let me tell you something that occurred to support it.

Our organisation in Istanbul sent us certain information on the 31st October, 1919, which according to them emanated from a trustworthy source. This is what they said:

"For the last two days, Kiraz Hamdi Paşa has been going to the Imperial Palace and has remained there in audience for several hours. A plot has been hatched to form a Cabinet with Marshall Zeki Paşa at its head. The other members are to include: Hamit Paşa, Minister of War; Prince Sabahattin, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Tevfik Hamdi Bey, Minister of the Interior. Eşref, Mahir Sait and others will be given the remaining portfolios. Sabahattin and Mahir Sait have not as yet been officially consulted. It is possible that His Majesty at a convenient moment, perhaps in the course of the next day two, will propose to Ali Rıza Paşa that he hands in his resignation. The party and the secret society we have mentioned before are involved in this plot."

Then we wrote to Cemal Paşa on the 2nd November, asking him to tell the Grand Vezir that he must not resign for any reason whatever, and that if he does the whole country will definitely break off all communication with Istanbul. (Document 176.)

All the military commandants in Rumeli and Anadolu were informed about the actual state of affairs and the contents of this telegram, and they were given to understand that all information concerning current events must be communicated to the general committees of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights" with which they were in direct touch. (Document 177.)

After Salih Paşa had returned to Istanbul we entered into communication with the Government on the question mentioned in the minutes of the 21st October, and which during the course of my remarks I have emphasised as being of special importance, namely, the place where the Chamber of Deputies should meet. I am sure that the representations made to the Government through Cemal Paşa, as well as our own observations are worthy of being remembered. As you will be able yourselves to form an idea about the exchange of opinions from the minutes of the first meetings

of the Grand National Assembly, I think it will be unnecessary for me to refer to this question again. Our exchanges of opinion and our discussions, however, on this point were not confined to the correspondence we carried on with the Government and with Cemal Paşa.

We insisted on ascertaining the views of the whole of the country and, especially, those of our organisations in İstanbul.

Here are some of the facts:

Our organisations in İstanbul stated in the reply they sent us on the 20th October, 1919, to our question of the 13th of the same month, "that they were convinced, and could not see that there was any danger in their doing so, that the Chamber of Deputies ought to meet in İstanbul; that, as anything the Entente Powers were to do against the Chamber itself would produce the worst impression on the opinion of the world, the possibility of this happening need not be thought of for a moment." They further added that "only in the event of the legislature attempting to exceed their present power would His Majesty decide to dissolve the Chamber; that the opposition had taken up a dangerous attitude; and that the Entente Powers were taking advantage of it and found courage enough to attack persons like Your Excellency."

Finally, they advised us "not to come to İstanbul until Peace had been signed, and not to stand for election as deputies." (Documents 178, 179.)

In the telegram we received on the 30th October from the İstanbul Branch of our organisations, signed by Karavasif Bey under a pseudonym and Şevket Bey in his real name, the views of the members of our organisation and those of many others were confirmed.

The first paragraph of this telegram read as follows:

"I have had an opportunity of talking to Ahmet İzzet Paşa the Grand Vezir, the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of Public Works, Esat Paşa, the oculist, who shows remarkable fidelity to our principles and commands great influence, and, sometimes at their request and sometimes as the opportunity offered, to Rauf Ahmet Bey and certain others. All of them agreed unanimously to the following:

"I. It is absolutely necessary that the Chamber of Deputies shall meet in İstanbul. But we ourselves must not go to İstanbul. The Grand Vezir has promised that when the foreign countries have given their consent, the Chamber shall be allowed to pass its resolutions without inter-

ference. But as it would be impossible to obtain guarantees with regard to ourselves, we were given to understand that we must stand on a higher plane in the general devotion of the people, either by considering ourselves absent on leave if we happened to be deputies, or simply by not becoming deputies."

Paragraph B contained some items that were completely new to us:

"After all, in the treaty to be drawn up the Government will be forced to accept proportional representation, based on the rights of the minorities. Therefore, it is anticipated in certain quarters that the Chamber will be dissolved and new elections will take place in which the minorities will be able to vote."

In Paragraph C of the same document this phrase occurs: "Surely the Government is actuated by good-will and is quite disinterested."

The second article gave us the impression of a confused and disjointed mentality that seemed quite incomprehensible to us. The desire was expressed that some Socialists, or members more or less associated with the "Liberal Understanding," should be elected.

The third article suggested that the Government should not be led into difficulties.

The fourth article inspired these ideas:

"I should like to win over to our cause all those who might injure us, by giving them every possible assurance and guarantee. I am advised on every side to proceed on lines that would be agreeable to, for instance, Refi Cevat, the Socialists, etc." (Document 180.)

The replies we sent on the 1st and 4th November, 1919, to our organisations in Istanbul contained our criticism and views in detail. We explained, among other things, that "the meeting of the deputies in Istanbul would give rise to doubts in many minds, and the people consider that it would be exceedingly dangerous."

We summarised the remarks that we made to the Government through Cemal Paşa. We tried to prove that "the danger supposed to threaten us personally was fictitious, because the same thing might apply to all the other representatives of the nation;" and we added, "that we demanded, if they really insisted on our remaining merely onlookers, that they would be good enough to let us know why they think that such a course would be necessary." (Document 181.)

Here is an extract from a telegram we sent to Karavasif Bey:

"His Excellency Ahmet İzzet Paşa originally feared that the national movement might lead to sanguinary conflicts in Istanbul. So that we can follow his advice, it is of the greatest importance that we should first know whether he has changed his mind on the subject. As for His Excellency Cemal Paşa, you will probably know that he, also, is in a state of hesitation and indecision. Abuk Paşa, too, is in the same quandary. I cannot be sure about Esat Paşa, the oculist. Some people seem to think that this man is exceedingly narrow-minded and that he only thirsts for honour and glory. In short, we have come to the conclusion that those men must be watched, whatever may be their rank, whose determination and views are at all doubtful and whose judgment is influenced by pressure exerted by our opponents in Istanbul."

After having reconsidered and calculated the doubts and dangers that threaten our selection of the place for Parliament to meet, we explained, "that what astounded us most was the question as to how the Government, giving proof that they were powerless to guarantee the safety of three specially prominent persons, could expect to protect the other deputies. The conviction that gradually forced itself upon us was, unfortunately, to the effect that it was not so much the foreigners as the leaders of the present Government, and certain others, who had such extraordinary misgivings about our being present."

We observed that, "it must appear to be quite natural that we did not want the Chamber of Deputies to meet in a centre where the dissolution of Parliament was already being anticipated in case it were decided to adopt proportional representation." We added that, "we could not understand what was meant by the hint about the disinterestedness on the part of the Government."

Were we to understand that it was their intention to abandon us in our difficult circumstances? And, answering one of their suggestions, we said that "the fear that the opposition might come into power is not to the point: it is quite impossible for us to deny our principles on account of any such fear as that." (Document 182.)

From this interchange of opinions and their causes, we can easily arrive at the conclusion that the leaders of our organisations in Istanbul were influenced by the views expressed by the Ministers and others and thus had merely become their mouthpieces.

Here is another telegram in cipher sent on the 6th November, 1919, signed by Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, and containing nothing but suggestions of Karavasif Bey.

Touching the place where the Assembly was to meet, we read the following:

"First of all, there are political objections and, secondly, administrative misgivings; thus it is impossible that the meeting... Necessity is of far greater importance than sentiment... Be good enough to tell the Government as soon as possible that you agree with them."

This meant that a sort of pressure was being put upon us. After that came a promise of happy events: "We shall soon send you some good news by Riza Bey, the Japanese." This was intended to mean that we had almost succeeded in winning the "Sulh-i Selamet" (Peace and Salvation) Party, as well as the "Millî Türk" Party to our side. We are destroying "Millî-Ahrar"; the national Congress will at last come to reason. The good news they were so anxious to send us concerned nothing but matters of trivial importance. (Document 183.)

On the 7th November, I wrote to Karavasif Bey, asking him to come to Sivas immediately.

In his telegram of the 19th November he told us what he thought about it:

Whom would Anadolu accept as their leader in case the Assembly, which would be in accord with the national forces, assumed a hostile attitude towards the Padişah?... Would Anadolu submit to the national forces?... It is, therefore, a patriotic duty to abandon the idea of allowing the Chamber to meet in Anadolu..." (Document 184.)

It might become very dangerous if we decided arbitrarily on this question of the meeting place and allow the nation and the deputies elected by them to carry out that decision. Therefore, I saw myself confronted with the inevitable necessity of most carefully and attentively studying the ideas and feelings of the people, of drawing my own conclusion from the actual desire of the nation and, then, of coming to a practical decision on the result.

I set to work to study the public opinion in different ways, by corresponding, as you already know, with the leading personalities in Istanbul.

It was also essential for me to know the standpoint of the Army, so

that I could feel sure that they would help me in carrying out my decision as to what was best to be done.

For this purpose, on the 29th October I ordered the commanders of the XVth, XXth, XIIth and IIIrd Army Corps to meet me at Sivas. I wrote to the officer commanding the Army Corps at Diyarbakir, to Cafer Tayyar Bey, commanding the Army Corps at Edirne, to Yusuf İzzet Paşa at Bursa, to Kâzım Paşa at Balıkesir, and to Bekir Sami Bey at Bursa telling them that it was not on account of the distance and their special position that I invited them, but that I wanted to keep them well informed about the decisions we had arrived at. (Documents 185, 186.)

Of all those whom I had invited, Selâhattin Bey, who was already at Sivas, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, who came from Erzurum, Ali Fuat Paşa from Ankara and Semsettin Bey, who represented the officer commanding the Army Corps at Konya and had personally to decide upon certain important matters concerning the front, met at Sivas. Those who attended the conference, which began on the 16th November, 1919, were members of the Representative Committee, some people who were not members but whose collaboration was useful to us, and the commanding officers I have mentioned.

The Agenda was confined to these three questions:

1. The place for the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies.
2. The position of the Representative Committee and the procedure of the national organisations after the Chamber had met.
3. What position would have to be taken by each of these after the Peace Conference in Paris had come to a decision, whether favourable or unfavourable to us.

Gentlemen, the answers to these questions which we had addressed to the general committees of our union may be divided into four groups, arranged according to the several points of view expressed in them.

According to the first, it was decided that it was advisable that the Chamber should not meet in İstanbul.

The second view was that the meeting should take place in İstanbul. The chief supporters of this opinion were the Committees of Erzurum, Trabzon, Balıkesir, and the whole of the districts of Karesi and Saruhan. We know that the most important personalities in İstanbul were nearly all

of this opinion. The Padişah himself desired it and the Government supported the idea.

The third point of view, which was represented by the Committee of the "Trakya - Paşaîî" Society, advocated some place in the neighbourhood of Istanbul.

Lastly, a certain number of the general Committees deferred to the personal view of Salih Paşa and saw no reason why Parliament should not meet outside Istanbul if the Government consented.

You will easily see from these differences of opinion pronounced by the nation to what extent the Government and their creatures had succeeded in producing confusion and anarchy in the public mind. On that account, it was not difficult to feel that stronger pressure on our part would lead to disaster.

I will now read you from the minutes the resolutions arrived at after a long discussion on this question, that took place between the 16th and 29th November, 1919.

1. Notwithstanding the doubts and dangers attending the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul and considering the fact that the Imperial Government had not yet consented to the meeting taking place elsewhere, it was agreed, in order that a crisis in the country should be avoided, that the meeting should take place in Istanbul. It was resolved, however, that care should be taken about the following:

- a) To inform all deputies about the situation and to ask them individually to express their opinion on it;
- b) Before going to Istanbul the deputies should meet in groups in such centres as Trabzon, Samsun, İnebolu, Eskisehir, Edirne — in case the Assembly meets in Istanbul — for the purpose of forming strong parties that would decide upon the steps to be taken to secure their protection in Istanbul as well as in places outside it, and that should be instructed to defend the principles laid down in our programme;
- c) Through the mediation of the commandants in the different districts and the principal recruiting offices, it would be the duty of all Corps commanders to make preparations without delay for the extension and reinforcement of our organisations.
- d) In anticipation of any promises being held out to them, inquiries should be instituted among all the high civil officials for the purpose of

ascertaining whether they will remain true and faithful to the national movement; their own personal energetic co-operation shall be solicited to strengthen and spread our organisations with all the means at their disposal.

2. The Representative Committee shall continue to perform their duty by keeping in the background until the National Assembly has met in Istanbul, when the deputies will be assured that they can exercise their legislative duties in perfect security and freedom. It is, however, requested that one representation shall be selected from the deputies for every Liva and two for every Vilayet and every autonomous Liva according to Art. 8 of the regulations, and will meet as members of the Representative Committee near Eskişehir. They will discuss the situation and settle what they will be called upon to do in the Assembly. To facilitate this, the Representative Committee will also be transferred to that place. When the Representative Committee will be consolidated in this way, the remaining deputies will join the Assembly in Istanbul. So long as the Representative Committee is holding office, the constitution and procedure of the national organisations shall be the same as is laid down in the regulations referred to.

When the Chamber of Deputies have felt assured that they are in complete security, the Representative Committee, by virtue of the full powers accorded to them by the regulations, shall convene the General Congress and shall, according to Art. 11 of these regulations, leave it to the Congress to settle the form and policy which the union shall adopt in future. The place and manner of the meeting of the Congress will then be governed by circumstances.

In the meantime, between the date of the Congress being convened and the actual meeting of it, the Representative Committee shall abstain from all official relations with the Government and the President of the Assembly, unless it should become absolutely necessary.

3. In the event of the Peace Conference in Paris deciding unfavourably towards us, and should such a decision be accepted and approved of by the Government and the Chamber, an effort shall be made to realise the aims clearly laid down and expressed in the regulations, by consulting the will of the nation in the speediest and most practicable manner.

Mustafa Kemal, Kâzım Karabekir, Hüseyin Rauf, Hüsrev, Ali Fuat, Mazhar Müfit, Rüstem, Ömer Mümtaz, Bekir Sami, İbrahim Süreyya, Hüseyin Selâhattin, Hakkı Behiç, Semsettin (C. C. S. XIIth Army Corps), Vâsif.

This is an accurate copy of the information and instructions which we transmitted to the deputies in terms of these resolutions.

Article 1

It is well known that Istanbul is occupied by the land forces and blockaded by the naval forces of the Allied Powers, in particular those of Great Britain; that the police and gendarmerie are in the hands of foreigners and have come under a mixed administration.

Moreover, it is confirmed that the Greeks have elected forty men as delegates in Istanbul; that they have organised secret police and revolutionary corps under the leadership of Greeks and officers who have come from Athens, and that they are ready to rise in revolt against the Government at a given moment.

We must recognise that, unfortunately, our Government in Istanbul has no freedom of action. On this account, there has been a great deal of discussion concerning the place of the meeting of the National Assembly. In the event of this meeting taking place in Istanbul, the dangers to which the deputies would be exposed would naturally give rise to a great deal of anxiety, particularly when the patriotic duty that lies before them is taken into consideration.

It is by no means improbable that the Allied Powers will cause the members of the Assembly to be arrested and banished if, in energetically defending the integrity of our territory and our political independence, they felt themselves called upon to criticise and object to the attitude of the representatives of those States that, in defiance of the law, disregarding the stipulations of the Armistice, and without thinking it necessary to wait until Peace has been signed, have occupied the most important territories in our country and have given the Christian elements an opportunity to infringe our own vital rights.

Following the example set by the English when the Moslem National Council met at Kars, it may be expected that the Christian elements, who have taken no part in the elections, the Societies of the "Friends of England" and the "Nigehban," which they have taken under their wing, will resort to all possible intrigues and horrors in adopting the cause of our enemies. Consequently, the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul would not be advantageous to the historic undertaking which is expected from them, and, being a symbol of the independence of the State and the

Nation, any attack directed against the Assembly would simultaneously be a blow aimed at our independence.

For this reason, Salih Pasa, Minister of Marine, who had been commissioned by the Cabinet to proceed to Amasya and enter into negotiations with the Representative Committee, having also recognised this truth, was morally convinced of the necessity of Parliament meeting in a safe place outside Istanbul, and he confirmed this view in writing and attached his signature to the document. If the Assembly were to be held at a place that is secure from foreign influence and afforded the necessary freedom from danger, all objection to Istanbul would be dispelled and the result would prove to the whole of the world — especially to the entire Mohamedan world — that the Caliphate and Sultanate are in a perilous position in Istanbul. If the Assembly should find that they were called upon to come to a firm decision on the question of our existence and our independence, they would be in a far better position to perform their patriotic duties, and the fact that the fate of the nation is resting solely in the hands of the Assembly would be clearly recognised by the Allied Powers.

Any objections that might exist to the meeting of the Chamber outside Istanbul could possibly be these:

The meeting under such conditions might be accepted as a sign that Istanbul would be abandoned, and malicious people would use this idea as a pretext for spreading poisonous propaganda.

Connection with the Chamber would not be so easy for the Government as it would be if it were sitting in Istanbul. But, to save His Majesty the inconvenience of changing his place of residence, the ceremony of opening Parliament would have to be performed by a commission appointed by him. On account of these objections, the present Government has not consented to the proposal that the Assembly should meet at some place outside Istanbul.

In default of the consent of the Government, the following objections must be added to those already existing:

As the convention of the National Assembly stipulates in legal terms that the opening of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate should take place simultaneously at the same place, the refusal of the Government to consent to the meeting of the Assembly at a place selected by them outside Istanbul, would result in neither the Senate nor the Government being

present at the opening and in His Imperial Majesty not allowing the Assembly to be opened in the proper manner provided by law.

In face of all these considerations there is legally no longer any possibility of convening Parliament outside Istanbul and, in spite of the objections that have been put forward, the meeting in that town is inevitable.

If the deputies were to decline to go to Istanbul and were to meet on their own account in some other town, their meeting held under such conditions would, naturally, not have the legislative character which must be possessed by the National Assembly. It would, perhaps, be a meeting representing the conscience, the aims and the independence of the nation. In these circumstances, it would be in the position to criticise and object to any decision that affected the fate of the nation, by relying, if necessary, on the support of the people themselves. In that case, the National Assembly would obviously be prevented from meeting in Istanbul.

This would mean that the Government would naturally offer resistance and take counter-measures, which would entail a rupture between the nation and the Government. If some only of the deputies were to go to Istanbul, the inconveniences we have indicated would be still greater.

The "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli," having carefully examined and studied all the above-mentioned possibilities, consider it their duty to inform all the deputies what would happen if they should find it necessary to meet in Istanbul, and to ask each one of them individually to express his opinion on the subject.

Moreover, we thought it necessary that the honourable deputies, before sitting in the National Assembly in Istanbul, should consider the advisability of meeting in some other town, and with that in view they should first meet at certain place so that they could study the following questions and communicate the result of their deliberations to the Representative Committee.

These questions were:

- A. If it were found unavoidably necessary to meet in Istanbul, what measures and dispositions would have to be taken in that town and throughout the country?
- B. The possibility to be studied for the formation of a united and determined party in the National Assembly to preserve and protect our aims, namely, to safeguard the integrity of the territory of our country and the independence of our State and Nation.

The towns most convenient for the meeting of the deputies who should discuss these questions are Trabzon, Samsun, İnebolu, Eskişehir, Bursa, Bandırma and Edirne.

Article 2

You are requested:

1. To transmit the contents of the first article to the deputy of your district.

As soon as possible to ask him for his personal views and to communicate them forthwith to the Representative Committee.

To bring them likewise to the knowledge of the General Committees, and secure their corresponding co-operation.

2. To assist and protect the meeting of the deputies in the localities mentioned in the first article, and to take the necessary steps to bring the result of their discussions to the knowledge of the Representative Committee.

It would be advisable to invite the deputies elected in their own electoral districts, who are at that time in Istanbul, to come to one of the above-mentioned meeting places near Istanbul.

I beg you to allow me to mention briefly certain events that took place in October, 1919.

The Mohamedan population of that part of the Vilayet of Izmir which was occupied by the enemy were the victims of oppression and criminal acts culminating in sanguinary deeds of violence. We urged the Government to do what was necessary with the representatives of the Allies to put an end to this condition. We told them that if the acts of violence and cruelty perpetrated by the Greeks were not stopped, we would be compelled to make reprisals. It was intended to hold a meeting of protest in Istanbul against these cruelties. When we heard that this public meeting had been prohibited, we drew the attention of Cemal Paşa to the matter.

Anzavur had begun to display his criminal and treacherous activity in the district of Bandırma.

We wrote to Kâzım Paşa, who was at Balıkesir, as well as to other interested persons, urging them energetically to put an end to all these degradations and at the same time to do everything they could to prevent a number of officers being landed in the district of Karabiga and Bandırma, for they were members of the "Nigehban" Society. We were also

informed that about thirty officers belonging to this society were preparing to land at Trabzon and Samsun with the object of starting a campaign against the Christians, and thereby bringing forth further interference and occupation by the foreigners.

We immediately drew the attention of the XVth Army Corps and the Mutasarrif of Canik to this fact.

You know that at the very beginning an English division had occupied Maras, Urfa and Antep. These troops were subsequently replaced by French. We tried on that occasion to prevent this new occupation by first taking diplomatic steps and later on, when it was an accomplished fact, by military operations.

A new and rather important revolt broke out at Bozkır. We tried in different ways to suppress it.

Kılıç Ali Bey was sent to Maras and Antep, while Kemal Bey, a Major in the Artillery, and Captain Osman Tufan Bey were sent to the district of Cilicia to collect sufficient troops there and enter into action.

I now recall an important fact that I would like to mention.

After the Sivas Congress was over, the Representative Committee took it upon itself, after the regulations and manifestos of the Congress had been drawn up, to bring out secret instructions, marked "Private and Confidential," for the armed national organisations, under the title "An Appendix to the Regulations of the Union for the Defence of the Rights." According to this appendix, Army Corps and Divisions were to be formed in the districts that were in contact with the enemy. (Document 188.)

On the 2nd November, Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, informed me in a telegram in cipher that "a new rumour has been added to those whose number is already considerable, to the effect that Ziya Paşa's non-arrival at Ankara could not be accounted for in any other way than that the authority of the Government we supported is diminishing, and that therefore the Government were persisting in their attitude and were urgently awaiting a reply."

The Government had thought it advisable not to consider the request we had sent to them (not to send Ziya Paşa) in a favourable light.

They confirmed the appointment of that official and insisted that he should take up his duties. But Ziya Paşa had not proceeded farther than Eskişehir when he returned and went on leave.

In the same telegram Cemal Paşa continued:

"The Government regard the terms of the manifesto issued to the Press referring to the incident at Bozkır as a breach of the understanding that existed between us."

But we had never published a manifesto of this description.

My answer to Cemal Paşa was:

In cipher. Urgent.

Sivas, 3rd November, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War

Reply to your telegram in cipher of 2nd November. No. 501.

1. We have adopted the principle of loyal understanding and real unity in our communications between the Government and the national organisation. Through the mediation of Your Excellency we had expressed a very important desire with the object of protecting the national organisations, whose aim is lawful, from any vexatious interference. We demanded that all the higher officials should be elected on these terms and that those who opposed them should be dismissed and replaced by others.

We have received no reply to our repeated requests regarding this. We do not yet know what has been done about the Valis of Trabzon and Dyiarkakir, and the Mutasarrif of Antalya. On the contrary, without studying the circumstances, the Minister of the Interior has sent Suphi Bey, who is as weak as he is inefficient and who is a member of the Society of the "Friends of England," as Vali to Konya.

The Minister of the Interior has totally ignored questions of this description. This leads us to think that he is following a policy that is antagonistic to the national movement. If we are mistaken, we beg you to point out to us where we are in error, so that we may set the matter right in our minds. I had written to tell you that Ziya Paşa, the Vali of Ankara, had been granted leave at his own request; of course, he is still officially regarded as Vali of Ankara; but until all doubt on this point has been dispelled, the extension of this Vali's leave may be considered as the most satisfactory solution that could be found.

If a man like Nurettin Bey were to remain in his office as Director of Police in İstanbul, it would suggest that Your Excellency is not inclined to see the importance of this question. Your indifference would have a very bad consequence for the Government, as well as for the national organisa-

tion. You will undoubtedly find it quite excusable that the Representative Committee cannot tolerate the slightest thing that could be injurious to the national organisation and the national unity.

2. No communication of any kind has been issued to the Press by the Representative Committee referring to the incident at Bozkır. There must be some misunderstanding about this. Possibly the information has been extracted from something that was published in the newspaper called "The National Will." Your Excellency surely knows that the Representative Committee has not thought it to be their duty to exercise a censorship over any newspaper. We beg you, however, to give us some information about this agency that appears to you to have led to a misunderstanding with the Government, so that we can draw the attention of the persons concerned to it.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the
Representative Committee.

The reply of Cemal Pasa, who pretended to be an agent of the Representative Committee and a partisan of the national movement, was as follows:

Ministry of War, 4th November, 1919.

To the Command of the IIIrd Corps at Sivas,
To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

The present Government, as stated in their official manifesto, having taken upon themselves the heavy responsibility of power under the present conditions with the sole intention of serving the country, and being devoted to this duty with the fullest loyalty and impartiality, consider it to be urgently necessary to give you information on the following points:

1. The non-Moslem elements have not voted at the elections; the different political parties also show a reserved and waiting attitude. The various political parties justify their reserve by saying that there are two governments in the country and that the elections were not conducted with the necessary impartiality. In addition, it is very probable that the Christian elements will put forward the same claim themselves as a reason for not having voted. The complaints and grievances about irregularities occurring during the elections are accumulating and find an echo in foreign circles and newspapers.

If the Chamber of Deputies is not representative of the different parties and, especially, if it should be formed under pressure from the national forces, it is unnecessary to say what the world will think about it. For this reason it is imperatively necessary to avoid any kind of pressure during the elections.

2. Based on numerous doubts of a home and foreign description to which the meeting of the deputies at any other place than the Metropolis would give rise, it is of vital interest to the country that the Assembly should meet in Istanbul.

3. From news which is constantly reaching us, it becomes evident that certain people in the provinces, appearing on behalf of the national organisations, interfere in the affairs of the Government. It is necessary and of the greatest importance that an end should promptly be put to this interference.

The Government insist on these three demands, otherwise it is impossible for them to carry on the administration of the country.

Cemal
Minister of War

I will give you the literal wording of my reply to this telegram, in which I observed in a note at the beginning that it was to be deciphered by Salih Bey, the senior A. D. C.

In cipher.

Sivas, 5th November, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

Reply to your telegram of 4th November, 1919.

1. The abstention from the elections of the non-Moslem elements of certain political parties that are doing even more harm to the country must be attributed to motives which they themselves prominently display with intention.

Is it not well known that the Christian elements declared that they would not vote at the elections, even long before the national organisation existed and before its name was ever mentioned?

As for the political parties that make such a fuss, everything they say is deliberately false, because, as a matter of fact, they have voted everywhere at the elections. But as these parties have no more than five or ten followers, the nation has no confidence whatever in them, and as the nation is de-

terminated this time to elect deputies from its own sons and not from the candidates in Istanbul, the parties in question are only upset because they know that they have not the faintest chance of succeeding. What can we do about it? We are astonished at the undecidedness of the Cabinet. Where is the pressure that you speak of excercised? by whom? under what circumstances?

You must be good enough to give us precise facts on these points, so that the Representative Committee will be in the position to do their duty

No importance need be attached to these fairy tales, nor need they cause you the slightest anxiety.

2. Time will show whether the Government have been right or wrong in their views concerning the convention. We have told you that we will inform you of our conclusions on this question after we have received replies from our committees.

3. Before we can do what is necessary, we must be informed where and by whom there has been any interference in the affairs of the Government by any person acting in the name of the national organisations. But we think we ought to call Your Excellency's attention to certain acts of the Minister of the Interior which are calculated to create suspicion.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the
Representative Committee.

The Minister of the Interior decided to send several Commissions into the country. One of them, with Ahmet Fevzi Paşa, the former Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of War, at the head of it, consisted of İlhami Bey, member of the Court of Appeal, and Hasan Efendi, the Fetva Emini.

Cemal Paşa, the delegate of our Representative Committee, had told us nothing at all about this. We asked him on the 5th November to tell us what would be the duties of this Commission and what was the purpose of its dispatch. We added that "we were totally unable to find any reason why the Fetva Emini and another man who had been Director of Police in Kâmil Paşa's Cabinet were appointed members of this Commission." (Document 189.)

The reasons that had necessitated Fuat Paşa's remaining at the head of his Army Corps at Ankara gradually became apparent. The chief reason

was that they had begun in the interior of the country to poison the minds of the people.

The intrigues of our enemies at home and abroad, who were in connection with one another, began to produce results which they considered satisfactory under the Cabinet of Ali Rıza Paşa, as they had done under that of his predecessor Ferit Paşa.

Kâzım Paşa tried to build up a front in the district of Balıkesir and to make himself master of the situation. On the Salihli and Aydin fronts it was important to restore the prestige and administration of the troops, from the military standpoint, and to send an officer for this purpose who was more or less known in these places. We had only Refet Paşa at our disposal and he was at Konya. Fahrettin Bey (now Fahrettin Paşa, holding the rank of Inspector in the Army) had taken over the command of the Army Corps at Konya. Consequently, Refet Paşa was ordered to leave for the front and take up the command of the national troops at Aydin. We ordered Ali Fuat Paşa to return to Ankara.

When we heard that Refet Paşa had arrived at Nazilli, I asked Cevat Paşa, who was Chief of the General Staff, to send four or five officers on his Staff who had gained experience in the war to Refet Paşa, whom I also informed that I had ordered this to be done.

When Refet Paşa arrived at Nazilli, he did not consider it necessary to take over the command from Demirci Efe; whether it was that he really thought it was not necessary or that he was prevented from doing so, I do not know. The fact remains that he preferred to continue his duties on the Staff under Demirci Efe's command... Refet Paşa reported the position to us. It is often very difficult to contest and refute the opinion of somebody who has been forced to come to a decision after considering all the evidence that he has gathered on the spot itself. In this case, either it was really advantageous to leave Efe in command and be satisfied to work side by side with an officer of equal rank, as Refet Paşa preferred to do, or for some other unexplained reason it was impossible to take over the actual command on this front.

Whichever it was, it would have been of no use at all if he had taken over the command.

But the strangeness of his behaviour, especially later on, became still more evident. Some time afterwards Refet Paşa actually disappeared from Nazilli, and it was only after he had asked whether he could get into communication with some foreign officers that we heard of his being at Balıkesir.

On the 22nd December, 1919, we replied to him that "we did not desire that persons who were in touch with the national organisations, and particularly one who was a member of the Representative Committee, should enter into communication in any way whatever with these foreigners."

Following that, Refet Paşa again disappeared. One day we received a short telegram from Bursa, signed Refet, which ran as follows: "Have arrived at Bursa from İstanbul."

I could not understand what that telegram meant. What on earth had the Paşa to do in İstanbul? Since when had the way Nazilli — Balıkesir led via İstanbul? I could not solve the problem. At last, we heard what had happened.

After Refet Paşa left Nazilli and had met Kâzım Paşa at Balıkesir, he had arrived at Bandırma and had gone from there to İstanbul on board a French torpedo-boat. He had interviews there with some of his friends and then returned to Bursa.

Gentlemen, even to-day I can throw no light on this dark incident. I am sorry I am unable to do so. From what I have said before, you know that at one time Refet Bey had been succeeded by Selâhattin Bey, who had arrived at Samsun on an English ship and who had brought him an invitation to go to İstanbul. At that time he had preferred to resign so that he could return there, and meanwhile the Government in İstanbul had issued an order that he was to be arrested, and myself at the same time, and that we were to be sent to İstanbul.

Those who understand anything about algebra will conceive it to be unpardonable that an unknown quantity should not be found when there were so many large known quantities available. Nevertheless, I must confess my own incapability to do this.

It is true that Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet had replaced Ferit Paşa's. But we all know that the means at hand of the new Cabinet were identically the same for detecting and punishing errors.

Refet Paşa's weak and remarkable behaviour was responsible for the fact that no serious dispositions for defence could be established at the Aydin and Salihli fronts until a regular army had been formed.

Let us now return to the narrative of events from the place where we left off.

Cemal Paşa had not been able to grasp the meaning of a certain sentence in our telegram of the 5th November, 1919, and asked us in a

telegram sent from the Head Office of the Sublime Porte to give him an explanation. He said:

"We cannot understand what you mean by: 'We think that we ought to draw your attention to certain acts of the Minister of the Interior which are calculated to create suspicion'. We request you to give us a full detailed explanation of this sentence without delay." (Document 190.)

We answered this short request in a rather exhaustive telegram, which I shall quote literally, although I am afraid I shall tax your patience by doing so.

In cipher.

Sivas 12th November, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa

Reply to telegram of 8th November, No 8084.

Some of the actions and indications of the Minister of the Interior which are calculated to create suspicion and which we recollect at this moment are:

1. The most important civil officials of some of the vilayets, amongst them those of Ankara, have been ordered to come to the telegraph instrument for the purpose of being interrogated in a threatening manner regarding an inquiry which was to be held concerning certain acts directed against Ferit Paşa's Cabinet during the course of the national movement, the reasons that gave rise to the accusations and their relation to the law.
2. In a telegram in cipher, as though it was a very mysterious affair, the Vilayet of Sivas had been asked what had caused the death of the Mutasarrif of Tokat, who had died in a natural way from an attack of typhoid fever, from which he had been suffering for a long time.
3. During the confidential conversation which the Minister of the Interior, accompanied by the Minister of Justice, had had with the national delegation that came from the Balikesir front, it was reported that the Minister of Justice (in the presence of the members of this delegation) had asked whether there was any possible way for proceedings to be taken against the leaders of the national movement!
4. Even at the present day the Minister retains Keşfi Bey, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior, in his office, in spite of the fact that he was the evil genius and confidant in all the acts and machinations of Adil Bey the former Minister, whose treason has been exposed by material proof, while his chief care as a true patriot when he took office

should have been to dismiss him. On the advice of this same official, the Minister is still transferring other officials in his Department.

You will find it quite natural that officials appointed by such a chief do not exactly enjoy the confidence of the nation. Ali Ulvi Bey, the former Mutasarrif of Kayseri for instance, who adopted an unfriendly attitude towards the national movement from the very beginning, and who, after having been suspended from his duties by the people, escaped arrest and banishment solely on account of his illness, notwithstanding his notorious inefficiency and inexperience in administration, was given an appointment at Burdur. Ethem Bey, also, who had been sent back to Istanbul, because of his incapacity and the impossibility of allowing him to remain in the Sancak of Canik, has been appointed to Menteşe.

Moreover, Cavit Bey, the former Mutasarrif of Niğde who had recently been brought to Sivas, has been appointed Mutasarrif of Aydin and, lastly, the Mutasarrif of Antalya one of Cemal Bey's creatures, the traitor who was formerly Vali of Konya still remains at his post, in spite of the repeated applications and remonstrance of the people.

5. The management of the Employment Department, equally as important as that of any other, has been given to an Armenian.

6. No alteration has been made in the Directorate of the Press and the Agency service.

7. It is well known that the unity of the nation is the only power by which the fate of the nation can be secured, and it is the national organisation alone that can maintain this unity.

Those who are endeavouring to compromise the sacred cause of upholding this unity and this organisation — a cause whose aim is the safeguarding of the country from disintegration and partition, and the security of the independence of the State and Nation — are the malicious politicians who are the agitators in Istanbul.

They can only be rendered innocuous by stern and efficacious measures being taken against them. The only way to bring about this result is to confide the Direction of the Police to a man who shall be selected from among honourable, patriotic and competent persons who have the courage to act on their own initiative. Your Excellency is well aware, however, that the present Director of Police is the chief support and a strong partisan of the old Cabinet, which is accused of treason, and of their creatures. As can be seen, on the other hand, from the letters written by Sait Molla to Mr. Frew,

the English clergyman, the official in question is a supporter and a refuge of the opposition, that is to say, of the enemies of the nation. His Excellency Salih Paşa also acknowledged this fact at Amasya. In other words, this means that the Minister of the Interior not only has no scruples about confiding the destiny of the country and the nation to the hands of such a man, but he may even think that there is an advantage in doing so.

As for Kemal Paşa the Commander of the Gendarmerie, considering beyond all doubt that he is as dangerous to the national movement as he is to yourself, can it be believed that his retention at his post is due to the good will of the Minister of the Interior?

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the
Representative Committee.

The telegram from the Minister of War, dated 9th November, 1919, is also very interesting. In this telegram Cemal Paşa expresses the ideas of the Cabinet by emphasising these points:

1. The elections must take place in a lawful and proper manner.
2. The Chamber of Deputies shall meet in Istanbul.
3. The communications sent to you hitherto by the Government, to the effect that you are prohibited from interfering in the affairs of the State on behalf of the national organisation, are hereby officially confirmed.
4. It is clearly evident that the demands expressed by you in a number of your telegrams have given the impression that you are assuming authority.
5. The Government have no intention of abandoning the neutrality announced in their manifesto, and, therefore, cannot exercise any pressure on persons whose opinions differ from those held by the national organisation, nor can they punish them.

This telegram concluded with the following threat:

"If the present situation continues for a moment longer, the Ministerial Council will certainly resign." (Document 191.)

These statements revealed the true state of affairs. The Cabinet did not care to admit that among those who held convictions that were antagonistic to the national organisation were the enemies of the country and the nation; they made 'no distinction between the national organisation and

those traitorous organisations that had been formed by our enemies — between Ali Kemal or Sait Molla and ourselves. The incidents at Adapazari, at Karacabey, at Bozkır and Anzavur were not regarded by them as crimes.

After having emphasised these points in our reply to Cemal Paşa, we added a few words that we thought would have the effect of drawing out the Government's intentions:

"Judging from what you say, the Imperial Government considers the national organisation as unnecessary. If this is so and if you are strong enough to save the country without any support from the national organisation, we asked you to say so frankly, and then we can do all that is necessary to put matters straight between us." (Document 192.)

It was only on the 28th November, 1919, that is to say, eighteen days after he sent it off, that I received the letter which Cemal Paşa had specially sent to me at Sivas on the 10th November, in which he had returned to all the questions upon which we had been corresponding, summarising them and commenting on them.

Speaking, among other things, about the deputies meeting elsewhere than in Istanbul, he wrote:

"It is evident that the Padişah will refuse to give his consent to the Assembly meeting in those circumstances. The Americans have hinted — have even expressly stated — that attacks on the Chamber of Deputies by the Allied troops might be to the advantage of the Empire, but they did not believe that this would be at all possible." Then he told us, as though we did not know it already, that "the fat-heads among the officials who are not inspired by the spirit and sentiments that guide the national movement, put their trust in the armies of the occupation;" and he added that "the majority of the members of the former Cabinet are included in this category." To illustrate this contention by a typical example, he quoted the instance when the Director of Police, who was clearly included, was superseded.

And after administering a reproof that was intended for us, he said: "The Cabinet have planned to do a great deal, but they cannot depend upon the strength of the forces on which they rely and hesitate to act boldly." He continued: "And I am not exaggerating when I say that the Minister of the Interior is the first to speak of relying on these forces, namely, the nation."

Cemal Paşa, after having signed this letter, added a postscript (also signed), of which I will quote a few words:

"The opposition and the foreigners are determined to prevent the Chamber being opened. If the Representative Committee perseveres in its opposition by continuing to make difficulties about the place of its meeting, all that we can do is to trust in God." (Document 193.)

Comment on the logic, the judgment and the truth of the views expressed in this letter, as well as his remarks in general, is quite superfluous.

I shall confine myself to quoting a paragraph of the lengthy reply to this letter that we sent on the 28th November. It ran thus:

"We cannot treat arguments seriously which, from your point of view, would result in shaking confidence in the strength on which the Imperial Government leans for support in such an important crisis."

Damat Şerif Paşa, Minister of the Interior, did other things to destroy national unity and drive the nation into a state of passive resistance against the culpable efforts that were still being made and which were multiplying. We observed that he induced other Departments to adopt similar tactics.

Here is an example:

There was a Kadi at Eskişehir, named Hamdi Efendi. As he could not remain there on account of his opposition to the national forces, he went to Istanbul without any intention of returning. This Kadi was now sent back to Eskişehir and was reinstated by the new Cabinet. The Mutasarrif appealed to the Minister of Justice and demanded his recall; he received no reply to his appeal. The Mutasarrif and the officer commanding the zone of Eskişehir sent us a report on this state of affairs, and added: "If the Ministry continues to ignore our request, we shall feel ourselves obliged to remove this person. Please be good enough to let us know what we are to do."

We replied: "If you are unable to convince the Imperial Government — who have promised to conform to the national aspirations and who in accordance with this promise enjoy the complete support of the national organisation — of the necessity for the removal of this Kadi, it is evident that the only thing left for you to do will be to turn him out."

The number of officials appointed in Istanbul and sent back, like this Kadi, was naturally very considerable.

The first paragraph of a telegram, dated 24th November, 1919, in which Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, explained to us the viewpoint of the Cabinet on questions of this kind, stated that, "the internal and external

affairs of the State do not permit of any outside interference." (Document 194.)

We sent a detailed answer on the 27th November;

"Although we recognise, in principle, that the leadership of the home and diplomatic affairs of the State does not permit any interference from without, it is, under the abnormal conditions in which we are now living, very natural and legitimate that the nation cannot allow any event or act that could injure national unity to weaken (consciously or unconsciously) the national organisations, whose duty is to safeguard the destiny of the country and the nation." And the telegram ended with these words: "The Representative Committee has remained faithful to the obligations it has pledged itself to fulfil . . . but provided, nevertheless, that those obligations will be mutual . . . The Government have hitherto failed to fulfil any of the obligations drawn up and signed by Salih Paşa, and if reasons that they could not control have hindered them from doing so, they have kept us in ignorance of them." (Document 195.)

You will see clearly, from the evidence I will now lay before you, what little justification Ali Riza's Cabinet had to criticize us, and how careless they were in the choice of the expressions they used.

In Istanbul, the secret unions and some of their leaders were all relying on foreigners. This is likewise shown in the letter from Cemal Paşa, Minister of War. Thanks to the extensive support from, and the supineness and absolute indifference of Ali Riza's Cabinet, they worked energetically and unceasingly to plunge the country, from one end to the other, into blood and flames.

However, we had not left the Cabinet in the dark regarding the news and documents that were in our possession. A number of documents which our organisations had succeeded in obtaining in Istanbul were handed over in their original condition to Cemal Paşa and the Grand Vezir.

As these documents had already been brought to the notice of the foreign representatives and, consequently, were known to most of the Entente Powers, and as extracts were also sent to all of the military commanders and all others concerned, I do not see why I should hesitate to bring them to your knowledge and to that of the nation, now that this incident is a matter of history.

I think that I ought to read these documents to you verbatim, so that they will give you a clear idea of the difficulties, visible and invisible, to which we were exposed during the course of the national struggle. They will also serve as an education and an example to coming generations.

These documents are copies of the letters that Sait Molla, known as the chairman of the "League of the Friends of England", wrote to Mr. Frew, the reverend gentleman who was an English clergyman.

The authenticity of these documents is unquestioned, although Sait Molla, when he heard that copies had been made of this correspondence, tried to contest their genuineness in a long and violent *démenti*, which was published in the Turkish edition of the "İstanbul" on the 8th November, 1919. The copies of these letters were made inside Molla's own house and were taken down word for word in a note book.

But apart from this, the contents of these letters agree in their minutest details with the events as they happened at that time, as well as with the doings of the persons they refer to — as has been borne out in another quarter.

With your permission, I shall now proceed to read these letters, which are arranged according to their dates.

Dear Friend, .

11th October, 1919.

I have sent the T.L. 2,000 that I have received to Hikmet Bey at Ada-pazari. Our affairs there are going on very well. You will see the good results in a few days.

I hasten to send you the following information which I have received. I shall give you further details to-morrow morning when I see you. Our agent 285/3 tells us in a letter he sent by a special courier from Ankara that the national troops show an inclination towards France and that the officers sent by General Franchet d'Esperey to Sivas, after having had a conversation with Mustafa Kemal Paşa, are taking certain steps against the English Government.

Although D. B. Q. 91/3 is a member of our league, I am convinced that he is spying for France, and he tells everyone that you are the president of our society. In spite of your favourable opinion of him and the confidence you put in him, what I tell you in this particular case will show how mistaken you have been in believing all this time in this man.

Yesterday I called on His Highness Damat Ferit Paşa and Adil Bey. I told them on your behalf that we must have a little more patience yet. His Highness thanks you and declares that the national forces have taken root throughout Anadolu, that he, being unable to come into the Government until the confounded leaders of this movement are knocked down

by a counter-stroke, does not see any possibility of upholding the terms of the agreement concerning the Peace Conference which had been approved of by His Imperial Majesty. He urgently recommends that something else should be done by His Britannic Majesty's Government to disperse the national troops and that a Joint Note should be presented to the Sublime Porte before the elections for the Chamber take place. He also urges that greater energy should be employed in carrying out our aim, by stirring up bands to commit acts of violence and extortion against the Greeks at Adapazari, Karacabey and Sile, which will all be attributed to the national troops, who will then be accused of disturbing public order; also to provoke a campaign in the English Press against these troops, and to give instructions by wireless concerning the questions which we discussed yesterday with E. B. K. 19/2, who had been sent expressly in a torpedo-boat.

To-night, at eleven o'clock, Adil Bey will see you personally at K. and will tell you certain personal requests made by Ferit Paşa. Afterwards His Majesty will be able to talk to Mr. T. R. Do not trust Refik Bey any longer. Sadik Bey will also be able to work in company with us. With the expression of my esteem,

Sait.

P.S. We have not received any news yet from Karacabey and Bozkır

Second Letter

18th October, 1919.-

From a letter that N.B.D. 285/3 sent on the 12th from Ankara, it can be seen that Vasif Bey, a retired colonel on the General Staff and a member of the Representative Committee at Sivas, will be sent to get into touch with d'Esperey and that he will leave in a few days.

Hikmet Bey has received the money. He is asking for some more.

When I saw you the other day I forgot to tell you that I am being followed. When I came back after seeing you, I noticed two men who were waiting for me at the corner of the street; one had a fair moustache and the other was of dark complexion and had no moustache. As it was night, I felt rather anxious. I heard them say in a whisper: "This is Sait Molla. We can go away now." I feel that these frequent meetings will be dangerous for me. We shall be able to see more of one another when you are living in Fuat Paşa's house in the neighbourhood of the tomb we have spoken about. Nazım Paşa has heard about our organisation; he was apparently very angry that he had not been told about it before. Assuming that you

will agree, I have registered him under section N.B.S. 495/1. Until the question of a house has been arranged he will keep in touch with me.

The T.L. 1,200 that was sent to N.B.D. 298/3 at Karacabey has been received. He will go. Ferit Paşa is waiting impatiently for the Note to be given to the Sublime Porte.

His Imperial Majesty is very unhappy about the present state of affairs. It will be to our advantage if you can send him consolation and encouragement in an indirect way.

Do not forget that our Sovereign is showing weakness about everything.

Sait Abdülkadir Efendi has given very strange accounts about the affair in question. His colleagues seem to say that this is not compatible with his patriotism.

It rests with you to do what is necessary. The rumour has been circulated that Nurettin Bey, Director of Police, has been dismissed. Will you draw the attention of the authorities to this man, who is a protector of all of us. I send you my esteem,

Sait.

P.S. Ali Kemal Bey has been talking to this person and was clumsy in saying what he wanted, for I am told that the man he was talking to easily saw through him and answered disdainfully: "We can see that you are working for the English."

Third Letter

19th October, 1919.

The party belonging to Esat Paşa, the oculist, and in particular Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa, have your propaganda continually denied by referring to official documents and try to allay the excitement of the people. I beg you to let the person we were talking about yesterday be ordered by His Majesty not to take any notice of the people who appeal to him.

Sait.

Fourth Letter

Dear Sir,

19th October, 1919.

The Freemasons encounter opposition and find mixed opinions among their friends. They do not want to follow the example of the Unionists. We

shall carry our programme through by allowing young men who are convinced of our ideas to join this organisation.

As my dress prevents me from personally intervening, your old friend K.B.V. 4/35 will act on our suggestions. There is no news yet from Ankara and Kayseri.

I send you, dear Sir, my esteem,

S.

Fifth Letter

Dear Master,

21st October, 1919.

Kasideci Zade Ziya Molla yesterday told Adam Block, an old friend of his, that he thinks he ought to warn him that he considers it incompatible with English dignity and English policy to afford protection to the members of the "League of the Friends of England," who are under my presidency, that this would have an unpleasant effect on public opinion and, further, that this union should be represented by men of honour.

I would like to remind you that Ziya Molla is personally very irritated with me. His son-in-law's sister was formerly my wife; I incurred the animosity of the family when I sent her back to them. Please bring this to the knowledge of His Excellency Adam Block; and I would like to take this opportunity to tell you that this Molla is not a friend of England at the present time, for he is acting as an agent of the national movement and is still in touch with Kemal Paşa. His calumnies about me show his true character.

S.

P.S. If you have no objection, I would ask you to let His Excellency Adam Block know all about what I am doing for you.

Sixth Letter

Honourable Sir,

23rd October, 1919.

It is reported in the letter of the 20th October, which was sent by courier from N.B.D. 295/3, that he has left for Kayseri in accordance with our instructions and that he has left K.D.S. 93/1 at Ankara; he has sent a literal copy of the instructions to Galip Bey. As the funds supplied to him have come to an end, he asks for more. He learns that the secret organisations are extending the field of their activity and that our friends who

have escaped from the clutches of the rebel leaders are beginning to work in secret by remaining in the villages for the present. He adds that the steps taken recently at your instigation will soon bear fruit. M.K.B., who speaks very pure Turkish, would like to take a more important part; he would be an efficient substitute for Hoca.

The preparation of the instructions X. VV. is completed. If no newcomers have sneaked into our ranks, our plan will be carried out before it is discovered.

I have kept the courier 4. R. here because I am waiting for the funds to arrive.

S.

P.S. At the end of the little work, I have appended what Ahmet Riza Bey has said about the Italian mandate. It would be a dangerous thing for us if he went to France. Perhaps you can prevent it.

Seventh Letter

Sir,

24th October, 1919.

Ali Kemal Bey spoke to this person yesterday. He is said to consider that we ought to proceed slowly with the Press. It is not an easy thing for us to lead intellectual people and journalists into another path which goes in an opposite direction from the one they had previously chosen. In his opinion, all the officials are supposed at the present moment to be in sympathy with the national movement.

Ali Kemal Bey will implicitly follow your instructions. He is also trying to secure for himself the co-operation of the Zeynelabidin Party. In summary, the state of confusion will be aggravated.

It seems that a great deal has been said about me in French and American quarters for several days past. I have not been able yet to find out what it is all about.

On account of the influence which the followers of the national movement have on the politicians of the present Government, my life is in your hands. This gives me confidence.

I have had a private conversation with Hikmet. This time I found him rather undecided. Nevertheless, he gave me strong assurances. "I am a loyal man," he told me; "I always keep my word." What do you think

about the incident at Sivas? Our preparations are rather backward but they will gradually improve.

The "man of Kadıköy" is busy about this. But the confounded unionist Press sometimes harasses us. Their publications must be watched. Our Paşa is still nervous: "When is it going to happen?" he asks.

Communication between us is very difficult now, because you have not settled the question of the house. N.B.S. 495/1 advises you to watch what is going on at Konya. He asks me to call your attention to the matter he explained verbally to you. I told him that you were sorry about Ali Kemal Bey's last mishap. We must get hold of this person. Do not miss this opportunity. It is the very time to make him a present.

I am sorry that you did not receive my letter of the 19th October. Please caution the agent. It is most important to avoid all danger. Send me a new password. I shall give their numbers of membership to Hikmet and the man of Kadıköy.

I am yours, with the greatest esteem,

S.

P.S. I always forget to tell you something I have wanted to tell you for a long time. So that we can get Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his followers to come here in perfect confidence, we must pretend that we have some sympathy with them. I would like you to think seriously about this. We cannot champion his cause in our own Press.

Eighth Letter

Dear Sir,

26th October, 1919.

According to your instructions, I had a long conversation with Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Hamdi Efendi and Vasfi Efendi about postponing the elections and watching them. They have agreed to do this. Propaganda has begun in various quarters. They will try to win over all those who can be of use to us. Spend money to split up the votes. His Majesty will be informed about this. I feel quite sure that through your clear-sighted efforts we shall succeed.

S.

Ninth Letter

27th October, 1919.

The courier 9. R. has arrived. The Keskin organisation has been

completed. I have given the necessary instructions about propaganda to our comrades. I am convinced that very soon indeed we shall reap our first successes.

S.

Tenth Letter

Dear Sir,

29th October, 1919.

There are rumours at Court that in all probability a new Cabinet will be formed. This must be hastened. Certain operation of our Anadolu organisation have been discovered by the national troops. A movement against us has been set on foot, chiefly at Ankara and Kayseri. In spite of their assurances, the Kurdish Society has not succeeded in doing anything at all. Some of our bands have dispersed.

At any cost and without fail we must bring the Cabinet we propose to power.

I expect Ali Riza Paşa to take steps to hinder our plans. Those whom we have chosen to go to Bozkır seem rather afraid to go because they are very well known there.

I must point out to you how important it is for you to use your influence to get K.B. 81/1 at Konya to make the most of the incident, and to urge our propaganda section to redouble their efforts in this direction.

S.

P.S. Somebody has been talking to Hikmet about one of my letters. How have the contents of it been discovered? I have spoken personally to Hikmet about it, and to my great astonishment he has told me that this indiscretion has actually taken place. Is the spy in your camp or mine?

Eleventh Letter

Dear Sir,

4th November, 1919.

I have been speaking to our confidential friends in the League about the revolt of the Kurds. They told me that, having arrived only quite recently, they would obey the instructions that had been given to them soon after their arrival and that they were in need of rather considerable sums of money to send to their various colleagues in Kurdistan. They showed me the letter from D.B.R. 3/141. He speaks of great agitation that is said to have taken place at Urfa, Antep and Maraş against the

French and against their efforts to influence the people to oppose the policy of reconciliation that is being followed by the officer commanding the Army Corps.

I do not think that it was justifiable to prevent Zeki Paşa from being appointed president of the Ministerial Council. He exercises authority and influence with the Kurds. The Armenian massacres of by-gone days have been forgotten. In any case, your observations are premature. If need be, the matter can be skillfully adjusted. We expect you to help us at any moment. We are trying to draw the others into this affair.

With my best respects,

S.

Twelfth Letter

Dear Sir,

5th November, 1919.

The statements made by Ahmet Rıza Bey to the correspondent of "Le Temps" must naturally have aroused your attention. The political finesse shown in the advice he gave to Emir Faysal, namely, to come to an understanding with the French, cannot have escaped your keen observation. The leaders of the national troops have for a considerable time shown a remarkable bias towards France and, simultaneously provoking unrest in the Irak, they intend in the same way to assail your sovereignty in Syria. Any indifference or negligence respecting such action would lead to an extraordinary outburst of popular feeling against England throughout the Mohamedan world. Special attention should be given to noting the most important point and drawing the attention of your statesmen to it. I beg you not to imagine for a moment that I am underestimating your ability in what I say, but we hold that it would do a great deal of harm and would be contrary to our political ideals if any other Power or political influence than your own should prevail in Turkey.

The various kinds of sympathy which certain statesmen, and the Press of France, Italy and, especially, the United States, evince towards the national forces is palpable proof of the jealousy they have of your political and military power.

Be assured that men like Ahmet Rıza, who from former times are still enjoying the most intimate friendship of men like Clemenceau, Pichon and other politicians, will play a very important rôle in France and will succeed in winning public opinion there to a very great extent.

Respecting the news of Ahmet Riza's coming journey to Switzerland, you may be sure that he is determined to go from there to France.

Our bands that were scattered and routed in the district of Balikesir have taken refuge at A.R. We shall form new ones. We shall still require at least T.L. 5,000.

It can be seen from a letter from D.B.S. 40/5 of Karaman that they must content themselves for the present with assuming a waiting attitude. According to another letter from Kayseri from K.B.R. 87/4, we learn that they will begin operations immediately.

Ziya Efendi says that now that everything is ready at his post H.K. and C.H., nothing is left for him to do but take relief funds there. If you wish, he will tell you personally all particulars about the situation.

I must point out to you that we are being watched in an extraordinary way and that Sivas is regularly kept well informed about all we are doing.

Do not put any confidence in Mehmet Ali; he is not careful enough. He is always making mistakes. It would be advisable if you did not make use of anyone but myself for anything of an outside nature. Ali Kemal Bey must, at any cost, be put down on our list. If we estrange this man, who knows so many of our secrets, our enemies will immediately know everything that we are doing. Treat this man with gentleness and soothe him from time to time.

With the expression of my esteem,

S.

P.S. It is rumoured that Kemal has been arrested. As he belongs to our organisation, all about our relations with K.B.R. 15/1 might be discovered. This man must be protected.

Gentlemen, we did everything with all the means at our disposal to counteract these extensive intrigues, to nullify the dangers, and to disentangle the situation which had been created. We made violent efforts to suppress the notorious risings and revolts by repelling the attack of official hostile troops, as I have told you already or as I shall try directly to recall to your memory.

Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet would not have lent us any support at all if they had not been aiming at the destruction of the national forces, which opposition they could not tolerate; in trying to do this they continually quarrelled with us. Their worthy colleagues who succeeded them in the Government

simply followed their example, which led them from one scandal to another and from one disaster to another.

Concluding that all these secret and revolutionary organisations emanated from the skull of Mr. Frew, and that poison was flowing from this fertile source — poison that was being instilled into the minds of the traitors, our so-called fellow-believers, by whom these instigations were transformed into deeds — I wrote a letter personally to Mr. Frew, the reverend gentleman in question, in the hope that he would suspend his activities and restrain his energy for some time.

So that you may know what I said to him and understand the circumstances thoroughly, I must tell you first of all that I had already had an opportunity of discussing some points with Mr. Frew.

I wrote in French:

To Mr. Frew,

I have pleasant recollections of the conversation I had with you with the help of Mr. Marten.

It gave me the impression that your long residence in Turkey and among Turks had given you a perfectly true conception of the country. But now I observe with regret that your contact with certain quarrelsome and self-seeking persons has led you off into a wrong direction.

Permit me to inform you that the plan you had concocted with Sait Molla, about which we have received trustworthy information and which you have even begun to carry out, will surely be disapproved of by the English nation.

If, instead of relying on people like Sait Molla, you would judge Turkey and the Turks according to the sentiments of true patriots, you would see how impracticable such plans as yours are. In proof of this, it is sufficient for me to point out the miserable failure that followed the ill-advised incidents at Adapazari and Karacabey which occurred so recently. They could easily have been avoided. Has not the undertaking planned against Sivas by Captain Nowill, in conjunction with the late Vali of Elazığ and the Mutasarrif of Malatya, after all ended in no other result than the utter confusion of its originators — an undertaking that relied on the support of the Kurds and that ended in a fiasco, notwithstanding all that was done to insure its success?

I feel that it is my duty to inform you, in all good faith and in the most serious manner, that England is making a great mistake in not trusting

in the good will of the Turks. On the contrary, the measures which you consider it necessary to take to reach success are entirely wrong and lead you exactly in the opposite direction to the one in which you want to go. I don't see any point in going into details, for events to follow will prove to you the falseness of the promise regarding the favourable results to be obtained from the T.L. 2,000 sent to Adapazarı with Sait Molla.

I would like you to know that it is very dangerous indeed to pretend that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is your collaborator and is entangled in your enterprises in precisely the same manner as the impostors with whom you are associated. You are well aware that our Sovereign, who in his position is not held responsible and is compelled to be impartial, will surely have no intention of altering the national will and the national sovereignty.

It appears to me that if the people of England were to be informed of the brutal and uncivilised intrigues carried on by English officials in Turkey — documents proving these intrigues are in our possession — which are undoubtedly contrary to the intentions and interests of the English nation, they and the rest of the world would see in them strong reasons for disapproval.

I would like to emphasise one more point, which is especially remarkable. You call yourself a servant of God. May I ask how compatible with your spiritual duties is the zeal which you display in mingling yourself in political intrigues and in taking an active part in questions that can very easily lead to sanguinary conflicts and vain bloodshed? When I conversed with you I had no idea that you were a politican of this description. I took you to be a man who is seriously devoted to the cause of humanity and justice. How completely mistaken I was is evident from the latest information I have received from a reliable source.

The Rev. — Frew.
British Embassy
Istanbul.

Believe me, Sir, etc.,

Is there still any doubt in your mind about the Government being better informed than the Representative Committee as to the originators and the source whence the criminal enterprises emanated, which, under the nose of and with the knowledge of the Government, had taken place and are still doing so in Istanbul, as well as the manifestation which revealed the fatal effects of these enterprises in such a glaring manner throughout the country? And how is it conceivable that the leaders of a Government so

well informed about the actual facts could accept as true the calumnies and insinuations of our enemies, whose sole aim was to disguise the situation and confound the minds of the people?

Instead of inflicting this august Assembly with the trouble of answering these questions, I prefer to let Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, who expresses the thoughts of Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet, speak for himself.

I will admit that I was very much astonished when I received Cemal Paşa's telegram in cipher. I found it very difficult indeed, to grasp its meaning, so much so, that I asked him to repeat it. Then the Minister sent me two telegrams on the 9th December in quick succession. Here they are:

Sivas, 9th December, 1919.

To the Command of the IIIrd Army Corps.

To his Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Repetition of the telegram asked for by you.

It is well known that the Government is making arrangements to be represented at the Peace Conference.

The Conference can only lead to favourable results if the delegates who attend it represent a Government that enjoys the confidence of the nation and is furnished with authority that is recognised to be efficient in the internal administration of the country. The foreign representatives emphatically advise that order and security in the interior of the country should be restored, and they refer in energetic terms to the emigration of the Christian population, who are fleeing from Anadolu in fear of being massacred and are seeking refuge in swarms in the territories occupied by foreign troops.

It is true that those who go to the occupied towns, particularly to Adana, do so with the intention of increasing the already dense population of Armenia. But the lack of order and moral security in Anadolu of they speak destroys the efforts of the Government to rectify matters. In spite of the assurances of the Representative Committee, certain persons in the provinces continue to interfere with the Government, recall officials just as they think fit and dismiss others if they are not satisfactory to them, prevent the taxation of the population and by violence extort contributions for themselves. As this procedure has not yet been put to an end, there is much concern about it in foreign quarters.

In any case, it is not very advisable for our Government, in the face of all the difficulties lying before them on land and at sea, to assume a threatening attitude towards the Powers that are called upon to decide our fate.

Besides, the representative of France has publicly declared that the dispatch of telegrams to foreign missions by the Representative Committee is evidence that two governments are existing in the country. The employment of offensive expressions towards any one of these Powers in particular is incompatible with the inborn tact and common sense which are characteristic of us.

We must not forget that dignity and calmness in misfortune and danger are qualities that are inherent in our race; the higher interests of the country must not be sacrificed to conceptions or exaggerated and dangerous actions which are sometimes inspired by discouragement and despair.

We can only defend our rights by pursuing a wise policy and by adapting ourselves judiciously to the exigencies of the occasion.

These observations do not convey to your Excellency anything that you do not know already, but it is absolutely necessary that I should give your colleagues and committees patriotic advice as to their procedure.

We trust that the Chamber of Deputies, which will soon meet, must follow our advice if it would secure the salvation and liberation of our beloved country; moreover, we trust that they will devote themselves entirely to the fulfilment of this noble ideal. These are the views of the Cabinet.

Cemal
Minister of War.

I think it is unnecessary to weary the honourable Assembly by analysing the telegram you have just been listening to. I shall therefore confine myself to telling you what I said in reply.

In cipher.

Sivas, 11th December, 1919.

To His Excellency Cemal Pasa, Minister of War.

Our Committee has received your telegram of 9th December in which you explain the standpoint of the Cabinet.

In spite of the many declarations and communications we have sent you, we find that this telegram is no more than a repetition of the opinions you have given us already.

We have repeatedly declared and insisted that the aim of the Representative Committee has always been to protect the Government from being interfered with and to strengthen the confidence of the nation in it.

We are forced to the conviction that unfortunately our communications have not been treated by you as they deserve.

1. It is not true that the spirit of order and moral confidence has been threatened in Anadolu. On the contrary, the confusion and uncertainty caused by Ferit Paşa's Cabinet have recently disappeared under the influence of the national union.

2. It is not a fact that private people have dismissed and replaced officials just as they thought fit.

But it seems to us that the Ministry of the Interior is pursuing a very significant course by insisting on the appointment of certain officials who are notorious and who have been turned out under the late Cabinet on account of their hostility to the national movement.

The actions of the Ministry of the Interior, which are directly opposed to the national aims and which give the impression in the opinion of the public that the spirit of Adil Bey, the former Minister, is still living in the Ministry, are apparently not accepted by the people. Is there anything more justifiable and legitimate than this?

The fact that the same Under-Secretary and the same chiefs of the Departments are retained in their posts places both your honourable Cabinet and our Representative Committee, who have accepted obligations towards the nation, in a very difficult position.

The affair of the Mutasarrif of Dersim, which we referred to in our telegram of the —*) December deserves attention.

The Representative Committee can do nothing more in this matter. Considering the fact that the representations made hitherto for the purpose of mitigating the consequences of such acts on the part of the Ministry of the Interior have not met with the favourable reception they merited, we must decline to renew our requests.

However, we must tell you, for the last time, that if the Imperial Government is honestly desirous of gaining the confidence of the nation — which the Representative Committee does not for a moment doubt — and wishes to serve the country, it must adopt an attitude that conforms

*) The date is omitted in the original.

more to the spirit of the nation and adapts itself better to the peculiar situation, and it must try to eradicate the evil that lies within itself. This object cannot be obtained by using the Representative Committee as a target and by continually writing to it on the same subject, as the Government have done since they came into power.

3. It is quite possible that irregularities have been committed at the Aydin front, where the situation is an unfortunate inheritance of the treacherous policy followed by the late Government, which was regarded by the nation as an enemy and which treated our enemies as friends.

But it may be said with perfect truth that, thanks to the national unity realised by the General Congress at Sivas, as well as to the efforts and patriotic co-operation of the Ministry of War, this state of affairs has come to an end.

4. The nation has refrained from taking up a threatening attitude against any of the Powers with whom it has concluded an armistice. But, should the necessity arise, it has decided that it will oppose every attack upon the legitimate and sacred rights of the country by force of arms.

5. Regarding the question of the dispatch of telegrams to foreign representatives by the Representative Committee, these were confined to protests to which your honourable Cabinet gave their consent.

Moreover, it is the legitimate right of the Representative Committee, being representative of the unity of the nation, to do this on behalf of the nation.

It is certain that, if the Government would evince the same feeling and would hasten to show an agreement of opinion in such matters between themselves and the nation, there would be no obstacle standing in their way, but, on the other hand, very distinct advantages would result therefrom.

But the French say that you have not even protested against such an apparent injustice as the occupation of Adana. This is what gave rise to the formal declarations made by the French representative. In short, we consider it necessary to declare to you that the Representative Committee have never given way to despair or discouragement, nor have they failed to appreciate their sacred duties to the extent that they have been unable to understand what the welfare of the country and the nation expected from them.

But their principle is to prefer dignity to degradation in all that they do and undertake to do for the welfare of the nation. They hold the infallible

belief that on these lines a skilful policy, based on the exigencies of the situation, be followed. For this reason, they cannot recommend any principles to the nation which are antagonistic to those they derive from the very soul of the nation, which is so vigilant in the face of painful realities.

They have the fixed hope that the Chamber of Deputies, whose convention is looked upon as a necessity, will be permeated by the same spirit and imbued with the same sentiments.

6. We have already explained to you the stand of the Representative Committee.

We respectfully declare that for the welfare of the country it is necessary that your Excellency, as our representative, shall inform the Cabinet of the matter referred to and assure them that this is all pure imagination.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the
Representative Committee.

To give you an example of the confusion that the corrupt atmosphere of Istanbul produced at this time in the minds and thoughts of persons who were regarded as being most honourable and judicious, and who accepted the most difficult tasks for the liberation of the country, I would like to tell you of an individual case which engaged my personal attention while I was still at Sivas. There might perhaps be some amongst the honourable members here present who have not forgotten it.

Senator Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa had given the editor of the "Bosphorus" some of his ideas about our political position. You will remember that Mahmut Paşa was at that time a member of the Peace Commission. Seventeen days later I read another statement at Sivas made by the same general, which had been published in the "Tasvir-i Efkâr" on 31st October, 1919. One sentence attracted my attention: "Without accepting the exaggerated demands of the Armenians as being reasonable, we are willing to consent to certain alterations being made in the frontier line."

It was, indeed, an astonishing and remarkable thing that a statesman, a member of the Peace Commission could commit himself to a statement that was practically a promise to grant territorial compensation in Eastern Anadolu to the Armenians.

In a telegram that I thought it right to send to His Excellency Çürüksulu Mahmut Paşa on the 17th November, 1919, I said that "the population

of Eastern Anadolu were perfectly justified in feeling incensed and irritated at this phrase; that the nation, according to the decisions arrived at at the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, had no idea of ceding an inch of their territory and had decided to defend their own rights, as already announced to the whole world, even if the Government should tamely submit to a shameful promise of this description."

I added that this decision of the nation was very well known to the honourable members of the Peace Commission and that they must follow it. (Document 196.)

During our stay at Sivas, a great number of questions and incidents attracted our attention, and we were moved by force of circumstances to take certain steps within the national movement itself, as well as with reference to administrative, military and political affairs. It would take far too long to enter into them fully in detail. I shall only show you how forcibly the concatenation of facts influenced our actions.

*
* *

It was very important to carry out the national organisations to the end. For this purpose, we took definite measures. Others had also to be taken to remove certain differences of opinion that had arisen concerning the elections.

Some of our Circassian compatriots at Maraş had, as I have said already, sent a telegram on behalf of all the Circassians in that district to the French military commander at Antep, requesting that Governor of Cebeli Bereket should be sent to Maraş. We expressed our regret to the Mutasarrif of Maraş that he had approved of such a step. We informed him that the notables of Maraş were not to think of preparing a reception for him when he arrived at that town. We also called the attention of the Government to this matter.

Insecurity in the district of Bolu increased. Instructions about it were sent to Rüştü Bey, commanding the 1st Division, who had succeeded Asım Bey in the command of Izmit.

In a telegram in cipher from our organisation in Istanbul dated 20th November and signed by Karavasif Bey and Colonel Şevket Bey, we were informed that "the Kaymakam of Gebze is hostile to the national forces. In order to minimise and counteract their authority he was considering how he could veil the misdeeds of Yahya Kaptan, who had committed all

sorts of infamous crimes and was concocting further intrigues." The necessity was emphasised that this Kaymakam should be removed. (Document 197.)

We sincerely shared this opinion and replied that they should secure his removal by applying to Cemal Paşa. (Document 198.)

This case of Yahya Kaptan marked one of the most important phases of the revolution and, being very instructive, I would like to give you some striking details about it.

As what I have already said undoubtedly proves, an essential part of the plan which our united enemies were endeavouring to carry through consisted in showing to the world by material proofs and facts that unrest was prevailing in the interior of the country and that the Christian elements were the object of constant attacks, pretending that all this was the work of the national forces. Imbued with this secret and insidious intention, they had begun, as we have seen, to organise bands and to incite them against the Christian population, so that later on the national forces would be charged with the crimes they had themselves committed. These enterprises, which had begun to spread all over the country, found a specially important field of activity in the districts of Biga, Balıkesir and, chiefly, İzmit and Adapazarı because they were near the capital and, therefore, were bound to attract attention.

As the consequence of this, which in some ways showed dark malice but otherwise, it must be admitted, considerable skill, we found ourselves placed in the necessity of exercising special initiative and of undertaking steps of a specific nature. For the Government was openly attributing all these hostile intrigues to the national forces and, instead of taking energetic steps to stop them, they began to criticise and bring pressure on the Representative Committee and continually to demand that we should suppress the activity of these gangs and end their crimes. Besides, the Government had unfortunately succeeded in instilling their ideas and convictions on this question into the heads of the leaders of our organisations in Istanbul.

The arrangements we made to carry out our operations in the district of İzmit in the neighbourhood of Istanbul consisted in organising armed national parties; with the help of the military commanders and some trustworthy officers in this district, we persecuted and annihilated these treacherous gangs.

The most important, and numerically the strongest, of the national

parties that we could assemble for this purpose was commanded by a devoted patriot who was known by the name of Yahya Kaptan.

We first came into touch with the late Yahya in this way.

On a certain day the operators at the Telegraph Office at Sivas told us that a very urgent telegram had been intercepted — that is to say, had not been transmitted by Istanbul — and that the contents of it were as follows:

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Sivas.

"It is I, Yahya, who was recommended to you yesterday from Izmit. I shall await your orders to-morrow evening at the Telegraph Office at Kuşçalı." (Kuşçalı is a village between Üsküdar and Gebze.)

Yahya Kaptan had actually been recommended to us by our organisation at Izmit.

On the 4th October I received the following message from Kuşçalı:

Important and very urgent.

His Excellency Mustafa Kemal, Sivas.

I am Yahya, who was recommended to you two days ago from Izmit. In obedience to your orders I have come to the instrument to receive your orders by telegram. To-morrow evening, at latest, I shall be at the Telegraph Office at Kuşçalı.

Yahya

Yahya Kaptan had probably noticed that his message from Istanbul had not been transmitted and had sent the above telegram to the office at Kuşçalı to be forwarded before he arrived there himself. (Document 199.)

I gave the following order: (Document 200.)

4th October, 1919.

Through the Telegraph Office at Izmit to Yahya Efendi at Kuşçalı.

Do all you possibly can to raise a strong force in the district where you are. Keep in touch with us through Tahir Bey, the Kaymakam at Adapazarı. Meanwhile hold yourself in readiness.

Mustafa Kemal

President of the "Union for the Defence
of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

After Yahya Kaptan had received this order, he raised the force I had requested him to do and succeeded for several months in preventing the intrigues of the treacherous gangs in Istanbul and the neighbourhood.

Eventually, the Government in Istanbul had him assassinated. Although the activity of Yahya Kaptan and his tragic death took place some months later, I feel, as I have already alluded to this affair, that I ought to give you all the particulars about it while I have the opportunity, so that I need not refer to it again.

On the 24th November, 1919, the following telegram came from the Telegraph Office at Kartal: (Document 201.)

"We are compelled to hand Yahya Kaptan over to the Government because he has murdered an innocent man in the middle of the village, he has caused the mayor to be flogged in public and he has pillaged several villages. The Ministry of the Interior is following up this affair very energetically. We must hand Yahya Kaptan over to obviate the Government's being driven into a difficult position. I am awaiting Your Excellency's orders here at the instrument.

Ahmet Necati, Major
Chairman of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights
of Anadolu and Rumeli."

The chairmanship of the committee of our national organisations was seldom conferred on military officers and official persons.

Moreover, the chairman of a committee ought to have been informed of and to have known all about our regulations, especially that there was only one Representative Committee and not one in every town.

After the receipt of this suspicious telegram, I telegraphed to the officer commanding the troops at Izmit as follows:

In cipher. Urgent.

Sivas, 25th November, 1919.

To Mahmet Rüştü Bey Efendi, Commanding the 1st Division,
İzmit.

In a telegram from Necati Bey, who signs himself chairman of the Union for the Defence of the Rights at Kartal, we have been informed that he has to hand Yahya Kaptan over to the Government as he is accused.

of murder, of an assault on the mayor, and of pillaging villages. Further, we hear that the Ministry of the Interior insists very energetically on this being done at once. In the critical times our country is now passing through, it cannot be tolerated that the person referred to shall be handed over to the Government for he has distinguished himself by performing useful services from the very beginning of the national movement. I ask you, therefore, urgently to settle this affair on the spot and see that Yahya is delivered from legal persecution with the authority and in the name of the Government. Give the necessary orders to Necati Bey at Kartal and report the result to me.

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee.

On the 26th November, 1919, I received the following telegram from the office at Hereke:

I appeal to you urgently on behalf of the nation.

The abuses Major Necati Bey is guilty of dishonour the national forces in such days as these. I beg you immediately to institute an inquiry.

Yahya

Commanding the troops at Gebze.

Major Necati Bey is guilty of abuses that dishonour the national forces Izmit reads:

Izmit, 29th November, 1919.

To the Commander of the IIIrd Army Corps, Sivas.

Reply to the telegram of 15th November.

To the Chairman of the Representative Committee.

From the inquiries I have made so far, it seems evident that Yahya has not committed any murder nor has he been guilty of an assault on the mayor. On the contrary, Major Necati Bey wants Kaptan out of the way because he regards him as an obstacle standing in the way of his own personal ambition.

Just when they appealed to Your Excellency in a telegram they had conspired to induce Yahya to go them and to kill him; but he saw their trap and did not fall into it. I am carrying on my inquiries in due course and shall immediately inform you of the result.

Rüştü

Commanding the 1st Division.

A few days later Rüstü Bey sent me the following supplementary information:

Izmit, 5th December, 1919.

To the Officer commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, Sivas.

For the Representative Committee.

Major Necati Bey, while carrying on his actual duties at the School of Musketry at Maltepe and assuming the title of chairman of the Union for the Defence of the Rights, is pillaging the district with gangs belonging to Küçük Aslan, the Albanian, which he has assembled round him and which he pretends are national forces. Nail Efendi, Captain in the Gendarmerie, is in collusion with him. I have no doubt at all about the truth of these statements.

This gang has been employed to perpetrate crimes, such as the assassination of the Greek watchman at Darica and robbing and assaulting a rich man named Stelianos — crimes that have recently put the Government in difficulty. Considering that these offences are attributed to Yahya Kaptan, who has had nothing whatever to do with them, and that false evidence inculpating him has been sent both to you and the Government, we can only come to the conclusion that these two individuals, by carrying on their intrigues under the cover of the national forces, intend to create difficulties for the people and the Government, and meanwhile fill their own pockets. It is possible that they may also have some political object in view.

Yahya Kaptan up to the present moment has behaved very honourably, as he is accustomed to do, and has not taken part in any of these acts of violence, but, on the contrary, has prevented these gangs from committing crimes in the zone for which he is responsible. He is now the object of official persecution by men who want to get rid of him either through the Government or otherwise by attacking him personally. Yesterday Yahya Kaptan came to see me and told me officially that his life is in danger, that he must get away from here, and that he would hand over the arms and ammunition in the possession of his men before he goes away.

I have given him the requisite advice and have sent him back to his duties, telling him that he is needed for further more important services in days to come.

The information I have received from the Kaymakam of Gebze, who is very well informed about everything that is going on, confirms what

I have just reported in every particular. He is very much against Necati Efendi and Nail Efendi but has a high opinion of Yahya Kaptan.

Although I do not know with whom Necati Bey is in communication in Istanbul, it is rumoured that he receives money from time to time from some secret source or other. As they are staying in this district and as their weapons are stained with blood, Yahya Kaptan does not want to remain here any longer. Consequently, it seems necessary that Necati Efendi, who is an officer on the active list, should be transferred to another post and Nail Efendi to one in an opposite direction.

Personally I cannot do anything in this matter because these men are directly under the authority of Istanbul.

I appeal to you to do all you can to see that the necessary steps are taken.

Rüştü

Commanding the 1st Division.

I sent a telegram to Cemal Paşa, the Minister of War, on the 8th December, 1919, and in it I mentioned in detail the information that I had received from Rüştü Bey. (Document 202.)

On the same day the leaders of our organisation in Istanbul were informed about what was happening and the appeal we had sent to Cemal Paşa. We begged them to do all they could to further our appeal. (Document 203.)

Nineteen days later, on the 27th December, a long telegram, with the ciphered signature of Vasif and the proper signature of Colonel Sevket Bey, contained this:

".... the bands belonging to Yahya Kaptan and his associate Kara Aslan, as well as those of Sadık, especially infest the district of Alemdağ and are the cause of a great deal of insecurity."

"After having enumerated some of the excesses attributed to Yahya Kaptan, the telegram went on: ".... they have compelled us to take steps that will render these criminals harmless."

"The fact that Küçük Aslan's gang, with whom he has been on bad terms for some time, is welcome (?) has moved him to veil his own criminal deeds in various ways."

"Captain Nail is an enemy of Yahya's. With regard to Necati Bey, he was elected chairman by the Kaza of Kartal when the Government was

overthrown, and he has broken off relations with the chief authority in favour of the national forces. (?!) . . . He has effectively co-operated in the national organisation. . . . For the purpose of preventing the raids on and robberies of the Greeks of Yeniköy, he has fitted out and led Küçük Aslan's gangs. . . . You have provided him with relief funds yourself (?!)."

"Yahya Kaptan . . . proceeds in a way that prevents him from doing anything of importance."

"It is true that Major Necati is not skilful enough, but at the same time he does not deserve to be punished."

" . . . to put an end to the Greek and Armenian intrigues and to dismiss the Kaymakam of Gebze immediately from his office . . ." (Document 204.)

There were many things in this information that were quite unknown to me. For instance, I know nothing about the existence of Küçük Aslan's gang, and still less that it was welcome. I have no recollection of ever having given money to gang through Necati Bey.

On the other hand, we know very well that Yahya Kaptan, in obedience to the orders we had given him, was actually engaged in suppressing enemy bands or, at any rate, preventing them from succeeding in carrying out the schemes of the enemies by molesting the Christian population.

I think that the documents I shall now show you will throw a very lurid light on the real part played by the Kaymakam of Gebze.

I wrote again to Rüştü Bey, commanding a Division, on the 4th January, 1920, and repeated to him accurately the information sent by Vasif Bey, begging him, as this information did not agree with the news he had personally sent me, to institute fresh inquiries through trustworthy persons and to inform me of the opinion he had come to. (Document 205.)

As I am anxious that you shall be fully informed, I must trouble you to listen to Rüştü Bey's reply.

Command of the XXth Army Corps.

Düzce, 7th January, 1920.

Reply to the ciphered telegram of January 4th, 1920.

To the Chairman of the Representative Committee.

As different allegations had been advanced against Yahya Kaptan, I had repeatedly commissioned Captain Ali Ağuş Efendi to inquire into them and find out whether there was any truth in them. The result of all

A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

these researches has been entirely in his favour. It is quite possible that through ignorance he may have made some trifling mistakes with the idea of doing his best.

As regards the Büyük and the Küçük Aslan* they are mainly robbers. Here is the answer verbatim that came from the Kaymakam of Gebze, to whom I had written in connection with this affair on 1st December, 1919. No. 17.

There is no doubt that in his heart the Kaymakam is an enemy of the national organisations. Consequently, it is quite natural that he should be the first to complain about Yahya.

I was obliged to refer, at least in part, to the contents of the telegram in question, and with the same confidence I showed the letter in question to Sevket Bey in Istanbul. If for reasons unknown to me Istanbul would do anything against Yahya, of course I would not be called upon to do anything.

Copy.

Reply to your esteemed letter of 30th November, 1919, No. 53.

The statements made by Major Necati Bey, Chairman of the Union for the Defence of the Rights at Kartal, about a murder and certain acts of violence against the person of the mayor are inaccurate, because they gave no precise indications as to the date and the persons concerned. Burhanettin Bey, the Mayor who was alleged to have been flogged, has stated officially in writing that he has not been the victim of an assault at the hands of Yahya Kaptan, nor has he addressed any complaint to me on the subject.

As far as the charge of murder is concerned, neither the Government nor the judicial authorities have been consulted about any accusation of the kind. No order for the arrest of Yahya Kaptan has been issued. If the assassination of the two Greeks of Darica and the robbery and assault on Stelios Çorbaci in the village of Paşaköy at Kartal are what is referred to, everybody knows that these crimes were perpetrated by Küçük Aslan's bands and that there has been a very bad feeling between them and Yahya Kaptan for a considerable time.

Some time ago, a gang consisting of eighteen men was under the protection of Captain Nail Efendi, but at present it is under the command

* Küçük Aslan = Little Aslan; Kara Aslan = Black Aslan; Büyük Aslan = Great Aslan.

of Major Necati Bey. It is rumoured that each of the men is paid T.L. 50 a month. Therefore, they are able to attend to their usual business, which consists chiefly in pillaging villages.

Major Necati Bey is an old schoolfellow of Captain Nail Bey's. About six weeks ago they met at a notorious feast that Ali Kaptan, a member of Küçük Aslan's gang, had arranged to celebrate his marriage. The expenses connected with the feast were covered from the money that had been robbed from Çorbacı, who had been kidnapped by Ali Kaptan. Later on, Necati Bey spent several nights at Nail Bey's house. They understand one another very well because they share the same views. For a long time Nail Bey has been against Yahya Kaptan and, when he was engaged in forming organisations here, he did all he could to get him removed from my district.

The idea prevails here that these two crimes were committed with the intention of getting the national forces and Yahya Bey accused of them. It is quite evident and generally accepted that these crimes were committed by Küçük Aslan's gang in the district where they carry on their depredations.

Besides this, it is an undoubted fact that Nail Bey has been in correspondence with Istanbul, with the object of getting Hakkı Bey recalled. He commands a Cavalry Division belonging to the Guard in Istanbul, which had been sent out to hunt this gang. Pretending that Hakkı Bey is not wanted, it is because of him that the matter has not been carried any further. If it is another murder that is referred to, precise details, with dates and names of the persons concerned, must be furnished.

On the day that the Greek watchman was murdered at Darica the crime became known through the members of Küçük Aslan's gang, who were walking about openly in the bazaar discussing it.

As he was afraid of the consequences, Captain Nail had applied to be transferred to another post and declared that he would not stay here any longer; but the officers commanding the regiment and the other troops, as well as Major Necati Bey, who intervened, calmed him and promised that they would make it unpleasant for Yahya Kaptan with the help of Sirri Bey, the delegate. They took his part in this way so that they could keep him here.

On Tuesday, the 25th November, 1919, Necati Bey came back, and the captain persuaded him to his way of thinking and induced him to give false evidence against Yahya.

Then he tried to waylay him. He asked him by telephone to come to a certain place where Küçük Aslan's gang were waiting in readiness in his house to throw themselves on him.

But he lacked the courage to carry out his plan — no one knows why — and he threw up the attempt when it was half completed. Meanwhile Necati Bey had to return to Kartal.

It is evident that Captain Nail Bey is continually at work concocting false evidence against Yahya Kaptan. He lays traps for him, sometimes using Necati Bey's and at others Küçük Aslan's gang the latter being his tool in affairs of this sort. Lastly, I have the honour to bring to your notice the fact that Yahya Kaptan will not allow the villagers to be pillaged or the Christians persecuted, as is being done by the gang of his adversary Küçük Aslan. When Büyük Aslan Bey's gang, which is under his command, happens to do undesirable things he stops them immediately; he is actively engaged in maintaining order and security so that he may further the national plans which aim at the independence and salvation of our country. He had also previously done useful service by winning over Büyük Aslan's gang and obtaining their pardon from the Government.

The accusations against Yahya may be traced to his having identified himself against the personal interests of the captain and to his having severely reproached him for the crimes committed by Küçük Aslan's gang, with which he is now credited, and for screening the perpetrators of them. (Kamakam of Gebze, Mehmet Nurettin).

Rüştü

Commanding the 1st Division
and the District of Bolu.

Before this information reached us, we received the following message:

"Yahya Kaptan has been surrounded at Tavşancı by the military force that has been sent from İstanbul."

When we received this message we asked the commander of the troops at İzmit in a ciphered telegram, dated 7th January, 1920, to account for this, and we waited at the instrument for his answer. We told him: "If this information is correct, let the commander of the troops know that we are aware of his having been sent from İstanbul, that Yahya Kaptan is our man, and that if he has done anything wrong we shall do all that is necessary, because we shall not allow him to be surrounded and arrested." (Document 206.)

Two telegrams were sent on the 7th January, 1920, which we only received on the 8th.

One of them was signed by Fevzi Bey, temporarily commanding the 1st Division at Izmit. He said:

"A party consisting of two thousand men has landed at Tavşancıl to-night and has surrounded Yahya Bey, commanding the national troops. Please tell us what we are to do."

The second message was from the actual commander of the division, who was at Düzce. Rüştü Bey reported to the same effect as Fevzi Bey had done. (Document 207.)

In Fevzi Bey's reply on 7th January to our request for details that we had sent on the same date, he told us that Yahya Kaptan had not been made a prisoner up till then, that a meeting between the troops from Istanbul and our own would probably take place, and that orders must be given to the commander of this division.

At the same moment a telegram, dated the 10th January, 1920, arrived from Cevat Bey, my aide-de-camp, who was then a deputy in Istanbul.

Harbiye, 10th January, 1920.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps.

To His Excellency Mustafa Paşa.

On the night of the 6th January before daybreak the "Bandırma," with her lights covered, arrived at Hereke having on board four officers and fifty gendarmes under the command of Hilmi Bey, assistant of the Chief-in-Command of the Gendarmerie, and Nazmi Bey, commanding the Gendarmerie at Üsküdar, with ninety men of the battalion of Guards in Istanbul under the command of Captain Nahit Efendi. They landed in the early hours of the morning at Hereke, and immediately marched to Tavşancıl, where they searched different houses. They gathered together the civil council of the village and ordered them to surrender Yahya, the traitor, or to tell where he hid. They added that if their order was not carried out they would burn down Tavşancıl.

The civil council declared emphatically that Yahya Kaptan had not been in the village during the last two days and that they had no idea where he was. It will not be possible to take Yahya alive. If he were killed, however, it would apparently be to the great advantage of the Greeks who

dominate the Marmara coast and who are supplied daily with arms and ammunition by the English and French. At the same time, the corrupt people in Istanbul would be pleased. Another thing that would happen if Yahya is assassinated would be that a great number of gangs of corruption working for our enemies would be formed in the districts of Izmit, Adapazari and Istanbul, because his death would mean the end of the national force commanded by him.

Consequently, I beg your Excellency to give orders to the competent authorities so that his Excellency Cemal Paşa can personally take this matter in hand and that Yahya, in accordance with my former communication, will be liberated under another name. (Cevat)

Cemal
Minister of War.

The fact that this telegram was ciphered according to the key used by the Minister of War and bore Cemal Paşa's signature, and that it contained the phrase "so that Cemal Paşa can personally take this matter in hand, etc. . ." is worthy of particular notice. It means that Cemal Paşa ciphered Cevat Bey's message with his own key and transmitted it with his signature, without having considered it necessary to read it over first. For it was Cemal Paşa himself who originally ordered the operations against Yahya.

If this had not been so, he surely would not have permitted the telegram to be sent in which I was begged to give the order so that Cemal Paşa could intervene to secure Yahya's liberation.

In the two telegrams from the acting commander of the Division at Izmit, dated the 9th and 10th January, 1920, we were informed of the rumour that two skirmishes had taken place and that Yahya Kaptan had been killed. (Document 209.)

On the 11th January, 1920, I asked the temporary commander whether he had sent our message to the officer commanding the force that had been dispatched from Istanbul. (Document 210.)

Three days later his report of the 14th January 1920, told us that "my personal inquiries have resulted in . . . that no encounter has taken place; but Yahya, after surrendering, was killed outside the village with some sharp instrument; the fact that his head was cut off and cannot be found confirms his." (Document 111.)

When we received this sad news we sent a telegram to our organisation in Istanbul, through Colonel Sevket Bey, on the 20th January: It read:

"Will you be good enough to inform us what led the Government to send troops against Yahya Kaptan; at the same time we want to know the names of the persons who are guilty of murdering him. It has been reported to us that he was killed deliberately after he had surrendered. Some of our loyal comrades in Istanbul demand to be furnished with details. I beg you to reply as soon as possible."

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

In reply to a former message, we also received from Istanbul this telegram, dated 21st January, 1920, which reached us a day later.

Beşiktaş, 21st January, 1920.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps, Ankara.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Reply.

1. A trustworthy person who is on the spot states that, after he had been captured, Yahya Kaptan was escorted to the guard in the village. It is reported that about ten bandits fired on the escort on the way and that, in trying to escape, he was killed.

The Government have, nevertheless, demanded an inquiry to be instituted.

2. The Government is said to have decided to arrest Yahya Kaptan because he is accused of a number of offences that he is alleged to have committed under cover and on behalf of the national troops — offences which are said to be generally known and confirmed by official and private inquiry. Our organisation had demanded that these persecutions should be stopped; it had offered in return to guarantee that Yahya would disappear for a time, that he would have nothing more to do with the national troops, that he would not commit any more acts of violence, and that he would discharge the deserters and gendarmes whom he had gathered around him. We had already made the necessary arrangements to this effect with the competent authorities and had even sent a special deputy for this purpose to Gebze.

Meanwhile, the Government had secretly sent troops, declaring that

it was their intention to arrest Yahya Kaptan, the result of which has been as I have reported. (Vasif)

Şevket.

Commanding the fortress of Çanakkale.

It was reported, both that fire had been opened in the neighbourhood while he was being escorted to the guard outside the village, and that he was trying to escape and had been killed in the attempt.

We would have been very stupid if we had not understood at once that these expressions were similar to those commonly employed in cases of murderous attacks like this.

The statement that the Government, who co-operated with the leaders of our organisation in Istanbul and formed their decision jointly with the object of suppressing Yahya Kaptan, should suddenly and secretly have created an accomplished fact, is particularly worthy of notice. Men belonging to the Gendarmerie and a Guards battalion from Istanbul are called out in Istanbul... and the leaders of our organisation, who pretend to be masters of the situation, do not know anything about it!

We demanded an explanation of this telegram from Istanbul.

Telegram in cipher.

Ankara, 22nd January, 1920.

To Colonel Şevket Bey

Commanding the fortress at Çanakkale

Istanbul.

"A great number of people, especially in Istanbul, are following the account of Yahya Kaptan's assassination with the greatest interest and demand to be furnished with full particulars about it. So that we may know the truth, would you immediately send us a reply telling us what the offences were which you state are known everywhere."

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

I hope I shall not be straining your patience too far if I quote verbatim the reply we received to our demand for details.

Besiktas, 24th January, 1920.

To be handed to His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

To the Commander of the XXth Army Corps, Ankara.

Reply to the telegram of 22nd January.

1. We have heard it rumoured that Yahya Kaptan was murdered after he had surrendered. We are making further inquiries and will inform you of the result.

These are the reasons advanced by the Government for the suppression of Yahya Kaptan.

2. He would listen to nobody, but publicly committed atrocities and robberies in the name of the national troops. For a long time he had been harbouring and concealing bandits; he had not obeyed orders that had been given him to go to any particular place.

Lastly, the complaints that had been sent to them from the villages and the surrounding country made it impossible for the Government to hold back any longer, so they made up their minds to take strenuous action against him without letting our organisation know anything about it. (Vasif)

Colonel Sevket.
Commanding the fortress of Çanakkale.

It was altogether inexact to state, as was done in the second clause of this telegram, that Yahya Kaptan did not listen to anybody and to give that as the reason for the action taken against him and his subsequent assassination. The deceased man listened to me and received orders from me and acted upon them. I had not ordered him to recognise any other authority or any other person, nor to take orders from them. We ourselves desired that he would not obey any orders that came from the Minister of the Interior and Kemal Paşa, the traitor, or from the Commander of the Gendarmerie that were brought to him by any person coming from Istanbul. It was still more untrue that he committed robberies and brutalities in the name of the national troops; they were committed rather by numerous gangs, like that belonging to Küçük Aslan, that were formed, as documents in our possession prove beyond doubt, by traitors and enemies of the country. It is likewise reported by reliable persons who have been making inquiries that Yahya devoted himself to circumventing these gangs in their lawless work.

I cannot proceed without mentioning a message that was telegraphed to us before this regrettable incident occurred, which bore the joint

signatures of the chairman of the Defence of the Rights and the Kaymakam of Gebze. It was to this effect:

"From information received by the people, it is evident that, on account of the slanderous statements made by certain individuals, Yahya Kaptan, commanding the national troops at Gebze, has now been surrounded at Tavşancıl by about two thousand men under the command of high officers who were sent from Istanbul last Tuesday evening; he cannot escape. Your excellency will understand how unjust such treatment is in the case of one who is doing so much good work for his country. We are waiting at the instrument and beg you to let us know what can be done to save him.

Fevzi, Kaymakam

Hacı Ali,

Hacı Ali, Chairman of the
Committee for the Defence of the Rights.

Let me read you another message I received about the same affair from Sürrî Bey, the deputy, who was working for the organisation of the national forces in the district of Izmit.

Izmit, 11th January, 1920.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps.
To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. The affair of Yahya Kaptan, about which we exchanged messages four days ago, has ended in his being assassinated, as you will surely have heard.

2. The idea that Yahya Kaptan might possibly stand before the gates of Istanbul at the head of the organised troops must have put these persons, who are enemies of the national forces, into a state of terror. This is undoubtedly the reason for his removal having been decided upon.

3. This being the probable motive for the crime, the incident loses its local character and deserves to be taken into serious consideration by the Representative Committee.

4. Hikmet Bey, commanding the Gendarmerie, never moves a finger and still less sends parties under his command to pursue the gangs that haunt the Liva of Izmit; he considers the daily escape of prisoners in batches of fifteen to twenty at a time from the gaol, which is next door

to his own house, as a common event of no importance; but he has shown himself remarkably active when there was the question of doing away with Yahya. Then he placed himself personally at the head of the detachment of gendarmes who had been called out.

At last he was successful in dealing this heavy blow against the national forces. Continuation follows. (Sirri, Deputy.)

Fevzi

Acting Commander of the 1st Division.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps.

5. These districts will be alarmed at the national forces organised at Gebze losing their leader.

6. The murder of Yahya, who was known in this district as the support of the national troops, under such distressing conditions has naturally produced considerable confusion.

7. The removal of Yahya is regarded as evidence of the aggressive attitude which the Government intend to adopt in future towards the national forces.

8. Following these facts, the foreigners will undoubtedly assume that the national forces are unimportant in the eyes of the Government and that the latter believe that they are in a position to play with them. In consequence of this, it is necessary to act promptly. (Sirri, Deputy)

Fevzi

Acting Commander of the 1st Division.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps.

Continuation of the telegram in cipher, No. 68.

1. Unless a reliable man is appointed immediately to take command of the national troops at Gebze and the situation is made more satisfactory, we must resign ourselves to the fact that throughout the whole of the Sancak of Izmit and the Liva of Üsküdar there will not be a single man left who will declare himself to be an adherent of the national movement.

2. Hikmet Bey, commanding the Gendarmerie regiment, must be dismissed from his post without further delay.

3. In order that the national forces in the Liva of Izmit will be able to exist and be properly organised, Fevzi Bey, Lt. Colonel on the active

list, must be appointed commander of the Gendarmerie. I state emphatically that there is no other course possible. (Sirri, Deputy)

Fevzi
Acting Commander of the 1st Division.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps.

Continuation of the telegram in cipher, No. 79.

1. The rumours that are being circulated to the effect that the national forces in Anadolu have fallen into disgrace have given fresh encouragement to our adversaries through this regrettable incident. We must do all that we possibly can to prove that the energy and vital power we possessed hitherto have by no means deteriorated.

2. I think that His Excellency Ali Fuat Paşa ought to come here himself.

3. I feel obliged to repeat that the Liva of İzmit must not be neglected and that something effectual must be done to show the interest we take in it. Sirri, Deputy.

Fevzi
Acting Commander of the 1st Division.

Rauf Bey, who was at that time in Istanbul, wrote me the following letter:

Istanbul, 19th February, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

It is understood here also that Yahya Kaptan has been assassinated. The Commandant of Istanbul has been ordered to take the affair in hand. A post-mortem examination of his body has been made. The Government have ordered that those who are guilty of this crime shall be brought to trial.

Hüseyin Rauf

There was no longer any doubt remaining that Yahya Kaptan had been murdered. This truth having been fully established, did it follow that the Government by taking legal proceedings would ensure that the perpetrators of the crime — the Government themselves being the actual murderers — would for ever remain undiscovered? But, it is merely a

question of time when every detail, every truth, will be thoroughly and impartially sifted and laid bare by history.

It is in the firm conviction that the examination of the motives and factors that drove the Government and the leaders of our organisation in Istanbul to commit such a base crime will lead to really instructive results that I have supported the many details concerning an incident which at first sight appear unimportant by actual proofs and documents. If in the preceding account I have succeeded in contributing something that will be considered particularly enlightening in the eyes of the nation, I believe I shall have performed a conscientious duty and shall feel more satisfied.

In this thought, it might be well to bear in mind two points.

Firstly, the secret organisation to which Sait Molla belonged and the role played by individuals and gangs in the districts of Gebze and Kartal, all of whom belonged to this organisation; the skill they displayed in attributing their deeds to our own people and organisations, thereby misleading people who were regarded as patriots; and the success of their manoeuvres.

Secondly, the attitude of the leaders of our organisation in Istanbul. These men, relying on ourselves, the Representative Committee, who were asked to follow our instructions and communications, ought to have understood that steady advance in the direction of our common aim could only be possible if they faithfully did their duty. But they did nothing of the sort. In spite of the warnings of the Representative Committee, they believed in their own superiority and acted accordingly. In their comparatively isolated position their vanity increased, they lost their nerve and, under the delusive influence of this, they went so far as to allow themselves to be hoodwinked. (Document 212.)

Before bringing my account of this affair to an end, I would like to read a final telegram, which must fill everyone who has a conscience with sadness.

4960

Istanbul, 14th January, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of
the National Forces at Ankara.

Yahya Kaptan, my husband, has been brutally murdered after he had surrendered. He committed no crime; the only reason given for it is

that he was associated with Your Excellency. The murder was committed by Captain Nail Efendi, commanding the Gendarmerie at Gebze, and Lieut. Abdurrahman Efendi. All the inhabitants of Tavşancı were witnesses of the deed. The Ministries of Justice and of the Interior are making inquiries about this crime. I am left in a desolate position with two children. We rely that Your Excellency will do all you can to obtain support for us.

Şevket Hanım, widow of Yahya Kaptan.
Karagümrük, Karabaş, No. 19.

* * *

The affair of Yahya Kaptan commenced on the 20th November, 1919, and in order to follow its development we have had to extend our account of it over a long period.

Let me now return to the point where we were describing other events.

The Allied Powers objected to the railway line that ran from Ankara to Eskisehir being used. On the 21st October, 1919, we called upon the General Committee at Ankara to protest energetically to the representatives of the Allied Powers, so that we could make use of this line.

We requested the persons who had taken the initiative in forming organisations at Adana to go to Niğde or Kayseri in order to get into communication with us. By doing so we were able to carry on our work with them.

The situation at the Aydin front grew more serious from day to day. We wrote to the Ministry of War asking them to decide that the T.L. 400,000 allocated to the fleet should be applied, as we had already agreed with Salih Paşa at Amasya, to the needs of this front. We urged the officer commanding the XIIth Army Corps at Konya to provide the men fighting at this front with arms, ammunition, machine guns, and new batteries of Artillery.

The French, under the pretence of controlling the railway line running from Bandırma to Soma, had landed a Division at Bandırma. It was clear that they had no right whatever to send troops into this town where complete safety was prevailing. We drew the attention of the officers commanding the XIVth Army Corps and the 6th Division to this matter on the 24th November, 1919.

Foreign officers visited the Aydin front, made propaganda there and tried to find out what was really going on there. We gave orders at the

front that they were on no account to allow these officers to come into contact with the fighting troops and that they must insist that the officers apply officially to the Government. They were to tell them also that if they had anything to say about the national forces, they were to address our General Committee on the subject. We added that those officers who were making propaganda were to be removed from the district under escort and, if it should become absolutely necessary, they were even to shoot any Allied soldiers who were found at the front.

We wanted to make sure that the people of Izmir would vote at the elections, and we conveyed our intention to them regarding this in different ways. But, of course, the Greeks objected to our doing this. We protested to the representatives of the Allied Powers and the Neutral Mission on the 29th November, 1919. We also wanted to inform the population of our protest and so communicated with Ethem Bey, Director of the Posts and Telegraphs in this town.

Probably many of you will remember that during the enemy's occupation a foreign newspaper called "Ferda," which was hostile to the national forces, was published at Adana. This newspaper printed many columns of abuse about us, simply to mislead and distract national public opinion in Anadolu. We decided to stop the circulation of it in the country.

Nevertheless, Damat Şerif Paşa, Minister of the Interior in Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet, about whom Cemal Paşa had repeatedly spoken in terms of praise, regarded the publication of this paper as undoubtedly very useful in the country and gave orders to the effect that free circulation of this poisonous rag was not to be interfered with. Therefore, we considered it necessary to draw the attention of Cemal Paşa, Şerif Paşa's friend, to this fact on the 3rd December, 1919.

*

* * *

As we could not prevent Parliament from meeting in İstanbul itself, we thought of forming a united and determined party in the Chamber because we thought that this would be the only way left to us to "uphold and defend our aim, which was to safeguard the integrity of our country and the independence of our nation."

Among the instructions we issued by circular letters on the 18th November, 1919, we had pointed out that this plan was one of the main questions the deputies would have to discuss when they met in groups in certain localities.

On the same day, in order to form this party, we had the idea of requesting the deputies to send a representative from each liva to Eskişehir, so that they would be able to get into touch with the other deputies who were going by train to İstanbul from Eskişehir. By going personally to this town we wanted to organise a general meeting at which we could discuss matters. Amongst other questions, the safety of the deputies while they were in İstanbul was a matter we wanted particularly to talk over. I shall show you later on when I go into details why we wished to remain in Ankara instead of being present at this meeting.

At last, after still waiting at Sivas for another month, we left for Ankara.

In order to make our arrival known in this town, we circulated this open telegram on the 27th December, 1919.

"The Representative Committee, which has left Sivas for Ankara, via Kayseri, has arrived to-day and has been the object of sincerely patriotic and enthusiastically cordial demonstrations on the part of our great nation, not in Ankara alone but along the whole of their journey. The spirit of unity and determination shown by our nation is enough to encourage our optimistic and firm convictions concerning the future of our country.

"For the time being Ankara will be the seat of the Representative Committee. We send you the renewed expression of our high esteem."

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

On the 2nd January, 1920, we sent a further message to the General Committees of the Union, to Çelebi Cemalettin Efendi at Hacı Bektaş and Hacı Musa Bey at Mutki.

Here are some extracts from it:

"... The statements made to us and the inquiries we have made during our journey have happily shown us that the national organisation on which our national unity, with the help of Providence, is based, are flourishing, and that they have become a power and a source of energy upon which we can justly rely in our endeavours to secure the welfare of the nation and the country."

"Owing to this determination the foreign outlook as regards the interests of our country and our nation has become favourable, on the lines laid down by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses."

"In this circular note we beg you all to work with the greatest energy until the day arrives when our legitimate claims will be secured through our unity, our resolution and our sacred faith; we beg you to bring the foregoing statements to the knowledge of the villagers, so that the whole nation may be fully informed about them."

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli."

We had had the idea for a considerable time of transferring the seat of the Representative Committee to Ankara. I shall read you a telegram from Kâzim Karabekir Pâsa that was sent to us when this question was first considered.

In Cipher.

Erzurum, 3rd October, 1919.

To the Command of the IIIrd Army Corps.

To the Representative Committee.

I do not think that the honourable committee, which represents the national forces, ought to be removed to Ankara. In fact, I do not think that it ought to be transferred to any place at all that lies west of Sivas. If the committee, which is organising the national forces of the vilayets in the East, were to leave suddenly, these vilayets would immediately become disorganised. To avoid giving our enemies, who always detect something bad in every one of our moves and comment on them in an adverse spirit, a fresh opportunity and new pretext for slandering the national movement — which has hitherto been led so legitimately and logically — it is advisable that the seat of the Representative Committee should remain in one place, or in no case be transferred to any place west of Sivas.

Kâzim Karabekir
Commanding the XIIIth Army Corps.

I would not like to believe the authenticity of this telegram. But what was I to do? This ciphered telegram had been transmitted to the IIIrd Army Corps at Erzurum; after it had been deciphered, the IIIrd Army Corps forwarded it to us with the remark "deciphered on the 4th October," and it was signed "Fethî".

There is no doubt that Kâzım Karabekir Paşa had come to Sivas in answer to our invitation and had talked with us; consequently; he must have known perfectly well how wrong he was in expressing such an opinion.

It is evident, however, that it would not have been necessary to discuss the matter verbally in order to discover the futility of his opinion. It is easy to see at a glance how he got this erroneous notion into his head.

First of all, he ought to have been convinced from the very beginning of the fact that the Representative Committee did not organise and represent the national forces in the eastern vilayets alone but in those of the whole of the country, the whole of Anadolu and Rumeli. This is all the more the case as the telegraphic communications on this subject that had been going on for many days. The transference of the Representative Committee from Sivas to Ankara could not have been the reason for the eastern vilayets still being disorganised. The orders and instructions that the Representative Committee had given by telegraph to the eastern vilayets from Sivas could be transmitted equally as well from Ankara.

Moreover, reason dictated that the Representative Committee be nearer Istanbul land the Western Provinces than to the Eastern ones. Firstly, there were some among our western and south-western vilayets that were actually occupied by the enemy. Under the very eyes of the enemy occupying these vilayets strong defences had to be erected and unremitting care taken in their fortification. Our eastern vilayets, on the other hand, were not in such a perilous position; neither was there any apparent certainty that immediate danger was actually threatening them.

Even if the possibility of an Armenian attack from the east was feared — a possibility that was rather an improbability — the XVth Army Corps, by national troops and commanded personally by Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, was ready to repel it. Then again, at the İzmir front there were commands and troops of different kinds, as well as vital influences arising from various sources encouraged by the opposition. Moreover, no defensive measures were yet taken against the occupation troops at Adana.

It is a general rule that persons whose duty it is to direct and assume supreme command in time of war must be as near as possible to the most important field of operations, where the danger is greatest. Lines of communication must not be so far away that he would be unable to control the

general situation. Ankara was the most suitable place meeting such conditions. In any case, we did not insist on going to Balıkesir, Nazilli or Karahisar because we wanted to be busy at the fronts, but we wanted to go to Ankara because it was connected with the fronts and with İstanbul by a railway line and because it was absolutely on a par with Sivas regarding the general control of the situation and the supreme guidance of the operations.

I will refrain from giving you further reasons to show that our presence at Ankara was considered advantageous and necessary, especially as the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in İstanbul itself was now inevitable.

Of all the reasons that were advanced against the removal of the seat of the Representative Committee to Ankara, that in which our enemies were mentioned as "detecting something bad in every one of our moves and commenting on them in an adverse spirit" was particularly incomprehensible to me. In fact, as Kâzım Karabekir Paşa himself asks, what attitude or what initiative of ours has ever been liked or could be liked by our enemies, unless they had been adapted to their own wishes!

There is a Government in İstanbul under Ali Rıza Paşa which is in favour of the national movement; the Chamber of Deputies having assumed the chief control of affairs regarding the fate of the nation and the country after they had met in this town, what need would there be for the Representative Committee to interest themselves in the western fronts or in the Chamber? And why should they be in communication with one another? Under these conditions, would it not have been sufficient, and would it not have been more efficacious, if the Representative Committee had devoted themselves exclusively to the organisation of the eastern vilayets? If these had been the considerations governing the opinions in question, they would have deserved a certain amount of attention, though of minor importance; but in that case, it had to be admitted that there was a wide gulf lying between the views of the Representative Committee and those entertained by Kâzım Karabekir Paşa about the situation in general, for their suggestions concerning the actual situation differed entirely from one another.

If we consider for a moment what the phrase that referred to the removal of the Representative Committee to Ankara being considered unfavourably by our enemies means, we may perhaps discover the source of this opinion and will be better able to understand it; but we have no leisure at the present moment to occupy our minds with it.

As I have told you already, after having explained to them the funda-

mental question, we had said in the original telegram in which we had requested the Chamber of Deputies to hold a preliminary meeting that would last for several days — a telegram the copies of which I had sent also by post — that the date of the meeting would be settled at the place where the Representative Committee would be at the time, after an agreement in writing had been come to with the Deputies, as soon as their names and addresses were known. We added that the Representative Committee would then immediately move to a place nearer to İstanbul. (Document 213.)

The railway line running from Ankara to Eskişehir having been opened again, when we arrived at Ankara we informed the persons concerned, in continuation of our previous communication, that Ankara had been chosen as the place where the deputies would meet. This we did in a circular note on the 29th December, 1919. We pointed out in the note that this would be extremely desirable, because we wanted as many as possible to join in the discussions. (Document 214.)

I think that you will not be very much astonished to hear that certain persons in İstanbul tried to interfere with this benevolent and patriotic proposal on which we had put so much hope.

Let me explain what I mean. While we were inviting the deputies to come to Ankara, there were others who were doing all they could to make our invitation ineffective and wreck our preparations for the proposed meeting. Some of the deputies informed us about this by telegram. One of the telegrams, for instance, signed by Hüseyin Baki, Deputy for Burdur, dated the 29th December, was to this effect:

"In a telegram to the president of the election committee signed by Hüseyin Kâzım, Deputy for Aydın, on behalf of all the deputies assembled in İstanbul, he informs us that I am to go immediately and by the shortest route to the seat of the Caliphate. A telegram that has come to-day from the Ministry of the Interior confirms this request."

"After the receipt of the order from his Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, who signed it in the name of the honourable Representative Committee, I informed you of my opinion. As I have not yet received any reply, I urgently beg Your Excellency to let me know what I am to do."

A telegram of the same date, signed by "Bahri, Deputy for Akdağ Madeni", contained the following: "Although we had been instructed in a telegram from Hüseyin Kâzım, Deputy for Aydın, that the deputies should go immediately and by the shortest route to İstanbul, I am not clear as to

whether this invitation is meant exclusively for those deputies who have been elected members of the Representative Committee or whether it applies to all the deputies. I beg Your Excellency to tell me what I shall do."

Other similar telegrams arrived. I gathered from them that the most important point was that our colleagues the deputies regarded the Representative Committee, as well as the Government and the persons who claimed the right to invite all the deputies to go to Istanbul, as being unanimously devoted to the common ideal and in full accord with one another. They had no idea about the unfriendly intentions of the Government and of the persons concerned. At most, they might have come to the conclusion that possibly a new position had been created through an understanding between ourselves and those in Istanbul or that an error might have occurred concerning the organisation of the meeting; this was clearly evident in the candour and sincerity of their communications.

I replied to their question in these terms:

We know nothing at all about Hüseyin Kâzım Bey's communication. Apparently he is ill-informed about the situation. It seems more in conformity with the interests of our country and nation to obey the instructions contained in our telegrams of the 19th and 29th December last. Be good enough immediately to take the necessary steps about this and send a suitable reply to Kâzım Bey, and let us know the result. With our best greetings,

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

The following circular note was sent to all the deputies:

Ankara, 30th December, 1919.

"We have heard that Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, Deputy for Aydin, has sent telegrams to a number of honourable deputies to the effect that they should hasten their departure for Istanbul. As this shows that Hüseyin Kâzım Bey has not been fully informed about the position, we have had it properly explained to him, and at the same time the contents of our communication . . . No. . . . Consequently we repeat the invitation sent out by the Representative Committee and request the deputies who have been elected members of the Representative Committee and the others who desire to be present at our discussions to come after the 5th January to Ankara."

Mustafa Kemal,
In the name of the Representative Committee.

In a telegram in cipher that we sent on the 30th December, 1919, we informed our organisation in İstanbul what Hüseyin Kâzım Bey had done. We asked them to let him know the contents of our circular telegram and at the same time beg him to expedite his departure for Ankara if he wished to take part personally in the discussions. (Document 115.)

Who was the man who stood in our way when we expected effective help from our organisation in İstanbul? I am sure you have already guessed who he was. Yes; he was our delegate in İstanbul, who at the same time was a Minister — Cemal Paşa himself. Now listen to the telegram he sent us, signed by himself, on the 1st January:

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps,
To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

I have the honour to bring to your notice the fact that a group of deputies who are at present in İstanbul have appealed to me and have handed me the following list of their claims:

1. It is necessary that the Chamber of Deputies shall be called together as soon as possible. The fact that some deputies have recently been invited to go to Ankara may delay the opening of Parliament.
2. The delay of the opening of Parliament and the fact that the deputies are invited to go to Ankara is regarded — among other things which are especially exploited by the enemy — as indicating that the legislative power is apparently under the influence of other secret designs. It is evident that this fact is capable of producing a great deal of mistrust throughout the country, as well as abroad.
3. The Chamber cannot perform its functions under such conditions.
4. Sending a delegate to İstanbul with wide powers to maintain contact between the deputies, as has been done previously, will be sufficient for the purpose.
5. It is expected that those concerned will give urgent instructions to postpone the departure of those deputies who desire to go to Ankara and ask those who are already there to come immediately to İstanbul.

Cemal
Minister of War.

I ask you, is there a shadow of sincerity and dignity to be found in such conduct and in such a communication? First of all, our decision to meet

the deputies and our instructions for this meeting had already been made six weeks before. If this was dangerous and really incompatible with the interests of our country, ought not these gentlemen and the Government, who pretend to have as their aim the same national ideal as ourselves, have tried to come to an understanding with us, or at least have told us what their opinions were and what they intended to do, before they telegraphed to the deputies invited by us, urging them to come to Istanbul? Was it right to neglect doing anything of the sort? Was it right to try to wreck our arrangements by putting forward their own ideas to confuse the deputies from the provinces and to send them urgent telegrams, addressed to the election committee, signed by Şeyh Muhsini Fani and the Minister of the Interior, asking them to come to the seat of the Caliphate by the quickest and shortest route?

Secondly, why should these persons, who had shown no sign whatever of impatience when the legal limit had long been exceeded and the new elections could not take place, show so much energy now after the elections had taken place? The latter had only been secured by our unceasing activity and through our numerous urgings since we had held the Congresses at Erzurum and Sivas — above all, when they owed their own election to our efforts. I repeat, ought they to have been so violently impatient that they could not wait even a few days longer, especially when it was the question of our attaining one of our chief aims that necessitated this postponement, so that we could discuss precautionary details and confer with those who had shown so little wisdom in allowing the meeting of the Chamber to take place in Istanbul? Were they all in such a hurry to cause another scandal and expose themselves to insult without taking any protective steps against such possibilities?

Thirdly, did not these very gentlemen, who deceived their loyal and honest comrades and wanted to draw them even one day earlier into the "vortex of dangers and mortification" in which they themselves were floundering in Istanbul, also belong to the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli?

Were they not members of this national union? Are not the members of a union obliged, even if they happened to be deputies, to come to an understanding with the leaders of the union and adapt their conduct to the programme that has been drawn up in agreement with them? Is this not the rule in all civilised countries?

Why were they afraid of the members of a group or a party coming

into contact with their leaders? How could this fact have led the foreigners to believe that the legislative power was carried on under the influence of other secret designs? Did these gentlemen believe it beneath their dignity to appear to be under the influence of a force that was embodied in our organisation and which had succeeded to bring about the new elections and the appointment of the deputies?

Were these gentlemen unable to appreciate that, from the very fact that these deputies belonged to a strong national organisation extending throughout the country, a clear path might be laid down under the leadership of this organisation? I repeat—from this very fact the greatest confidence would be established in our country as well as abroad; this alone would compel the respect of the whole world?

Moreover, would we not have been prophets to foresee that the Chamber could not render the services expected from them unless the deputies were in a position to take up a determined attitude and brave every danger, inspired by firm confidence in the reality of a clear national aim? Or were they, as later events showed, possessed of such mentality that they could unblushingly swallow every insult like cowards?

These gentlemen did not want me personally to be in communication with the deputies. The Government, also, and certain other persons believed it to be still less desirable that I should go to Istanbul. They merely advised that a delegate with wide powers should be sent. Wonderful and praiseworthy sagacity! Were not the delegates whom we did send responsible for the fact that the deputies of our nation fell into the hands of the enemy? Again, were they not our delegates who in the end were proved to be incapable of even looking after the safety of their own persons?

And what have we to say about the tact shown by these gentlemen who, after having been unsuccessful with their own invitation to the deputies and after having been unable to deceive them or create a *fait accompli*, had asked us to influence the deputies on the lines of their manoeuvres?

Is not this a very remarkable kind of tactfulness?

In reply to the telegram which I shall speak about directly, I sent this short message in cipher:

5th January, 1920.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

Reply.

"Will you be good enough to let us know the names of the deputies who signed the appeal and to whom it was addressed."

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee,

Harbiye, 6th January, 1920.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps, Ankara.

Reply to telegram of 5th January.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

"These are the names of the deputies: Hüseyin Kâzım, Tahsin, Celâlettin Arif, Hamit . . . , etc. The two former brought the appeal to me."

Cemal

Minister of War

As we learned from later information, it was not at all a group of deputies who had sent the telegram in question. It is reported that the Grand Vezir, after having heard that a certain Hakkı Bey, whom he knew, had been elected Deputy for Siverek, asked him and Hüseyin Kâzım to come to him and dictated to them a telegram they were to send to me. It was further said that this telegram had been passed from hand to hand by some of the deputies, who also signed it. Then it was reported that Hakkı Bey and Hüseyin Kâzım Bey had taken the telegram to Cemal Paşa to get it ciphered.

The telegram, which contained five articles and was meant to represent an appeal, had therefore been drawn up later in a fraudulent manner. To call attention to this deception, it was enough that an appeal was mentioned and that it bore no address. The Chamber had not actually met yet, nor had the presidency of it begun to exercise its functions.

Nevertheless, I replied to the questionable message from Cemal Paşa in this telegram in cipher:

Telegram in cipher.

Ankara, 9th January.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

To be handed to Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, Tahsin Bey, Celâlettin Arif Bey and Hamit Bey.

We have seen from the telegram you sent to us through his Excellency Cemal Paşa that you consider that the departure for Ankara would produce malicious comments. This question is of vital interest to the country and the nation.

If a strong party, supported by the national organisation, is not formed in the National Assembly; if the resolutions which the nation has brought to the knowledge of the whole world through the Congress of Sivas are not adopted by a crushing majority as a guiding principle and article of faith; they the results at which our national unity is aiming will be destroyed and the country will be exposed to disaster. The propaganda made by a group of people without country and without religion cannot be accepted by us as a practicable principle. Our aim is to secure the salvation of the nation and to save the country. We attach the greatest importance to the fact that you are coming to Ankara for several days so that we can exchange opinions and that the adoption of uniform principles will be possible.

Taking the above into consideration, we hope you will do what you consider right and will receive the assurance of our feelings of esteem.

Mustafa Kemal,
In the name of the Representative Committee.

Whilst we were engaged in dealing with the difficulties that resulted from the disgraceful behaviour in Istanbul which I have spoken about, a sanguinary and rather serious incident brought about by a false prophet took place on our eastern frontier.

We received numerous reports about it from the XVth Army Corps.

Four leagues from Bayburt there is a village called Hart. A certain Seyh Eşref living in this village had been spreading the doctrine of Shiism there. Roused by this propaganda, the Müftü and Ulema of Bayburt sent a deputation to Hart to consult the Seyh.

In the name of the local authority, he was requested to answer certain questions but failed to do so. Thereupon the local government sent a detachment of fifty men against him. The Seyh, incensed at this, ordered his pupils to disarm the detachment sent against him and cast the officers and men into prison, while some of them he executed.

Then some troops were collected at Bayburt, but in the end it was thought advisable to settle the affair without any further bloodshed.

Several deputations consisting of Ulema and notables went to the Seyh to give him advice and bring him to obedience.

Sixteen days elapsed. The requests of the last deputation, under the leadership of the Kadi of Erzurum, had scarcely any effect at all on the Şeyh. He addressed them in these words:

"You are all unbelievers. I do not recognise one of you. I refuse to surrender. I shall fight you to the end. God has told me that He has chosen me to preach His religion." Meanwhile, to attract the people to support him and incite them to revolt, he caused statements to be circulated in the neighbouring villages and signed them as "The Founder of a Religion" or "The Expected Messiah."

Lt-Colonel Halit Bey had gone to Bayburt to take over the command of the 9th Division, which was quartered there, and he marched to Hart at the head of sufficient troops on the 25th December.

The Şeyh refused to surrender and declared that he would defend himself with the aid of the rebels he had succeeded in gathering round him. A skirmish was unavoidable. Both the artillery and the infantry came into action, and some more of the Şeyh's disciples from the neighbouring villages reinforced him. As Halit Bey told me in a telegram in cipher, which he sent directly from Bayburt on the 1st January, 1910, "the affair at Hart terminated after the false prophet, his sons and some of his adherents were killed. Then Hart capitulated."

In the same telegram Halit Bey also gave me some information about the deputies. I replied on the 21st January, 1920, "I congratulate you heartily on your success at Hart, and I thank you for all you have done to hasten the departure of the deputies for Ankara."

Mustafa Kemal

*

* *

There was a chronic difference of opinion between the Minister of War and the Representative Committee. The Minister intended to put the generals and senior officers in Istanbul, from the rank of colonel downwards, at the head of the various Army Corps and Divisions.

He also stated that he wanted to transfer the senior and junior officers who were in that town to regiments in Anadolu. To inaugurate this intention of his, he proposed to appoint Ahmet Fevzi Paşa, formerly Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of War, to the command of the XXth Army Corps at Ankara *vice* Ali Fuat Paşa, and Nurettin Paşa to the command of XIIth Army Corps at Konya *vice* Colonel Fahrettin Bey. This was his intention.

If this principle had been carried out, nearly all the younger officers of high rank who had distinguished themselves in the World War and who had been appointed to command Army Corps and Divisions would have lost their commands.

In that case, the generals and higher officers in Istanbul on the retired list would, on account of their rank and long servise, be preferred to the younger officers who were in command of the larger units of the Army.

We could never have consented to such a principle, especially under the conditions then prevailing.

Consequently, whenever the opportunity offered we wrote to Cemal, over and over again explaining our point of view and asking him not to allow these officers to take up their appointments.

Fahrettin Paşa at the head of his Army Corps was busily engaged in making his dispositions on the Aydın front. Ali Fuat Paşa had been dismissed in Ferit Paşa's time. Çemal Paşa had no inclination to put an end to this injustice.

The late Mahmut Bey, commanding the 24th Division, who was at Ankara, had taken over the command of the XXth Army Corps for the time being. As he was at the same time in command of the national troops, Ali Fuat Paşa kept his Army Corps well in hand.

We resolved categorically to oppose any change being made in the command of the great units of the Army; we determined not to sacrifice those officers whose personality and friendly attitude towards the nationay movement were well know to us in favour of a principle which had been put forward with some sinister intention. We considered it necessary and desirable that only the young and loyal officers and medical men who were in Istanbul should be sent to Anadolu, without loss of time, to serve in the different branches of the Army there.

As soon as we arrived at Ankara, Cemal Paşa began to show greater obstinacy and impatience on this question. He made it a personal matter and threatened to resign.

He urgently called me to the telegraph instrument so that I could reply to him immediately. On the 29th December, 1919, I sent him the following telegram in cipher:

"We have never recognised the removal of Ali Fuat Paşa from his command as being final. For this reason, we cannot allow Fevzi Paşa to be appointed to succeed him.

To carry out the principle you are adopting before Peace is concluded will lead to very serious consequences. It is impossible for us to consent to men who have acquired rank and position during the war being reduced in rank now. Such a step would compel those who are working at the present moment for the national organisation to send in their resignations, and this would lead to national unity suffering a severe setback. The position of capable men on the retired list would be improved by giving them appointments in the offices of the Army Corps and in the recruiting offices or by giving them commands in districts and places which are under the various Army Corps.

As for the junior officers and officers on the Medical Staff, they ought to be sent without delay to Anadolu.

With regard to the XIIth Army Corps, it has declared its adherence to the national movement and is now on active service against the enemy. The mutual confidence that has emerged from this actual co-operation inspires both parties at the present moment. Any change in the command would not be tolerated. The state of affairs in these districts would not allow such an alteration to be thought of."

I entered into communication with all the officers commanding in Anadolu and Rumeli and called their attention to this matter.

At the beginning of January, I gave the following order to Fahrettin Paşa at Konya: "If Nurettin Paşa is appointed to your command you are not to surrender it to him, and you will continue to perform your duty towards the nation and country as you have hitherto been doing. Report to us at once any communication that reaches you on the subject." A similar order was sent simultaneously to Fuat Paşa at Ankara.

During the first days of January, Cemal Paşa sent Salih Bey, his A.D.C. — now Salih Paşa commanding the VIIIth Army Corps — with two letters to us, the Joint Note from the Allied High Commissioner, dated 24th December, 1919, and a copy of the Government's reply to this Note.

In these letters Cemal Paşa also spoke of his principle of replacing the commanding officers and of the necessity of sending Ahmet Fevzi Paşa and Nurettin Paşa to take up their commands. He also insisted that if men who had openly joined the national movement were allowed officially to retain their important commands, the opinion would be gathered — especially in foreign countries — that the Army was taking an interest in politics; an unpleasant impression would undoubtedly be produced thereby and the Ministry would receive many expression of similar opinions about it. Speak-

ing again of his resignation, he added that the meeting of the Chamber in such an event would be nothing more than an empty hope. (Document 216.)

The replies I sent to this communication may be summarised in the following:

"We repeat that we are convinced that our views are the correct ones. The present situation and the future of the front and the districts of Aydin — which has been handed down to us through the criminal acts of Ferit Paşa — as well as the national forces in these districts, are questions of continual and most serious anxiety. We are doing everything we can to avoid being troubled in the future.

"It is very important for us that the Government should not regard Ali Fuat Paşa as guilty, as the world seems to think he is. The resignation and removal of persons who were the early pioneers of the national movement would be attributed to the fact that their loyalty is regarded as a crime. This is a suggestion that we consider intolerable.

"Everything has been done to eradicate the political objections that have been raised by the Government.

"Ahmet Fevzi Paşa is quite unfitted to work with us. We have told you of the perfectly unreasonable speeches he made during the journey of inspection which he took by order of the Government. You told us that you did not believe that he had expressed himself in such terms. In a private telegram in cipher which he addressed to our comrades he says that "the catastrophe looming before our country will be inevitable unless an end is put to the anarchy prevailing in the Army to-day." This man appears to see anarchy in the support which the national movement renders to the Army. He ought to know, however, that the Army is not independent of the national organisations but is, indeed, the very heart and soul of them.

"The first thing that Ahmet Fevzi Paşa did at Gönen was to demand the release of the criminals who were implicated in the affair of Anzavur and whose capture was only effected after endless trouble.

"Do not try to make a personal question out of this matter, because you are well aware what reasons influenced us to refuse to consent to your appointment of these two persons, which you made without previously consulting us. This would be incompatible with a feeling of fidelity and attachment to the country and the nation.

"Your remark that in case of your resignation 'the meeting of the

Chamber would be nothing more than an empty hopé, means that the Cabinet, including the Grand Vezir, is opposed to the Parliamentary régime. We would be very glad if you will explain this important point." (Document 217.)

I would like to say a few words about the Joint Note presented by the Allied High Commissioners to Ali Riza Paşa's Government and which we received, as I have said already, from Salih Bey, A.D.C.

After having called the attention of the Ottoman Government to correspondence between General Sir George Milne, commanding the Black Sea Army, and the Minister of War, the High Commissioners of France, Great Britain and Italy expressed themselves in these terms:

"From this correspondence it is clearly evident that Cemal Paşa Minister of War, instead of carrying out the instructions given to him by the officer in chief command of the Black Sea Army, according to the decision of the Supreme Council in Paris, avoids the responsibility attached to his high office and puts forward certain excuses and reasons which we cannot accept.

"The High Commissioners, in calling the attention of the Ottoman Government to the serious consequences that will follow the attitude of the Minister of War, are desirous of knowing what steps the Government consider necessary in order to carry out the decisions of the Supreme Council which have been communicated to them by the officer in command of the Black Sea Army.

"In order that they may be in the position to inform the Supreme Council — who are aware of this — the High Commissioners request the Ottoman Government to inform them immediately what they propose to do about the neglect of the orders given to the Minister of War on behalf of the Supreme Council."

In their reply to this Note, the Ottoman Government first describe how the occupation of İzmir took place. Then they mention the investigation made by the Mixed Commission and the distress of the population, who only thought about what they could do to escape from the murders and acts of violence arising from the cruelties of the Greeks up to the time when the investigation began. Then they speak of the confidence felt by the Government and the Army in consequence of the sense of justice and fair-play shown by the Commission of Inquiry. They recall the proposal made by the Ottoman Minister of War to General Milne in their letter of the 23rd August, 1919, with the sole object of putting an end to the bloodshed, if

only for a short time, and they add that their proposal to interpose Ottoman troops between the Greek and national troops had been rejected.

It is further pointed out in this Note that two other letters, dated 20th and 27th August, 1919, proposing that the occupied territory should be occupied by Allied troops other than those of Greece had remained unanswered.

It is emphasised, in addition, that the letter from General Milne on the boundary question was sent to the Minister of War on the 3rd November, 1919, but that he, not being authorised to deal with the contents of this communication himself, had applied to the High Commissioners to explain his position.

The Note also mentioned that the entire population unanimously opposed the Greeks alone occupying the temporary boundary line. Explaining that the Government and the Army lacked the power to restrain the people, the Allied Powers were asked to suggest a fair solution of the question. Accompanied by the traditional solemn declarations of the deepest respect, the Note ended with this urgent request: "We ask for your kind mediation in helping us to dispel the suspicion that the Government and the Minister of War refuse to carry out the decisions of the Supreme Council." (Document 218.)

I will now refer to the points dealt with in Cemal Pasa's letters.

While the Minister of War informed us on the one hand about the Note presented by the Allied High Commissioners, on the other he reminded us again of the points he had wished for a long time we would agree to and which he now continued to insist upon. I do not know whether we ought to believe that, in fully explaining his wishes to us once more and at the same time giving us this Note to read, Cemal Paşa wanted to influence our opinions.

After having spoken of the aims of the policy of the Allies, Cemal Paşa continued: "The Government intend shortly to publish a declaration promising that the reforms which can be accepted within the points proposed by Wilson will be carried out. We must not irritate the Minister of the Interior, for if we do he will resign and this will lead to a crisis. It is certain that when Parliament opens there will be a change in the Ministries of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs. Our enemies do not want the Chamber to be opened. We have heard that the Union of the Friends of England, pretending that the recent elections were not conducted according to law, intends to appeal to His Majesty to dissolve the Chamber."

(Document 219.) He mentions once more the question of the deputies going to Ankara.

Now let us analyse what has been said in these three documents and subject them to a short analysis.

From the Note presented by the High Commissioners it can be seen that Sir George Milne, commanding the Black Sea Army, had personally given counsel and orders to Cemal Paşa, Ottoman Minister of War, just as though the latter was directly under him. Till now, Cemal Paşa had not mentioned this to us.

We see, also, that the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire is criticised because he was unable to carry out the instructions and orders that had been given to him and because he brought forward reasons and excuses that were unacceptable.

We can well understand what the orders were that the Minister received and why he could not execute them. The reason was that the national forces resisted them... The national forces did not obey the orders given to them then or afterwards by the Minister of War and the Government in accordance with those issued by Sir George Milne... This is what the High Commissioners, on behalf of the Supreme Council in Paris, call in their Note "inacceptable reasons and excuses." In other words, they mean to say: "If you are a Government, if you are a Minister of War, you must govern the country, the people and the Army; if you do so, reasons and excuses are superfluous."

Ali Rıza Paşa's Government came into power on the 2nd October, 1919. It succeeded Ferit Paşa's Cabinet. Therefore, it was the latter that proposed on the 23rd August, 1919, that Ottoman troops should be interposed between the Greeks and the national troops. And again, it was Ferit Paşa's Government that proposed on the 20th and 27th August, 1919, that the territory should be occupied solely by Allied troops.

Ali Rıza Paşa's Government had not yet made any proposal. On the other hand, General Milne indicated the boundary of the occupied territory and ordered Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, to extend the Greek troops up to this border-line. This was the command that Cemal Paşa found himself unable to obey. In any case, it is a remarkable fact that he and the Cabinet of which he was a member, after having been in power for a month, were at last able to declare to the foreign Commissioners that they were powerless in face of the national forces.

In the Government's reply to the Joint Note of the High Commission
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

ers, one point is passed over in silence, while the answer to all the demands of this Joint Note shows perfect deference and courtesy. In my opinion this fact is the most important and most significant thing of all in these documents. This main point, I maintain, is that Sir George Milne ventures to give direct orders and instructions to the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire and yet this does not seem to wound the pride of the Minister of War, who, in all his transactions with the national organisation, is ever referring to questions of self-respect and scarcely ever mentions the dignity of the Government who accepted the responsibility of safeguarding the independence of the Ottoman Empire. They will not allow that their dignity is already assailed and the independence of the State jeopardised. They do not even protest against this attack; they do not even venture to assert that they decline to make themselves the instrument for this blow against our independence. They do not venture: why? — because they are afraid! They had to suffer for their fear, as we shall soon see. To avoid being afraid we must live in surroundings and in circumstances where human dignity and national pride are immune from any attack.

As for those who do not appreciate this necessity, we would err if we assumed from the very start that they are insensitive and indifferent to the sacred sentiments which it is the highest and most honourable duty of a nation and an individual to protect from assault.

It is not by urgent petitions or by appealing to justice and pity that the affairs of a nation and a State are promoted or their dignity and independence guaranteed.

To sue for justice and commiseration should never be accepted as a principle. The Turkish nation, generations to come, must never lose sight of this for an instant.

I told you of the answer we had sent to Cemal Paşa about the change of commands. Let me tell you what the views were that we expressed on different questions at the beginning of this reply. Our interpretation of the main subjects was this:

1. All the Allied Powers intend to obtain for themselves as much as possible of the interests they covet in every part of Turkey. This leads them to create for themselves individually a strategical point of support in Turkey upon which they can rely.

The neutral attitude of the Government discourages them. To this fact we must attribute the cause of the hostility and dissatisfaction shown

by the foreigners, as well as the weakness of a Government that have not the country behind them.

2. The Government must not be in too great a hurry to publish their declaration. It must not be published before the position of the Cabinet has been established. The Cabinet can have no strength unless they pursue a course which carries the conviction that they rely entirely on the national forces, and unless they publicly declare their identity with these forces and proclaim the fact openly before the whole world.

When the Chamber has met and a strong party within it is composed of adherents of the Defence of the Rights, it will be time enough to think of giving explanations.

In any case, it must be drawn up before the departure of the Peace Delegation, in co-operation and in accordance with such a party. For, without this co-operation it would be of no use at all. Besides, it would be altogether wrong to begin with a list of the reforms which it is proposed shall be carried through. On the contrary, the main consideration, namely, the independence of the nation and the integrity of the country, must be put forward from the very first; then the proposed administrative reforms will come up automatically for discussion.

The manifesto and regulations issued by the General Congress at Sivas contain very important guiding principles; on them this statement can be based. Accurate indications of the future frontiers, the independence of the State and Nation, the rights of minorities, the interpretation that the nation puts on the expression "foreign help", are all referred to in them.

A statement on these lines can be prepared at once, but it must not be published before the Chamber has been opened and union with the majority in power has been effected. This is the procedure that must be adopted.

3. We can see no reason why the resignation of the Minister of the Interior should lead to a crisis in the Government. You give the impression that you look upon the Minister of the Interior as being the Grand Vezir, because it is only the resignation of the Head of the Government that produces a crisis. The impression is given that the Cabinet falls with Şerif Paşa and that he is dependent on Ferit Paşa.

We cannot understand what you mean when you say that a change in the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is certain

to occur when Parliament is opened. Have these Ministers already threatened to retire then?

It is quite natural that our enemies are doing all they can to prevent the Chamber meeting. But ought the Sovereign to allow himself to be used for the dissolution of Parliament? If this is at all probable, we would have assembled Parliament in Istanbul merely for the purpose of dissolving it and leaving the nation without a Parliament. Consequently, it is very important that we should be accurately informed of the intentions of the Sovereign concerning this probability at once, in order that we can make arrangements for the deputies to meet in a safe place outside Istanbul. If the Chamber meets in Istanbul and this suggested fate should befall it, the responsibility will rest on those who insist that it shall meet in Istanbul.

4. It would be better if the deputies came to Ankara to discuss matters with us.

*
* *

I felt it my duty to get into closer touch with the honourable inhabitants of Ankara, who had received me in such a wonderful manner and had shown me such really sincere and encouraging sentiments, to discuss the questions of the day with them.

Therefore, we held a public meeting. This took place at the time when we were expecting the deputies whom we had invited to come to Ankara. (Document 220.)

I will tell you as quickly as possible what we talked about at this meeting.

First of all, Wilson's principles. Some of the fourteen points included in them apply to Turkey. The Ottoman Empire, vanquished and driven to ask for an armistice, had trusted in a miracle in view of the reassuring influence offered by these principles.

Next, the 30th October, 1918, the articles of the armistice at Mudros, especially Art. 7, were like "corrosive poison eating into the brain of every patriot."

This article alone was enough to wreck the fate of what still remained to us of our country, as it provided for the possible occupation and invasion of the country by the enemy.

The miserable spectacle, without dignity or honour, presented by Cabinets composed of weak and incapable men which succeeded one

another in Istanbul, was regarded as a true picture of our guiltless and long-suffering nation. It was considered to have no influence at all, and the civilised States went so far in their indifference to it that they ignored the claims of civilisation in their treatment of Turkey.

The most absurd rumours, which it had been their custom for a long time to spread abroad in the world against the Turkish people, were received with more credence than had ever been the case before.

The awakening of the nation and the activity shown during the last nine months has altered the picture. The situation has improved and will continue to do so. If the nation succeeds in preserving its independence and does not shrink back from any sacrifice that may be necessary to win independence, the end is sure.

The foundation laid by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses is the principle upon which Turkey must build her future.

The nation caused the overthrow of Ferit Paşa's Cabinet. But it is not the nation that must bear the responsibility of the Government having been entrusted to Ali Riza Paşa. Nevertheless, we accept it.

I shall now review the discussions we had with the deputies who had arrived at Ankara. They could not all get there on the same day; they came singly or in small groups, and they left in the same way. As a result of this, we had to repeat, day after day, almost the same points to each individual or to each group.

As you are aware, it was most important to establish confidence in all of them. Actuated by this, we sought first of all for the satisfactory features in the home and foreign conditions and tried to make them understand these as thoroughly as was possible. We were never tired of repeating this truth to them: conscious and sound unity is an indestructible power that will guide us to a definite result.

We explained that the existence and happiness of human society depend on perfect cohesion being shown in critical times.

We told them that our national unity, which aimed at the salvation of the country and the victory of independence, required the creation of a serious regular organisation, and we spoke of the amalgamation — if I may use the term — of the capable leaders and the forces required to mould them into one indivisible whole. In this way we expressed the necessity for the formation of a strong and uniform party in the Chamber which was soon to be opened in Istanbul.

The nation was passing through such a critical time as is only recorded in history in periods of disaster which mark the fall and extinction of States. The future that nations prepare for themselves by neglecting to take their destiny into their own hands is problematical and fraught with misfortune.

The Turkish nation began to realise this truth. And thus it happened that they hastened to respond to every sincere call that could promise them salvation. It would, however, be an error to believe that the spiritless education and administration that had been going on for several centuries could allow any human society to obtain its freedom in a day or even in a year. Therefore, those who have penetrated into the inner depths of human affairs and had recognised the truth must regard it as the highest duty on earth to enlighten and educate the people as far as possible and to guide them on a path that leads them to their goal.

The heart-felt longing that wells from the innermost part of the Turkish nation, the firmest faith of their consciousness, was already crystallised in the single word: Liberation.

The cry for liberation resounded from one end to the other of our Turkish native land. There was no longer any need to consult the people. It was easy for them henceforward to find words that expressed their yearning.

In the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses the national will had clearly been formulated.

Those who had been elected deputies by the nation, because they had openly declared their fidelity to the principles laid down at these congresses, had before anything else to form a party that shared these principles and that bore a characteristic name which expressed the purpose of the union that had supported these principles, namely, the "Party representing the Union for the Defence of the Rights."

Supported by the national organisation and emanating from the nation itself, this party had to accept the duty of courageously representing and defending the sacred claims of the nation throughout the land.

We also consulted the deputies as to the way in which the claims and aims of the nation should be expressed in short and weighty terms, so that these could form the basis of a concise programme. To gather some idea of it, preliminary drafts of such a programme were made, called the "National Pact."

These bases were finally determined upon in the Chamber in Istanbul and were clearly defined.

All the individual persons and parties with whom we had discussed these questions left us with the assurance that they were fully in accord with us. Nevertheless, we never heard that they had formed a party in the Chamber in Istanbul that was called the "Party for the Defence of the Rights." Why was that?

Yes, indeed, — why? I have waited for a reply to that question until to-day. These gentlemen felt that they were bound to look upon the formation of such a party as a crime against their conscience, as a sin against the nation; they were men without faith, cowards, incompetents.

They lacked faith because they did not believe in the seriousness of the claims of the nation, in their paramount character; nor did they trust in the steadfastness of the national organisations from which the strength of these claims originated.

They were cowards; they thought it was dangerous to belong to the national organisations.

They were incapable; they were unable to appreciate that the only factor of salvation was the very nation itself and that it ever would be so. They were stupid enough to imagine that great aims could be attained simply by bowing down before the throne, by trying to gain the favour of foreigners, by suave and conciliatory behaviour.

In addition to all this, they were ungrateful and selfish. They put little value on the fact that nationalism and the national organisation had won respect in a very short space of time and had secured their very existence. They cared only for the satisfaction of their despicable conceit by adopting the false view that a settled position and certain existence were things of easy attainment.

Was it a shame to adopt a title such as that expressed and approved at Erzurum and Sivas? Was there any other title more characteristic or comprehensive?

Yes: we have heard that there was such a title as "Fellâhi Vatan Grupu"*. .

* "Fellâhi Vatan Grupu" literally means: "Negro party of the native land." This is an ironical rendering of the real name, which is "Felâhi Vatan Grupu", meaning the "Party for the Salvation of the Country".

I want to describe fully and accurately certain phases and events that we passed through. I would also like to unveil one side of the question with which we are dealing at this moment.

I was absolutely certain that in Istanbul an attack would be made against the Chamber and it would be dissolved. I had even decided what we would do if this should happen.

We made preparations and gave instructions to the effect that the Chamber would meet at Ankara.

While doing all that I thought it would be my duty to do concerning this, I had also considered what I would have to do to prevent any misunderstanding that might possibly arise in the minds of the people. This led me to wonder whether I ought to be elected President of the Chamber.

My idea was that as President of the Chamber I would have the necessary qualifications and authority to recall the deputies who had been dismissed. I admit that this step was only intended as a matter of form and that I could only make use of it temporarily. Nevertheless, in critical times it is necessary to take advantage of anything that might be of assistance, even if it should have only a temporary effect.

As a matter of fact, in any case I would not have gone to Istanbul.

Without betraying my intention, however, I would have temporised; the business would have been carried on as though I were only absent for the time being and the Chamber had been under a Vice-president.

Of course, those of our colleagues who were able to grasp the true state of affairs and actually went to Istanbul had to be very careful to avoid any hitch in our plan. I discussed this with several people who were interested in it.

They agreed with me and left for Istanbul promising and assuring me that they would carry out this plan to the letter.

But I heard afterwards that, with the exception of one or two of them, they did not even open their mouths to say a word on the subject.

The first suggestion that had been made was that the question should be asked whether there was not one among so many deputies representing the nation who was worthy to be elected President of the Chamber, even if they had to vote for a deputy who was not present? Would it not degrade the Chamber in the eyes of our enemies if the deputies who formed the Chamber were not people who recognised their own importance?

Another conclusion was:

"From the very beginning it will give the impression that the Chamber would be exposed to criticism if the leader of the national forces was to be elected President; therefore, this would not be expedient." Those who noticed that the people who came to such conclusions were not altogether strangers to me are reported to have preferred to keep silence.

I must admit that the defeat of this measure put me in rather a difficult position when the Chamber was dissolved.

I shall explain this to you when the opportunity occurs.

IV.

The Chamber was opened on the 12th January, 1920.

About ten days afterwards I received a telegram from the Minister of War which I shall read to you.

Telegram in cipher.

Harbiye, 11st January, 1920.

(To be delivered immediately.)

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps, Ankara.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

In a Note they have presented to the Government, the English have demanded that I shall dismiss His Excellency Cevat Paşa. Although this demand is energetically opposed by the Cabinet, circumstances have made it necessary that the Government should remain in power and that we, Cevat Paşa and myself, should resign.

Salih Paşa will temporarily take over the office of Minister of War. I beg you to refrain from saying or doing anything that could add to the difficulty that the Government is facing. Otherwise, the position will become much more serious than you can imagine.

Cemal,
Minister of War.

This telegram arrived on the 22nd January. I immediately sent the following reply at 11.30 a.m.

22nd January, 1920.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

1. Will you be good enough to send me the actual wording of the Note.

2. When I have read it I will inform you of our views about it. Do not be in too great a hurry to agree to the proposal.

Mustafa Kemal

The reply came with Cemal Paşa's signature in cipher.

Very urgent.

Kadıköy, 22nd January, 1920.

To the Command of the XXth Army Corps, Ankara.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Here is a summary of the Note. We are reproached for:

1. Having appointed specially selected officers to the Staff of the national forces;
2. Having sent soldiers dismissed from the XIVth Army Corps, and drawn from the strength of that Corps, to the national forces;
3. Having sent munitions, etc., for artillery;
4. Having delayed the demobilisation of the battalion that had returned to İstanbul from Zonguldak;
5. Having transferred a regiment from Afyonkarahisar to Alasehir;
6. Having transferred a regiment from Bursa to Bandırma.
7. It is known that the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff are personally responsible for the above. Both of these officers must be dismissed from their posts within forty-eight hours.

Please observe that the question of the Aydin front has not even been referred to in this Note.

In reply to it we said:

"There is no truth in Nos. 1, 2, and 3. No. 4 refers to a matter which has not taken place since I accepted office. In accordance with suggestions made to me I have sent these soldiers back to Zonguldak. With regard to No. 5 the officer commanding the division has been recalled."

"The sixth point, concerning Ahmet Anzavur; this was necessary for security's sake and has been the subject of correspondence with you. I refer you to the documents."

These explanations were not accepted. Therefore we have considered these alternatives: either not to send any other reply than the first one or not to take any notice of the orders contained in it; that the Cabinet should resign, or that I alone should do so. In the first case, we were afraid that it would give rise to a scandal here; in the second case, they would obtain precisely what they desire, namely, to bring Ferit Paşa back into Government: we rejected this proposal also. Therefore, we agreed upon the third, that is to say, that I should resign, and we preferred that the department should be administered temporarily by some other Minister. In any case, I would first like to hear what you decide, and I beg you to accept the assurance of my esteem.

Salih, A. D. C.
Cemal, Commanding the Division.

What does Cemal Paşa mean when he points out that the Aydin front was not even referred to? There is no doubt that the Aydin front and the support given to it is part of the national defence and that is what is referred to.

Cemal Paşa wants us to understand from this remark that the Representative Committee is responsible.

In my reply I gave Cemal Paşa the following order:

22nd January, 1920.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

If you comply with the demand of the English and resign, the consequences will be dangerous and much more serious than you suggest will be the case in the other event.

Besides, we cannot allow Your Excellency, who is a delegate of the Representative Committee, to resign without the knowledge of, and in opposition to the declared opinion of, the Committee.

We have also considered the possibility that the English might compel you to resign, and we have taken all necessary steps to meet this possibility.

Therefore, we would like to know the exact wording of the Note; after we have read it we will give you our decision. Meanwhile, we beg

you to keep us well informed of what is going on and continue to remain in the Cabinet. We ask you officially to carry out our instructions.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

I also sent this message to Ali Riza Paşa:

Ankara, 22nd January, 1920.

To His Highness the Grand Vezir.

The fact that the English have demanded the recall of the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff is a formal attack upon the political independence of the Empire. Does it not indicate that all the discussions about the division of our country and the annihilation of our political existence, which have stirred the public opinion of the whole world for a considerable time, have led to a final decision? Or, is this only a manoeuvre to find out what is to be done to put an end to our political existence? Or is it, perhaps, nothing more than one of those acts the Allies have come into the habit of performing, without even conferring with one another, to show their individual power? We do not know and we have no means of discovering which of these three possibilities is the right one. Neither can we find out whether there is any connection between this and the offensive which the Greeks have begun on the Salihli front.

But there is no doubt that if the Government of the Empire were to give in to this barefaced attack upon our political independence, and if the nation were to reply to it only by silence, we should be making it easier for our enemies to deliver further deadly attacks upon our political existence. Therefore, we formally demand that the Government, which is regarded by foreign countries and our own as being supported by the Union for the Defence of Rights, will energetically reject the proposal in question and at all costs retain the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, whatever shape the aggressive attitude of the English in Istanbul might take and however powerful it might be. The slightest degree of conciliation would not only be injurious to the independence and existence of our nation, but it would place the Government in a position that would be accepted as having abandoned their obligations towards the nation and would only delay and check our national struggle for independence. Consequently, if the Government would adopt such an attitude, we would be forced to declare that, as they have not fulfilled their obligations to-

wards our Committee, they have lost all the power bestowed upon them by the nation, and that we should hold them responsible for having taken up an attitude which is not compatible with our claim for independence. In case of resistance, even if the English would take upon themselves to remove the Minister of War from his office by force and overthrow the entire Government, the situation that would result would be still more favourable, in regard both to foreign countries and our own, than would be the case if the Government consented to sacrifice the Minister as they are ordered to do. We beg Your Highness to reply within an hour or two. If the English forbid us to hold communication with İstanbul, we shall declare a national and religious war for the purpose of gaining our independence.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli."

On the same day I sent the following telegram to Cemal Paşa:
Personal and very urgent.

22nd January, 1920.

To His Excellency Cemal Paşa, Minister of War.

You appear to have resigned your seat as Minister of War by command of the English. It is our duty and your own not to consent to this; it impairs the independence of our State and our Nation. We shall take all necessary steps to enable us to perform our duty to the end. We beg you to do yours, to retain your office and administer your department. If, from any personal cause or difference of opinion with your colleagues, you do not wish to remain in office, you may resign. But you are not to do so at the request of the English, but rather in a manner that behooves the Minister of a free nation. We beg you not to consider the matter from a personal point of view but to reckon with the probability of serious disasters threatening our country of which this intervention would conceivably be the forerunner. If you retire from the Government under other conditions, the English intervention and the attacks on our independence will be considerably facilitated. If you insist on not returning to your office, we shall feel ourselves obliged to add in serious terms that the Minister of War is also responsible through not fulfilling his patriotic duty. We shall declare that the English are attacking the independence of the nation. The fact that you have delayed for a whole day before communicating the contents of the Note to us and that your resignation pre-

ludes you from the possibility of carrying on further communication with our Committee makes your position still worse. We demand and insist upon an immediate reply.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

This was the reply sent by the Grand Vezir:

Sublime Porte, 22nd January.

To the Representative Committee of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

It is not the English alone who have demanded the dismissal of Cemal Paşa and the removal of the Chief of the General Staff. The representatives of England, Italy and France have presented a joint ultimatum to the Sublime Porte, in which they give the reasons that led them to make this demand, and wherein they give us fortyeight hours within which to accede to their demand. As this demand was considered to be unacceptable by the Government, they resolved, after careful consideration, to resign. Even if the Chamber had already met they could not have acted differently. To induce the representatives of the Powers to withdraw their demand, we have done certain things and have proved to them that their arguments were inconclusive. But the representatives have reiterated their demands. The resignation of the Cabinet was already a fact. Cemal Paşa has addressed them personally and has said that the resignation of the Government before the Chamber of Deputies had been able to begin their discussions would be very injurious to the country. He emphasised the probability that the resignation of the Government at such a critical time would lead to exceedingly grave consequences — even to a rupture between Istanbul and Anadolu — and he preferred that the question would be solved by his resignation. These are the different stages of the development. As the Chamber of Deputies will surely meet in sufficient strength in a day or two, the Government will put all these question before it. It is important that you should not interfere in this matter because the Chamber will take the matter in hand. The Ministers are perfectly well aware how serious the position is and are satisfied that they are doing the right thing. They have resolved to accept the lesser of the two evils. We inform you that, unless you tell us by Saturday morning that you will cease interfering, the Cabinet will resign and will accept no further responsibility for what may follow.

Ali Riza
Grand Vezir.

Gentlemen! This terrible ultimatum was not addressed to those who had offended him , but to us!

Congress.

22nd January, 1920.

To His Highness the Grand Vezir.

Before the Representative Committee can come to any decision about the contents of your telegram, it is absolutely necessary for them to know the text of the ultimatum. I beg you to let us know it immediately.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

Erenköy, 22th January.

To the Representative Committee of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

Reply.

It will be sent to you after the meeting of the Cabinet Council.

Ali Riza

The Grand Vezir.

I must here remark that we could never get a verbatim copy of the Note from the Government and have not done so up to the present moment.

This is my reply to the Grand Vezir:

12th January, 1920.

To His Highness the Grand Vezir

We shall send Your Highness our final decision after we have seen a copy of the ultimatum. There is, however, a difference of opinion existing between the Government and ourselves regarding the principles that govern the present situation which we should first like to clear up. The Government have regarded our communications as interference in their own affairs, that is to say, they have thought it necessary to ignore the diplomatic aspects and insist that they are dealing with a question of an internal character; but the only question before us is that a Minister has been removed from his post by foreigners. It is not a question of the person of the Minister of War as you appear to maintain. The incident must be judged in exactly the same way as if any other Minister or a totally different person had been in a similar position.

Moreover, it is doubtful at the moment whether the Power ordering the resignation of the Minister will allow the Chamber to be opened and will accept the declarations made by the Government. As we must be ready to guard against accomplished facts which might be created before the Chamber has been able to say a word, we are anxious to know the views of the Imperial Government. Your Highness will readily admit that if we should be called upon to face another accomplished fact before the Chamber has been able to say anything, and if there should be a postponement for the adoption of measures relating to delicate questions of foreign policy, the responsibility for this would not lie with ourselves. When the Chamber has actually met and has assumed its duties, we shall, naturally, not appeal to the Government on any question. The fact that the Note was not presented on behalf of the English alone, but was a Joint Note from the Allied Powers, is another reason for holding that the entire importance of this is that it is a matter of foreign policy.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

In reply to our telegram of 23rd January, 1920, Cemal Paşa stated that his resignation was inevitable and that he must wait until the National Assembly had shown what its attitude would be. (Document 221.)

At noon on the same day we communicated our own new point of view of the situation to the officers commanding at Ankara, Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Bandırma, Balıkesir, Konya, Edirne, İstanbul and Bursa, drawing their attention to it and asking them for their opinions. (Document 222.)

In addition to this, I sent this message to Kemalettin Sami Bey (now Kemalettin Sami Paşa, Ambassador in Berlin), who was commanding the 10th Caucasian Division and was then in İstanbul.

22nd January, 1920.

To the Officer Commanding the 10th Caucasian Division.

We request you to go immediately to Rauf Bey and to take the necessary precautions for your safety; to follow with him the development of the situation on the spot and in that neighbourhood. It is entirely out of the question to think of yielding to the demand of England. We have taken steps at once to meet the situation. You must secure telegraphic communication between İstanbul and ourselves. (Document 223.)

Mustafa Kemal

Through Kemal, commanding the Caucasian Division, Şevket commanding the fortress and the A.D.C. of Salih Bey, the Minister of War, I also approached Rauf Bey, Bekir Sami Bey, Cami Bey and all the other deputies in the following communication in cipher (22nd January):

The English have demanded that Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, and Cevat Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, should resign. This constitutes a deliberate attack on the independence of the State. For this reason, the steps which the nation shall take against this proceeding are part of the struggle which will be carried on to maintain our independence. During the first phase of this struggle the responsibility will fall on the deputies. They will have the paramount duty of repelling the attack which the English have made on the political independence of the Empire by interfering in the election of the Ministers and by exerting pressure upon the Government. Make definite plans regarding the part you will have to play in this and tell us what you decide. When we go into action, however, the following points must be made sure: Firstly, we must not expose ourselves to the possibility that, in some unforeseen way, an Irade will be read in the Chamber proclaiming its dissolution. If this appears at all probable, it will suffice if the deputies hold a private meeting and decide upon the course they will take. It is important that we declare to the Peace Conference, to the European Nations, to the Islamic World and to the country in general that a deliberate blow has been struck at the political independence of the Empire. If the English do not stop their aggressive policy it will be incumbent on the Chamber to transfer their meetings to Anadolu and to take the administration of the affairs of the nation into their own hands. This course will be supported in every possible way by the national forces, who combine in themselves the entire strength of the nation. The necessary arrangements about this have already been made.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

The contents of the above were communicated to all the commanders. In addition, I sent a message in cipher to Rauf Bey on the 23rd January, through the officer commanding the 10th Caucasian Division, to this effect: "Although the resignation of the Minister of War has been handed in, this question has not lost its importance."

"The representatives of the Foreign Powers have chosen to elect members of our Government just as it pleases them! This establishes a precedent that will give them the power to treat a government that has

A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Ataturk

the confidence of the Chamber in a similar way to-morrow. The pliability shown by the Government in this case, in leaving the nation and the Press in total ignorance of this incident and declining to treat it as a Cabinet question, also constitutes an attack on the independence of the nation. Consequently, this incident must not be passed over in silence, and it is imperative that the Government shall be overthrown publicly in the Chamber, because they have been incapable of upholding the independence of the nation." I wrote all this to Rauf Bey. (Document 224.)

On the same day I gave the following directions to the officer commanding the 10th Caucasian Division and to Rauf Bey: "It is necessary that the Government, on account of their resistance to the commands of the Allies, shall impress upon the Peace Conference the necessity of declaring before the whole world that they have decided to overthrow the Ottoman Government and that they do so on account of the national forces. The fact that the Cabinet and the former Government had tacitly consented to make concessions on questions that touched the national independence distinctly shows that their members have exposed their weakness; it further discloses that this term equally applies to their intelligence and understanding and that they are entirely undeserving of confidence. We cannot co-operate in solving such complicated questions with people who are so deficient, both in character and intelligence. Therefore, the Government must be overthrown as the outcome of this last incident. They must take care to bring a Minister into power who is worthy of the confidence of the whole nation." (Document 225.)

In view of the possibility that foreigners might extend their aggressive intentions and might attempt to arrest certain Ministers and deputies in Istanbul, I resolved, in anticipation, to make reprisals by arresting some foreign officers who were in Anadolu. I informed the officers commanding the Army Corps at Ankara, Konya, Sivas and Erzurum of my resolution in a private telegram in cipher on the 22nd January, 1920, and ordered them to act accordingly on the same day. (Document 226.)

The answer to the telegram I sent to the deputies was signed jointly by Vâsif Bey, Rauf Bey and Bekir Sami Bey. They told me that "as soon as the discussions in the Chamber officially begin, the Cabinet will resign as a result of the recent incident. In order to save the situation, it is necessary to keep the Cabinet in power till then. Abstain from doing anything meanwhile, and give us your instructions. You may feel assured that your point of view will be unanimously accepted by all the authorities." (Document 227.)

I decided to issue no more communications, either to the Government or the Chamber, but to leave it to my honourable colleagues among the deputies to make the necessary arrangements. (Document 228.)

In order to show you what ideas inspired the persons in Istanbul to act as they did, I will give you one or two examples as briefly as I can.

Some consider this or that diplomatic representative to be a very honourable man. He tells us that we may have confidence in him. He is a friend of the Turks. This man has expressed himself in very sincere and sympathetic terms. If the Minister of War and Cevat Paşa had not resigned, the War Ministry would have been occupied. The reserve and firmness shown by the national forces is very irritating to some people. But do not be too impatient — our enemies will be crushed, depend upon it. If an offence has been committed, there is no doubt that those who are guilty will be put to shame. Perhaps other insane acts will still be perpetrated but be very careful to avoid doing them yourselves. The persons who were in Istanbul felt convinced that such ideas as these were the right ones. (Document 229.)

It is reported that for a week after the deputies had been meeting in Istanbul they were busy with the selection of the officials of the Chamber and among other questions that of the presidency naturally cropped up in its turn. I have already mentioned that I thought it would be advantageous and even necessary that I should be elected President of the Chamber and that I had expressed my opinion about this to influential persons. In the first days when the deputies, as I have said, began to discuss this question, Rauf Bey told me in his messages of the 28th January, 1920, and 1st February, 1920, after having referred to other matters, that: "We did not continue to discuss the question because it was surrounded by considerable difficulty." (Document 230.) And he continued . . . "the question has been discussed recently at a private and confidential meeting. Şeref Bey explained the advantage of your being elected . . . We feel that at the moment the votes will be divided and we declared that Your Excellency would rather continue to direct the affairs of the nation and remain the power behind the Chamber. Our statement was received with applause, and we could see the sincerity of the manifestations for the person of Your Excellency that was shown in all parts of the Chamber. At the full sitting Reşat Hikmet Bey was elected President, while Hüseyin Kâzım Bey and Hoca Abdülazîz Mecdi Efendi were elected first and second Vice-presidents."

After all, Şeref Bey was the only member who advocated my election as President. At the meeting which they called "private and confidential,"

the other persons had not even suggested any reason for my being elected President. The question of my election ought to have been raised first of all, and then it could have been ascertained afterwards whether the proposal would have led to the votes being divided. Seref Bey's arguments were so weak and inconclusive that it was not easy to guess how the voting would have gone.

In my reply to Rauf Bey on the question of the election of the President, I said: "The doubts you express have been considered already and have been provided for. The reasons given in favour of my election are well known. They are that I would take care that the national forces are recognised by the nation; that I would carry on the duties of President very well in case the Chamber were to be dissolved; that I would endeavour, with the authority that would be vested in me as President, to consolidate the material and moral forces of the nation for its defence, in case a national upheaval should result from peace proposals that were irreconcilable with our future existence. What you say distinctly shows that these reasons relating to the defence of our country are regarded in certain circles in Istanbul as not being of any importance. If the defence of the nation was to be in jeopardy to-day or in the future on account of mistaken points of view, the responsibility would fall only on those who have committed this error. I need not assure you that I have no personal ambition concerning this question."

We know that the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff had been forced to resign. We have also heard that this same Reşat Hikmet Bey, who had been elected President of the Chamber and who has since died, had been arrested on some pretext by the foreigners. At that time, Rauf Bey himself informed us, on the 28th January, 1920, that the arrest of the members of the Representative Committee who were in Istanbul had been contemplated. This state of affairs proved that the hour was nearer than was generally anticipated when a hostile attitude would be taken up against the national forces, that the Chamber would be dissolved, and that, consequently, the necessity for providing for national defence was great. But only a few people anticipated this fact.

We had to do what was necessary at Ankara for the release of Reşat Hikmet Bey. (Document 231.)

A telegram in cipher, dated 27th January, 1920, in which Rauf Bey described the dilemma in which the Chamber was placed, contained some disturbing phrases. Here are some of them: "The Cabinet had first thought of resigning; but they did not. The present attitude of the Chamber does not help

the solution of this question. The deputies who are present here are not inclined to allow telegrams to be read in full sitting of the Chamber which the nation has addressed to the Chamber about the district of Maraş. We are advised to behave amicably on this subject towards the Allied Powers individually. There is not even a proper place for us to meet in." (Documents 232-233.)

In our telegram of the 7th February, 1920, we mentioned to Rauf Bey the following matters: The deputies, yielding to local and foreign influences which are increasingly in evidence in Istanbul, have lost sight of peace and are divided, some cringing before the foreigner and others trying to gain special favour for themselves or giving way to distrust. Our colleagues continually sacrifice their own conceptions and convictions with the object of winning as large a majority as possible of the deputies. In trying to be conciliatory, they have lost all their influence with the Government and recognised circles. If the present condition of things is allowed to go on, they will probably become the tools of anti-national movements and of ambitious people of various kinds; decisions on national questions unfavourable to us will be the inevitable consequence. The only thing to obviate this is to be content with one party — even though it be a small one — consisting of friends who are absolutely loyal to our principles. This would be far better than giving in, as has been done hitherto. Without hesitation or conditions, the Government must be overthrown. We must take a determined stand about this. (Document 234.)

Ali Riza's Government had not resigned. To avoid raising a controversy, the Chamber had not the courage to overthrow them and had put their confidence in this newly-formed and inexperienced Cabinet.

I do not know whether you remember the terms of the declaration made by this Cabinet before the Chamber. In a kind of introduction to it, the Grand Vezir pointed out the most important task he had fulfilled, namely, to put an end to the discord existing between the Government and Anadolu, which had even reached a rupture of relations between the two parties. He said that henceforward the national movement would find its expression in this High Assembly; he did not see what there was to prevent them from acting together constitutionally in the future.

He wanted it to be interpreted from these words that in the future the Representative Committee should no longer act in the name of the national will and would not maintain an opposition that was contradictory to the principles of the Constitution. The Grand Vezir did not think it necessary to speak about the injurious attack of which he himself had been the object

on the very day that the National Assembly had met — and with him the Chamber and the nation — and which was in contradiction to the national will and the principles recognised by the whole world. But he warmly resented the National Committee, and our honourable colleagues among the deputies stooped to listen to his words.

The Government, contending that they had not acted otherwise than impartially towards the political parties and would continue to do so, left it to the Chamber to appreciate the success they had hitherto gained.

Declaring that the administration of the country needed improvement, and referring again to the old system in which the Ottoman Empire had always taken refuge when pressed by the Powers, the Grand Vezir promised new reforms. "We shall," he said, "introduce the system of decentralisation to a wide extent."

He enumerated the principles of the intended reforms and said that, for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of minorities, proportional representation would be introduced and sufficient full powers would be given to foreign inspectors for the control of questions connected with Justice, Finance, Public Works, Police and even the Civil Administration.

Referring to foreign affairs, the Grand Vezir pointed out the obligation that: "The Imperial Government considered it their duty not to fail to carry out the stipulations of the Armistice," whilst on the other hand he was content to say that peace would put an end to the excitement and disorder caused by the occupation of Izmir, and he brought his statements to a close by expressing his firm conviction that "foresight and determination" will turn the "misfortune" into "happiness." (Document 235.)

It would be waste of time to analyse and criticise this statement, which was approved by the Chamber. But let me read you the precise wording of a document that shows the secret designs and shameful behaviour of Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet.

Very urgent.

Istanbul, 14th February, 1920.

To the Vilayets and independant Livas.

Whereas the National Assembly, which is the only place in which the national movement can find expression, has met and, with the help of God, has begun its work.

Whereas the complete carrying out of the constitutional laws in the country must now take place free from all obstacles and influences, and

whereas claims the name of the nation's will in any other place than in the said assembly are prohibited; and.

Whereas this is one the main points laid before the Chamber by the Government, in which a large majority has shown its confidence.

I hereby bring to the knowledge of all concerned by this circular note, that all machinations and actions tending to interfere with the affairs of the Government will be liable in the future to be punished according to law.

Ali Riza, Grand Vezir.

What was the purpose of this circular note? What advantage could be gained by depreciating the Representative Committee in the eyes of the nation and declaring that it would be liable to be punished? The Representative Committee, feeling from time to time the necessity for calling the attention of the Government to one matter or another, could have no doubt that their initiative was based on the purest and noblest intentions and dictated by strictly patriotic motives. The Government, considering their chief aim to be the suppression of the Representative Committee — thereby destroying the unity and integrity of the nation — show on the other hand no concern about the encounters which took place on the fronts of Aydin, Adana, Maras, Urfa, Antep. They seem to care less about the attacks made by the Foreign Powers, of which they themselves were the victims. I must openly mention here, also, that unfortunately there was no sign that the National Assembly, which was called "the only place in which the national movement can find expression," devoted itself to anything in particular, as the Grand Vezir had emphasised with thanksgiving to God.

In face of the statement of the Grand Vezir which I have just quoted, we decided to warn the nation in a circular message.

Circular Note

Telegram.

17th February, 1920.

Having succeeded in strengthening the national unity by achieving the opening of the Chamber — this authority which expresses the will of the nation in a lawful manner — our union looks upon it as one of their most important and fundamental duties to preserve the national unity till a peace is concluded that accords with the national aims. It being of importance that our union, animated by the spirit of determination and having ever-growing faith that they will overcome all their difficulties, should continue its work for the liberation of the country and the salvation of our

national existence, we renew our request to the general committees and the executive committees to continue their work so that the national organisation, whose aim is to secure the existence of the nation and its maintenance, may be formed with branches extending to the farthest corners of our country.

Mustafa Kemal,

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli."

A communication from Istanbul on the 19th February, 1920, brought us the news that: "The English diplomatic representative has verbally given definite information to the Government from the Foreign Office that the capital will be left to the Ottoman Empire, but, at the same time, he has demanded that the Armenian massacres shall cease forthwith and that our operations against the Allied troops — including those of Greece — shall also cease immediately." He added that if this was not done, our peace conditions would be altered. Certain advice was given to us at the same time to the effect that no incident, however insignificant, should be allowed to occur that could give rise to complaints being made concerning them."

What could be the meaning of this verbal communication? Could it mean that, in addition to the districts occupied by the Greeks, the French, and others, they resolved to occupy Istanbul as well? Only if their conditions are accepted will they abandon the idea of laying hands on Istanbul?

Or, perhaps, it meant that the Greeks, French and Italians, have only temporarily occupied certain districts. Perhaps the Allied Powers intended to seize Istanbul but would abandon the idea if we observe the conditions they imposed.

Or did the Allied Powers intend to indicate this: "The occupation by the Greeks, French and Italians is an accomplished fact; the occupation of Istanbul is contemplated; if you will allow the Greeks, French and Italians to remain in security and unmolested in their zones of occupation and if you actually give evidence that you consent to the occupation, we shall abandon the idea of occupying Istanbul?"

Finally, did the Allied Powers entertain some doubt about the Government not succeeding in disbanding troops at the front which the national forces had sent into the occupied districts to oppose the forces of the enemy and not putting an end to the fight they carried on and the movement they made against them, and did they consequently plan to occupy Istanbul on

the pretext that the Government could neither prevent the attacks against the Allied Powers (including the Greeks) nor put an end to the Armenian massacres — which, by the way, did not exist?

I believe that later events have shown that the last of these suggestions was the nearest of all to the truth. It was, however, noticeable that the Government, far from interpreting the proposal made by the English diplomatic representative in this light, had, on the contrary, founded their hopes on it.

In order to understand how ill-advised this proposal was, we shall recall certain phases of the situation as they presented themselves at that time. The assertions regarding the Armenian massacres were undoubtedly not in accordance with the fact. For the Armenians in the south, armed by foreign troops and encouraged by the protection they enjoyed, molested the Mohamedans of their district. Animated with the spirit of revenge, they pursued a relentless policy of murder and extinction everywhere. This was responsible for the tragic incident at Maraş. Making common cause with the foreign troops, the Armenians had completely destroyed an old Mohamadan town like Maraş by their artillery and machine-gun fire.

They killed thousands of innocent and defenceless women and children. The Armenians were the instigators of these atrocities, which were unique in history. The Mohamedans had merely offered resistance and had defended themselves with the object of saving their lives and their honour. The telegram which the Americans, who had remained in the town with the Mohamedans during the five days that the massacres continued, had sent to their representative in Istanbul clearly indicates in an indisputable manner who were the originators of this tragedy.

Threatened by the bayonets of the Armenians, who were armed to the teeth, the Mohamedans in the Vilâyet of Adana were at that time in danger of being annihilated. While this policy of oppression and annihilation carried on against the Mohamedans, who were only trying to save their existence and their independence, should have attracted the attention of the civilised world and excited their commiseration, how could the denials or the proposal made to us to abandon the attitude attributed to us be taken seriously?

Was not the position in the districts of Izmir and Aydin similar or, perhaps, more tragic?

The Greeks daily reinforced their troops and multiplied their munitions, and in this way they completed their preparations for an offensive. On

the other hand, they did not fail to deliver partial attacks all along the line. We had received news that during these days an infantry regiment, a fully equipped regiment of cavalry, twenty-four motor-lorries and a number of other wagons, six guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition had been disembarked at İzmir; enormous quantities of ammunition were on the way to the different fronts.

The truth was that our nation had never taken up an aggressive attitude anywhere against any foreigner without good reason.

Would it have been reasonable in these circumstances to place exaggerated importance on the base calumnies before the enemy had evacuated parts of our country which he had occupied, or before it was absolutely certain that he would do so? Was it so difficult to understand that such proposals and enterprises were only intended to destroy the national forces which had been the sole mainstay of the country? Considering how uncertain the future seemed to be, was it allowable to desert the national cause suddenly? Was it not the aim of our nation to keep not only İstanbul under our sovereignty but also the Straits, İzmir, the district of Adana, and, in short, every part of our country within our national frontiers? How could it be expected that the Turkish nation be satisfied with the understanding that İstanbul alone would be left to the Ottoman Empire — even if this would be a subject of satisfaction to Ali Rıza Paşa, the Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire — and that the nation, contented with this promise, would decide to remain calm and passive? Did not Vahdettin's Grand Vezir wish to ponder over his responsibility before history for all these machinations which were aimed at the disbandment of the national forces?

It was natural that the nation and the national forces refused to submit either to the demand of the foreigners or to the wishes and commands of the Government who tried to enforce them.

In a telegram in cipher which Rauf Bey sent on the 19th February, 1920, he gave us information about the Government and the Chamber which deserves your attention. This is a summary of what he said:

"On the 19th February, the Grand Vezir, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Marine attended a meeting of the "Felâhi Vatan" party. The Grand Vezir said that he did not consider it necessary or politically advantageous for the national forces to constitute themselves a second Government; that they had no right to interfere in the affairs of the Government; that the operations that had taken place in the district of Maras should cease and end; that quiet and security should be guaranteed.

He stated that Ziya Paşa and Ahmet Fevzi Paşa should be sent to Ankara, respectively, as Governor General and Commander of the Army Corps. The Minister of the Interior had also expressed his wish that his freedom of action should not be interfered with; he said that the Government had not succeeded in making the change in the appointments of the Prefect of Police and the Command of the Gendarmerie; he referred to the honesty of his old friend Keşfi Bey and informed them that he had appointed him Governor General of Bursa, while Faik Ali Bey was to be Under Secretary of State. With regard to Salih Paşa, he said that he was of the opinion that political reasons prevented the Government from taking possession of the places which had been abandoned at Maras and the neighbouring district. He added that such an attitude would incense the French Press against us."

"The Sovereign has more influence over the Government than the Chamber. Considering the spirit prevailing in the Chamber, it is impossible to overthrow the Government and put a national Government in their place that would fulfil the desired conditions." (Document 236.)

I brought this information to the knowledge of all commanding officers in Anadolu and Rumeli, and added: "The Representative Committee appreciate the difficulty of bringing a government into power which is more devoted to the national cause in a city like İstanbul, which is occupied by the enemy and is suffering under foreign pressure, and has therefore announced and communicated its opinion about the Grand Vezir's statement on the 17th February, 1920, in a circular addressed to all the organisations. Acting within reasonable limits, it is essential that every attempt to injure national unity shall be wrecked. We specially ask you once again to draw the attention of the persons concerned to the well-known fact that the national forces cannot abandon their activity until a peace is attained which is in accord with the national movement, and that they must redouble their watchfulness and guarded attitude in order to safeguard and strengthen the national unity and consolidation." (Document 237.)

I sent the following reply to Rauf Bey.

21st February, 1920.

To Salih Bey, A.D.C. to the Ministry of War. For Rauf Bey.

Reply to your telegram in cipher of 19th February, 1920

From the discussions that have taken place between the Grand Vezir and his colleagues who had accompanied him, and the "Felâhi Vatan"

party, it is clearly evident that the present Government, supported by the confidence placed in it by the National Assembly, are preparing to destroy the authority and influence which the national forces have gained throughout the country. The fact that Faik Ali Bey, who was dismissed on account of his resistance to the national movement, has been appointed Under Secretary of State; that the rank of Governor General of Bursa has been conferred on Keşfi Bey, Under Secretary of State, who worked with Ferit Paşa and Ali Kemal; and the persistency in the intention to send to Ankara Ahmet Fevzi Paşa and Ziya Paşa, whose appointment has not been approved of by the nation, clearly show that they are working openly against the national forces. As we are more than ever convinced of the fact that it is necessary for the Government and the nation to work in complete concord for the purpose of attaining a peace based on the principles agreed upon in accordance with the national movement, we consider that it is a national duty not to oppose or place difficulties in the way of the Government. All has not yet been accomplished and the national aim has not yet been attained. Almost insuperable difficulties are still lying before us. It is important to ask the Government, in the face of the complete uncertainty that veils the future, whether they consider that they can do without the efforts of the national forces in the struggle for liberation. As for ourselves, we consider that any attitude that could injure this national unity and solidarity, which has never before been apparent to the same extent in the history of our country, is a crime against our country, and we shall not hesitate to meet it by making reprisals. It will be very satisfactory if the members of the Government will be perfectly clear about the irrevocableness of the attitude which we should feel ourselves forced to adopt in such an event. The concord and unity existing between the Government and ourselves can only continue if the present state is maintained. The fact that appointments and dismissals are made which are by no means necessary and, especially, that an unyielding attitude is shown in the case of certain officials who had been dismissed on account of their hostile attitude to the national movement must be regarded as a sign of antagonism against the national forces; likewise, we shall not suffer that offices shall be entrusted to such persons. There is no doubt about the fact that Ahmet Fevzi Paşa and Ziya Paşa will be sent back without any further delay.

If our colleagues in the National Assembly, although fully conscious of the seriousness of the present situation, remain silent about these abnormal facts, the Government, who are being pressed and urged themselves on every side, will encourage it. It is, therefore, essential that those colleagues who

adhere to our ideal must take a definite and decided attitude in this particular case. If the Government were to rule the Chamber, it would lose the supreme control, and it is evident that in such an event it would be impossible to come to beneficial decisions for the liberation of our country and to realise a national aim. We implore you to put forward your utmost patriotic efforts to force the Chamber to adopt the aims of the national forces, which are accepted as an article of faith by the entire nation. The nation look upon them as sacred and they adopt them as their own. In addition, we beg you to take care that control is placed over the Government to see that they act on these principles in their fullest meaning.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

Let me read you another reply we sent to Rauf Bey:

Telegram in cipher.

21st February, 1920.

To Salih Bey A.D.C., Ministry of War. For Rauf Bey.

Reply to your telegram in cipher of 20th February, 1920.

If the Government have taken up a threatening attitude against the party formed in the National Assembly, it is because this group has not been able to develop and strengthen itself as a political party which is solid throughout. Thus it appears above all other things necessary that this party gets really to work and becomes an element of conscious control. The fact that the Government, with the intention of treating you with consideration and being amiable to you, have invited you again, arises from the fact that they have recognised your present weakness and wish to distract your attention, so that meanwhile they can gain time and strengthen their own position. It is time that you take up a determined attitude towards the Government. The Grand Vezir and the Minister of the Interior must be told plainly that the national forces will continue their activities until they have been successful.

Our enemies, who are still occupying the country and want completely to enslave the nation, might well consider themselves justified in objecting to the activity of the national forces. But that a national power struggling for the salvation of the State and Nation should be the object of attack from their own Government is a matter that astounds us.

In the same way as the opinion held by the Allied Powers that Istanbul should remain under Ottoman Government has given us satisfaction,

their demand that we should cease our activity has equally astonished us. We have informed Fevzi Paşa, the Minister of War, that we shall not lay down our arms until we are certain that Izmir and Adana will remain under Ottoman rule. We also want it to be recognised that we have not attacked the Armenians and that if certain incidents have occurred between the Armenians and ourselves — the former having been armed and incited by the French — the responsibility for this must rest on the shoulders of the Armenian nationalists and those who have encouraged them.

With regard to the Government's proposal that we shall not extend our operations beyond Maraş and Urfa, the immediate evacuation of Adana by the French must be insisted upon, so that the population may be quieted and that the national forces may be restrained. The French must be told straightforwardly that it will be impossible to prevent the national forces from continuing their struggle for liberation if Adana is not immediately evacuated; that the flame of patriotism is on the point of spreading to Aleppo and Syria; that the success of the French will increase immediately if they evacuate Adana and its surroundings; and that, in order to allay the violent articles in the Anadolu Press, the Allied Powers must discontinue their attacks and oppression.

To silence a guiltless nation that cries out against so much injustice, oppression — even massacres — which it has been called upon to endure, is a kind of tyranny to which it is impossible to submit. Throughout the world the Press is entirely free from such arbitrary restriction. We would rather that you had never helped the English to remove a great quantity of ammunition from Akbaş. We do not think that a single cartridge should have been returned to the English.

If the Government think that they will succeed in exciting the pity of the Allied Powers by rendering them such services, and if they think that such hypocritical behaviour would carry weight in bringing about any amelioration in the Peace conditions, we can only regret that they lack so much common sense. In short, as it is quite certain that in these critical moments, when the question of our peace is in the balance, every act that gives the impression of weakness on the part of the national forces will have a disastrous influence on the fate of our nation, we beg our colleagues to do their duty in controlling the Chamber resolutely and with the utmost devotion.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

On the same day it was considered necessary to send the following telegram also to Rauf Bey, because we wanted to find out what opinion prevailed about the work of the Representative Committee and the national forces. I had its contents also forwarded to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa at Erzurum.

Very urgent. To be delivered immediately.

21st February, 1920.

To Rauf Bey.

In order to convene the congress which will have the power under the last article of our regulations to alter the constitution of the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli, the Chamber of Deputies must give evidence that they are performing their legislative duties in safety and complete freedom. The Representative Committee, being the head of all the organisations in their present form, must continue to act officially until Peace is signed, as this is agreed to and demanded by all our comrades.

What excite public opinion against them and place them in a difficult position are: the attacks of the opposition Press, which are practically encouraged by the Government; the public insults thrown out by the Senate; the attitude and the acts of the Government, and, especially, the declarations made by the Grand Vezir and the speeches he makes in the Chamber, which were applauded whenever the question of the unlawfulness of the national forces was mentioned.

On the one hand, the organisations that exist under the title of the "Union for the Revival of Islam," to form which according to the Sovereign's wishes is the object of persons like Zeynelabidin, Hoca Sabri and Sait Molla, have no other object than to destroy the national forces by directly attacking them. Among other things they did on the 19th inst., they incited the inhabitants of Niğde and Nevşehir by such expressions as, "the Chamber of Deputies has already been opened," "our Sovereign does not desire that there shall be any more national organisation, or that there shall be any more public meetings or demonstrations held." It is not improbable that such ideas as these were spread as far as Konya and all over the country, and that similar incidents may take place there as well. Consequently:

1. The Government must be asked to inform us definitely whether they are for the maintenance of the national forces, or not;
2. It is necessary that the "Felâhi Vatan" party should ascertain whether they enjoy complete safety and freedom; whether they are con-

vinced that the national forces must be dissolved, or not; and that in case it is considered that they should be maintained, a statement to that effect should be laid before the Government and properly supported in the Chamber. We are agreed that the party should be asked to discuss this question;

3. If the suppression of the national organisations and the national forces should be decided upon in the interests of the country, it would be imperatively necessary to compel the Government themselves to take the necessary dispositions against the troops of the enemy on the fronts of Izmir, Maras, and elsewhere.

We beg you to consider what we have said above with the greatest seriousness and do what we have demanded. Also, we beg you to inform us of the result as quickly as possible, to relieve us from the difficult position we are in. We are under the impression that some of our colleagues in Istanbul are consoling themselves by putting great trust in foreign powers that are far away, instead of seriously concentrating their final efforts on doing something practical to protect us against the blows aimed at the unity of the national forces, which are the cause of so much anxiety and trouble. With regard to ourselves, we ask you to bear this in mind: If we do not succeed in making the best use now of the power we have in our hands, foreign Powers will no longer consider us worthy of mercy.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee.

In his reply of the 23rd February, 1920, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa said:

"I do not think it at all likely that the Representative Committee and the national forces will take up an antagonistic and domineering attitude against the tendency that is now apparent in the National Assembly in Istanbul. As far as I can see, the only course open to the Representative Committee is to withdraw from the affair in a dignified way and leave it to the sense of honour and patriotism of the National Assembly to decide what to do and assume the responsibility for their decision.".. "If the National Assembly does not agree to the maintenance of the national forces and the Representative Committee, they can express their thanks to them and, according to the resolutions of the Congresses, exercising their authority of legislative control in perfect security, they can inform them that they must be dissolved and stop their activity, meanwhile taking it upon themselves to watch over the destiny of the nation henceforward... But it is very doubtful whether the National Assembly could assume the respon-

sibility of coming to the decision and declaring that they are secure in their present position now and in the future. If Rauf Beyefendi puts forward this proposal, carries through the resolutions mentioned above, and induces the Assembly to write to the Representative Committee calling upon them to cease their activity, they must surrender voluntarily. They must publish the fact in the Press and announce it to the country, and from that moment they must stop all further activity. They will preserve their honourable position and their dignity in a legitimate way. It is understood that the Aydin front, which has been specially established during the last year on the urgent demand of the nation, will not be broken up nor will its fate be entrusted to the Greeks. Nor can the Government break it up. The men fighting on the front will continue to fight as they have been doing hitherto. But it will be a local fight, and the commanders of the Army Corps will carry it on from their own bases, according to circumstances and the object it is intended to attain. With regard to our position and our future actions, we shall do what we think necessary as events require. This is our opinion." (Document 238.)

This conception, this opinion expressed about twenty days before the actual occupation of Istanbul, is very important. I shall confine myself to calling your attention to one expression, namely, that "we shall do what we think necessary as events require." It was evident that we could not adopt such an attitude of resignation. On the contrary we were merely adherents to the principle of anticipating what might possibly occur, of calculating and deciding upon the course we should take and following it promptly and energetically. That is why from the very beginning we endeavoured to find out what they intended to do.

When I read to you literally the reply which I sent to Mazhar Müfit Bey's letter, you will appreciate what it was necessary to say in reply to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa. I shall not quote Mazhar Müfit Bey's letter. If necessary he will publish it himself. But this was my answer to it:

Ankara 25th February, 1920.

To Mazhar Müfit Bey, Deputy for Hakkâri.

I did not receive your long letter of the 14th February till yesterday, and I shall send my reply to it to-morrow by courier. Your account of the present state of affairs in the high National Assembly and in the "Felâhi Vatan" party has distressed me. The picture that arose before my eyes when I read all you told me is a very unhappy one.

The unfortunate people see that their honourable deputies, whose duty they imagine it to be is to defend, preserve and secure their lives, their existence and their destiny, have forgotten what their real duty is towards the nation and country from the very beginning. At a time when the West and all those whom we call our enemies are pretending that Turkey and the Turks lack any capability and, consequently, assign to themselves the right to take up any hostile action they think fit against us, and whilst we are all resolved to prove the error of this opinion so far as each one of us is concerned, it is painful to have to admit that our selfishness, our narrow-minded passions, are blinding us and depriving us of the power to see things as they are. "The deputies who first arrived wanted to do one thing; those who came later wanted to do something else; one deputy is treated by the Representative Committee as a confidential friend, and another as a narrow-minded man..."

Do those deputies who make speeches of this kind represent the great Turkish nation? The mentality and the character here revealed astound and confuse me, and I do not know what to think about it.

You speak of the formation of a new group or party... With regard to myself, my dear Mazhar Müfit Bey, I cannot believe that any group or party comprising men of the mentality and character you describe could assume such an attitude in the belief that it will help them to save the country. While my companions and I, who are doing our duty devotedly in the name of the Representative Committee, only desire to continue to work for the salvation of the country and the nation till we die, I can see from the attitude and behaviour of the honourable deputies a complete lack of foresight on their part, which leads them to stand in our way. We have written to Rauf Bey telling him to demand from the Chamber of Deputies and the "Felâhi Vatan" party, who in their childishness and shortsightedness have given us to understand that they no longer consider it necessary to rely on the organisation of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights" and the national forces who have created these organisations, that they should come to a final decision and tell us what they intend to do. We beg you also to exert your influence to obtain this decision as quickly as you can. In arriving at it I want to remind you that you must not forget the fact that at the seat of the Caliphate, which is the meeting place of the honourable deputies, there are 40,000 French, 35,000 English, 2,000 Greek and 4,000 Italian troops, and that the English Mediterranean fleet has cast anchor in front of the Palace of Findikli.

Mustafa Kemal

The first telegram in cipher that we sent to Rauf Bey referred to the leaders of our organisation in İstanbul; it is mentioned therein that they had agreed that part of the ammunition lying in the depot at Akbaş was to be handed over to the English. Allow me to tell you something about this. There was an ammunition depot at Akbas, which is situated on the European coast not far from Gelibolu. In this depot, which was guarded by the French, there was an enormous quantity of arms and ammunition. The Government, believing it to be in their interest to show their complacency respecting the desire of the Allied Powers, had promised to surrender some of the arms and ammunition stored in this depot. The Allied Powers intended to send them to Wrangel's army; a Russian ship had arrived at Gelibolu to carry them to Russia. The Government had previously obtained the consent and support of the leaders of our organisation in İstanbul to this.

But now, Köprülü Hamdi Bey, one of our heroic comrades at the head of a division of national troops, crossed the Strait on rafts during the night of the 26th February, 1920, reached the European shore, seized the depot at Akbas, arrested the French guard and cut the communications. Then he sent all the arms and a large part of the ammunition to Lapseki, meanwhile taking the French soldiers with him under escort. After he had taken the arms and ammunition into the interior of the country, he sent his prisoners back. We estimated that about 8,000 Russian rifles, 40 Russian machine-guns and 20,000 cases of ammunition were stored in the Akbas depot. (Document 239.)

Following this incident, the English landed 200 men at Bandırma. Foreseeing the possibility that the arms and ammunition, which were stored in localities in this district behind the territory garrisoned by the national forces where there were also some Allied troops, would be brought to another place by them or be rendered useless, or that Allied soldiers might occupy the depot, we issued orders to all commanding officers to take certain steps, and commanded them to act firmly and decisively. (Document 240.)

Almost at this identical moment, Anzavur had succeeded in creating a serious and almost dangerous situation in the districts of Balikesir and Biga. At Balikesir he intended to take the national forces in the rear. He commanded a rather considerable number of men. A sanguinary skirmish took place at Biga between his men and the national forces that were sent against him. Anzavur was victorious. He scattered our troops, captured our guns and machine-guns, killed some of our officers and men and took some

prisoners. Hamdi Bey, the hero of Akbaş was among the killed. Then Ahmet Anzavur, acting in the name of the "Union Ahmedîye" — which was named after himself — continued and extended his criminal activity.

On the 3rd March, 1920, I received a telegram in cipher which was of extreme importance. İsmet Paşa sent it from İstanbul. After I had arrived at Ankara, İsmet Paşa came to see me there. We were working together. But now His Excellency Favzi Paşa had succeeded Cemal Paşa in the Ministry of War. In obedience to the explicit request of his Excellency, and for an especially weighty reason, I had sent İsmet Paşa back to İstanbul a few days before.

The matter which we regarded as of special importance was this. The Greeks had prepared an offensive. The reasonable thing to do in such a case was to mobilize our forces and begin a regular war. His Excellency Fevzi Paşa was perfectly convinced of the necessity of doing this.

The presence of İsmet Paşa in İstanbul would be expedient, so that he could take the necessary steps, and by appointing him chief of the General Staff we would have been able to rely on his official co-operation. That is why I thought it would be a good thing to send him to İstanbul. İsmet Paşa's telegram ran as follows:

Harbiye 3rd March, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa

It is reported that a union has been formed in İstanbul which, in agreement with the English, has passed certain resolutions. Some of them are said to be: To overthrow the Government and hand over the power to another; to dissolve the Chamber and disband the national forces; to clear the way for the occupation of İzmir and Adana; to establish a Supreme Council of the Caliphate in İstanbul which would serve as the factor of peace and good-will amongst all Mohamedans; to draw up and publish a Fetva against Bolshevism. The Minister of War attaches importance to the objects of this union. The activity of Anzavur in Anadolu is the result of the work of this union, and so is the ever-increasing pressure of the English on the Government. The Minister desires me to send you this for your information. İsmet.

Salih, Major

A. D. C. to the Minister of War.

As you already know, the British representative had proposed to the Government that the operations against the Allied troops, including those

of Greece, should cease, and had informed them of the "gilded promise" made by the English, according to which Istanbul would still belong to the Ottoman Empire, on condition that this proposal was accepted. But we had been informed of the fact that, at the precise moment when this proposal was made in Istanbul, the Greeks had landed fresh troops, new means of transport, and enormous quantities of ammunition at Izmir, on the 18th, 19th and 20th February, and were preparing for a new offensive. We lost no time in passing this information on to the Government and drawing their attention to it, ignoring the fuss they had made in trying to prevent our so-called interference in the affairs of the Government.

While the Greeks were preparing for this new offensive, Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet was confronted with a new proposal, namely, "to retire the national forces who had taken up a position against the Greeks for a distance of three kilometres!"

It was evident that Ali Rıza Paşa's Cabinet was incapable of carrying out this proposal, but they intended to oppose it. The Grand Vezir under-force of circumstances, had replied that it was impossible to do this.

The Greeks began their offensive on the 3rd March. They seized the plateau of Gölcük and Bozdağı. Meanwhile, Ali Rıza Paşa resigned; the only thing he could do to extricate himself from his responsible position was to hand in his resignation and go. For, could it not be seen beforehand that Ali Rıza Paşa, who had done everything he possibly could to put an end to the activities of the national forces and had completely failed, would be held responsible by the Allied Powers if he had brought forward new proposals and had again failed?

Had not Cemal Paşa been turned out of the Cabinet because he had not obeyed the orders of Sir George Milne, the Commander-in-Chief? If they were preparing the same fate for Ali Rıza Paşa, was he not sure that the Sovereign would lack the power to keep him in office? In that case could he have relied on the National Assembly in Istanbul, which, as he said, was "the only place where the national aims found their expression"? Would he have condescended to lean for support on the Representative Committee, whom he had threatened to punish, by declaring that it was impossible any longer that they should speak or put forward claims in the name of the national will? To withdraw, therefore was merely to follow the line of least resistance, and this he did. (Document 241.) Ali Rıza Paşa had not consented to resign when we had asked him to do so during the first attack on the Cabinet. He had declared that he would be of greater service to the country

if he did not resign. And the Chamber had supported him by accepting his opinion, which only showed their ignorance. Did it happen that the duty which he referred to consisted in letting the Greeks have as much freedom as they desired to complete their preparations for the offensive which was intended to tread another part of the sacred soil of our country underfoot and cause more of our beloved countrymen to groan under their yoke?

Rauf Bey and Karavasif Bey, who had told us about this resignation in a ciphered telegram, dated 3rd March, 1920, also told us that the chairman of the "Felâhi Vatan" party and the Vice-president of the Chamber had been sent as a deputation to the Palace. They were not received by the Sultan; but he sent them an Irade in which they were instructed to consult the First Secretary and the First Chamberlain. The chairman of the party had declared the loyalty of the national organisation to the Sultan and led the conversation to the question of the resignation. The Sovereign, through the First Secretary handed them the following Irade: "I send my greetings to all the deputies. With you, I appreciate the seriousness of the situation. As the exigencies of the present moment demand, I will select someone to take over the office of Grand Vezir. I cannot interfere with him in his position nor in his choice of the Ministers. But I shall advise him to come to an agreement with the majority party." The deputation from the Chamber left the Palace after having expressed their loyal thanks to the Sovereign. Among other information we received was the following: "The deputies are anxious; but they have confidence that the new Government will be satisfactory. Nevertheless, it is possible that the foreigners will urge the partisans of the "Liberal Understanding" and the union "Nigehban" to ask Ferit Paşa or one of his friends to form the new Government, so as to ensure the success of the reactionary scheme they are planning. In this case, the Chamber will be dissolved as a matter of course. If you take effective steps at Ankara... with the Sovereign."

Is it not a strange thing that those who appealed to me that day with such a request were the same persons who had written to me a few weeks previously in this strain: "Considering that the Chamber has been officially opened, we ask you in future to give us your orders and to be assured that your ideas will be thoroughly supported by all concerned." These persons who, in agreement with the Government, had tried to prevent me from interfering in their affairs and actions now expected that steps would be undertaken by the Representative Committee at Ankara, thus admitting that they were incapable themselves of doing anything at all in Istanbul.

We yielded to this wish also, not because they asked us but because we felt compelled to do so for the sake of the country.

We spent the 3rd March and the whole of that night in telegraphic communication with Istanbul to keep them fully informed of all that was going on. Acting on the information we received, partly from Ismet Pasa and partly from others, I sent a circular note to all the troops, to the headquarters of the organisations and to the nation on the 4th March. (Document 243-244.)

To the President of the Chamber I wrote:

Ankara 4th March, 1920.

To His Excellency the acting President of the Chamber of Deputies.

We are sorry to hear that Ali Riza Paşa's Cabinet has resigned and has informed the Chamber that the reason for their having done so is that they have been repeatedly interfered with by the Entente Powers.

The national forces are fighting on the Aydin front against the enemy who is trying to invade our dear country in every inch of whose soil the bodies of her faithful and devoted sons are interred. No power, no authority, can prevent our nation from fulfilling the duty that history imposes upon us. The righteous indignation felt by our nation, which is ready to make every sacrifice, can only be allayed if a Government come into power that show they can be trusted. In these historic days the nation is awaiting with impatience the definite resolutions of the deputies, who are the elected representatives of the free national will. We are sure that, conscious of the responsibility you have accepted before our country and before history, regardless of the fact that the eyes of the entire world are upon you, you will arrive at decisions in accordance with the steadfastness and devotion of the nation, and we inform you that the whole nation is following and supporting you in your patriotic endeavours.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

To the Sovereign we sent the following telegram:

Ankara 4th March, 1920.

We lay this petition at the foot of Your Imperial Majesty's Throne.

The fact that there is a new Ministerial crisis following the resignation

of the Cabinet, because they could no longer resist the attacks on our independence and dignity of the Entente Powers, whose intrigues and interventions are not in accord with the stipulations of the Armistice, has produced a feeling of intense excitement in the public opinion of the nation. All Your Imperial Majesty's subjects have united their thoughts and desires around your Throne as Emperor and Caliph, resolved to agree to make every sacrifice to secure the independence and inviolability of Your Majesty and the integrity of your Empire. Anxious and distressed as they are in face of the forces commanded by the enemy who is striving to sow discord and provoke trouble, your people await with grave anxiety a speedy end to be put to the Ministerial crisis, and pray that a Cabinet will be formed that consists of honourable Ministers and that it will agree in every particular with the aspirations of the nation. Our Committee, in unity with all Your Majesty's subjects, is certain that the aims and claims of the nation, which had been expressed by the majority, will enjoy Your Majesty's support and protection. We consider it to be our patriotic duty to lay at the foot of the Throne the expression of our view that our country, in which the unfettering of a thousand passions is threatening peace in foreign countries as well as in our own, could not suffer for a moment that a Prime Minister who would be unable to restore peace in the national conscience should be entrusted to form a Government. And we consider that if — may God forbid it! — such a possibility should arise, regrettable events, unexampled in the history of the Ottoman Empire, would follow.

We are Your Imperial Majesty's, etc...

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee of
the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli."

We sent copies of this telegram to the President of the Chamber and to the commanders of the Army Corps for their information. We ordered the Telegraph Office in Istanbul to transmit a copy of it to the newspapers and the Press Society.

In addition, we sent the following circular note to the commanding officers, Valis, Mutasarrifs and the Central Committees of the Defence of the Rights:

4th March, 1920.

On account of the interference and pressure exercised by the Entente

Powers, which have become absolutely insupportable, the Government resigned yesterday, the 3rd March.

From reliable information, we learn that the overthrow of the Ministry is the result of the activity of a secret union which is led by our foreign enemies and is formed with the co-operation of the parties of the opposition, with the ostensible purpose of bringing Ferit Pasa, or a man of similar character, into power and of establishing in Istanbul a Supreme Council of the Caliphate, destined to serve the plans of the enemy. That is to say, in order to prepare the ground for the work of the secret unions, the Entente Powers have first exerted pressure to compel the Cabinet to resign. Considering the seriousness of this position, the Chamber of Deputies naturally continues to do all that is necessary. With the object, however, of confirming and actually supporting these steps, we must urgently and very seriously inform the Imperial Chancellor, the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Press, that the nation can no longer tolerate any head of the Government who would not act in agreement with their demands. We beg you urgently on receipt of this telegram not to lose a minute in sending telegrams to this effect and to make sure that they will be sent off without fail this very night. Please send us the result to-morrow morning.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee of
the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli."

The flood of telegrams which, in obedience to our instructions, inundated the entire country during the night of the 4th March, produced the desired effect in the Palace of the Sovereign and in the Chamber of Deputies on the following day.

From a person, whose identity or rank I could not recognise, we received the following news on the 6th March:

Istanbul 6th March, 1920.

The office of Grand Vezir has been offered to Salih Paşa, Minister of Marine.

Halit

Acting General Secretary of the
Union for the Defence of the Rights

This message was followed by another:

Chamber of Deputies.

6th March, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

I beg to inform you that His Imperial Majesty the Caliph has just granted an audience to the President of the Chamber of Deputies in the course of which His Majesty has deigned to inform him that he has offered the office of Grand Vezir to Senator Salih Paşa, formerly Minister of Marine. The latter is engaged in forming his Ministry and the crisis may therefore be considered to have terminated, at latest, by to-morrow evening.

Celâlettin Arif
President of the Chamber of Deputies.

On the same day, before we heard of the Grand Vezir being appointed, we received a message from Rauf Bey. I will read it to you literally because it deserves your notice.

Harbiye 6th March, 1920.

Personal. Very urgent

To be delivered without delay.

To the command of the XXth Army Corps, Ankara.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. Last night I spoke to İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa. The office of Grand Vezir has not been offered to either of them. The provisional Cabinet has no idea who will be Grand Vezir. From a reliable source, we have learned that Reşit Bey, the former Minister of the Interior, is driving to and fro between the Palace and the French and English Ambassadors. According to a rumour that is current, it is suggested that he will take over the Government. The evening before last His Majesty received Tevfik Paşa. Then he received Ferit Paşa, with whom he had a long conversation from five o'clock in the afternoon until ten at night. Yesterday, Friday, long consultations took place at Balta Limanı* at which Kemal and Mehmet Ali, the former Minister of the Interior, were present. The discussions were continued at Ali Kemal's house, and Mr. Frew, the English clergyman, took part in them. Celâlettin Arif Bey was received in audience yesterday at 4 p.m. He told His Majesty that the present crisis should not be allowed to last much longer, and he repeatedly pointed out the necessity of a

* A town and palace on the Bosphorus.

Cabinet being formed that possesses the confidence both of the country and the deputies. At first His Majesty declared that he himself understood as well as he did how delicate the situation is. He spoke of the necessity of the national forces and delivered himself to this effect: "The selection of a person as Grand Vezir who has the confidence of the country and foreign countries as well cannot be made in too great haste; it will take at least until next Sunday." My personal impression, which has been derived from the facts and information I have quoted, is that the Sovereign is in communication and negotiating with the English and is waiting for a reply from London. In any case, the position is very critical indeed. If he should decide to trust in England, it is not improbable that he will even ask Ferit Paşa to form a Government. In short, the only people whom he has personally received are Tevfik Paşa and Ferit Paşa, and his meeting with them was of a secret character. A person who is in connection with the Palace, and whom I know to possess your confidence, came to me last Thursday on behalf of some persons in close touch with His Majesty and asked me for my opinion. I told him plainly in reply that the only person who could clear up the situation in favour of the Crown, the State and the Nation would be Your Excellency, but, as in present circumstances in face of the occupation you cannot return to İstanbul, it would be better to hand the Government over to İzzet Paşa. Salih Paşa hints that the dissolution of the Chamber is quite possible. We have been informed that Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, the Vice-president, is intriguing in the name of the Chamber with the Palace and the English. I send this to you for your information

Celâlettin Arif Bey will go to the Palace to-day and will explain the situation very clearly to His Majesty. He will declare to him that, if the Government were to be handed over to members of the opposition, the organisations in Anadolu would be shaken and that thereby the principles announced in Eastern Europe — which would in the end prove fatal to him — would gain ground in our country and the Caliphate would come into a miserable position in the eyes of Islam. He will show His Majesty all the telegrams concerning this question which have arrived from the different headquarters of the national organisations in Anadolu and, in addition, will hand him a written account which we have jointly composed. We will send you a copy of it later.

2. This telegram was handed in at the Telegraph Office at Harbiye on the 6th March, 1920. at 5.15 p.m.

Salih
A. D. C. to the Minister of War.

Surely it was unnecessary for Rauf Bey to mention me with regard to the post of Grand Vezir. Nothing of the sort had ever been mentioned between us. Incidentally, I had no belief that the Government in Istanbul could live. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, I had been convinced for a long time that it had run its course. An idea so utterly foolish as that I should accept the post of Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire would, of course, never have entered my head. While I was calmly and deliberately watching the natural course of the revolution, I had thought of nothing but the plans that would be necessary to adopt in the future.

Rauf Bey sent me a copy of Celâlettin Arif Bey's account which he had referred to. (Document 245.) After the Cabinet had been formed, he sent us this message:

Harbiye, 8th March, 1920.

To the Provisional Command of the XXth Army Corps.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

1. This is the composition of the Cabinet: Salih Paşa, Grand Vezir; Şeyhislâm, unchanged; Minister of the Interior, unchanged; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sefa Bey, unchanged; Minister of War, unchanged; Minister of Marine (temporary), Salih Paşa; Minister of Public Works, Tevfik Bey; Minister of Finance (temporary) Tevfik Bey; President of the Council of State (temporary) Abdurrahman Şeref Bey; Minister of Education, Abdurrahman Şeref Bey; Minister of the Evkaf, the former Şeyhislâm, Ömer Hulûsi Efendi; Minister of Justice, Celâl Bey; Minister of Commerce, Ziya Bey, Director General of Taxes.

2. The leading political opinions of Celâl Bey are unknown to us. The present composition of the Cabinet is the work of the Palace, with the object of gaining time for Ferit Paşa. Salih Paşa hopes that he is rendering a service to the country by putting an end to the crisis. We are not inclined to put any faith in this Cabinet and we are doing all we can to induce the party to adopt our view. The danger of Ferit Paşa coming into power is still threatening, and we beg you to do what you think necessary to meet it.

3. We must also call your attention to one matter, which we think is very important. Salih Paşa intended to consult the party about their opinion. He wanted to know the names of Ministers whom he would have to select from outside the Chamber in case he found it impossible to find

suitable ones inside it. But later on he changed his mind and formed the Cabinet composed as I have told you without any assistance. (Rauf)

Salih.

A. D. C. to the Minister of War.

The account I have given you of the crisis in Istanbul is rather a lengthy one. As the situation develops, we shall see many other things that happened in Istanbul.

We shall now glance at what goes on in Edirne, and then return to Istanbul.

I think I have always mentioned in the course of my general remarks that we have never lost sight of Trakya in our organisations and plans. Our connection and correspondence with Edirne were maintained and continued in just the same way as with every other district in the country.

I consider that this a fitting opportunity to bring some interesting points in this correspondence to the knowledge of this honourable Assembly.

Cafer Tayyar Bey, commanding the 1st Army Corps, described in an excellent way in a very detailed account, dated 31st August, 1919, the activity of the Greeks in Trakya — especially in Western Trakya — and the enterprises they were engaged in there.

He complained that he could not act efficiently in the face of their extraordinary activity there.

He informed us that, "from certain correspondence it was evident that General Milne had not allowed him to make dispositions in his Army Corps that would enable him to do his duty in view of the situation and the consequences that might possibly ensue." (Document 246.)

Of course, there could not be the slightest doubt that he would not consent to do anything of the sort. I cannot imagine what could have put the idea into their heads to enter into correspondence on this subject, which was already as clear as daylight.

In the instructions I had given to Cafer Tayyar Bey on the 3rd January, 1920, I repeatedly reminded him of the necessity of organising armed national troops on the basis of the "Secret Instructions" with which we had furnished him.

"It is necessary," I said, "to gain the advantage in this way, which cannot be attained by distributing the troops in any other." (Document 247.)

On the same day, I also wrote to Cemal Paşa, Minister of War, telling him about the position of affairs and begging him to resist the preparations made by the Greeks, at least in Eastern Trakya. (Document 248.)

From the reports coming from the union of "Trakya-Pasaeli," it was clear that the formation of organisations had not been as successful as had been anticipated and that certain high officials were reproached for this. (Document 249.)

From the very beginning, I sent certain observations to these officials. (Document 250.)

But before long the most serious complaints were directed against Cafer Tayyar Bey. The letter I will now read to you will, I think, give you some idea about this.

My esteemed Paşa,

26th January, 1920.

I approve of what Arif Bey says about the population of Trakya. The union of Trakya is not composed in proportion to their material strength. Unfortunately, Cafer Tayyar has misled all of us; he has not carried through any organisation at all and has done nothing about arms and munitions, even to the extent of a single rifle. I accuse Cafer of pursuing personal aims. Also, knowing nothing whatever about Bulgarian affairs, he is absolutely ignorant concerning prevailing conditions.

An order from Cafer to his troops has come by chance to our knowledge within the last few days. He mentions in it what the Greeks are doing and intend to do, and although the present situation necessitates that at last organisations should be formed in obedience to the instructions issued by the "Defence of the Rights," he asks the commanding officers whether or not they think that help ought to be given to the population by the officers. Think of it! — May the curse of God fall those who ask such absurd questions and deceive the people when the fate of the nation is at stake.

Lastly, Trakya, which we expected would stand up for our country by carrying on the war and the revolution, could not do anything at all, even though the Bulgarian troops had evacuated Western Trakya and left only about five or ten officials and no more than about 150 to 200 gendarmes there.

I do not know whether Cafer was troubled about this condition of things. Consequently, we shall send Topçu İhsan and Rasim, the veterinary

surgeon (an intelligent, smart, steady and thoroughly reliable comrade), to the organisations in Trakya. We shall also send arms from here.

We can only hope that this confounded Cafer will not hinder them from doing their duty. All we ask him to do is to get out of our way and never inflict us with his presence again.

The English are receiving reinforcements on the Edirne line of detachments, composed solely of Englishmen. The Greeks are taking up positions at Hadimköy, at Çorlu and at Lüleburgaz. There is a state of unrest in Bulgaria. The criminal actions of the Greeks are too abominable to describe; the Governor is powerless in the face of the pitiable complaints of the population. Cafer shows his weakness. It cannot be foreseen that the concentration of foreign troops now taking place against Bolshevism in Trakya will become the object of any action on the part of the Bulgarians, against whom they are directed.

A firm hand and an energetic brain are needed there. Neither Cafer nor the Governor are the men who are wanted there; they are not energetic enough. These are the actual facts and the exact state of affairs. I am doing all I can against both of them. The other day I received a telegram in cipher from you which troubled me very much indeed and I asked in cipher for certain explanations, but I have received no reply. Do you believe, Pasa, that I am following a personal policy? Or, do you take me for one of those imbeciles who cannot appreciate the importance of a plan or estimate the difficulty of a situation? I protest against both of those insinuations. My faith and my conviction are unchangeable. I go straightforward without deviating to the right or to the left: I only ask you to tell me frankly what is in your mind. These severe and reproachful expressions wound me very deeply, but they would neither prevent me from working faithfully nor drive me over to the side of the opposition.

But this is a personal matter, and I want to draw your attention to it and beg you to let me tell you now that in your delicate position, requiring tact and forethought which must never be lost sight of, it is necessary that you should do nothing until you are quite clear about what troubles me and until you ascertain the exact truth about it.

I send you the expression of my esteem, Paşa, and sincere wishes for you success.

Vasif

From the reports and messages that came from Edirne I realised that a wrong policy was being implemented there. In the letter which I have just read, certain sentences indicate this fact too. To counteract this, I repeated once more on the 3rd February to Cafer Tayyar Pasa and Rauf Bey in Istanbul the opinion which we had consistently from the beginning.

The consideration I reiterated was the following: To speak of united Western and Eastern Trakya is bad policy. Eastern Trakya is incontestably an integral part of our country. As for Western Trakya, this territory had once been ceded by Treaty.

Eastern Trakya can, at best, serve as a base of operations for those who are struggling for the liberation of Western Trakya.

If we insist on claiming a united Eastern and Western Trakya, this may give rise to certain other claims on Eastern Trakya.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Bulgarians, too, are demanding an economic exit to the Aegean Sea. Bulgaria is very eager about this. (Document 251.)

Cafer Tayyar Pasa on his part complained about the officials, notables and the population. He said, in a telegram in cipher on the 7th March: "The people here expect everything from the Government. On account of the neutral attitude shown by the higher officials, the national organisations cannot be formed according to Your Excellency's desire. I am particularly trying to get into contact with the villagers by making frequent tours of inspection into the interior of the province... but it is impossible for me to visit all the villages." He added: "We all wish that the national organisations will spread and rest on a firm foundation, but this will only be possible if we work hard to surmount the obstacles I have just indicated." (Document 252.)

General Milne did not allow Cafer Tayyar to dispose his troops as he wished to do. The Vali and Mutasarrif remained neutral and abstained from leading and guiding the people who expect everything from the Government relating to the national organisations. And we cannot see how these organisations could possibly spread and be put on a solid foundation until these hindrances had been surmounted.

I have occasionally mentioned a certain society called "Karakol" and the steps that were taken to restrict its influence. We learned that this union was trying to extend its influence in Istanbul. Consequently, it was necessary to send a fresh warning.

12th March, 1920.

To Colonel Sevket Bey, Commanding the fortress of Çanakkale.

It is noticeable that our organisations in Istanbul are not sufficient for us to reach our aims. According to the reports of some well-informed people who have come from time to time, and particularly recently, to Ankara, the cause of our failure is to be traced to the fact that endeavours are being made to put in force the decisions of the "Karakol" society in the name of the organisation for the "Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

The regulations of this "Karakol" Society had alarmed many people who wanted to get into communication with the organisations. With this object, it is quite enough for Istanbul to form organisations on the lines of the regulations governing the organisation for the Defence of the Rights. For it is to the unification of the different ideas that we have to look for the main strength of Istanbul.

For the armed organisations, the particular enterprises and the actual activities which might become necessary in Istanbul, it is sufficient to put into force a clause of the regulations for the Defence of the Rights. If objections were raised to the publication of the names of the persons who form the council of the head committee in Istanbul and its branches, the members of these organisations could hide their identity.

I particularly urge you to inform me clearly about the organisations, the foundation on which they are already formed or are going to be formed, and the names of the persons who constitute the head committee and the leading councils.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

If you will allow me, we will now return to Istanbul. In a second telegram, dated 11th March, 1920, Rauf Bey said: "On the afternoon of the 10th March the representatives of the Entente, as the result of an order which had come from London, had met to discuss the question of arresting the leaders of the national forces in Istanbul and had decided to execute this order. This information had been given to us secretly by a confidential informant and those concerned had been advised to leave Istanbul immediately. Having looked into the matter and weighed all the different possibilities, however, they had come to the conclusion that they would

stay in Istanbul to the last and do their duty there as their honour prompted them to do. It is reported that it was Salih Paşa, the Grand Vezir, who was deliberately responsible for this resolve.

They were apparently endeavouring to overthrow the Cabinet, for cause they felt certain they would succeed in doing so. (Document 253.)

On the same day, in a short telegram which was in continuation of the preceding one, Rauf Bey said: "As we have not received any reply from you as to your opinion of our last message and the position of the Ministry, we are afraid that it has not reached you, and I am naturally anxious about your health. We are awaiting your reply."

I had given the following information to Rauf Bey on the 11th March, and it was also communicated to the XVth and IIIrd Army Corps.

11th March, 1920.

Yesterday evening, the 10th March, the interpreter of Captain Boizeau, the dragoman of the French representative at Ankara, who has given us confidential information from time to time, has told us to-day that Withall, the English representative at Ankara, has just left Ankara and that, accompanied by his staff, he is going to Istanbul with all his furniture and baggage; he said that the English would suspend railway traffic after his train had left. According to our information, Withall has actually left. It is very likely, therefore, that railway traffic will be interrupted. There is no doubt that this is connected with the steps taken by the Entente Powers in Istanbul.

Mustafa Kemal

This is what I said in reply to Rauf Bey's last message:

"Even if you intend to attack the Cabinet by introducing a motion of want of confidence in them, you will not have adequate reasons to support you. Until I have a clear and definite idea about the cohesion and courage of the party, and whether it will show a precise indication of unity, I cannot offer any opinion as to whether it is advisable to make this a constitutional question or not. We must see if Salih Paşa has come to an understanding with the leaders of the party."

"It would be a very good thing if the Chamber, confronted with the decision of the English to proceed to make arrests, will act courageously now and will continue to do their duty. Only, it is absolutely necessary that you and those comrades whose presence is needed for our enterprises will definitely decide to throw in your lot with us."

"If you do not, it is very important that those persons who can organise the unified procedure of the party and their will should already at the present moment be instructed to do this and that you will come here immediately. Those people who do come should possess the necessary qualifications to represent the country and should be able, if called upon to do so, to form a Government and carry on the administration. There is no doubt that the Entente Powers will institute radical coercive measures . . ." (Document 254.)

Mustafa Kemal

Before three or four days had elapsed events proved that we had appealed to Rauf Bey and the others in the nick of time. Unfortunately, our request was not accepted in its full importance and significance.

Men like Rauf Bey and Vasil showed themselves pliable enough to be taken to Malta. You know all about that.

I have been told that some of our friends had arranged and prepared the way to reach Anadolu and come on to Ankara. If that is so, the reason they did not come to Ankara but preferred to give themselves up to the English to be taken to Malta deserves to be inquired into. Indeed, starting with the idea that the position and the final destiny of Turkey is hanging in the balance, surrounded by gloom and danger, it is not improbable that, influenced by the fear of plunging into this dark peril and exposing themselves to such a horrible and terrifying fate, they preferred to surrender to the enemy and spend a certain time in prison.

Nevertheless, I shall refrain from pronouncing stern judgment upon them. Acting on these possibilities, I lost no opportunity in doing everything I could to obtain the release of these persons from Malta.

On the 14th March, the command of the XXth Army Corps at Ankara received a letter in cipher from the officer commanding the 10th Division in Istanbul. (No. 465, dated 9th March.) It read as follows:

9th March, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

As the English have commandeered the offices of the "Turkish Hearth," a national organisation, the latter has been transferred to the building of the National Institute for Education and Instruction, which was also commandeered by the English yesterday.

Hâdi

At 10 a.m. on the 16th March, while we were at the telegraph instrument, we received the following message:

"The English have made a surprise attack this morning on a Government building at Şehzadebaşı and have had a skirmish with the soldiers. At the present moment they are beginning to occupy Istanbul. I send you this for your information."

Manastırlı Hamdi

I made a pencil note on this telegram: "To be transmitted immediately to the Army Corps with my signature. Mustafa Kemal." Then I began to question the sender of the telegram. Manastırlı Hamdi Efendi continued without stopping to report as follows: "Not only a particularly trustworthy man but all who come here confirm what I have reported. We have just this moment heard that the Military School has been occupied. English soldiers are on guard outside the Telegraph Office at Beyoğlu, but it is not yet known whether they intend to occupy it or not."

Meanwhile an official of the Telegraph Office belonging to the Ministry of War told us that: "In the forenoon the English have fought their way in; five have been killed and about fifteen wounded. At this moment the English are patrolling the town. They are now entering the Ministry. They have occupied it. They have reached the Nizamiye Gate. Interrupt the connection. The English are here."

Manastırlı Hamdi Efendi was still able to get into communication with us:

16th March.

"Your Excellency, English sailors have occupied the Telegraph Office at the Ministry of War and have cut the wires. They have occupied Top-hane, and troops are being landed from their men-of-war. The situation is getting worse. Your Excellency, during the fight this morning six of our men were killed and fifteen wounded. Your Excellency, I am awaiting your orders."

Hamdi

Hamdi Efendi continued:

"Early this morning, while our soldiers were still sleeping, British sailors occupied the Post Office. Our men, being suddenly aroused, were still half asleep when the fighting began, which resulted in six of our men being killed and fifteen wounded."

"Meanwhile, the English who had prepared this dastardly attack moored their warships at the quay, occupied Tophane and the Beyoğlu Quarter, and later on the Ministry of War. At the present moment it is impossible to get into connection with the Telegraph Offices at Tophane and the Ministry of War."

"From news just received the occupation is reported to include Derince."

"The Telegraph Office at Beyoğlu does not reply any more. Probably it is also occupied. God grant that they will not occupy this office. The director and officials of the Telegraph Office at Beyoğlu are just arriving here; they have been turned out of their office."

"Your Excellency, I have just this moment heard that this office will be occupied within an hour."

The late Hayati Bey, following the order I had given him at the end of my first message, made a summary of the news that had come through and transmitted it to all the commanding officers in Rumeli and Anadolu. I had instructed that these communications should be sent to Edirne without delay, via İstanbul. (Document 255.) Hamdi Efendi reported in these words: "I am carrying out Your Excellency's orders. I am writing to Edirne and all the Telegraph Offices are ready." I asked Hamdi Efendi: "Have you heard anything about the Chamber of Deputies? Is the Telegraph Office there in working order?"

"Yes," replied Hamdi Efendi, "it is. The Commander of the XVth Army Corps is there. The Paşa asks to be put into communication. Shall I do this?"

From this moment we were unable to get into connection with Hamdi Efendi. We concluded from this that the chief Telegraph Office in İstanbul had also been occupied.

If we had not had such a courageous patriot as Manastırlı Hamdi Efendi there, who knows how long we would have had to wait before we heard of the misfortune that had befallen İstanbul? As I have already remarked, not one of the Ministers, Deputies, Commanders and members of our organisation in İstanbul had thought of sending us any information in good time.

It must be assumed that all of them were affected by deep emotion and were very much excited. I cannot say whether this was any reason why they should lose their heads to such an extent that they could not

get onto the telegraph line between Istanbul and Ankara. Hamdi Efendi, the telegraph official, came to Ankara later and took charge of the Telegraph Office at our headquarters. I believe it my duty to the nation as a patriot to express publicly here how grateful I am to him.

In face of these events I issued the following command in order to guard against every possible unforeseen incident:

Circular to all Valis and Mutasarrifs

To the officers commanding the IIIrd Army Corps at Sivas, XIVth Army Corps at Bandirma, XXth Army Corps at Ankara, XVth Army Corps at Erzurum, XIIth Army Corps at Konya, XIIIth Army Corps at Diyarbakir.

To Refet Bey at the Izmir front, the Command of 61st Division at Balikesir, the head Committees and leading Councils of the Union for the Defence of the Rights.

Telegram. Urgent.

Ankara, 16th March, 1920.

Although still convinced of the solidarity of the entire Mohamedan and civilised world, which is inspired by feelings of humanity, our nation will not be able for the time being to maintain connection with the friendly or hostile outside world.

The humane attitude which we shall adopt towards the Christian population dwelling in our country will be all the more appreciated at the present time, and the possibility that the Christian population will not enjoy any real or apparent protection from any of the foreign Governments will be conclusive evidence of the civilising factors existing in the character of our race. I request you to proceed in strict accordance with the law and enforce it with vigour if any persons should act contrary to the interests of our country and disturb order and quiet in the country. Administer the law impartially, without distinction of race or creed. And I beg you to treat all those who do their duty as citizens in a conciliatory spirit and to show due solicitude for them; pay honour and obedience to the local authorities. Finally, I request that you communicate the above immediately to all persons concerned and that you bring it before the people in such manner as appears most expedient to you.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the Union for the Defence of the Rights.

When the Entente Powers had occupied the Telegraph Offices in Istanbul their intention was to circulate an official communiqué throughout the country by telegraph. However, on account of the warning we had received, this communiqué was not accepted at any, except a very few, of the Telegraph Offices. The most important of those who received it and replied to it were Suat Bey, Mutasarrif of Izmit. (Document 256) and Suphi Bey, Vali of Konya. (Document 257.)

Official Communiqué

Five-and-a-half years ago the leaders of the "Committee of Union and Progress," who had taken the destiny of the Ottoman Empire into their hands, aided by unknown circumstances but at the instigation of Germany, led the Ottoman Empire and people to enter the World War.

The result of this iniquitous and fatal policy is known. After having passed through sufferings of every description, the Empire and the people had to submit to such a defeat that the leaders of the "Committee of Union and Progress" found that their only means of salvation was to ask for an armistice and flee.

After the armistice was concluded, the Entente Powers had one duty to fulfil. This consisted in preparing the ground for a Peace that will secure the happiness, the future development, the social and economic life of the entire population of the former Ottoman Empire, without distinction of race or religion.

While the members of the Peace Conference were engaged on this question, certain individuals, partisans of the fugitive leaders of the "Committee of Union and Progress," formed an organisation, calling it a "National Organisation," and, disregarding the orders of the Sultan and the Central Government, dared to commit certain acts, such as calling the population, which was completely reduced through the fatal consequences of the War, under arms and producing discord between the individual elements, besides robbing the population on the pretence of levying national contributions. In this way they have not secured peace but have commenced a new period of war. In spite of these intrigues and provocations, the Peace Conference has continued to do its duty and has just decided that Istanbul shall remain under Turkish administration. This decision will have a soothing effect on Ottoman minds. While communicating this decision to the Sublime Porte, they have been informed of certain conditions which will affect the decision referred to.

These conditions consist in safeguarding the lives of the Christians living in Ottoman provinces and in putting an end to the continual attacks that are specially directed against the troops of the Entente Powers and their Allies. Although the Government has shown a certain amount of good-will in respect to this warning, the men who are working under the adopted name of "National Organisations" have unhappily not agreed to abandon their policy of provocation and intrigue.

On the contrary, they have tried to win the Government over to their side to co-operate in their enterprises. In view of this situation, which constitutes a grave danger to the Peace for which everybody is anxiously longing, the Entente Powers have seen themselves forced to consider certain steps that will secure the conduct of the Peace negotiations which will soon begin.

For this purpose, they have discovered one way only to do this, namely, to proceed to a temporary occupation of Istanbul.

The decision having been put into execution to-day, the following points are brought to public knowledge:

1. The occupation is temporary.
2. The aim of the Entente Powers is not to weaken but rather to strengthen the authority of the Sultanate in the territories that will remain under Ottoman administration.
3. The aim of the Entente Powers, also, is not to separate Istanbul from the Turks. But if — which God forbid — extensive unrest or sanguinary persecution should occur, it is very likely that this decision will be altered.

The duty imposed on all Mohamedans and non-Mohamedans in this time of difficulty is to carry on their business, to assist in the maintenance of order, to close their ears to the lies of those who want by their acts of madness to destroy the last hope of building up a new Turkey on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, and to obey the orders issued from Istanbul, which at the present moment is the seat of the Sultanate. Some of the persons who have been taking part in the intrigues referred to have been arrested in Istanbul. They will naturally be held responsible for their acts and for the events that have been produced thereby.

The Army of Occupation

As a sequel to this Communiqué, I issued a circular note to this effect:

16th March, 1920.

To all Valis and Commanding Officers,

To all the Committees of the Defence of the Rights.

The military occupation of Istanbul by the Allies has taken place after resistance. It is quite probable that the people who are pursuing malignant plans will make use of this conspiracy to deceive the people. Thus, we have learned that an attempt is being made to spread certain unsigned proclamations in the form of official communiqués. No importance whatever is to be attached to rumours of this description, in order that errors and excitement which might be justified by them will be avoided.

The "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli," who are following the course of events with the closest attention, will keep the people fully informed of them.

Mustafa Kemal

By various means on the same day I issued this protest:

16th March, 1920.

To the Italian Representative at Antalya.

To be forwarded to:

The Diplomatic Representatives of England, France and Italy;
The Diplomatic Representative of the United States in Istanbul;
The Foreign Ministers in Neutral Countries;
The Legislative Chambers in France, England and Italy.

All the official buildings in Istanbul, including the Chamber of Deputies, which is the symbol of our national independence, have been formally and forcibly occupied by the troops of the Entente Powers and a great number of patriots who have been acting in accord with the aims of the national movement have been arrested. This last blow, which has just been directed against the sovereignty and political freedom of the Ottoman nation, strikes — still more than at the Ottomans who are resolved to defend their lives and their independence at all costs — at the principles that have been regarded by humanity and by the civilisation of the 20th century as sacred, such as the sense of freedom, of nationality and of country, and at the principles of modern society and human conscience which created them.

As for ourselves, we are imbued with the sacred character of the

struggle we have entered upon for the defence of our rights and independence, and we are convinced that there is no power on earth that can deprive a nation of its right of existence.

We are not content to leave it to official Europe and America, but to the Europe and America of science, culture and civilisation, to judge rightly the character of this step, which constitutes a conspiracy such as history has never recorded down to the present day and which is incompatible with the honour and self-respect of the peoples who have joined it. It is actually based on downright dishonesty. By an armistice based on Wilson's principles, the nation has been deprived of all means of defence. Once more, and for the last time, we draw your attention to the great responsibility in the eyes of history which this event will involve.

Next to God, the lawfulness and sacred character of our cause are our surest strongholds in these painful hours of difficulty.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli.

During the night I circulated the following instructions:

Telegram in cipher.

16th March, 1920.

To all Valis and Commanders.

It is necessary that meetings should be held for the purpose of informing the Heads of the Legislative Chambers of the Entente Powers and all the neutral countries, as well as the representatives of the Entente Powers, by telegram that Istanbul, the public buildings there, and especially the Chamber of Deputies, have been formally and forcibly occupied, and for the purpose of protesting energetically against this occupation having been carried out after the nation had been disarmed according to the stipulations of the armistice.

It must be set out clearly in these telegrams that this ignominious affront constitutes a fatal blow, not less against Ottoman sovereignty than against the principles of freedom, nationality and country which civilisation and humanity have erected in the course of twenty centuries. Further, that this can in no way shake the faith of the Ottoman nation and their will to defend their independence and existence, but that the civilised nations by condoning this ignominy will take upon themselves a grave responsibility

in the eyes of history. The telegrams addressed to the Parliaments and Foreign Ministers of neutral countries shall be handed to the respective authorities in Istanbul but shall also simultaneously be dispatched through the Italian representative at Antalya.

I request you to send us a copy of the telegrams of protest.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

Telegram in cipher.

16th March, 1920.

To Colonel Refet Bey.

We think it would be advisable to send to the Presidents of the Parliaments of the Entente Powers now sitting and to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in neutral countries copies of the telegrams of protest which will be dispatched during the course of the meetings that are held in consequence of recent events.

We beg you to obtain the good services of the Italian representative at Antalya for this purpose.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

On the same day I caused the following proclamation to the people to be published:

Proclamation

- To all Commanding Officers;
- To all Valis and Mutasarriffs;
- To the Union for the Defence of the Rights;
- To the United Press.

The various steps which have been taken by the Entente Powers with the object of dividing our country are already known to you.

Firstly, after having come to an understanding with Ferit Paşa, they decided to subject our defenceless nation to foreign administration and to annex different important parts of our country to the Colonies belonging to the victorious Powers. The will and determination of the national forces, supported by the whole of the nation, shown in the defence of our independence, have shattered these designs.

Second, they have addressed themselves to the Representative Com-

mittee with the object of ensnaring the national forces and of pursuing a policy of predominance in the Orient with their consent. The Committee has refused to enter into negotiations of any kind until the independence of the nation and the integrity of its territory has been secured and, before all else, until the occupied districts have been evacuated.

Third, they have interfered in the acts of those Governments that had associated themselves with the national forces; they have attempted to shake national unity and encourage the treachery of the opposition.

One after another, these attacks have been wrecked by the determination and solidarity which sprang from the national unity.

Fourth, they have begun to influence public opinion by speaking about disconcerting decisions which had been arrived at regarding the fate of the country.

These threats, also, have had no effect, on account of the will and determination of the Ottoman people, who have resolved to submit to every necessary sacrifice for the defence of their honour and their country.

Last, the forcible occupation of Istanbul to-day has destroyed the seven-centuries-old existence and sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the Turkish nation is compelled to-day to defend its civilising capabilities, its right of existence and independence and its entire future.

We shall have won the applause of mankind and shall pave the road to the liberation for which the Islamic world is yearning, if we deliver the seat of the Caliphate from foreign influence, defend it with religious fidelity in a manner worthy of our glory and realise the independence of the nation. God is with us in the war which we have entered upon for the independence of our country.

Mustafa Kemal

In the name of the Representative Committee
of the Union for the Defence of the Rights of
Anadolu and Rumeli.

Simultaneously, I issued a proclamation to the entire Islamic world in which the above-described infamous proceedings were referred to in detail. This proclamation was spread abroad by various means.

On the very day of the occupation, without waiting for further news after having been informed about the situation by the messages sent to me by Manastırlı Hamdi Efendi, the telegraphist, and about the wording of the proclamation issued by the Army of Occupation which confirmed the news

sent by Hamdi Efendi, I took measures which I regarded to be urgently necessary and carried them through — as I have just explained.

Contradictory and exaggerated news about the way in which Istanbul had been occupied and the arrests that had been made began to reach us from different quarters. We made many inquiries ourselves.

We learned that the deputies, who had scattered after they had been assured of the impossibility of performing their legislative functions, and several other persons in Istanbul had fled and were on their way to Ankara.

I gave the necessary orders to the authorities along the line of their route to facilitate their journey.

Among the steps I took on the 16th March after the occupation of Istanbul had become known there are some which I need not refer to here, because I already mentioned them when the National Assembly was opened.

For instance, you will have read in the first minutes of the Grand National Assembly some details of what was done about the disarming and removing of the foreign troops at Eskişehir and at Afyonkarahisar, about the destruction of the railways in the districts of Geyve and Ulukışla, about the arrest of foreign officers in Anadolu, and about other matters.

The most important thing was our determination to fulfil our patriotic and national duty by securing the meeting at Ankara of an assembly furnished with extraordinary powers.

On the 19th March, that is to say, three days after Istanbul had been occupied, I issued a communiqué regarding the question I have just described and the manner of its execution.

For two days I was personally at the telegraph instrument and came into communication with the commanding officers. I discussed the position with them and asked them to give me their views about it.

In the draft I had first made, I had used the expression "Constituent Assembly." My intention was that the assembly which was to be convened would from the very first be endowed with full powers to alter the governmental system.

But, because I did not or could not explain this expression with sufficient clearness, they pointed out to me from Sivas and Erzurum that the people were not familiar with it.

Thereupon, I contented myself by using the expression: "Assembly endowed with Extraordinary Powers."

To all Vilayets;
To Autonomous Livas;
To the Officers commanding Army Corps.

The formal occupation of the metropolis by the Entente Powers has disorganised the national forces of the State, that is to say, the legislative, the executive and the judicial power. The Chamber of Deputies has been dissolved through the Government having been officially informed that under prevailing conditions there is no possibility for the deputies to perform their duties.

With the object of considering and carrying out the best way to secure the inviolability of the capital, the independance of the nation and the liberation of the country under these conditions, it has become absolutely necessary to convene an assembly to be held at Ankara that will be furnished with extraordinary powers and will permit those members of the Chamber that has been dissolved to come to Ankara to take part in it. Therefore, we expect from your patriotism and your capabilities that you will proceed to carry out elections on the following lines:

1. An Assembly, furnished with extraordinary powers, will meet at Ankara for the purpose of conducting and controlling national affairs.
2. The persons elected as members of this Assembly are subject to the same legal conditions that apply to deputies.
3. The Livas will form the electoral constituencies.
4. Five deputies will be elected in each Liva.
5. The elections will take place in all the Livas on the same day and at one uninterrupted sitting of a committee consisting of electors of the second class, who will be chosen by the Kazas belonging to the Livas; of electors of the second class in the chief places in the Livas from among the administrative and local councils in the Livas; of the leading committees of the Defence of the Rights in the Livas. In the Vilayets it shall consist of the central councils of the chief places in the Vilayets; of the general councils of the Vilayets; of the local councils of the chief places in the Vilayets; of the electors of the second class in the chief provincial towns; in the chief towns in the Kazas; and of the electors of the second class in the Kazas belonging to the chief town.
6. In the same manner that each party, group and union may chose candidates, so every one individually has the right in his constituency to put forward his candidacy and thus actually take part in the sacred struggle.

7. The elections will be conducted by the highest official of the town in which they take place, and he is held responsible for the regularity of the election.

8. The elections shall be conducted by secret ballot and there shall be a clear majority. The result of the polling shall be controlled by two persons nominated by the committee and in their presence.

9. A protocol shall be drawn up giving the result of the elections in triplicate, and it must be attested by the signature or the personal seal* of all the members. One copy shall be kept in the town, the second shall be handed to the successful candidate and the third sent to the Assembly.

10. The expenses incurred by the members shall be settled later on by the Assembly. Travelling expenses, however, are to be guaranteed by the local authorities and determined by the electoral committee, based on the unavoidable expenses that had been incurred.

11. The elections shall be finished so that within a fortnight, at latest, the majority of the members will be able to meet at Ankara. The members are to leave immediately, and the result of the elections, as well as the names of the members, shall be communicated forthwith.

12. You are requested to inform us of the hour when you receive this telegram.

Note: For the information of officers commanding Army Corps, the Vilayets and the independent Livas.

Mustafa Kemal
In the name of the Representative Committee.

During the course of the week I put myself into personal telegraphic communication with the deputies who came to Ankara from different directions. They were given information calculated to raise their spirits and allay their unhappiness. Nobody was left in Istanbul who could have represented our ideas there.

As for those who, in spite of the warnings we had been sending them in different ways for many a month, had not formed any organisation as we had instructed them to do and had worked for the "Karakol" Society, their leaders had been sent to Malta and their adherents in Istanbul had given no evidence that they were still active or even any sign that they were still alive.

* The possession of a personal seal was customary by law, because many persons were unable to read or write.

In order to form a new organisation, I would have been obliged to make very exhaustive efforts to spend more money than our financial position at that time would allow.

In the course of my general remarks I have spoken several times about the question of my election as President of the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul and my intentions about this. I have already pointed out that in this attempt I met with certain difficulties and the plan did not succeed.

In fact, as the Chamber in Istanbul had become the object of a conspiracy and had broken up, I hesitated for a moment to call the deputies together and to undertake to form an assembly, particularly of the nature I have described.

Let it be understood that I did not know whether Celâlettin Arif Bey, President of the Chamber, would come to Ankara. I thought that in case he might come there, I would wait for him and let him call the Assembly himself.

But the situation required an immediate and quick decision. I did not think it prudent to lose any time in expecting an improbability.

But at the same time, in order to secure the execution of the decision I had to make, I was obliged to put myself in telegraphic communication with all the commanders, and I spent several days in obtaining their opinions and listening to what they had to say.

Communication had been re-established with Celâlettin Arif Bey on his arrival at Düzce in the night of the 27th March. Then I sent him this telegram:

No. 34.

Ankara 27th March, 1920.

To the Honourable Celâlettin Arif Bey, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Düzce.

The formal and actual occupation of Istanbul by the English, which has subjected the power of the State to slavery and oppression; the heinous attack on the Chamber of Deputies, assailing the independence and honour of the nation; the impossibility thereby imposed on the representatives of the nation of fulfilling their duty on questions concerning the fate of the country; the necessity which they found of taking refuge behind the nation; all these events have made it necessary to call together an Extraordinary

Assembly which shall have the administration of the State and the Nation under their authority and in their control.

No doubt you have been informed that the Representative Committee has decided to convene an assembly provided with extraordinary powers at Ankara and that orders have been sent everywhere for this purpose.

We think it advisable that you should take notice of the communication of the 19th March that was sent out with this object, that you should confirm it and that you should express your opinion on this matter of public interest in a short proclamation, so as to hasten the elections and the meeting of the assembly.

I await your reply.

Mustafa Kemal.

This is Celâlettin's reply:

Düzce 27th March, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

I have not read the proclamation of the 19th March to which Your Excellency refers. Although it would be well to convene an extraordinary assembly, it is necessary that it should be constituted as far as possible according to law.

It is true that our Constitution does not provide for anything like the meeting of such an extraordinary assembly, but it is helpful in this case to refer to the provisions of other Constitutions. Thus, for example, the French Constitution provides that if the Chamber were to be attacked or legally dissolved, the members of the Chamber who had been able to escape should assemble in a suitable place with members of the councils of departments or arrondissements — two of each from every council — and discuss the necessary plans for the re-opening of the Chamber, in this manner overcoming the effect of the attack made upon it. The decisions arrived at by this assembly are lawful, and any one who does not obey them is liable to be accused of high treason. As a matter of fact, I had these principles in my mind.

My opinion is that when I arrive at Ankara, after I know on what principles the proclamation of the 19th March is based, a new proclamation must be drawn up. We shall discuss this later on.

Ismail Fazıl Paşa, İsmet Bey, Reşit Bey, the Deputy for Saruhan, who are here at the instrument, send you their respectful greetings. Rıza Bey,

a colleague and the deputy for Kırşehir, also sends you expressions of his esteem and begs you to tell his father at Keskin that he is at Bolu.

Celâlettin Arif.

If we analyse the wording of this telegram carefully, we can easily see that there is a considerable difference between my point of view and that of Celâlettin Arif. When I resolved upon the meeting of an assembly provided with extraordinary powers, I was well aware that our Constitution did not contain any provision for such an assembly. But in order to arrive at my decision it did not occur to me to think whether such a provision existed or not.

Moreover, I did not think for a moment of calling a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in its present form comprising those deputies of the Chamber who had already been attacked and had been able to escape, even with addition of two members elected from each of the Vilayet Councils and the Livas.

On the contrary, I had intended to organise an assembly of a totally different character and endowed with powers to manage the successive stages of the revolution that I had in my mind. For these reasons, I abandoned all hope of finding a possibility to bring our conceptions — between which I had no doubt there existed a very strong difference — into agreement by discussing them.

Nevertheless, I had my proclamation of the 19th March communicated to Celâlettin by telegram.

The next day he replied as follows:

Düzce, 28th March, 1920.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

The Representative Committee's proclamation of the 19th March, 1920, has been brought to my notice. In their general form the contents of it agree with the principles which I personally hold. It is natural, therefore, that on my arrival at Ankara, after we have discussed the details, another proclamation will be drawn up. I am obliged to stay at Bolu to-morrow but shall leave in the evening for Ankara.

I send you my best respects.

Celâlettin Arif,
President of the Chamber of Deputies.

Although Celâlettin Arif Bey states that after having taken notice of our proclamation he finds its contents agree generally with the principles that he holds, he does not immediately draft a proclamation confirming the first one. He postpones doing this till he has arrived at Ankara and discussed the question.

When Celâlettin Arif arrived at Ankara rather lengthy conversations and discussions on this question took place with him and some lawyers.

But, unless I am very much mistaken, Celâlettin Arif Bey never agreed with me about the character and the extraordinary powers of the National Assembly.

He always maintained that the chief task of the Assembly which had just met consisted in guaranteeing that the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies would take place in Istanbul, and he always looked upon himself as the President of this Chamber.

Let me refer to a little incident that comes to my mind and which confirms what I have just said.

One day, when I was President of the Grand National Assembly and he was Vice-president, Recep Bey, at that time Secretary of the Assembly, told us that Celâlettin Arif Bey had brought up the question of remuneration and in his capacity as President of the Chamber of Deputies had demanded the emoluments attached to his office.

You are aware that at that time there was no difference between the remuneration of the President, the Vice-president, the other chairmen and the members of the Assembly. Celâlettin Arif Bey alone, in his position as President of the Chamber of Deputies, claimed that an exception should be made in his case and spoke of his lawful right to demand a higher salary.

I declared that this question could only be raised at a full sitting of the Assembly and must be referred to it. Celâlettin Arif Bey doubted whether he could weather the storm that would undoubtedly be raised in the Assembly and so he abandoned his claims.

The elections began to take their normal course seriously and rapidly all over the country, according to the instructions issued on the 19th March, 1920. A certain amount of hesitation and reluctance was felt only in certain places, for a longer or shorter time according to the individual localities.

At last the deputies from all the electoral districts, representing the whole country and nation, were present without exception at the Grand

National Assembly. The places which originally intended to stand out were Dersim, Malatya, Elâzığ, Konya, Diyarbakır and Trabzon.

I must call your attention to the fact that it was not the inhabitants of these districts who showed hesitation and reluctance but rather the higher civil officials who were there at the time. As soon as they once understood the real position, the people no longer hesitated for a moment to identify themselves with the will of the nation.

Let us consider once more some of the main events which, so to say, are the natural consequences of the revolution. In a telegram in cipher, dated the 29th March, that I received from Selâhattin Bey, commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, we had been informed that the attitude of the 15th Division at Samsun was doubtful and that "some officers entertained strong feelings towards the Sultan." It was reported that certain officers had appealed to their superiors and had told them that they would not obey any orders that were antagonistic to the Sultan. It was also said that they would resign their commissions if pressure were put on them.

Newspapers and travellers who came from İstanbul were reported to have said that the buildings that had been commandeered were completely evacuated on the second day after the occupation had begun; that Salih Paşa's Cabinet was continuing its work and that the Senate was sitting; that during the last Selâmlık the usual ceremonies were performed in the presence of the Minister of War and the Minister of Marine; and so forth.

"Therefore," the rumour continued, "it was asked, what is all the fuss about? What are they doing behind the back of the Cabinet while there is still a Ministry in office in İstanbul?"

The officer commanding the 15th Division, who had reported the feeling and attitude of his officers, made the following observations:

"There is nothing out-of-the-way in putting an officer under arrest here, but if this should occur now it might lead to a march against Anadolu."

"I do not know what the conditions of service in the national forces are at the Izmir front. I believe the men are paid."

"As it is quite natural that in case war breaks out the whole of the population cannot be paid, I feel sure that on the day following the outbreak of hostilities there will not be a trace left of the national forces."

"With regard to the regular troops, desertions have already taken place. As there is no money forthcoming and as there is still a Government in İstanbul, I am very doubtful also about the officers."

On the other hand, Selâhattin Bey, commanding the IIIrd Army Corps, in obedience to instructions I had given him, had arrested a certain English officer, Captain Forbes, attached to the Control Commission, who had come to Amasya. Another English officer had arrived at Samsun. He had written to Selâhattin Bey, had demanded that Captain Forbes should be set free immediately, without a moment's delay, and sent to Samsun, and had stated that if this were not done he would be held responsible for the consequences.

When Selâhattin Bey applied to me for instructions I advised him to send the following reply:

"I have not arrested Forbes. It has been done by the nation whose capital has been occupied in complete disregard of the terms of the armistice and the laws of humanity. Consequently, it is the nation alone that can decide about his release." But Forbes did not remain under arrest; they were content to expel him.

We were informed in a short telegram in cipher from Haydar Bey, Mutasarrif of Bolu, that the bridges near Çatalköprü, a place situated between Adapazarı and Hendek, as well as the bridge at Mudurnu, had been destroyed by the enemies of the national forces.

Another telegram in cipher of the 9th April, sent from Düzce by Mahmut Nedim Bey, commanding the Bolu district, brought us the news that manifestations had taken place against the national forces on the previous day at Adapazarı, that the telegraph and telephone lines between Hendek and Adapazarı had been cut, and that the Abaza of Düzce, who had hitherto remained neutral, had decided to join our opponents. We also learned that the destruction of the large bridge at Mudurnu, between Hendek and Adapazarı, was the cause of the communications being interrupted.

When we received these messages we drew the attention of Mahmut Bey, commanding the 24th Division at Geyve, to the state of affairs. We were also informed that a branch of the Society for the Revival of Islam had been formed at Nevşehir under the presidency of Nedim Bey, Kaymakam of Nevşehir. According to the report we received, eight of the most intriguing members of this Society had been called to Niğde.

The members of this Society declared that they would never recognise anybody but the Sultan and swore to sacrifice all they possessed in money and men to exterminate the national forces. Apparently they met every night. Their leaders had been arrested by a detachment from the division stationed at Niğde, which had been sent for that purpose by the commanding officer.

We shall see from the sequel that a great number of similar incidents occurred. While we were working to secure the opening of the Grand National Assembly, which engaged our attention more than anything else, the waves of reaction and revolt in the districts of Düzce, Hendek and Gerede, lying in the zone of Bolu, began to spread and seemed even to approach Ankara, via Nallihan and Beypazarı.

Endeavouring in one direction to restrain these waves, I thought out other means to save the deputies who assembled at Ankara, and who were not yet sufficiently informed about the situation, to form a spectacle that could easily put them in terror, and to avoid a possibility that this could produce and become serious enough to prevent the meeting of the Assembly. With all this in view, I exerted the utmost energy to make certain that the Assembly would open. We finally decided to be satisfied with the delegates that had been able to come and to open the Assembly on Friday, 23rd April, 1920.

I think I ought to quote the contents of the circular sent out by me on the 21st April and which was prompted by this resolution because it constitutes a document that will show how far we were obliged to adapt ourselves to the sentiments and views prevailing at this time:

Telegram, Very urgent.

Ankara 21st April, 1920.

To the Army Corps (temporary Command of the XIVth Army Corps);

To the Command of the 61st Division;

To Refet Bey Efendi;

To all the Vilâyets, independent Livas, Central Committees of the Union for the Defence of the Rights;

To all the Magistrates.

1. On Friday, 23rd April, after prayer, the Grand National Assembly, if God be willing, will be opened.

2. As the duties of the National Assembly will be of a vital description and of the utmost importance — such as, for instance, securing the independence of our country and the deliverance of the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanate from the hands of our enemies — and as it will be opened on a Friday, the solemn character of this day will be acknowledged by offering solemn prayer, before the opening, in the Haci Bayram Mosque. All the

honourable deputies will take part in this prayer, in the course of which the light of the Koran and the call to prayer will be poured forth over all the believers.

When the prayer is over, we shall move to the place of meeting especially decorated with the sacred flag and the holy relic. Before entering the building, a prayer of thanksgiving will be said and sheep will be sacrificed in thanksgiving.

During this ceremony, the troops belonging to the Army Corps will line the road leading from the Mosque to the building and will take up special positions *en route*.

3. In order to emphasise the sacred character of this day, the reading of the whole of the Koran and the Buhari containing the tradition of the Prophet will begin at the chief town in the province under the supervision of the Vali of the Vilâyet, and the last portions will be read for the devotion of the people in front of the building where the Assembly will meet when the Friday prayer is over.

4. In every part of our sacred, suffering country the reading of the Koran and the Buhari will begin from to-day onward, and before Friday prayer the solemn call to prayer is to be intoned from the minarets. When during the Hutbe the Imperial title of His Majesty our Sultan and Caliph will be pronounced, special prayers and petitions will be offered, begging that within a short space of time His Sublime Person, His Imperial States and all his oppressed subjects may regain freedom and happiness. The reading of the Koran being finished at the end of the Friday prayer, sermons will be delivered on the importance and sacred character of the national endeavours which aim at the liberation of the seat of the Caliph and Sultan and every part of our country. Sermons will also be delivered on the obligation of everyone to do his patriotic duty, which will be pointed out to him by the Grand National Assembly that comprises representatives of the whole nation. Prayers will then be said for the deliverance, salvation and independence of our Caliphate and Sultanate, of our Faith and our Empire, of our Country and our Nation.

After these religious and patriotic observances have terminated and we have left the mosque, a solemn ceremony of congratulation will take place in all the Ottoman towns and seats of the highest authorities to commemorate the opening of the National Assembly. Before Friday prayer the Mevlût will be read everywhere.

5. You are requested to use every possible means to spread the fo-

regoing communication without delay to the remotest villages, among the smallest units of troops, among all the organisations and institutions in the country. It is to be printed in heavy type and placarded publicly. In places where this is not possible, it is to be printed and distributed gratis.

6. We pray God to grant that we may be successful.

Mustafa Kemal,
In the name of the Representative Committee.

On the 22nd April I had the following short communiqué distributed:

Telegram.

22nd April, 1920.

To be forwarded without delay.

To all Vilâyets and independent Livas;
 The Army Corps;
 Colonel Refet Bey at Nazilli;
 His Excellency Ali Fuat Pâsa, commanding the XXth Army
 Corps at Bursa;
 Colonel Bekir Sami Bey, commanding the 56th Division at
 Bursa;
 Colonel Kâzım Bey, commanding the 61st Division at
 Balıkesir.

As the Grand National Assembly will be opened and commence its duties, if God be willing, on Friday the 23rd April, you are informed hereby that from this day forward the National Assembly will be the lawful authority to which all civil and military authorities and the entire nation must turn.

Mustafa Kemal,
In the name of the Representative Committee.

*
 * *

Gentlemen,

What I have already told you was intended to give you a description of the circumstances and events in which I took part both personally and in the name of the Representative Committee. In what follows I will deal with the Revolution and the events which have taken place from the time that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was opened and a regular Government was established until the present day. These statements will deal with the various stages of the events which are known to all of you or about which there is no secret. Indeed, the documents relating to them are to be found in the minutes of the Assembly and are to a great extent included in the files of Ministries and in the newspapers. Therefore, I shall confine myself to an outline of the general events. I desire to make the task of the historian easier by pointing out the successive stages of the Revolution. I consider it to be my duty to undertake this more in my capacity as a leader of our organisation than because during the course of these events I have been President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its Government, Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic.

I

Gentlemen,

Soon after the Assembly was opened I described the position and circumstances in which we found ourselves. I also pointed out the course that I considered it would be necessary for us to follow. The most important thing being the political principles which Turkey and the Turkish Nation would have to adopt.

It is well known that under the Ottoman rule various political doctrines were held. For my part, I had arrived at the conviction that none of these doctrines could be accepted by the political organisation of the New Turkey. I took care to express my views on this question clearly before the Assembly. Later on I still laboured with the same idea before me. I think I ought now to summarise the generality of the principles which I have exposed at different times concerning this.

You know that life consists of struggles and conflicts. Success in life is only possible by overcoming difficulties. All depends upon strength, upon

moral and material energy. Further than that, all the questions that engage the attention of mankind, all the dangers to which they are exposed and all the successes which they achieve arise from the turmoil of the general combat which is raging throughout human society. The conflicts between the Eastern and Western races mark some of the most important pages in history. It is a generally accepted fact that among the peoples of the East the Turks were the element who bore the brunt of attacks and who gave evidence of the greatest strength. In fact, both before and after the rise of Islam, the Turks penetrated into the heart of Europe and attacked and invaded in all directions. We must not omit to mention the Arabs also, for they attacked the Occident and carried their invasion as far as Spain and across the frontiers of France. But in every offensive we must always be prepared for a counter-attack. The end that awaits those who act without considering this possibility and without taking the necessary precautionary measures against it is defeat, annihilation, extinction.

The counter-attack delivered by the West which was aimed at the Arabs began in Andalusia with a heavy historical defeat which pointed a moral. But it did not stop there. The persecution extended to North Africa.

After calling to mind the Empire of Attila, which extended as far as France and the territory of the West-Roman Empire, we will turn our minds to the times when the Ottoman State, founded on the ruins of the Selçuk State, was master of the crown and the throne of the East-Roman Empire in Istanbul. Among the Ottoman rulers there were some who endeavoured to form a gigantic empire by seizing Germany and West-Rome. One of these rulers hoped to unite the whole Islamic world in one body, to lead it and govern it. For this purpose he obtained control of Syria and Egypt and assumed the title of Caliph. Another Sultan pursued the twofold aim, on the one hand of gaining the mastery over Europe, and on the other of subjecting the Islamic world to his authority and government. The continuous counter-attacks from the West, the discontent and insurrections in the Mohamedan world, as well as the dissensions between the various elements which this policy had artificially brought together within certain limits, had the ultimate result of burying the Ottoman Empire, in the same way as many others, under the pall of history.

What particularly interests foreign policy, and upon which it is founded, is the internal organisation of the state. Thus it is essential that the foreign policy agree with the internal organisation. In a state which extends from the East to the West and which unites in its embrace contrary elements with opposite characters, goals and culture, it is natural that the internal

organisation be defective and weak in its foundations. Under these circumstances its foreign policy, having no solid foundations cannot be strenuously carried on. In the same proportion as the internal organisation of such a state suffers specifically from the defect of not being national, so also its foreign policy must lack this character. For this reason, the policy of the Ottoman State could not be national and was deficient in clarity and continuity.

To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, to subject them to the same conditions and thus to found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealisable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe all the Turks existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth which the centuries that have gone by and the men who have lived during these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events.

There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Panislamism and Panturanism could have succeeded or how they could have found a basis for their realisation on this earth. As regards the result of the ambition to organise a state which should be governed by the idea of world-supremacy and include the whole of humanity without distinction of race, history does not afford examples of this. For us, there can be no question of the lust of conquest. On the other hand, the theory which aims at founding a "humanitarian" state which shall embrace all mankind in perfect equality and brotherhood and at bringing it to the point of forgetting separatist sentiments and inclinations of every kind is subject to conditions which are peculiar to itself.

The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is national policy. In view of the general conditions obtaining in the world at present and the truths which in the course of centuries have rooted themselves in the minds of and have formed the characters of mankind, no greater mistake could be made than that of being a utopian. This is borne out in history and is the expression of science, reason and common sense.

In order that our nation be able live a happy, strenuous and permanent life, it is necessary that the State pursue an exclusively national policy and that this policy be in perfect agreement with our internal organisation and be based on it. When I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. We must not lead the people to follow fictitious

aims, of whatever nature, which can only bring them misfortune; we expect from the civilised world civilised human treatment, friendship based on mutuality.

Another important question which I also brought before the Assembly related to the formation of the Government. You will appreciate that this question was at that time a very delicate one.

In reality, it was a question of acknowledging collapse and the abolition of the Ottoman rule Caliphate. It meant the creation of a new State standing of new foundations. But to speak openly of the position as it revealed itself might eventually jeopardise the goal we were aiming at. For, the general opinion inclined to the idea that the attitude of the Sultan-Caliph was excusable. Even in the Assembly during the first months there was a tendency to seek communion with the seat of the Caliphate, a union with the Central Government.

I tried to explain that the conditions under which Istanbul found itself equally prevented an open or private and secret communion with the Caliph and Sultan. I asked what we considered we could attain by such communion and declared that it was quite unnecessary if it was a question of making known that the nation was struggling to preserve its independence and the integrity of its territory. For, was it possible that the person who held the office of Sultan and Caliph could have any other idea or desire? I stated that even were I to hear the contrary from his own lips I could not believe it but would incline to the assumption that every statement of that kind was only produced under pressure. While further insisting that the Fetva issued against us was a malicious invention, that the orders and instructions of the Government need to be made clear, I avoided the deliberateness advocated by certain persons of weak character and superficial judgment.

So far as the formation of the Government was concerned, it was necessary to take account of opinions and sentiments before making a proposition. In bowing to this necessity, I brought forward my suggestion in the form of a motion, but a motion of which the intention remained quite clear. After a short discussion it was carried, in spite of a few objections.

If we read this resolution to-day we shall see that fundamental principles were defined and formulated in it.

Let me enumerate them and point out the details:

1. It is absolutely necessary to form a Government.

2. We cannot allow a regency to be established or the chief of the Government to be defined as provisional.

3. It is a vital principle to recognise that the national will expressed by the Assembly is actually governing the destiny of the country. There is no power standing above the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey combines in itself the Legislative and the Executive Power.

A Council elected and authorised by the Assembly conducts the affairs of the Government. The President of the Assembly is at the same time President of this Council.

(Note: As soon as the Sultan-Caliph is delivered from all pressure and coercion he will take his place within the frame of the legislative principles which will be determined by the Assembly.)

It is not difficult to appreciate the character of a Government standing upon such foundations. Such a Government is a People's Government based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. It is a Republic.

The fundamental principle in the organisation of such a Government is the theory of the unity of powers. As time advanced, we understood the force of these principles. Then followed discussions and incidents.

After the statements and analyses I made in the open and private sittings which lasted for several days and after the introduction of the motion on the principles which I have just enumerated, the Grand Assembly showed its unanimous confidence in me by electing me President.

I will now tell you something. You know that, instead of being ascribed to the excitement and awakening of the people, the national unity which now began to manifest itself was regarded rather as the result of personal initiative. Under this impression, it was considered important to prevent any prominent step on my part. It was thought advisable to do something with the object of leading the nation and the Government to disown and condemn me. In the propaganda which was carried on it was explained that there would be no longer need for the slightest action against the Government and the nation if I were disowned and condemned. That I, individually, was the cause of all the trouble; that it would be illogical for a nation to expose itself to dangers of every description at the behest of one man. The Government and my enemies made use of me personally as a weapon against the nation. In consequence of this, the Assembly examined this point during a secret sitting on 24th April, 1920. I begged them to take this point also into con-

sideration in the election of the President, to regard it as a further subject for hesitation, and in every question to arrive at a decision only and solely with the single thought of the salvation of the country and the people.

In accordance with the Act of the 2nd May, 1920, regarding the election of the Commissioners of the Grand National Assembly, the Ministerial Council, consisting of eleven Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff, was determined upon in the Grand National Assembly.

About a week had elapsed since the 23rd April when the Assembly was opened. Naturally, during this time the affairs of the country and the people could not stand still, especially as regards the measures which had to be taken against the activities and movements of our enemies. Several members elected by the Assembly as Ministers had, however, when this Act was passed begun their work in co-operation with me. Among them was His Excellency İsmet Paşa, who had undertaken the duties of the General Staff.

I think at this opportunity I ought to emphasise this point. While at that time the question of the duties that could appropriately have been assigned to the different members was being considered, I had made up my mind that İsmet Paşa should be Chief of the General Staff. Refet Paşa, who was at Ankara, had a private interview with me at which he asked me to make certain statements on this question. He wanted to know whether the Chief of the General Staff was the highest military authority. When I replied that this was actually the case and that only the Grand National Assembly was superior to it, he raised objections to my selection. He declared that he could not agree to it and that it would create a situation which would be tantamount to handing over the chief command to İsmet Paşa. I told him that these duties were very important and very delicate, and that I must be trusted to know all my comrades and to be impartial towards them. I added that it was not right on his part to hold such opinions.

Fuat Paşa, with whom I spoke later on the western front, categorically opposed the appointment of İsmet Paşa as chief of the General Staff. I tried to persuade him also to my point of view, telling him it was the most feasible one at the moment. The argument Refet Paşa and Fuat Paşa advanced after they had made some personal remarks was, that they had worked with me in Anadolu long before İsmet Paşa had done so, because he only joined us later. But in my previous statements I had already had an opportunity to emphasise the fact that İsmet Paşa had worked with me before I left İstanbul. In consequence of this he had come to Anadolu to work with me there; but when His Excellency Fevzi Paşa had been appointed

War Minister he was again, for pressing reasons, sent on a special mission to Istanbul. There could be no question, therefore, of seniority as regards our unity of opinions and collaboration.

If the appointment of İsmet Paşa to the highest position on the General Staff had been unsatisfactory, it would have been the patriotic duty of Fevzi Paşa to direct my attention to it. However, on the contrary, His Excellency found the appointment perfectly satisfactory and, with feelings of sincere cordiality, himself accepted the Ministry of National Defence which had been offered to him. The dignity and the great zeal which İsmet Paşa displayed as Chief of the General Staff, and later on as commander at the front, proved in practice how correct was the choice I had made, and in this I have a clear conscience before the nation, the Army and history.

When the Assembly passed the Act relating to crimes against the country on the 29th April, 1920, and in the course of the following months the Acts regulating the Independence Courts, it was following the natural consequence of the Revolution.

We have mentioned certain hostile movements and events, especially the risings which began to take place after the occupation of Istanbul. They occurred and succeeded one another with great rapidity all over the country.

Damat Ferit was immediately put at the head of the Government in Istanbul. Damat Ferit Paşa's Cabinet, the party that all the hostile and traitorous organisations in Istanbul had formed, all the rebellious organisations of this party inside Anadolu and the Greek army, in short, all the enemies united against us in common action. The instructions of this unified policy of attack were contained in the Fetva, "Insurrection against the Sultan," which the Sultan-Caliph had circulated throughout the country, for which he utilised every possible means, even including enemy-aircraft.

Against this general attack of an anti-patriotic character, we took counter-measures before the opening of the Assembly by driving the foreign troops that were in Afyonkarahisar, in Eskisehir and along the railway out of Anadolu; by destroying the bridges at Geyve, Lefke, and Carablus, and by causing the honourable Ulema of Anadolu to draw up a Fetva after the Assembly had met.

The internal upheavals, which began during the year 1920 against our national organisation spread rapidly throughout the country.

The territories involved were Bandırma, Gönen, Susurluk, Kirmasti, Karacabey, Biga, Izmit, Adapazarı, Düzce, Hendek, Bolu, Gerede, Nallıhan,

Beypazarı, Bozkır, Konya, İlgin, Kadınhan, Karaman, Çivril, Seydişehir, Beyşehir, Kochisar, Yozgat, Yenihan, Boğazlıyan, Sile, Erbaa, Çorum, Ümraniye, Refahiye, Zara, Hafik and Viranşehir. In all these the flaming fire of rebellion raged and reduced the whole country to ashes. The clouds of treachery, of ignorance, of hatred and fanaticism darkened the sky and threw the whole of the country into deep shadow. The waves of insurrection surged even up to the walls of our headquarters at Ankara. We encountered audacious attacks, which culminated in the destruction of the telegraphic and telephonic communication between our headquarters and the town. Following İzmir, other important districts in Western Anadolu were ravaged with fire and sword by the Greek Army.

It is remarkable that a general insurrection of this kind did not take place eight months before, when the nation had gathered round the Representative Committee and had cut off all communication with Damat Ferit's Government, and when only a few incidents, such as Ali Galip's enterprise, were to be recorded. The universal insurrections which now took place showed that they had been consistently prepared in the country during the previous eight months. With the Governments that followed that of Damat Ferit it was felt very bitterly once more how correct the reasons were on which our struggle for the preservation and strengthening of the national consciousness were based. On the other hand, the sad results of an omission of another description on the part of the Government in İstanbul will be seen when it became a question of occupying ourselves with the front and the Army in order to give more force to the national struggle.

In order to get a clear idea of the internal insurrection, let me put before you a summary of the phases of these demonstrations.

Anzavur's insurrection which began on the 21st September, 1919, north of Balıkesir, was repeated on the same ground on 16th February, 1920. Both of these insurrections were suppressed by our national troops. On the 13th April, 1920, the districts of Bolu and Düzce also rose. These insurrections spread on the 19th April, 1920, as far as Beypazarı. Then Anzavur rebelled again for the third time on the 11th May, 1920, in the districts of Adapazarı and Geyve. He attacked a weak national detachment of 500 men supplied with artillery and machine-guns. Anzavur continually attacked the national detachments and the regular troops which were sent against him. He was beaten on the 20th May, 1920, in the vicinity of the Geyve Pass and was forced to take to flight.

The insurrection in the Düzce district was important. A band of 400

men, consisting of Circassians and Abaza, entered Düzce, broke open the prisons and, after a skirmish, disarmed our cavalry on the spot. This force took the Government officials and officers prisoners. We sent troops from every direction against the insurgents. Among them was the 4th Division which was stationed at Geyve, and with its commander Lt.-Colonel Mahmut Bey marched forward on Düzce. Hendek also revolted when Mahmut Bey had left that town for Düzce, on the very day the Assembly was opened, that is to say, on the 23rd April, 1920. The insurgents took possession of Adapazari as well. On the 25th April, 1920, Mahmut Bey, set on the wrong track by the insurgents, fell into an ambush and was killed on the road between Hendek and Düzce by the first shot. His chief staff officer, Sami Bey, his ordnance officer and several others fell with him. Following this, the 24th Division was captured by the insurgents without having had an opportunity to come into action. All their guns and rifles were taken and their baggage was plundered. At this moment the Vice-governor of Izmit, Çerkez İbrahim, arrived at Adapazari from Istanbul. He conveyed the Imperial greetings to the population and began to enroll volunteers for the sum of T. L. 150. When all the united insurgent forces had gained the mastery over this territory they began to attack our troops in the Geyve Pass.

The troops which we sent to this insurgent district were:

1. Çerkez Etem Bey's Division, which consisted of the national fighting troops at Salihli and Balıkesir.
2. Captain Nazım Bey's command, consisting of two regular battalions, four mountain guns, five machine-guns and 300 mounted efes.
3. Lt.-Colonel Arif Bey's, consisting of two infantry battalions, eight machine-guns, two field and two mountain guns.
4. Major İbrahim Bey's, consisting of 300 men of the national forces, two machine-guns and two mortars.

The commanding officers were Ali Fuat Paşa, for the operations in the direction of the Geyve Pass, and Refet Paşa, for those in the direction of Ankara, Bolu and Beypazarı.

Gentlemen, at Izmit a host of traitors were also gathering under the name of the "Army of the Caliphate," commanded by Süleyman Şefik Paşa. Some of their troops under the command of Hayri Bey, Major on the General Staff, had reinforced the rebels in the Bolu district. Among these were a great number of officers who had been sent from Istanbul.

Next to Süleyman Şefik Paşa, the important commanders of this Army
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

of the Caliphate were Suphi Paşa, a cavalry Brigadier General, and Senai Bey, Colonel in the artillery. In İstanbul there was also a specially formed staff, of which the principal leaders were Refik Bey, Colonel on the General Staff, and Hayrettin Bey, Lt.-Colonel on the General Staff.

I would like to tell you here something that comes to my recollection about Suphi Paşa. I had known him since we were at Salonika together. I held the rank of Major and Adjutant then, while he was already a Brigadier General commanding the cavalry. In spite of the difference in our rank and seniority, there was a sincere feeling of comradeship between us. When the Constitution was proclaimed he carried out for the first time some cavalry manoeuvres at Cumali in the district of İstip. He had invited me among several other officers to be present at these manoeuvres and exercises. He had studied in Germany and was a very skilful rider but by no means an officer who understood his work as a leader. Although I was not entitled by my rank or authority to do so, at the end of the manoeuvres I sharply criticised the Paşa in the presence of all the officers, and subsequently published a little work called "The Camp of Cumali". On account of my public criticism as well as my little book, Suphi Paşa felt that he was very much offended; as he confessed himself, his spirit was broken. But he was not really angry with me personally; our comradeship continued as before. It was this same Suphi Paşa whom they had sought out and put in command of the Army of the Caliphate. Later on, the Paşa came to Ankara when I was just leaving. We met in the middle of a great crowd. The first thing I said to him was: "Paşa, why have you accepted the command of the Army of the Caliphate?" Without a moment's hesitation, Suphi Paşa replied: "In order to be beaten by you."

By this he meant to say that he had taken over that position for this purpose. But in reality his troops were already beaten before he accepted the command.

The revolt in the districts of Bolu, Düzce, Adapazarı and İzmit lasted until the 4th June, 1920 — that is to say, for more than three months. There was still another revolt on the 29th July, and then for some time there was no peace in these districts. But in the end the rebels were completely defeated and their leaders had to suffer the avenging penalties provided by the laws of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The part of the Army of the Caliphate which was in the district of Bolu was beaten later on. Its leaders, Major Hayri and his officers, Captain Ali, Lieutenant Şerafettin, Lieutenant Hayrettin, Mehmet Hayri, an officer belonging to the machine-gun detachment, Hasan Lütfi, Secretary of the battalion, and İbrahim Etem, on the medical

staff, suffered the same fate as the other leaders of the rebels. The Army of the Caliphate was compelled to flee from Izmit to Istanbul.

Whilst we were occupied with the rebels in the north-west of the districts of our country, another rebellion broke out in the districts of Yenihan, Boğazlıyan and Yozgat. These revolutionary movements are also worth mentioning.

On the 14th March some individuals, like Postacı Nazım, and Çerkez Kara Mustafa, rose in revolt with 30 or 40 men in the village of Kaman belonging to Yenihan. This movement spread and became more important. During the night of the 27th May, 1920, the rebels surprised one of our detachments at Çamlıbel and took them prisoners. In the district of Tokat another party of rebels attacked one of our battalions on the march on the 28th May, dispersed it and took some of the men prisoners. During the night of the 6th June, the rebels, whose boldness was increasing, occupied Zile. Our soldiers retired to the fortress of Zile, which they defended. Three days later, when their food supplies and ammunition were exhausted, our troops surrendered to the rebels. On the 23rd June the latter attacked Boğazlıyan quite unexpectedly. They dispersed our troops that were there. The 5th Caucasian Division at Amasya, commanded by Cemil Cahit Bey, was sent against the rebels. Kılıç Ali Bey, who was in the district of Antep, was ordered to go there with some national troops. Another detachment from Erzurum, which came from there to Ankara, was also appointed to this district. Until the middle of July we were occupied in fighting and suppressing the rebels. The Yenihan revolt also encouraged agitators in other parts of Central Anatolia to rise. Celâl Bey, Edip Bey, Salih Bey and Halit Bey of the Çapanoğlu family collected gangs of robbers. Those of the Aynacıoğlu and Deli Ömer also rose in revolt on the 13th June and occupied the chief place in the district of Köhne, not far from Yozgat. After occupying the town of Yozgat on the 14th June, they became masters of a rather wide territory. The troops of the IIIrd Army Corps stationed at Sivas and the National Forces we had left in this district proved to be inadequate. Those commanded by Etem Bey and İbrahim Bey were sent from Eskişehir and the district of Bolu to Yozgat.

After the rebels in Yozgat and the surrounding country had been defeated, the troops which had been sent there were transferred to other districts; but, generally speaking, quiet could not be restored there.

On the 7th September, 1920, parties of adventurers of the type of Küçük Aga, Deli Hacı and Aynacıoğlu in the district of Zile, and some other

individuals in the district of Erbaa, such as Kara Nâzim and Çopur Yusuf recommenced their criminal activity. The Aynacıoğlu family had succeeded in collecting a body of about 300 horsemen. Then İbrahim Bey's command, which had received the name of the 2nd "Flying Column," was recalled from Eskişehir where they were and, in conjunction with national troops and parties of gendarmerie, followed and punished the rebels. These latter in different parties had occupied themselves with robbing and creating unrest in the districts of Maden, Alaca, Karamağara and Mecitözü. It was only after more than three months that İbrahim Bey's efforts were crowned with success.

At the same time important revolts which demanded our serious attention also broke out in our Southern districts.

The leaders of the Millî tribe, like Mahmut Bey, İsmail Bey, Halil Bey, Bahur Bey and Abdürrahman, after having established secret communication and connection with our enemies, considered themselves the leaders of all the tribes from Siirt to the districts of Dersim, and claimed rule over and command of this district.

When, in the beginning of June, the French advanced with the intention of taking possession of Urfa for the second time, the Millî tribe began their march in the direction of Siverek; our 5th Division, which was in this district, was ordered to operate against this movement. This division was reinforced by our national troops that were in the same district. Under pressure of our troops, the tribe in question saw itself forced on the 19th June, 1920, to retire in a south-easterly direction into the enemy's zone. After making preparations for some time in this zone, this tribe with the force of 3,000 men mounted on horses and camels, and with nearly 1,000 men on foot, invaded our territory again on the 24th August. They had penetrated as far as the district of Viranşehir when they declared that they had come with the intention of asking for pardon, thus deceiving the officers commanding districts and leading them not to take the proper precautions. Meanwhile they attacked our troops who were scattered about in the district, defeated them and occupied Viranşehir on the 26th August, 1920. In order to cut off all communication and contact with us, they destroyed all the telegraph lines in the neighbourhood. It was only a fortnight later that the detachments of the 5th Division that had been held back and were at Siverek, Urfa, Resulayin and Diyarbakır, in combination with the forces of the loyal tribes, were able to overcome the rebels.

The Milli tribe again fled southward towards the desert, closely pursued by our troops.

While we were engaged in the south with this suppression of the revolt of the Milli tribe, a man named Çopur Musa, accompanied by others he had gathered round him, induced the soldiers in the district of Afyonkarahisar to desert and incited the population to refuse to do their military service. On the 21st June Çopur Musa attacked Çivril. He fled before the troops we sent against him and joined the Greek Army.

There was yet another revolutionary movement that took place at Konya before the one I have just mentioned. On the 5th May, 1920, we discovered in this town a revolutionary society and we set to work to arrest the members of it. The next day the leaders whom we were about to arrest incited the population to revolt and held an armed meeting in Konya itself. With others who had arrived from the neighbourhood and who were also armed, they raised a general revolt. Our commander at Konya who courageously intervened succeeded with the forces at his disposal to disperse and pursue the rebels and arrest the ringleaders of the movement.

*
* *

Now let us recall the situation on the different fronts immediately after the Assembly was opened.

1. The Greek Front at Izmir.

As you are aware, Nadir Paşa, commanding the XVIIth Army Corps, was personally at Izmir with his staff when the Greeks landed in that town. In addition to his Corps there were two regiments of the 56th Division there commanded by Lt.-Colonel Hurrem Bey. By special order of the officer commanding the Army Corps, these troops were surrendered to the Greeks without being allowed to defend themselves and were exposed to painful insults. One of these regiments, the 172nd, was at Ayvalik. It was commanded by Lt.-Colonel Ali Bey (Colonel Ali Bey, Deputy for Afyonkarahisar).

When the Greek Army extended their territory of occupation, they landed troops at Ayvalik. On the 28th May, 1919, Ali Bey was fighting against these Greek troops. Up till then no resistance had been offered to the Greek Army. On the contrary, under the influence of fear and in obedience to the orders of the Central Government, the inhabitants of some

towns and smaller places had sent special deputations with high officials at their head to meet them. After Ali Bey had established a fighting front at Ayvalık, national forces gradually began to organise fronts at Soma, Akhisar, and Salihli.

On the 5th June, 1919, Colonel Kâzım Bey (His Excellency Kâzım Paşa, President of the Assembly) had taken over the temporary command of the 61st Division at Balıkesir. Later on, he commanded the Northern front, comprising the districts of Ayvalık, Soma and Akhisar. After the appointment of Fuat Paşa to the command of the West front, Kâzım Bey was promoted to the rank of a Corps Commander in the Northern Army.

After Izmir was occupied, some patriots were active amongst the military force and the population in the district of Aydin organising the defences against the Greeks, rousing the enthusiasm of the population and forming a properly armed national force. The courage, sacrifice and ardour of Celâl Bey (Deputy for Izmir) deserve to be mentioned here. He had left Izmir under an assumed name and in disguise, and had succeeded in reaching that district. During the night of the 15th June the troops sent by Ali Bey from Ayvalık had attempted a sudden attack on the Greek troops of occupation at Bergama and had annihilated them. Troops sent from Balıkesir and Bandırma had participated in this attack. Following this event the Greeks considered it necessary to retire and rally their scattered and weak forces. They abandoned Nazilli. The troops recruited from among the population in the vicinity began to press upon the Greeks, whilst preparations were being carried on at Aydin. A violent encounter took place between the Greeks and the people, which resulted in the Greeks abandoning Aydin and retiring their troops.

Thus in the middle of June, 1919, the Aydin front was established. In this district were Colonel Mehmet Şerif Bey, commanding the 57th Division. Major Hakkı Bey, commanding the artillery, Major Hacı Sükrü Bey, commanding an infantry regiment, and Yürük Ali Efe and Demirci Mehmet Efe at the head of the National Forces. Being master of the situation, the latter assumed command of the Aydin front. I have already had an opportunity of telling you that Colonel Refet Bey (Refet Paşa), whom I had sent later on to the front, was also under Demirci Mehmet Efe.

Provisioning the National Forces on the different Izmir fronts, the gradual reinforcement of which by officers and men had been the object of our efforts, was safely secured by the population of these districts. National organisations had been formed for this purpose in the districts behind the

Army. It was only after the formation of the Government by the Grand National Assembly that this task could be transferred to the Government.

2. *The French Southern Front.*

a) In the district of Adana national forces had been drawn up immediately in front of the French troops in the country around Mersin, Tarsus, İslahiye and in the district of Silifke, and with great courage had begun active operations against them. The heroic deeds of Major Osman Bey, who concealed his identity under the name of Tufan Bey, in the district east of Adana deserve to be specially mentioned. The national troops made themselves masters of the district right up to the gates of the towns of Mersin, Tarsus and Adana. They besieged the French at Pozanti and forced them to retreat.

b) Skirmishes and serious fighting took place at Maraş, Antep and Urfa. Eventually the occupying troops found themselves compelled to abandon these places. It is my duty to mention here the names of Kılıç Ali Bey and Ali Saip Bey, who were chiefly responsible for these successes.

The National Forces gained solidarity day by day in the French occupied districts and on the French front. The occupying troops were strongly pressed everywhere.

As a result of this, the French tried to get into touch and enter into negotiations with us after the beginning of May, 1920. A major and a civilian coming from Istanbul arrived first at Ankara. These gentlemen intended to go to Beirut straight from Istanbul. Haydar Bey, former deputy for Van, acted as their dragoman. Our conversations did not lead to any important practical result. However, towards the end of May, a French deputation led by M. Duquest, who acted in the name of the High Commissioner of Syria, came to Ankara. We agreed with this deputation to an armistice of twenty days. During the temporary armistice we prepared for the evacuation of the Adana district.

Objections were raised by some members of the Grand National Assembly to the twenty days' armistice I had concluded with the French deputation. Nevertheless, when I agreed to it I had this in my mind: First of all, I did not want to be interfered with while I reorganised the National Forces in the district and on the front of Adana that had been partly reinforced by regular troops. Calculating on the possibility of the National Forces dispersing during this suspension of hostilities, when I promulgated

the armistice, I added some instructions about certain steps that were to be taken. On the other hand, I desired to gain a political advantage which I considered to be very advisable. The Grand National Assembly and their Government had not as yet been recognised by the Entente Powers, but, on the other hand, in regard to questions concerning the fate of the country and the nation, these Powers were in touch with Ferit Paşa's Government in Istanbul. Considering the fact that the French, disregarding the Istanbul Government, had entered into negotiations and had come to an agreement with us on any question meant at that time a political advantage of the highest importance. During the course of the armistice negotiations, I clearly and formally demanded the complete evacuation of territory situated within our national frontiers which was occupied by the French. The French delegates spoke of the necessity of going to Paris to ask for full powers on this question. The twenty days' armistice was considered to give the delegates the necessary time, to provide themselves with the authority to come to a still more important agreement. In the course of these negotiations and interviews I gained the impression that the French would abandon Adana and the district of Adana. I had expressed my opinion and my conviction on this point in the Assembly. When, however, the French occupied Zonguldak before the armistice had elapsed, we considered that as far as we were concerned this step was equivalent to a violation of the armistice, although they intended to show thereby that the agreement referred solely to the district of Adana. Through this our understanding with the French was delayed for some time.

During the secret sitting of the Assembly on the 9th May, 1920, when I had given certain explanations and had mentioned that French officials and the French deputation had put out a feeler and had tried to get into relations with us, one of the deputies (if my memory does not deceive me, it was the late Fuat Bey, Deputy for Çorum) told me that "apparently Istanbul had been trying for several days to come to an understanding with us," and he asked me whether I was willing to give him some information about this.

As a matter of fact, four or five days previously a certain "Leon" in Istanbul had tried to get into touch with us telegraphically by the Çanakkale line. After he had got into communication with Ankara and was sure that we were at the instrument, he said: "We have something very important to tell you, so that we must postpone our exchange of telegrams until to-night, because then the military central station can be prevented from overhearing our conversation."

We did not telegraph to them that night; but one or two nights afterwards they tried again to reach us. On this occasion a telegram was transmitted to us, signed by Nurettin Paşa, formerly Governor of Izmir. This is the content of that telegram:

"Two of my comrades and I consider that it is more in accordance with the interests of our country to consider how İstanbul can come to an understanding with us. The local Government as well as the English are of this opinion also. We await a favourable reply." Nurettin Paşa addressed his telegram to the President of the Representative Committee. He did not appear to know that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and their Government had already been formed and had begun to exercise their functions, nor did he know that an Act relating to crimes against the country had confirmed the existence and legality of the Grand National Assembly. I handed Nurettin Paşa's telegram to His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Minister of National Defence. His Excellency replied to Nurettin Paşa. He said: "The fact that you addressed your telegram to the President of the Representative Committee leads us to believe that you are not yet fully acquainted with the real position." After having explained the real state of affairs, Fevzi Paşa asked: "What authority in İstanbul is desirous of carrying on this conversation and with what authority do they wish to speak with Ankara?" The unsigned reply that we received to this said: "The persons who have sent the telegram are not here at the present moment. They handed in the telegram and went away. To-morrow at ten o'clock we shall be able to give you further information." Later on Nurettin Paşa tried a second time to get into touch with us by telegraph. This time he said: "As it is impossible to come to an understanding by telegraph, will you send a deputation furnished with full powers to İstanbul so that we can talk and come to an agreement?"

Our reply was: "It is quite evident that it is impossible to come to an agreement; but we would rather that you came to Mudanya, and we shall be glad to know when you can come. Persons with full powers representing us will be in that town. The necessary instructions have been sent to Bursa." Nothing further was done in the matter. Hoca Müfit Efendi (Kırşehir) inquired whether it was really Nurettin Paşa who had sent the telegram. I replied: "Yes; I have no doubt that it was Nurettin Paşa."

I want to call attention to the fact that the steps undertaken through the mediation of Nurettin Paşa in İstanbul happened at the time when Anzavur was beaten in the district of Balıkesir and when we had attained our first successes at Bolu.

We received no further telegrams from Nurettin Paşa; but he came personally to Ankara in the middle of June, accompanied by Diyarbakırlı Kâzım Paşa. He declared that before working with us he wanted to know our opinions with regard to certain questions. They were:

1. What our intentions and views were regarding the Caliphate and Sultanate.
2. What our viewpoint was concerning the question of Bolshevism.
3. Whether we had resolved to carry on a war against the Entente Powers — especially against England.

The conversation took place at night in one of the rooms of our headquarters in the School of Agriculture. In addition to Kâzım Paşa who had arrived with Nurettin Paşa, Fevzi Paşa and İzzet Paşa were present at that meeting. Nurettin Paşa did not consider the replies which he received to the first and second questions to be sufficient; but the reply to the third led to long and bitter discussions. For we had expressed ourselves to this effect: "Our aim is to secure the complete independence of our nation and the integrity of our territory within its national frontiers. We shall fight and conquer every Power, whichever it might be, who would try to block our way and hinder us from the realisation of this aim. We are absolutely firm in our conviction and our determination." It was this particular conception of ours that Nurettin Paşa had no faith in, and he refused to agree with us. Finally we told him: "When it comes to a discussion there is no question of changing our faith or of coming to new decisions. You will submit to the convictions of the nation as they have been hitherto drawn up and determined upon." Then the question of the duties that would be assigned to him arose. We decided that he should take command of the district south of the Greek front and the civil administration of the Province of Konya as Vali, with the additional rank of Commandant of the district of Konya. On the 18th June we appointed Fuat Paşa to command the entire Western front.

As at this time certain preparations of the enemy on the Greek front became noticeable, a certain amount of uneasiness was felt. On this occasion I had to start for the Western front in great haste without having been able to complete the arrangements for Nurettin Paşa's appointment and his departure for his new post. I left this to İsmet Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, to attend to and ordered him to carry out all the necessary formalities. The enemy had actually begun his attack along the whole line. Our troops retired. When Nurettin Paşa saw how unfavourable our position at the front was, he told İsmet Paşa that before he could accept his post the Government

must consent to certain conditions. For instance, the Government ought to ask for the opinion and agreement of Nurettin Paşa before coming to a definite decision on important questions relating to the administration of the country. For among those who formed the Government of the Grand National Assembly were apparently some young men and not experienced persons like Tevfik Paşa and certain others who had reached the age of wisdom. İsmet Paşa, finding these ideas somewhat strange, immediately sent me a telegram about the matter. As for myself, I found it significant that Nurettin Paşa had put forward these requests at the very moment when the general position had become critical, while he had abstained from doing so at the time I offered him the appointment. In the reply I sent to İsmet Paşa, I ordered that no office was to be entrusted to him. I also looked upon the contents of a letter that Nurettin Paşa had sent me two days after the Greek offensive had begun as being rather strange. If you like I will read the letter to you.

Railway Station, Ankara, 24th June, 1920.

To the Honourable President of the Grand National Assembly.

Your Excellency,

The manner in which I have been dismissed from the appointment of Commander and Vali as well as the way in which my dismissal has been conveyed to me, are regarded by me as offensive.

I beg that Your Excellency will allow me to tell you that in my opinion it is dangerous for the nation and the country when an observation inspired by patriotism and put forward by an official of the State is not entitled to be discussed or even listened to; further, it is dangerous when there is no inclination to wait or allow or even deem it necessary that the Grand National Assembly and their Executive Council should express their opinion, but on the other hand to follow the conceptions and wishes of the very limited number of two or three persons and, if I am not very much mistaken, to administer the affairs of the country in such a spirit.

As, under the present conditinos, I think I must be very doubtful about accepting an appointment and can see no advantage in our working together, I hereby inform you that I shall leave Ankara by the next train and shall settle down at Bursa, my native town. I permit myself on this occasion to bid Your Excellency farewell.

Nurettin İbrahim

I replied:

25th June, 1920.

To Brigadier-General Nurettin Paşa.

Reply to your letter of 24th June.

The appointment of Commander and Vali to which you refer had not yet been conferred upon you and you had not yet been notified of it in an official communication by the Ministers of National Defence and the Interior. Therefore, as far as you are concerned, there is neither a question of your appointment nor of your dismissal. It had only been suggested that an appointment should be given to you and that you should be consulted before it was offered to you. On account of the indecision you have shown in your thoughts and convictions at the moment when your appointment had not been decided upon, of which we had been informed by the Chief of the General Staff, the Council of Ministers had decided to abandon the idea of offering it to you. The law now in force does not provide, as you agree, that a decision of this kind has to be brought before the Grand National Assembly. As regards your departure for Bursa and your residence in that town, I must point out to you that, considering that you belong to the Army, it is necessary according to the regulations that you apply to the Minister of National Defence on that question.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly.

Nurettin Paşa did not go to Bursa but to Taşköprü, where he stayed for a long time. Later on, we shall meet him again under different circumstances, about which I shall speak at the proper time.

The first decision arrived at by the recently formed Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was to send an Embassy to Moscow. It was under the leadership of Bekir Sami Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Yusuf Kemal Bey, Minister of Economy, was one of its members. The chief object of this Embassy, which left Ankara on the 11th May, 1920, was to establish relations between Russia and ourselves. Although certain essential points in the Treaty that Russia wanted to make with our Government had been agreed to on the 24th August, the actual signature to the Treaty was postponed on account of certain details about which no agreement had been arrived at, concerning some matters that affected the situation. The signing of the document, known as the Moscow Treaty, was not possible before the 13th March, 1921.

The first general offensive by the Greeks, which began immediately after the insurrection which took place almost throughout the country, necessitates our looking westwards once more.

The Greeks began their general attack on the 22nd June, 1920, along the Milen line. Their troops were six divisions strong. They attacked with three divisions in two columns in the direction Akhisar — Soma; with two divisions in the direction of Salihli and with one in front of Aydin. The enemy's northern columns advanced on the 30th June to Balikesir and the enemy's cavalry occupied Kirmasti and Karacabey on the 2nd July, 1920. Destroying the bridge of Uluabat, our 61st and 56th Divisions that were facing them retired in the direction of Bursa. The enemy continued to advance, occupied Bursa and pushed his vanguard forward to the line Dimboz — Aksu. Our troops had been seriously shaken, and they retired as far as Eskişehir. While these operations were going on, the English landed troops at Mudanya on the 25th June and some others at Bandırma on the 2nd July.

Two Greek columns were pushed forward eastward in the direction of Salihli and reached Alaşehir on the 24th June. Later on, in their further advance, they occupied Uşak and penetrated as far as the district of Dumlu-pinar, the heights of which, however, were held by us. The national forces and the 23rd Division facing the enemy suffered heavy casualties which apparently weakened them very much. A Greek column, marching from Aydin, advanced as far as Nazilli.

You are probably aware that at the time of these operations our troops were mere skeletons without ammunition and incapable of being reinforced.

I went personally to Eskişehir and from there into the front line. I ordered our forces which were in this district and elsewhere to be reorganised. I took every care that new fronts under a regular command were established against the enemy.

Gentlemen,

The Greek offensive and the break up of our defences caused by it produced a great crisis in the Assembly, which found its expression in violent attacks and severe criticism.

In the forty-first sitting of the Grand National Assembly on the 13th July, 1920, some questions were addressed to the General Staff and to the Ministry of the Interior demanding why Bekir Sami Bey, commanding at Bursa, Hâkim Bey, Vali of the same Vilayet, and Âşir Bey, commanding at Alaşehir, had not been court-marshalled for their failure and their errors in the field.

Mehmet Sükrü Bey, Deputy for Afyonkarahisar, asked these questions. When Hakkı Hami Bey, Deputy for Sinop, urgently demanded that the accused should be punished, shouts of "Bravo!" were heard. Mehmet Sükrü Bey shouted out: "These men must be made responsible" and this was agreed to. The Chief of the General Staff replied to this matter on the 14th August, 1920; but the Assembly was not satisfied, and was still uneasy about it. Sükrü Bey, Deputy for Karahisar, demanded an inquiry. Another speaker insisted that the punishment of some of the officers was quite usual and quoted numerous instances to support it, whilst a third asserted that one commanding officer had taken with him thirty-six camel-loads of loot when the troops were retiring. Another deputy stated that the invasion by the Greek Army had involved all the towns and villages between Akhisar and the shores of the Marmara Sea with lightning rapidity, and mentioned that the terrible losses involved by the misfortune at Bursa had made the whole world feel that the defence of Anadolu was a mere phantom. He demanded the punishment of those who were responsible for this defeat which had attracted so much attention.

It was necessary for me to intervene in these protracted and heated debates. Appreciating the interest and feelings of the Assembly for the difficult position that had been created, I gave information and explanations with the object of calming the minds of the deputies and allaying these unhappy sentiments. After replying to some minor attacks produced by my statements, I declared that those I had already given were quite sufficient.

Before these lively discussions had taken place, the particulars of which you will have read in the minutes of the Assembly, similar debates had taken place on the 26th July during the secret sitting. I had then also been compelled to give long explanations. In face of the criticisms and the motions that had been made, which were based on the general misfortune, everybody seemed to have forgotten the real causes and factors of the defeat. Attempts were made to put the responsibility for every reverse on the Council of Ministers that had been formed scarcely two months previously and that had taken over the responsibility of the Government. Nobody thought of the fact that the Greek Army had established itself and had continued to make preparations in the İzmir district for more than a year past and that, in opposition to this fact, the İstanbul Government had done everything possible to render our army defenceless and had done nothing else but try to break up and destroy the forces which the nation had been able to collect. They were not possessed of a sufficient sense of justice to recognise that it

was only due to the energy and efforts of about five or ten determined and devoted men that in the course of a year we had, more or less, succeeded in creating a situation which the enemy had to reckon with. Nobody seemed to have judged or discussed the operations from the point of view of the military exigencies or with any knowledge of the actual state of affairs. The speeches that were delivered developed into shouts and complaints, either from overstrained patriotism or from moral weakness. Among those who spoke were men — although they were few — whose faith in the nation and whose patriotism were doubtful.

During the course of the long statements which I made in the secret sitting I have just referred to, I specially emphasised these points:

To avoid any possible misfortune we must first think of preventive means to meet it. When the misfortune has happened it is no good to complain. Before it began the Greek offensive was regarded as very probable. If the necessary precautions and measures had not been taken to meet it, the responsibility must not be put on the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and their Government. The Governments of Istanbul, together with the whole of the nation, ought to have begun seriously at least a year before to take the steps which the Grand National Assembly had on their part undertaken as soon as they had assumed the responsibility of the Government. Calling up troops at the front to suppress the internal unrest was considered to be of greater importance and urgency than arraying them against the Greeks, advisable as that might have been. Even to-day this is still the case. Possibly the enemy's attack could not have been pushed forward so far if the following troops had been at our disposition at the front: Those detachments that we had to take from Bursa; the two columns which had been sent into the disturbed district of Adapazarı; the column that had been scattered at Hendek — these four bodies of troops and the other that was fighting against the insurgents in the districts of Zile and Yenihan, and those national troops which were supporting all these regular forces. Not until rest is secured in the country and the unity and firmness of the nation and their desire for liberation is established will it be possible to work with the object of opposing a foreign enemy, and even from such an effort no essential advantage can be expected. But if the nation and the country observed an attitude such as I recommend, a success which the enemy might gain at any time and which might lead to the occupation of a large territory could only be of a temporary character. A nation that asserts and maintains its unity and its will sooner or later will be able to bring any proud enemy who attacks it to suffer for his presumption. For this reason, it is surely more

important to suppress the upheavals in the country than to fight against the Greek offensive. Besides, it was scarcely to be expected that the Greek offensive could have been otherwise, even if those troops which were appointed to oppose it would not have been withdrawn from the front on account of the trouble in the country. For instance, on the Northern front the enemy attacked with three divisions; we had no troops there that were of proportionate strength. It is not reasonable to make a great fuss and to say that the catastrophe would not have happened if our troops had taken up a position on this or that river or in this or that village, or if the officers commanding them would have stopped the enemy in his advance. There is no instance in history to show that a front has not been or could not be broken through. And this is especially the case if the front in question is not limited in proportion to the troops defending it but extending over hundreds of kilometres, for it would be a false conclusion to expect that weak troops at one or other point in the line could defend it indefinitely. Fronts can be broken through, but it is necessary to fill up the gaps in the line as soon as possible. This is only possible if reserves drawn up in echelon can be held in the rear of the forces at the front line. But were our national forces facing the Greek Army in such a position and had they such reserves behind them? Was even the smallest unit worthy of the name of a fighting force still left in our West-Anadolu provinces, including the town and district of Ankara or, more precisely, in the whole of our country?

It is illogical to expect results from the defence which the population of the villages in the neighbourhood of the fighting zone could offer. Even if we possessed the power and the means to bring all the auxiliary forces of the country into operation, time would have been required for the establishment of a serious military organisation which might have made certain of success. Was not the flower of our Army under the command of Bekir Sami Bey at Bursa composed of the skeletons of the two regiments that had been surrendered to the Greeks before they had fired a shot and which had been transported to Mudanya on Greek ships? Had the Government in Istanbul done anything to lift the morale of those troops? Were not the Government in Istanbul who had our troops attempt to defend Balikesir against attacks by the Greeks responsible for our being attacked in the rear by Anzavur? It must not be forgotten that the Governments of Istanbul and the Caliph-Sultan employed the Army of the Caliphate and the troops of the rebels on the road between Hendek-Duzce for the purpose of poisoning the spirit of our troops, as they had done to the 24th Division, which later on they had dispersed and whose officers they killed at the time this

comparatively strong division was destined for the Greek front. Was it possible that the Council of Ministers who had only just taken the destiny of the country into their hands could think of a mobilisation under the conditions that prevailed at that time? Was it possible or practicable to call the nation under arms at a moment when the country, from one end to the other, was driven and compelled to carry out the stipulations of the Caliph's Fetva? On the other hand, was it not indispensable before calling the whole nation under arms to think of the necessary quantity of arms, money, ammunition and transport to maintain them? In examining the situation and calculating the measures to be undertaken, facts, bitter as they might be, must never be lost sight of. There is no necessity or compulsion to deceive ourselves or one another. We were well aware of the requirements of the situation and the needs of the men at the front. I received a number of telegrams from all directions to this effect: "Send strong regular troops;" "Send such and such quantity of ammunition, because if we do not receive it we shall probably be defeated." All these telegrams sent under the excitement of the moment represented the situation in similar sensational language. Our duty and the situation we were in urged us not to destroy the moral of those who appealed to us. We had to guard against allowing ourselves to be influenced by their excitement, but rather to act in a way that would inspire them with hope and confidence.

We trusted that the situation would soon improve and that means would be found which would be really adapted to give the country and the nation hope and confidence. There was nothing to hinder this. The Executive Council could also call men of several different categories under arms.

* * *

Gentlemen: I will tell you something about the "Green Army," because I think this will help to throw a little light on an obscure subject.

After the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was established, a society called the "Green Army" was formed at Ankara. The original founders of this Society were well-known comrades of ours with whom we were in close touch. To understand the aims that inspired this Society we must recall certain situations and phases of the upheavals in the country and the activity of the national troops that were commissioned to suppress them. It had been seen that the rebels easily succeeded in misleading the regular troops by speaking to them of the Fetva published by the Caliph, the illegality of the Government at Ankara and the abolition of military service by the Sultan. It actually happened that the regular troops not only failed to fight against

the rebels but even deserted and returned home to their villages. It had been stated that the national troops understood the aims of the revolution more easily and had not allowed themselves to be deceived by the rebels. For this reason it was very difficult to carry the revolution through successfully with troops which at that time were exhausted and unwilling and which, it must be admitted, consisted of the inferior elements of the residues of the Ottoman Army. The fictitious belief had gained ground that it would be very difficult under the conditions then prevailing to inspire the Army with a conviction that was in accord with the new spirit. For this reason some persons were led to create a regular force to support the revolution that should consist of men who were conscious of their high duty and possessed the necessary qualifications. This idea and these efforts were encouraged by the events taking place in the country and which were of a sanguinary and dangerous character. Eventually, some men put these thoughts into actions and formed an organisation such as I have described. With regard to myself, I was trying to find means, on the one hand to restore and reinforce our army and on the other to draw the greatest possible advantage from the troops that had already been organised, in spite of their evident shortcomings. But at the same time we dared not neglect the truth that real discipline and the serious execution of military duties, which include unconditional and unqualified obedience, could only and always be possible in a regular army. The idea of deriving any advantage from the national forces could only be based on the desire to gain time. It was undoubtedly desirable that the national troops whose employment was absolutely necessary should comprise selected men who realised their duty.

The comrades connected with me who belonged to the first group of those who had undertaken the organisation of the "Green Army" had considered that they ought to take the initiative in this affair alone, with the object of helping me and not troubling me to attend to anything else. As I was actually very busy indeed, I took no part for a long time in what my comrades were doing. The formation of the "Green Army" was carried on as a secret organisation and spread to a certain extent. Hakkı Behiç Bey was their general secretary, and their Executive Committee with their headquarters at Ankara did serious and important work. Their printed regulations and special agents were sent all over the country. I must remark here that as the men who were occupied with the organisation of the "Green Army" had stated that I knew all about it and that it was being done with my consent and according to my wish, the number of those who worked everywhere for the purpose of extending and reinforcing these organisations

had increased. In its form the organisation had exceeded the original limits of the scheme, which was only to form a national force, and had now developed a much wider purpose.

Çerkez Reşit Bey, a Deputy, and his brothers Çerkez Etem Bey and Tevfik Bey joined the founders of the organisation. We must suppose that this happened when these gentlemen were travelling between Yozgat and Ankara. The troops belonging to Etem Bey and Tevfik Bey practically formed the nucleus of the "Green Army."

With this introductory description, I would like to inform this High Assembly about some of the acts and undertakings of Çerkez Etem Bey and his brothers which first began to attract my attention.

Çerkez Etem Bey had rendered certain services with the national force by successes they had gained when pursuing Anzavur, later on during the revolt at Düzce, and again when he was called to Ankara for the purpose of being sent to Yozgat, where he was received by nearly everybody with feelings of respect and esteem. There were certainly some people who exaggerated their praise. To judge from the attitude which Etem Bey and his brothers assumed later on, these manifestations had had the result of turning their heads and making them conceited, which led them to entertain certain illusions. When they were occupied in suppressing the revolt at Yozgat, Etem Bey and one of his brothers, Tevfik Bey, did not hesitate to take up an aggressive and offensive attitude towards all the officers commanding the regular and national troops, whether they were in the neighbourhood or far away and regardless of their rank and position. These leaders, most of whom knew very little about the character and importance of Etem Bey, avoided quarrelling with him in any way, being well aware that the country was in state of war and bearing in mind the services he had rendered — of which they had been informed in exaggerated terms. This led to Etem Bey and his brother Tevfik Bey becoming bolder than ever, and they began to imagine that no other officer or leader in the Turkish Army could compare with them in importance; they regarded themselves as heroes standing above all the others, and they began to express this idea in conversation with everybody. They ordered the Valis to obey them and accompanied these orders by threats of death if they were not attended to. Etem Bey tried to enforce his will in Ankara on the Government of Ankara. In his opinion the revolt at Yozgat was the result of the bad administration of the Vali of Ankara to whom Yozgat was subject, and, consequently, he resolved to make use of the same method of punishment which he had inflicted upon the other originators of the revolt, namely, to

hang this official on the spot. The Vali in question whom he commanded to come to Yozgat was Yahya Galip Bey, who had rendered, and still continued to do so, extraordinary services in a remarkable spirit of self-sacrifice throughout the course of our national activities. These services were fully acknowledged by us, and we knew how useful and necessary this man was to us. Etem Bey thought that if he could compel us to hand such a personality over to him he would gain the greatest influence. Naturally, we could not sacrifice Yahya Galip and refused to do so. Etem Bey and his brothers could not insist on their claims. We heard that Etem Bey had said at Yozgat and particularly before the deputies: "On my return to Ankara I shall order the President of the Grand National Assembly to be hanged in front of the building." (Süleyman Sirri Bey, Deputy for Yozgat, was one of those who heard these provocative words.) In spite of this information which we received, we preferred to act in such a manner that would ensure these brothers being usefully employed. Consequently, we treated them with forbearance. When they left Yozgat we sent them, via Ankara, to the district of Kütahya. Reserving the right of reverting to this question, I shall now proceed to my main subject — the "Green Army."

I have referred to the organisations of the "Green Army" being formed in my name. A man whom I personally knew wrote to me from Malatya, where Nazım Nazmi Bey had been sent on a mission from Erzurum, and informed me that efforts were being made to extend the organisation of the "Green Army" in a manner that would surely be very satisfactory to me. This letter called my attention to the question, and I made inquiries about this secret Society and came to the conclusion that in its present form it was of an injurious character.

I contemplated the question of dissolving it and spoke to comrades whom I knew on the subject. I explained my opinion to them and they did what was necessary. Hakkı Behiç Bey, the general secretary, declared, however, that my intention of dissolving the Society would be unacceptable and could not be carried out. I replied that I had a perfect right to dissolve it.

He took up a strange attitude and repeated that it would be impossible to dissolve it because the position of the Society was stronger and more important than we could expect and that its founders had made a mutual promise to hold out to the end and not abandon their aims.

Events showed that, in spite of our efforts, we did not succeed in completely stopping the activity of this secret Society, to which the brothers Reşit, Etem and Tevfik belonged as leaders.

They continued their activity, but henceforward in a spirit that was absolutely hostile and reactionary. They made propaganda in an aggressive tone for their opinions and aims in a newspaper called "Yeni Dünya," which they published at Eskişehir.

In what now seems to me to be its proper sequence, I will tell you something about our Eastern front, but I must first give you an introduction to it by recording one incident that had taken place previously.

Celâlettin Arif Bey, Vice-president of the first Grand National Assembly, obtained two months' leave with the consent of the Assembly, granted on the 15th August, 1920. In applying for leave, he stated that he was suffering from headache brought on by overexertion of the brain. He intended while he was away to inspect his electoral district, which he had not visited for a long time.

Celâlettin Arif Bey begged me privately to allow Hüseyin Avni Bey, Deputy for Erzurum, to accompany him. Hüseyin Avni Bey had no apparent reason for applying to the Assembly to grant him leave. I had to entrust him with a special mission. On the 18th August I asked the Assembly for permission to do so and they gave their consent.

When Celâlettin Arif Bey and Hüseyin Avni Bey arrived at Erzurum the former sent me three telegrams in cipher that were dated the 10th, 15th and the 16th September, 1920.

Judging from these telegrams the inhabitants of Erzurum were in a great state of excitement and unrest. Then he said that as soon as they had learned that Celâlettin had left Ankara for Erzurum they waited till he should arrive. As for the cause of all their excitement, it seemed that it was in connection with the Army ordnance stores, the loss of some rifles and ammunition and the unsatisfactory way in which they had been distributed.

Celâlettin Arif Bey demanded that something should be done immediately for the punishment and transfer of certain officials. Colonel Kâzım Bey (now Kâzım Paşa, Vali of İzmir), who was Acting Vali of Erzurum, was the first of those officials who should be punished or transferred.

As a result of the negotiations he carried on with the population and the decision arrived at, Celâlettin Arif Bey proposed to entrust the post of Vali of Erzurum to Nazım Bey, formerly Vali of Adana, to inform him of this via Trabzon, and, according to the wish of the people, to appoint an acting governor until Nazım Bey arrived. He further informed me that unless the growing excitement of the population was appeased by a speedy

and favourable reply, we might expect serious consequences from the feeling that prevailed.

In this last telegram he said: "As Ankara has not taken any notice of the complaints that we have sent, the question will take such a turn that all confidence in Ankara will be lost."

Apparently there was a great amount of neglect and terrible abuse going in our Eastern Army. This neglect seemed to have assumed such proportions that it interfered with the patriotism of the people, and this had caused a great deal of excitement. Nevertheless, it is evident that neither the acting governor nor the officer commanding the Army Corps had a very clear idea about this growing excitement which it was impossible to allay.

Not one of all the persons interested and those in the town who had official duties to attend to had noticed it; no one had come forward to warn the Government; but when the population learned that Celâlettin Arif Bey and Hüseyin Avni Bey had left for Erzurum — the former on leave on account of over-exertion of the brain and the other sent on a special mission by me — their excitement and all the unrest had suddenly stopped. When, however, the two deputies arrived the excitement broke out again!

To tell you the truth it was impossible for me to believe this news. It seemed to me very significant that Celâlettin Arif Bey and Hüseyin Avni Bey had arranged to travel together, and this caused me some wonderment. This feeling was particularly supported by the fact that the proposal to appoint a Vali in agreement with the population emanated from Celâlettin Arif, who was a Professor of Law and a well-known lawyer, and who, after having been President of the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul, had become Vice-president of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

On the 16th September I wired the Vice-president of the Grand National Assembly at Erzurum to the following effect: "Your telegram has been read before the Council of Ministers; we are in correspondence on this question with the officer commanding at the front." I asked the Commandant at the Eastern front for information and his opinion in respect to the communications from Celâlettin Arif Bey, which I transmitted to him in a summarised form.

On the 19th September I received a telegram from Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, commanding the Eastern forces; it was dated the 14th September and he had sent it off before mine had reached him. After the opening words, "I propose and submit to your approval that Celâlettin Arif Bey shall be

appointed Vali of the Eastern Provinces, in which shall be comprised the Provinces of Lazistan, Trabzon, Erzurum, Erzincan, Van, Bayazit and such other districts as the High Assembly may consider appropriate to be added to these districts," this telegram contained the following observations:

"In the event of this proposal being accepted and agreed to, and setting aside the advantage which lies in the fact that both duties, the military as well as the civil, will receive greater attention and will be treated as they deserve, another person will be present here as the representative of the nation to discuss, whenever necessary, important questions and take any steps that would become urgently necessary. I trust that what I have said will be taken into consideration by the Grand National Assembly with the attention due to this matter, and I beg that Your Excellency will do me the kindness of exerting your influence to this effect. The question has been discussed in its main points with Celâlettin Arif Bey, who has given his consent, but the decision will naturally depend on the National Assembly."

Celâlettin Arif Bey, speaking about the abuses in the Army and of the appointment of the Vali of Erzurum with the approval of the people, and declaring that distrust would arise unless an immediate answer were given, actually has an interview with the officer commanding the forces and induces him to propose that he should be appointed Vali of the Eastern Provinces with very wide powers. And apparently this Army commander knows nothing about Celâlettin Arif Bey's complaints, which, as a matter of fact, are aimed at himself!

It is difficult to gather any other impression that there was a conspiracy or a network of intrigue going on with a certain aim in view.

In Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's reply on the 18th September to my telegram of the 16th, he said: "The messages from Celâlettin Arif Bey are based on malicious gossip which has been disseminated by some persons for the sole purpose of getting rid of Colonel Kâzım Bey, the Acting Vali of Erzurum. Unfortunately I believe that the excitement of the people and the appointment of a Vali who shall be chosen by the people only means that Celâlettin Arif Bey has chosen a wrong road. The fact that the complaint in question has not been directed personally to myself, who possesses universal confidence and is greatly honoured by high and low, I may say, in the whole of the East, affords a reason for believing that those who are intriguing well know that they have little chance of success.

"Celâlettin Arif Bey has proposed to me that I shall remove Colonel

Kâzım Bey from Erzurum by depriving him of his position as Acting Vali and temporary commander of Army Corps. I replied that if he would personally accept these appointments temporarily, Kâzım Bey would be relieved of them by the order of the Ministry of the Interior.

"I believe that the position of Celâlettin Arif Bey at Erzurum, he being here in no official capacity, may injure his authority. It is absolutely necessary for him to be appointed Acting Vali of Erzurum as soon as possible, so that he can bring this matter which he has undertaken to a happy issue without any interference."

"If you think proper, you could later on appoint him to be Inspector or Vali of the Eastern Provinces. In any case I do not share his view that the excitement he mentions was only held back until his arrival. I believe that these statements are the exaggeration of an individual who met with a good reception."

In the reply that I sent to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa to his two telegrams of the 14th and 18th September I quoted a clause of the Act of the 5th September, 1920, which provides that "the same person cannot hold the position of a member of the Grand National Assembly and be an official of the State at the same time." I added: "The appointment of Celâlettin as Vali of Erzurum is out of the question unless he resigns his position as a deputy. His appointment to the governorship of this Vilayet could only be proposed to the Council of Ministers."

However, on the 18th September, the date of Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's last telegram, the anticipated attitude had already been adopted at Erzurum in contradiction to the stipulations of the Act to which we referred in our communication of the 20th September. I was informed of this illegal procedure in a telegram from Celâlettin Arif Bey, who was at that time Minister of Justice in New Turkey. He had drafted it on the 18th September, and I received it on the 21st. This telegram from the Minister of Justice, who had meanwhile appointed himself Acting Vali of Erzurum, read as follows:

Erzurum, 18th September, 1928.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of the Grand National Assembly.

After having received Your Excellency's telegram, through Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, I had a long conversation with him on the question we had laid before you. The Paşa will not recognise the seriousness of the matter. Persons under his command are in every way protected.

In order to calm public opinion as quickly as possible, I beg you to appoint Halit Bey, commanding the 9th Division, to conduct a serious inquiry into the scandal about the arms and ammunition and the events at Kilise, and to hand the guilty persons over to justice. As it is necessary to re-examine the payments of the Army accounts, I urge Your Excellency to institute an inspection of the accounts by an official to be sent here. A letter which I have just received from Kâzım Paşa informs me that Colonel Kâzım Bey had resolved unconditionally to resign his office as acting Vali but that he has changed his intention and has stated in writing that he will hand over these duties to myself or to some person appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. As it is inadvisable and even dangerous to leave the Colonel in his present position, I have found myself compelled personally to take over the position of Vali for several days while I am awaiting orders from the Ministry of the Interior, so that I can avoid the outbreak of disorder in the country under the present difficult conditions. I beg you to entrust our comrade Hüseyin Avni Bey with the position of acting governor, which would be in accord with the wishes of the people of Erzurum. As these proposals are fitted to calm public opinion, I am leaving it to Your Excellency to do what you consider necessary.

Celâlettin Arif
Minister of Justice.

This procedure and these communications from Celâlettin Arif Bey, Vice-president of the Grand National Assembly and Minister of Justice, began to assume the character in our eyes of a problem that could not easily be understood.

The situation was both grave and difficult, but in my opinion not on account of the secret aims considered to have been achieved by the friends of Celâlettin Arif Bey with whom he had been working, nor on account of the attitude they had adopted with this end in view, nor the accomplished fact they thought they had created.

Those who believe that men who have passed most of their days on the field of battle and have hurled themselves into the vortex of revolt and revolution could show any hesitation or fear when the question of adopting and carrying through counter-measures which unforeseen events of this kind demand are undoubtedly in error.

The situation was indeed serious and grave, because at this moment we had decided to attack Armenia on our Eastern front. We were engaged

in making preparations and taking dispositions for this purpose. The officer commanding the Eastern front had already received the necessary orders. The Minister of Justice in the National Government, who was immediately behind the army which was destined to proceed in an easterly direction and who apparently was engaged in discovering thefts committed in this army and proving that the members of it were rogues, found that the only thing to be done was to appoint himself unlawfully the Acting Vali of this Province.

The Commander of the front, who had left Erzurum and gone to his headquarters, wrote on the 22nd September: "The proposal I formerly made about Celâlettin Arif Bey's appointment as Vali of the Eastern Provinces had been suggested to me, and I believed it was a sincere idea. As I have since learned the actual facts of the case through Celâlettin Arif Bey's actions, I beg to inform Your Excellency that naturally I withdraw my proposal."

Kâzım Karabekir
Commanding the forces on the Eastern Front.

On the same day, that is to say, the 22nd September, I received a telegram from the Vice-president of the Grand National Assembly, who had assumed the office of Acting Vali of Erzurum. In this telegram he said: The abuses regarding arms and ammunition, as well as food supplies and the abandoned goods, the unlimited illegal requisitions, the acts of violence and violation of personal rights contrary to law, have deeply offended the people. We arrived here at the moment when Erzurum, under the influence of despair and distrust, had gone so far as to contemplate the necessity of governing itself as the only means of protection.

"Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's attitude was still less in accord with the interests of the country. For this reason the population insisted on putting a speedy end to the abuses which were being perpetrated openly and bringing the guilty ones to justice. In agreement with Kâzım Paşa, the people have demanded that immediate steps should be taken to inspire confidence and have appealed to me personally to take over the office of Vali temporarily.

"I have begged you to entrust Hüseyin Avni Bey with this office. I beg you to inform the deputy Hüseyin Avni Bey, who possesses the confidence of the country because he is regarded as one of themselves, of his appointment within the next twenty-four hours." Celâlettin Arif (Document 258.)

We had ourselves advocated the principle of government of the people by the people; but we had never anticipated that every province or every

district should individually constitute a separate administration. In the early days of the Grand National Assembly we had clearly defined our aims.

These had been approved and formulated in such a manner by the Grand National Assembly that this Areopagus was the only place in which the national will to be master of the destiny of our country found its expression. Could the methods which such a personality, who was one of the leaders of this Assembly and at the same time their Minister of Justice, was allowed to adopt for the purpose of discovering illegal acts committed in the Army and elsewhere and of delivering their perpetrators to justice, consist in the fact that he allowed himself to be taken in tow by some stupid persons and assume a rebellious attitude to which my fellow-citizens at Erzurum — true patriots as I know them to be — would never have given their consent?

He demanded that Hüseyin Avni Bey be appointed acting Vali within twenty-four hours. Was there any sense in this ultimatum?

Celâlettin Arif Bey made the same proposal to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, and it is reported that the latter replied: "Hüseyin Avni Bey is a man of moderate ability and has never held any public appointment; he entertained his fellow officers as a comedian on the stage when he was a lieutenant in the reserve. To make this man into a temporary Vali would mean to burlesque the office."

I replied to Celâlettin Arif Bey's ultimatum in these words:

No. 388.

Telegram in cipher. To be delivered immediately.

Ankara, 23rd September, 1920.

To Celâlettin Arif Bey, Minister of Justice, Erzurum.

Reply to your telegram in cipher of the 22nd September, 1920.

I wrote to tell you that I had taken your first telegram into serious consideration and had entered into correspondence about it with the officer commanding the Eastern front.

It is quite natural that the command should act as the situation demanded.

Your proposals and actions, which are inappropriate and unlawful, and which you persist in, have caused great astonishment to the Council of Ministers. The necessary communications have been made by the Ministries of the Interior and of National Defence to the competent authorities. It is imperative that you should return to Ankara immediately and explain

your actions to the Council of Ministers, which they feel they must request you to do, and, if necessary, to the Grand National Assembly.

Mustafa Kemal

President of the Grand National Assembly.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa sent this telegram in cipher on the 22nd September: "I am now perfectly certain that Celâlettin Arif Bey and some ambitious men had worked out a neat little programme with the idea of snatching up appointments and honours while he was still at Ankara.

"Thus for instance, Hüseyin Avni Bey was chosen to become Vali of Erzurum; Celâlettin Arif Bey, Vali-General of the Eastern Provinces. Either Celâlettin Arif Bey is used as a puppet, or the other man, about whom I have not yet formed a clear opinion but who may be very intelligent, is acting entirely for his own benefit. That he had written to you about Halit Bey without previously consulting me and that he displayed such obstinacy on the question of Hüseyin Avni Bey in my opinion bears this out. As Halit Bey is not in very friendly relations with Colonel Kâzım Bey, he can easily be induced to come to a decision that is not favourable to him. In this way, Hüseyin Avni Bey would make an excellent tool as Vali. Those who have heard that Hüseyin Avni Bey has been proposed as acting Vali have been astounded and disgusted about it. Allow me to inform you shortly of the fact that Mitat Bey, who has recently been appointed Director of Public Instruction and who is a brother of Necati Bey, Deputy for Erzurum, regards Bolshevism as a springboard for those incapable people in the country who never succeed in getting a position for themselves.

"Among those who are only looking after their own interests this person is conspicuous. Having found that I am not favourably inclined towards popular government, I believe that he entered into correspondence with Celâlettin Arif Bey and Hüseyin Avni Bey and that the whole matter was settled and approved of long ago."

My telegram of the 23rd September, 1920, in which Celâlettin Arif Bey was invited to return to Ankara was answered on the 24th September in violent language. It was addressed to the President of the Grand National Assembly, and added to it was the remark: "To be read before the Council of Ministers in the Grand National Assembly." Taking the two words "inappropriate" and "unlawful" in my telegram as being specially important, Celâlettin Arif Bey explains each of his actions and proposals at Erzurum. He defends himself by asking: "Is this inappropriate? Is this unlawful?"

As we had learned from information in our possession what these actions of Celâlettin Arif Bey were, it was not difficult to discover which of them were unlawful and inappropriate.

After saying: "I did not expect the Council of Ministers could conceive the idea that I would make an unlawful and inappropriate proposal," he continued to argue that he was convinced that there were comrades among us who will find that his complaints were fully justified. Then he advanced the real principle he had in his mind, namely, that unless a man was on the same plane as himself and was his comrade he could not possibly form a true estimate of his abilities.

Celâlettin Arif Bey informed us that he could not return to Ankara until he had visited his electoral district.

I had also informed the Government in Istanbul from Erzurum that I was unable to return to Istanbul. If the place where and the person from whom the invitation had been made were the same, it could have been assumed that in this case there had been a strange repetition of my conduct, but as the conditions were altogether different, it was impossible for me to believe that the heroic inhabitants of Erzurum who, in reply to the invitation from Istanbul, had opened their loyal arms to me would abuse their sincerity.

Even the telegram I received on the 28th September signed by fifty of the inhabitants, with officials among them, who came forward on behalf of the citizens of Erzurum, could not shake my conviction. It is true that the telegram was in very strong language and showed a revolutionary character; but all the signatures were those of officials in the provinces which Celâlettin Arif Bey administered temporarily as Vali.

And did not the particular fact that among the signatories there was a man who was a member of the Court of Appeal who had been appointed Director of Police temporarily by Celâlettin Arif Bey, help to enable us to see through the exceedingly low mentality that had inspired this telegram? We soon discovered that it was the result of a plot of some person who had gathered around Mitat Bey, the Director of Public Instruction.

Celâlettin Arif bey was supported by a telegram from Tevfik, who was President of the Central Committee at Erzurum, in which the words occurred, "we formally demand that you will act according to the communication sent by Celâlettin Arif Bey," wanted to achieve certain results by correspondence in cipher with Ankara which informed him of the impression he had made there.

Here is some of the correspondence that passed:

Erzurum, 21st September, 1920.

Ministry of Public Instruction, Ankara.

To Necati Bey, Deputy for Erzurum.

It would be advisable if possible to take the necessary steps for the appointment of Dr. Salim Bey, physician, as Director of Public Health. The former proposals for this appointment cannot be accepted seriously.

We request that our salaries be increased and the accounts transmitted to the Agricultural Bank. We have written to the Assembly. (Hüseyin Avni.)

Mithat
Director of Public Instruction.

Another letter:

Erzurum, 22nd September, 1920.

Ministry of Public Instruction.

To Riza Nur Beyefendi.

What result has been reached hitherto on the questions about which I have written to you?

What has happened about these questions in the Council of Ministers? I beg you to give me this information. I embrace you fraternally. (Celâlettin Arif.)

Mithat
Director of Public Instruction.

A further letter:

Very urgent and pressing.

Erzurum, 25th September, 1920.

To the Ministry of Public Instruction, Ankara.

For Riza Nur Bey and Necati Bey.

The provisioning of the families of the officers and men to the number of 22,000, of whom 9,000 are combatants and 13,000 noncombatants, who have been called under arms in accordance with the mobilisation order of June, including the levy of 1903 for the subjugation of the Armenians, has been imposed on the inhabitants of Erzurum, and up to the present date provisions, animals and transport material to the value of one million-and-a-half pounds have been requisitioned. Appreciating the great aim in view, the population have willingly consented to make all these sacrifices. A very

bad impression, however, has been produced and has moved the population to revolt and resist, from the fact that the notorious letter written by Çiçerin has to a certain extent contributed to the failure of the military operations; the Army, under the pretence of an Armenian-Bolshevist alliance, has shown a certain lack of courage, whilst the Armenians, having been emboldened by this letter of Çiçerin's, have tyrannised over the Mohamedan population; no success has been reached in coming to a satisfactory understanding with the Reds; and, that the abuses disclosed by Celâlettin Arif Bey have been permitted.

Kâzım Pasa having failed to possess the necessary qualifications to conduct the affairs in the East, a strong party must be created here, furnished with extraordinary powers and capable of standing up against the Armenians and carrying on the political and military affairs in a proper way.

A great deal of precious time has already been wasted — the documents are at Ankara — and probably many favourable opportunities have been lost.

On the other hand, taking the season into consideration, a difficult time has arrived for Erzurum. Care must be taken to protect the Army against the bad weather, for great difficulties must be overcome to supply the men with clothing and provisions.

Civil and military authorities have not been paid for the last four months and it is considered that requisitions must be made to cover the military expenditure; but it is not known whether the population will be capable of making this new effort, which seems to be out of all possibility.

The central Government is indifferent, and the neighbouring livas — especially the Vilayet of Harput — do not take the slightest interest in the matter. Demand explanations from the Government about this state of affairs, or, if necessary, from the Assembly, in my name. After you have finally secured the supply of necessities for the Army, come here.

I have never had much faith in the communications from the agencies regarding the Eastern Vilayets. (Hüseyin Avni.)

Mithat
Director of Public Instruction.

As can be seen, the person who, as Celâlettin Arif Bey believed, should have deemed his claims worthy of being brought before the Council of Ministers

and whose cipher key as Minister he had permitted himself to use did not desire to be his confidant but rather informed the President of the Assembly.

We quite understood how the game was intended to be played through a telegram that was sent in the name of the entire population of Erzurum, signed by forty or fifty persons, when another telegram arrived which also came from the population of Erzurum and which clearly showed how loyal this population was to the Government and the Grand National Assembly and how willing they were to submit to sacrifices.

Celâlettin Arif Bey, having at last seen with his own eyes that the armies of the Grand National Assembly were victorious in the Armenian expedition, forty-seven days after he had been ordered to return, was eventually convinced that he would have to leave Erzurum.

He had, however, informed the Assembly of his departure by this telegram:

Erzurum, 27th November, 1920.

To the President of the Grand National Assembly.

We beg to inform you that our honourable deputy Celâlettin Arif Bey, Vice-president of the Grand National Assembly and Minister of Justice, accompanied by our deputy Hüseyin Avni Bey, left for Ankara yesterday. In spite of the severity of the wintry weather, he has been greeted by the inhabitants of Erzurum with great and brilliant manifestations.

We take this opportunity to express to the Assembly our esteem.

Tevfik

President of the Central Administration of
the Committee for the Defence of the Rights.

When they returned from Erzurum, Hüseyin Avni Bey and Celâlettin Arif Bey took up a very hostile attitude against Kâzim Karabekir Paşa and worried the Assembly by attacking him.

The position on our Eastern frontiers engaged our urgent attention and did not allow us any more time to trouble about the traces which Celâlettin Arif Bey had left in the history of the revolution at Erzurum. I will now turn to the serious affairs which took place simultaneously on our Eastern borders.

You know that after the Armistice of Mudros the Armenians did not cease for a moment to massacre the Turks *en masse* in the interior of Armenia, as well as in the border districts. In the autumn of the year 1920 the

Armenian atrocities became intolerable. We decided to send an expedition to Armenia.

On the 9th June we ordered the temporary mobilisation in the Eastern districts.

We appointed Kâzim Karabekir Paşa, commanding the XVth Army Corps, to command the troops on the Eastern front.

In June, 1920, the Armenians invaded the district of Oltu and behaved aggressively against the Turkish administration there. On the 7th July our Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an ultimatum to the Armenians. The Armenians did not alter their behaviour. At last, four months after the mobilisation, military operations began by the Armenians attacking our combined troops in the districts of Kötek and Bardiz.

The Armenians were successful in a general surprise attack which they made before Bardiz on the morning of the 24th September, 1920.

While I was reading the report from the Eastern front which brought this scarcely enjoyable news, I received Celâlettin Arif Bey's ultimatum which he had drawn up on the 24th September, the day of the Armenian attack. (Document 259.)

The Armenians were driven back, and on the morning of the 28th September our troops began to advance. On the same day the fifty signatories to the Erzurum telegram opened their offensive against Ankara.

What an unfortunate coincidence! It gave the impression that these gentlemen had come to an understanding with the Armenians to attack us.

The Army entered Sarıkamış on the 29th September. Merdenek was occupied on the 30th September. Now for certain reasons our Army remained stationary for a month — until the 23rd October — on the line Sarıkamış — Laloğlu.

You will divine that one of the reasons was the situation created by Celâlettin Arif Bey and his accomplices at Erzurum. Kâzim Karabekir Paşa actually said in a telegram which was handed in at Sarıkamış on the 29th September: "After having visited the front and given the necessary instructions, I shall start for Erzurum and make a final settlement of the affair which has taken place there."

In a telegram in cipher which Kâzim Karabekir Paşa addressed on the 29th September to Celâlettin Arif Bey from Sarıkamış, he said:

"The open telegram with forty or fifty signatures which has been sent
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

in the name of the inhabitants of Erzurum is a document which the external enemies could not have procured even if they had spent millions in trying to get it.

"As I consider that this open telegram — the wording of which is more important and dangerous than the actual fact of the telegram itself — is much more threatening than the outside danger and that the possible consequences are graver than the situation at the front, I hereby inform you that I shall arrive at Erzurum to-morrow."

In his telegram of the 5th October, 1920, Celâlettin Arif Bey particularly pointed out that "as in the Army, which is inspired by patriotic feelings, there are a great number of valuable leaders and officers who enjoy the confidence of the people, the complaints against the abuses have not extended so far that they could influence the discipline and power of resistance of the Army."

I was naturally glad to hear the truth once more — which, by the way, was fully established — about the leaders and officers in our armies whose commander I had been for many a year in different theatres of war in our country.

Our Eastern Army, which was waiting on the battlefield, began its advance on Kars on the 28th October. The enemy abandoned this town without offering any resistance; it was occupied on the 30th October. On the 7th November our troops occupied the country as far as Arpaçay and Gümrü.

On the 6th November the Armenians begged for a cessation of hostilities and sued for peace.

On the 8th of the same month we informed the Armenian Army through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the terms of the armistice. Peace negotiations began on the 26th November and ended on the 2nd December; during that night the treaty was signed at Gümrü.

The Treaty of Gümrü is the first that was made by the National Government. By this treaty Armenia, which in the imagination of our enemies had already been given the Turkish districts as far as the valley of Harsit, was blotted out through the fact that it had to cede to us — the National Government — the districts which the "Ottoman Government" had lost in the campaign of 1876 — 77.

On account of important changes that had occurred in the Eastern situation, this treaty was superseded by the subsequent treaties of Moscow, concluded on the 16th March, 1921, and of Kars, on the 13th October, 1921.

I shall now refer in a few words to the relations which were restored mutually between ourselves and Georgia, with whom we were in touch on account of the situation on our common front.

When the English abandoned Batum in July, 1920, it was soon occupied by the Georgians. As this was in contradiction of the provisions of the Treaties of Brest Litowsk and Trabzon, we protested on the 25th July, 1920. Negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Turco-Georgian Treaty had been carried on with the Georgian Ambassador, who had presented his credentials to us at Ankara on the 8th February, 1921. Eventually, on account of the energetic ultimatum which we issued on the 23rd February, 1921, they consented that we should occupy Ardahan, Artvin and Batum. The latter town was occupied a fortnight later.

The occupation of these districts took place amidst the enthusiasm of the inhabitants, who had impatiently awaited their union with Turkey.

Under the treaty of Moscow Batum was abandoned again later on. But the union with the other districts occupied by us was confirmed.

*
* * *

Gentlemen, let us now cast a glance at the situation in Trakya at the time of which we are speaking.

The Central Committee of the "Trakya - Paşaeli" Society for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli held a congress in Eastern Trakya which entrusted the administration of Trakya to the General Committee of "Trakya - Paşaeli." Cafer Tayyar Bey (Cafer Tayyar Paşa), a member of this committee, commanded the Army Corps in Trakya and had been elected Deputy for Edirne in our Assembly.

The instructions which we had given to the Central Committee of Trakya and the officer commanding the Army Corps were based on the principle that the fate of Trakya would be settled at the same time as the destiny of the whole country.

These were the instructions we had given concerning military operations:

"In case of an attack by superior forces, resistance should be maintained to the end; even if the whole of Trakya were to be occupied, every separate negotiation — whatever solution might be proposed — was to be declined."

We declared that such was also the resolution of the commander in Trakya. But after a time, Cafer Tayyar Bey, relying on the promises made

to him by foreigners, had accepted an invitation and had gone to Istanbul; he had only informed us of this after he had returned.

Apparently certain rumours had been spread, for instance, that Eastern Trakya could not exist by itself but only under a foreign administration in combination with Western Trakya. In any case, a certain amount of propaganda was spread which was calculated to injure the morale of the country.

It appears that Muhittin Bey had been appointed Commander of the Army Corps by Istanbul while Cafer Tayyar Bey was still there. Cafer Tayyar Bey was allowed to return to Trakya. He had come into touch with different circles in Istanbul, but he did not take over the command of the Army Corps, in spite of Muhittin's proposal that he should do so.

The destiny of Trakya was consequently left to those decisions which were made under the influence of political circles in Istanbul.

The strategical position of the 1st Army Corps in Trakya at the time of the opening of the Grand National Assembly was as follows:

Headquarters of the Army Corps, Edirne.

60th Division, districts of Keşan, Edirne, Uzunköprü.

55th Division, district of Tekirdağ.

49th Division, district of Kırk Kilise.

After their success in the general offensive which was undertaken on the Western front of Anadolu, the Greek Army landed a Division at Tekirdağ on the 20th July, 1920.

Before the 49th Division, which was very much scattered about in the district of Tekirdağ, had time to rally, the Greek Division began to advance in the direction of Edirne.

The Greek troops, which intended to begin their attack from Western Trakya by crossing the Meric, were stopped and prevented from advancing any further, thanks to the watchfulness of Cemil Bey (at present Minister of the Interior), who was in command of the 60th Division, and of Şükrü Naili Bey (Şükrü Naili Paşa), who had arrived at Edirne with his troops on the 20th June, 1920, and who had already been seriously engaged at Edirne and at the railway station of Karaağaç.

I do not know what the commanding officer was doing. Muhittin Bey, commanding the Army Corps, should have collected all the troops of the 1st Army Corps and have taken steps against the hostile force which continued to advance in the direction of Edirne without being opposed!

According to the news that reached me, Cafer Tayyar Bey was taken prisoner by the enemy whilst he was wandering about on horseback in the district of Havza without having been able to get into touch with any of our troops. This is the reason that our first Corps was completely scattered and deprived of its commanding officer and leadership. Some of the troops were taken prisoners and the remainder fled into Bulgaria. Eventually the whole of Trakya fell into the hands of the Greeks.

Unhappily, we were not allowed to witness the spirit of sacrifice, the watchfulness and foresight which the nation demanded and expected from the officer commanding the 1st Army Corps!

There is no doubt that Trakya was in a peculiar position and under difficulties of a very special description. But neither the peculiar character of the position nor the difficulties could have prevented the Army Corps in Trakya from performing what military exigencies and patriotism demanded. Since this was so, the responsibility in the eyes of history and of his own nation must fall solely on the head of Cafer Tayyar Paşa. Armies have been known in history to have heroically and honourably defended a whole country against superior hostile forces, inch by inch to the last inch of their territory; some, in spite of all, have been able to preserve their existence. Such is the character of the Turkish Army. All those in command should possess the qualifications which are necessary for those at the head such an Army.

When leaders are engaged in their military duties, they must guard against allowing themselves to be influenced by political considerations. They must not forget that there are other competent people who are trusted to watch over the political requirements of the situation.

The only anxiety of the commanding officers, who are sending the sons of their country under their command against the enemy to expose themselves to death and who are risking the resources of the country in military operations, consists in the duty of carrying out the patriotic task which the nation expects, be it through fire and glittering steel to death.

It is only in such a spirit and with such convictions that military duties can be carried out. Neither by empty words alone, nor by discussing politics, nor by lending your ear to the deceitful promises of the enemy can you perform your duty. Those whose shoulders and, particularly, whose heads are too weak to bear the responsibility of command and duty are infallibly destined to suffer a tragic fate.

It is pardonable for a commander to be taken prisoner after he has

fulfilled his duty as a soldier and an official to the end according to the rules of war, and if having exhausted the strength at his disposal to the last shot and to his last breath, he falls into the hands of the enemy without having had the opportunity to shed his blood.

There have been Turkish commanders who, when their army has been conquered by an enemy of superior strength, withdrew on their account, went forth alone on horseback, sword in hand, and threw themselves on the tent of the enemy commander, seeking death.

Even if we were able to find excuses for a Turkish general who has fallen into the hands of the enemy without having been able to make use of his strength, whether from an accident or any other such cause, history cannot and will not forgive him.

Coming generations may derive warnings of this nature from the history of the Turkish revolution.

*
* *

The unfortunate influence which the recent upheavals in the centre of Anadolu had had for our troops and organisations confronting the Greek Army did not, after all, lead to the results which the enemy had anticipated. The main thing to which the enemy attributed the greatest importance was the annihilation of our defence by working directly on the men at the front and, in addition, exciting the population of the districts in the vicinity of the front, inducing them to rebel. In this direction Istanbul had already been active for a long time. The revolutionary movements in the district of Konya and in Konya itself, which Zeynel Abidin's Party was endeavouring to produce, at last broke out in the beginning of October, 1920.

A brigand named Delibaş collected about 500 deserters around him. During the night of the 2nd October he attacked Çumra by surprise, and on the morning of the 3rd he occupied Konya and seized the administration.

Haydar Bey, Vali of Konya, and Major Avni Bey (now Avni Paşa, a deputy) defended themselves heroically against the insurgents on the Alâettin hill with a small number of soldiers and gendarmes who were in the town.

Their conduct on this occasion deserves to be specially mentioned; but as they could not resist the superior forces and the attacks which came from every direction, they fell into the hands of the rebels. During the same day the rebels in the districts of Beyşehir and Akşehir prevented our military

deputations who were travelling in this part of the country on official business from carrying out their duty.

Nearly 300 rebels who had assembled near the village of Çekil, in the Ilgin district, opened fire on a party that was sent out to give them advice. South of Konya also, in the Karaman district, the rebels began to assemble. Sultanije fell into their hands.

The troops that we sent from Kütahya and Afyonkarahisar to quell this revolutionary movement, and which were under the command of Derviş Bey (now Derviş Paşa, commanding an Army Corps), came into touch with the rebels at the railway station of Meydan north of Konya. The troops that we sent in addition from Ankara under the command of Refet Bey, who was at that time Minister of the Interior — and which consisted of a cavalry regiment and a field-gun — joined Derviş Bey's troops which were advancing from the railway station at Meydan. Detachments from the Adana front were also sent in the direction of Karaman.

After some skirmishes on the 6th October, the troops marching on Konya relieved that town.

The rebels fleeing from Konya turned in the direction of Koçhisar, Akseki, Bozkır and Manavgat.

Another party of rebels occupied Kadınhan and Ilgin between Afyonkarahisar and Konya. Troops from the Western front were sent to this district under the command of Lt.-Colonel Osman Bey.

Osman Bey's detachment moved with vigour against Ilgin, Kadınhan, Çekil and Yalvaç. Our troops coming from the south relieved Karaman. They had succeeded in punishing the insurgents in the rebellious districts and also had driven them out of Bozkır, Seydişehir and Beyşehir.

Some of the remaining rebels surrendered to our troops and others fled in the direction of Antalya and Mersin. Delibaş went over to the French in the district of Mersin.

When I spoke to you about the organisations of the "Green Army," I told you that there were two opposite views about the question of organisation. Efforts were made to compromise the movement by fostering the idea of a kind of organisation which we might call "Militia" in contradistinction to the idea of the formation of a regular Army which we favoured.

In the Kütahya district the brothers Reşit, Etem and Tevfik carried on this movement with great zeal, making use of the forces known as "Flying Columns" which were at their disposal.

On the Western front propaganda made for this movement became so powerful and effective in the Army, among the population and even in the Assembly, that it was everywhere proclaimed: "The Army is good for nothing: it must be disbanded. We all want to become National soldiers." Etem Bey's troops which, being national, occupied a zone to itself and formed a special front among the Western lines of defence, began to be regarded as possessing special privileges and as being employed in preference to the regular forces, that is to say, as troops of which the others were jealous. Etem Bey and his brothers began to exert a certain amount of influence and predominance everywhere.

Meanwhile, the officer commanding the Western front made a suggestion to the General Staff which was attached to the brothers Etem and Tevfik and which consisted in "beginning an offensive against an isolated Greek detachment in the district of Gediz."

This officer pointed out that the enemy's forces were distributed along a wide front and that those in the district of Gediz were isolated and weak. He also imagined that the morale of the enemy's forces was bad.

At this time the Greek Army had three divisions in the district of Bursa, one in the district of Aydin and one each at Uzak and Gediz.

The commander of the Western front was able to send two divisions of infantry and Etem Bey's "Flying Columns" against the Greek force at Gediz. He expected by this operation to achieve a brilliant success.

Nevertheless, the General Staff did not agree to this proposal, for the enemy's force combined was stronger than ours. We had not had time as yet to organise and transform our Army. In addition to this, our supply of ammunition necessitated our being very careful.

If we concentrated all our troops on the various fronts we might, perhaps, have been able to put together a superior force and have gained a quick success over the enemy. But the condition of our troops and our lack of preparation would not have enabled us to convert such a success as that ultimately into a general and complete victory. We should have exhausted all our troops that were of any value and have wasted their strength with no other result than a temporary local success.

If the enemy on his part would have taken up a counter-offensive with all his troops, our defeat would have been certain all along the line of the front. Consequently, the essential duty of both the command at the front and of the Government was limited for the moment to reinforcing the front

and increasing the organisation of the Army. It was not regarded permissible to let ourselves be guided by conceptions of a personal and narrow description regarding the Western front, whose fate was a question of life and death.

The Chief of the General Staff insisted on abandoning the idea of an offensive at Gediz. As he could not come to an agreement by writing with the officer commanding at the front, he left Ankara and went personally to the headquarters of the Western front at Eskişehir. As a result of this conversation between İsmet Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, and Ali Fuat Paşa, commanding the forces, the departure of the latter with the intention of re-examining the situation on the spot had to be postponed.

A few days later a message from the front informed us that the offensive had been decided upon.

During this delay an enormous amount of propaganda was distributed in the Assembly and everywhere else in favour of the offensive.

Such expressions as the following could be heard everywhere: "The enemy is isolated at Gediz. We shall annihilate them there. We shall be very successful and our position will be improved. The Greek Army is ready to retreat." By using this language it was intended to show that the offensive was absolutely necessary.

In the end, the commander of the Western front attacked the enemy on the 24th October, 1920, at Gediz with the 61st and 11th Divisions and the "Flying Columns."

After some confused operations, which were carried on without any discipline, without any clear aim or order, we were, as you know, defeated at Gediz.

To counter this offensive, the Greek Army opened an attack on the 25th October, 1920, at Bursa. They occupied Yenicehir and İnegöl. They attacked our troops from Uşak in front of the heights of Dumlupınar and our troops retired.

Thus again, gentlemen, we suffered a general defeat along the entire front.

Four days after the command of the Western front had begun the offensive, the following telegram received from there was read before the Council of Ministers:

Çavdarhisar, 27th October, 1920.

To the Chief of the General Staff.

1. We must compensate for the losses incurred by the troops in the

battle. The battle of Gediz proved that 300 men in a battalion is not sufficient; we must raise the actual strength of a battalion to 400 men. As a result of the fighting that has been reported to you when all the troops had been sent from the depots to the front, I beg you to send me immediately 1,000 men fully trained, armed and equipped, specially selected from the troops at Ankara, or, if that is not possible, from the neighbouring localities.

2. The recent operations are responsible for all the clothing and boots of the men having been worn out; they are in rags and are walking barefooted in the snow which fell in the mountainous districts yesterday. As there is nothing to replace these necessaries here, I beg you earnestly to send great-coats, boots, cotton underclothing, tunics, vests and belts — in short, everything that will protect them in his bad weather; 15,000 of each article.

3. This is communicated to the Ministry of National Defence, to the Administration of the General Staff and to the acting command of the front for their information.

Ali Fuat
Commanding on the Western front.

It is natural that we were very much astonished at the contents of this telegram from Ali Fuat, which we read at the moment when the battle of Gediz was still going on, and especially the ideas that could have inspired it.

The state of the troops, the number of our forces, the extent of our preparations, the commissariat which was needed to supply the whole country were naturally all well known to the officer commanding at the front three days before this telegram was sent off. Everything that he required was at his disposal, and yet all these things were supposed to be worn out and used up during the three or so days that the battle lasted! Was it the General Staff who, in spite of many obvious facts, had forced the Western forces to undertake this attack?

After the telegram I have referred to had been read at the Council of Ministers, the following words were written under it: "Read at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. The statements in it have been considered quite unreasonable. The necessary help will naturally be accorded. The reinforcing troops will be drawn from the 3rd Regiment. Ismet"

If there should be a failure it was to be expected that a number of malicious stories would be spread, and this actually occurred when the general situation assumed a tragic appearance after the battle of Gediz. Rumours and criticisms, some of them justified and others not, began to circulate.

Some people, especially Etem and his brothers, "the gentlemen of the Flying Columns," attributed disaster solely to the officer commanding the Western front and to the regular troops. They spread the rumour that they had been deserted in a difficult position and said that the officer commanding the Army put the blame on them with the object of covering his own mistakes.

The Army maintained and proved that the "Flying Columns" had done nothing at all and that they were incapable of doing anything; during the battle they had not obeyed orders and they always kept as far as possible away from danger.

* * *

Before returning to the point I have just been explaining, I hope you will allow me to refer to a little incident. You know that, following the principle laid down when the Grand National Assembly was opened, the members of the Government who had been called the Executive Council had to be elected directly by the Assembly. This system was carried out until the 4th November, 1920.

It was only on this day that the Act hitherto in force was amended to this effect:

"Ministers will be elected by a clear majority from among members of the Assembly proposed by the President."

The incident which I will now describe to you was one of the causes which led to the amendment of the Act relating to Ministerial elections.

Nazim Bey, who was Deputy for Tokat, was elected Minister of the Interior on the 4th September by the Assembly by 98 votes against 89. In great haste and without losing a minute, Nazim Bey went to the Ministry and began to carry out his duties. Then he came to pay me a visit in my capacity as President of the Executive Council.

I declined to receive Nazim Bey. In refusing to receive a Minister who possessed the confidence of the High Assembly and had been elected by it, I was naturally fully conscious of the delicacy of my position; but the higher interests of the country imposed upon me the duty of acting in this manner.

Of course, I felt certain that I could justify my attitude and convince the High Assembly to recognise the importance of the point I had to bring before them.

There were some members of the Assembly who were inclined to hold strange and exaggerated ideas. Nazim Bey and his friends were among them,

and he had specially attracted my attention. I had come to a perfectly correct opinion about the thoughts and character of Nazim Bey from several letters I had received from him during the Sivas Congress, which were full of specious fallacies.

On his arrival at Ankara as a deputy, Nazim Bey developed a new form of political activity every day. He did not miss an opportunity of coming into touch with each of the political parties as they made their appearance.

Nazim Bey had also found the means of getting, directly or indirectly, into touch with foreign circles and had succeeded in gaining their encouragement and support. You are surely aware that this person had undertaken, for the sole purpose of serving his own interests, to form a party which he called the "Communistic People's Party." It lacked any serious character, and, as its leader, his intention was to occupy himself with anti-national affairs.

I had no doubt that this person was engaged in espionage on behalf of foreign countries. At a later date the Independence Court exposed more than one sad truth about him.

Now, this same Nazim Bey, thanks to the continual propaganda he and his friends had issued, had eventually succeeded in getting into the Ministry of the Interior. This success was also due to the help of those who had forgotten the higher interests of the nation and had worked up an opposition against us.

In this manner Nazim Bey had succeeded in putting himself at the head of the whole of the inner administrative machinery of the Government and in holding a position which enabled him to render the greatest services — not to the nation and the country, but to those whose paid servant he was.

It was natural that I could not acquiesce in this, and that is why I did not receive Nazim Bey, Minister of the Interior, but forced him to resign his office.

When the opportunity came, I frankly exposed the information I had received and my own ideas concerning him to the Assembly at a secret sitting.

Gentlemen: You are well aware that the greatest danger to a country and nation which are governed by Sultans and Caliphs is the submission of the Sultan or the Caliph to the interests of enemies bought by the enemy. Generally speaking, this is easily achieved. On the other hand, for those countries governed by National Assemblies, the most dangerous thing is that certain deputies can be bought and enlisted for the service and in the name of foreign countries. If we look at examples in history, we must indeed admit

that it is not impossible to find men devoid of patriotism who have succeeded in getting into National Assemblies.

For this reason a nation must be very careful whom they elect as their representatives.

The safest way to protect the nation from error is to guide it during the elections by a political party which has gained the confidence of the people through their ideas and actions. Even if we accept in theory that the majority of citizens is possessed of authentic information enabling them to express themselves about each of the candidates and to form a correct judgment of him — experience bears this out — this is apparently not an infallible truth.

* * *

I shall now return to the point where I had left off, namely, concerning the Western front. After the battle of Gediz and its painful psychological and material consequences, Fuat Paşa's authority and influence as commander of the forces appeared to have been shaken. Just at this moment Fuat Paşa asked in a telegram in cipher on the 5th November for permission to come to Ankara for the purpose of consulting us. I had begun to feel that I would have to recall him from his command. The unfavourable criticisms levelled against Ali Fuat Paşa and the fatal effect which the existence of the "Flying Columns" had had on the discipline of the Army had actually begun to be so noticeable that I considered it necessary on the 7th November to order Ali Fuat Paşa to return to Ankara as quickly as possible.

I was convinced that Ali Fuat Paşa could no longer hold the command of the troops on the Western front. At this time it was thought necessary to send a diplomatic mission to Moscow: here was an opportunity of sending him there as our Ambassador.

As regards the Western front, which required very serious and careful handling, it appeared to me that the quickest and best thing to do would be to appoint İsmet Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, who was already engaged in studying the general military operations, to take over the command.

It became clearly necessary that we should have strong cavalry units, both for military operations as well as for employment in the country against seditious movements and other troubles.

I considered it expedient to send Refet Bey (now Refet Paşa), Minister of the Interior, to Konya and the surrounding districts for the sole purpose of recruiting such units, and I added this appointment to his other duties.

Refet Bey had often for different purposes been to Konya and Denizli, where he had taken an interest in the southern part of the Western front, and was therefore well acquainted with this part of the country. Thus I was able to solve the problem in this way: The entire front was divided into two parts, of which İsmet Paşa was given the command of the most important one, called the Western front, while the southern portion of it could be given to Refet Bey, whom I had to send into the Konya district, and both fronts were directly under the General Staff.

Fevzi Paşa, Minister of National Defence, could undertake the command of the General Staff.

In Fuat Paşa's time there was another zone behind the front line extending from the front to Sivas. To control this zone Fuat Paşa had been obliged to create the post of an acting commander. It was clear that this was scarcely practicable. Consequently, it was natural that the part of this zone which was included as the base in the territory of the front came under the administration of the Ministry of National Defence in the new scheme.

To secure the quick preparation and reorganisation of the Army, it seemed advisable that for a certain time İsmet Paşa should still remain at the head of the General Staff, in the same manner as it was necessary that Refet Bey should temporarily retain his office as Minister of the Interior. In this we had the special object in view of securing the organisation of the cavalry, with which he was entrusted, as quickly as possible by preserving order in his district and requisitioning animals and material from the population.

Fuat Paşa arrived at Ankara on the 8th November. I went to the station personally to meet him. I noticed that he was dressed in the uniform worn by the men of the national units and carried a carbine on his shoulder. There could no longer be any doubt about the great influence which such ideas and ways of thinking had gained on the whole of the Western front, considering that they had even induced the officer in command to wear this uniform himself.

Therefore, after I had explained my ideas in short to Fuat Paşa, I mentioned the new duties which he could undertake. He accepted them willingly. On the following night I asked İsmet Paşa and Refet Paşa to come to me and we arranged their new appointments and powers.

The emphatic instructions I gave them were "to create a regular army and a strong cavalry force as quickly as possible."

This was the beginning of the execution of our determination "to destroy

the spirit and system of the irregular organisations" which we had resolved upon on the 8th November, 1920.

*
* *

Now let us pause for a moment and see what was going on in Istanbul. The plan followed by Damat Ferit's Government in collusion with our enemies of all descriptions "to attain the objective by force of arms" had not been successful.

We had resisted the internal upheavals and had suppressed them. The Greek offensive had at last been brought to a standstill on a certain line. The operations undertaken by the Greeks were confined to limited areas.

It became evident that we had undertaken as serious steps against the internal unrest as against the Greek forces. It was also apparent that the armed attacks, whether from the interior or the exterior of the country, would not succeed, and that the position of the National Government at Ankara could not be shaken.

Consequently, the policy of attack by arms pursued by Istanbul had been wrecked. The conviction that the policy would have to be altered naturally followed. In that case it would be better to adopt a policy of internal disintegration under cover of a policy of understanding, exactly as happened in September, 1919, after the first resignation of Damat Ferit Paşa and the Cabinet of Ali Rıza Paşa came into power, when the question arose of pursuing a policy which was apparently a reconcilable one towards us with the intention thereby of producing our inner disintegration.

We shall see that in the struggles that followed we had to combat ideas which were aimed at tempting us into internal and external enterprises; we contended against internal intrigues through the mediation of Istanbul in the same way as against the Greek Army, except under conditions which were far more difficult to understand and to explain.

Tevfik Paşa was at the head of the Government in Istanbul.

Ahmet İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa, respectively, occupied the offices of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Marine in this Cabinet, which soon tried to come into contact with us. It was Ahmet İzzet Paşa chiefly who made this effort.

An officer among the military leaders of the Palace was furnished with certain documents and sent to Ankara by Ahmet İzzet Paşa. In them we were informed that they hoped to arrive at a peace under more favourable

conditions than hitherto. Izmir, for example, with the consent of the Greeks would come under a special régime under Ottoman sovereignty. Above all, it was important to come to an agreement with the İstanbul Government.

It was remarked that Ahmet İzzet Paşa and the Cabinet to which he belonged were not clear about the character and authority of the Grand National Assembly and their Government; they had conceived the idea of forming a Government in İstanbul as a means to solve the problems concerning the destiny of the country and the nation.

With a view to enlighten İzzet Paşa and Tevfik Paşa's Cabinet and to inform them about the situation, we drew up a document containing in full detail all the communications and observations we considered necessary and sent it to them by the special agent who had come to Ankara and who left in the direction of İnebolu on the 9th November.

I received a short telegram from Zonguldak, signed "Captain Kemal," on the 12th November. It contained the words: "I have just left İstanbul for the purpose of sending a telegram in cipher." The telegram referred to was signed by İzzet Paşa, Minister of the Interior, and had been written in the direction of İnebolu on the 8th November, 1920.

In this telegram we were informed that they had obtained the consent of the French representative to transmit news between İstanbul and Zonguldak through the French wireless station. Then the question was asked: "Has the principle of coming to an understanding with the Government been accepted? If so, at what place would a meeting be possible and what route would have to be taken to reach that place?"

Later on an order to the chief Post and Telegraph Administration at Kastamonu arrived, which was signed "Orhan Şemsettin, General Director of Posts and Telegraphs in İstanbul," and was dated 11th November, 1920. This order was enclosed in the envelope of a non-official letter sent to the Direction at Ereğli and ran as follows:

1. It is necessary that telegraphic communication between Anadolu and the capital shall be established as quickly as possible.
2. To secure this, it is urgently necessary that, on the one hand, all the wires belonging to the main line between Sapanca and Geyve which can be repaired shall be put into working order, and that, on the other hand, the establishment and reparation of those lines which connect the towns of Izmit, Kandıra and İncilli which require considerable attention shall also be repaired.
3. Bekir Bey, Inspector in İstanbul, has been ordered to carry this out

and is ready to leave for İzmit. He has the foreman of a gang and a sufficient number of telegraph clerks under his command.

4. I request you to give these officials, who are in possession of special identification papers from the Ministry of the Interior, all the help they require in the places where they consider it necessary to carry out this work. In addition, they will need permission to enter into telegraphic communication with the competent authorities.

11th November, 1920.

The order we circulated in reply to this telegram was to avoid all communication with İstanbul and to arrest any one who would come with the intention of repairing the telegraph lines.

I postponed my reply to this telegram in cipher which İzzet Paşa had sent by a third person until the arrival of the information that İzzet Paşa had read the communication we had sent to him by the messenger. I wanted to know whether İzzet Paşa would maintain his views after he had learned our news. When I knew what I had to expect in this direction, I sent İzzet Paşa the following answer by means of the communication existing between us:

"A meeting with the deputation in question, at which it would be advisable that Your Excellency and His Excellency Salih Paşa should be present, could most easily and most quickly be made practicable at Bilecik. You could travel by rail from İstanbul to Sapanca and continue your journey by motor-car; or, you could come by sea to Bursa and go from there to Bilecik. If you prefer, you could continue your journey from Bursa by motor-car. We have already advised the competent authorities on both these routes. I beg you to arrange your journey so that you will arrive at Bilecik not later than the 2nd December; let us know the date of your departure from İstanbul and the road you have chosen to take from Zonguldak in the usual manner. I would remind you of the necessity of proceeding in such a way that your journey will not attract attention."

25th November, 1920.

Gentlemen:

In a telegram written in İstanbul on the 23rd November, which was signed by the special messenger who had arrived in İstanbul and which had been sent to İnebolu and transmitted from there to Ankara on the 27th November, the following was said:

"When I was with İzzet Pasa to-day, the 23rd November, the Minister
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

for Foreign Affairs made the following statements regarding the latest political situation:

"It is reported that the English Ambassador, who arrived here a few days ago, has declared that a favourable solution would be found for the Ottoman Government on the important questions of Armenia and Georgia, and afterwards on the question of Izmir. It seems advisable to profit by this favourable situation and not miss the opportunity of doing everything that is possible to safeguard the future of the country. If Ankara wants to gain time, feelers must be put out immediately and the following resolutions adopted unanimously."

"After making these statements İzzet Paşa said that it is our duty to make use of the advantages which our continued struggles have gained for us. If Anadolu would not receive the deputation which it is intended to send there, we must get into touch with him personally and explain our aims privately to him. If we were not to consent to this, the conclusion would be drawn that we had abandoned the idea expressed in the above-mentioned statement. In that case he would no longer remain in the Cabinet but would resign and, if it was desired, he would go to Ankara without taking any notice of İstanbul."

In the same telegram we were told that the following statements appearing in the İstanbul Press were attributed to İzzet Paşa: "In sending a special agent to Anadolu the Government wanted to find out whether any connection could be arranged with the people in Ankara or not. The agent who had just returned has stated that such connection could be established. Correspondence with this object has been opened. We shall naturally do what is necessary."

In answer to the observation that statements of this kind were not in accordance with the point of view of Anadolu and that they should be altered, the Cabinet told us that they did not agree with us. İzzet Paşa, however, gave the following explanations to the journal called "Tercümani Hakikat": "The higher interests of the country emphatically demand that the Press should be silent for the moment on this question. Consequently, I wish to be excused for the present from giving any information."

Tevfik Paşa and Ahmet İzzet Paşa were regarded as the great men of the moment. The nation believed them to be wise, well-informed, far-sighted and reliable. For this reason everybody abandoned himself to all kinds of hopes when Damat Ferit Paşa resigned and a Government succeeded it whose prominent Ministers were these very personalities. When Tevfik Paşa's Cabinet tried from the very beginning to get into touch and

negotiation with Ankara, public opinion could not imagine that there was any reason for doubting his good faith. Everybody looked upon it as a good sign that Tevfik Paşa's Cabinet had come into power. It was exceedingly difficult to believe or to convince anybody that this Cabinet had accepted office without having discovered a way to obtain the maximum advantages for the nation and the country. This was all the more so because, through the language they used in political circles and in the Press of Istanbul, they had adopted an attitude which confirmed this popular opinion.

We were persuaded of the fact that the actual situation was by no means what the public believed it to be. Nevertheless, we did not consider it advisable to reject the proposal of an understanding and a meeting that was made by Istanbul for the purpose of discovering a way to secure the liberation of the country before we had established the conditions which were most suitable to satisfy public opinion. For this reason we approved of the idea of a meeting at Bilecik between ourselves and a deputation of which İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa would be important members. I had no doubt that after our meeting with these men we would see clearly that public opinion was not standing on a firm basis. On the other hand, it was evident that it was vital to the national aims that at all costs a Cabinet should be formed in Istanbul that consisted of persons who were distinguished in the eyes of the public for the qualities I have just mentioned. Consequently, I regarded it as a national necessity that they should not be allowed to return when the meeting was over. We had decided upon our meeting with İzzet Paşa's deputation at Bilecik with this idea in our minds. It did not take place on the 2nd, but on the 5th December, 1920.

I will give you a short account of the events that occurred at Ankara and at the front up to the day of our meeting, and in anticipation of it.

You will remember that on the day on which İzzet Paşa's messenger had started via İnebolu for Istanbul, that is to say, on the 8th November, we decided to appoint Fuat Paşa our Ambassador in Moscow and İsmet Paşa and Refet Paşa to commands on the Western front. İsmet Paşa left for the front on the following day and took over his command on the 10th November.

Shortly afterwards I received a telegram in cipher, dated 13th November, from a close friend of Etem Bey's, which was sent from Eskişehir. It ran: "The rumour that Etem Bey, accompanied by Fuat Paşa, will go to Moscow, is regarded by the men at the front and the population to be with a sinister object. The fact that such men are removed from your environment has given colour to the opinion that your Excellency intends to establish a dictatorship."

In fact, the removal of these persons from Turkey was desirable both in the interests both of Etem and his brothers and of the salvation of Turkey. For this reason, I had told Fuat Paşa that if they wished it he might take them with him and appoint them to carry out any duties he might think desirable. It was not to be expected that the contents of this telegram sent by one of Etem Bey's friends expressed merely the ideas of the sender, or that it represented the truth, because neither the men at the front nor the people were interested in the question of Etem Bey being sent to Russia or not. What particularly attracted my attention was the fact that there were people who could imagine that I was aiming at a dictatorship and that this had led me to get rid of Etem and men of his type, who were in my way.

Soon after Ismet Paşa had begun to take up his duties at the front, Etem Bey, on the pretext that he was ill, came to Ankara and stayed there for a long time. While he was away, his brother Tevfik Bey took over the acting command of the "Flying Columns."

To make the situation perfectly clear, certain facts among the whole series of events must be emphasised. The officer commanding the "Flying Columns" had secretly raised a force at Karacaşehir, calling it "Karakeçili." The commandant on the Western front had not been informed about this. We heard by chance of the existence of this force on the 17th November. The order issued by the commandant to report the existence of this force and place it under inspection was not obeyed by Etem Bey. In opposition to the circular order issued by the officer in command, which called upon commanding officers to interfere neither with the civil affairs nor the men serving behind the front, the officers in command of the "Flying Columns" became more arbitrary in their actions and interferences whenever they had the opportunity.

Although the order had been given that Etem Bey's flying column was to be called the "First Flying Column" for the purpose of distinguishing it from the others, Etem Bey and his brothers not only refused to carry out this order but they assumed the title of "Commander of All the Flying Columns and of the district of Kütahya", and exercised the privileges due the position they had created for themselves.

As you will see from what I have said, Etem Bey and his brothers would not allow the troops under their command to be inspected and assumed titles and privileges to which they had no right.

In a report received by the officer commanding at the front on the 11th November, which was signed "Tevfik, Acting Commander of all the Flying

Columns," these statements occurred: "The 13th Division of the enemy is advancing via Emîrfakihli, İlyasbey, Çardak, Umurbey," and "The inhabitants of Gördes have invited the enemy forces to come into their district," while, as a matter of fact, it was no more true that the enemy had advanced than that the Turkish citizens had invited them to come there. You will guess that these communications were made with a certain object in view. The fact that the Mohamedan population was inviting the enemy to come in, could only be explained by the supposition that they feared oppression and tyranny from our side. Looking at the situation from this point of view, the officer commanding at the front issued a circular order to this effect: "Everything must be done to prevent any harsh treatment being exercised under the influence of some irritation that might be experienced during the fever of the battle. However great the treason shown by a village might be, the village is not to be set on fire under any circumstances. Whatever crime may be proved against any of the inhabitants, the troops are forbidden to carry out death sentences. Men who have been convicted of spying or any other treacherous action must be brought under escort to be tried before the Independence Courts."

Tevfik Bey, the acting commander of all the flying columns, refused to obey this order also.

The enemy had taken certain steps in order to concentrate his forces and had evacuated certain positions situated in the zone of the flying columns' command. It was necessary without loss of time to create an organisation to ensure the authority of the Government over the population in that district until the civil administration was re-established in these localities. For this purpose, a company of gendarmes consisting of men of good character was formed under the name of "Simav and the District of Simav Detachment," and special officers were appointed to it. They had the duty of maintaining order and discipline within a certain area. The recruiting offices of the district were placed under this special command regarding administration and order, and Lt.-Colonel Ibrahim Bey was put in command of it. The officers commanding the regular troops and the flying columns were only to be held responsible for military operations. In the statement addressed to the people referring to the establishment of this regional command by the commander-in-chief at the front it was said: "I appoint a regional command which shall be responsible for just administration and am prepared to listen to all of your complaints." I mention this particularly because you will see that it was falsely interpreted by the commander of the flying columns.

The inhabitants of this district retaken from the enemy had been sent

for military duty for two months from the day of their deliverance. Tevfik Bey, commanding the flying columns, also protested against the appointment of this regional command and put forward various reasons for doing so.

In a report on the 23rd November, 1920, Tevfik Bey stated that "following an attack by the enemy he had withdrawn his troops on the slopes north of the village of Günan," and he added this appeal: "Protect my left flank in the direction of Cümbürdü."

The enemy had made no serious attack at all. It was therefore clear that the intention of the commander of the flying columns was to compel the regular troops to be moved to the front and to concentrate his own command in the rear. İsmet Paşa, commanding the troops, accepted Tevfik Bey's message as serious, gave the necessary orders and inquired: "What is the strength of the attacking force in artillery? Has the enemy advanced from Kuruköy on the road to Çamköy?" He also told him that the Southern front was responsible for the defence of İslâmköy.

On the 24th November Tevfik Bey sent a telegram to the officer commanding at the front in which, after using some provocative expressions, he said: "It would seem that the Northern and Southern fronts are under the same Government; but as this is not so in reality, I shall not allow the sons of our country to be thrown away for no object, simply because the administration is lacking in competence. If our left flank is not protected within twenty-four hours I shall retire my mobile columns to the district of the Efendiköprüsü. I leave it to the Government to decide who will be responsible for this."

İsmet Paşa replied to the commander of the mobile troops in these terms: "The XIIth Army Corps is forty kilometres away from our left wing. Our troops have not been ordered to go into a decisive battle or to drive the enemy back after they have retreated. Consequently the flying columns practically constitute an independent cavalry force pursuing the enemy. Its function is to take the necessary dispositions to deal with the superior forces of the enemy, yet whenever the enemy goes into a local and serious operation you try to avoid decisive battle. This is always the duty of cavalry troops in such circumstances. As there is not a strong cavalry force on the Western front, it is impossible that they can reinforce your line of defence; but it is possible and even essential that the flying columns keep touch and maintain communication with the Southern front by the means presently at their disposal.

"On the whole our front is under good leadership, etc. . . ."

Gentlemen:

It was natural that the commanding officer of the Western front intended to put forward a regular budget for his armies. For this purpose he demanded on the 22nd November that there be an inspection of the actual strength of all the troops under his command. This was carried out in all its details, with the exception of the flying columns. In his reply, Tevfik Bey said: "The flying columns can neither be altered nor converted into regular troops... It is impossible to put officers or paymasters in charge of these vagabonds or induce them to agree to such a thing. At the sight of officers they will go mad as though they had seen the Angel of Death. Our troops are led by men like Pehlivan Ağa, Ahmet Onbaşı, Sarı Mehmet, Halil Efe, Topal İsmail; their non-commissioned quartermasters are men who can scarcely read or write. They cannot be moved about by telling them that they are not at the proper place. The flying columns must be commanded in an irregular way as they have been hitherto..."

"It is impossible to instil discipline and order into the men of the flying columns; they would disband immediately if they thought such an idea possible. I beg that you do not misunderstand me when I tell you this."

It was on this very day that a movement on the part of the enemy was observable in front of Bursa, in the district of İznik. The officer in command was obliged to go personally to the front to do what was necessary. With this object, he asked Tevfik Bey, commanding the flying columns, on the 28th November: "Where can I meet you when I come back from Bilecik where I am going to-day?"

No reply was sent to this question.

While he was occupying himself with the dispositions and measures to be taken with regard to the situation which had arisen at İznik, the command of the flying columns ceased to send reports on the military operations.

When asked what was the reason for this, the following telegram was sent in reply: "The reports have been duly sent to the President of the Grand National Assembly at Ankara."

(Signed) Tahsin
Captain.

It adds to the difficulties of a general at the front if he cannot be informed of what is going on at any particular part of that front. In the absence of such information serious mistakes can occur all along the line and might entail dangers that could possibly lead to irreparable consequences.

Ismet Paşa pointed this out to Etem Bey, who was at Ankara, on the

29th November, 1920, and begged him to call the attention of his representative to this question of reports.

On the 29th November İsmet Paşa sent us the following telegram:

To the Chief of the General Staff,

To the President of the Grand National Assembly.

1. The commander of the flying columns has not sent any report since the evening of the 27th November.

2. I have requested Etem Bey to call the attention of his representative to this fact. I have received a telegram from Etem Bey to-day in which he tells me that Tevfik Bey is hurt about the establishment of the "Simav and District of Simav Detachment" to take over the civil administration of the districts recovered from the enemy, and I have replied to this telegram. There is something quite unusual in this situation, but I have no supplementary intelligence about it. I beg you to let me know what information you have about this."

I would like to tell you how the correspondence between the command of the Western front and the command of the flying columns, as well as the news about the situation, came to my knowledge.

The telegram sent by Tevfik Bey, acting commander of the flying columns, to İsmet Paşa, in which he hesitated to hand over spies and deserters to the Independence Court and declared his intention of retiring his troops in the direction of the Efendi Köprüsü if the XIIth Army Corps would not protect the left flank of the flying columns within twenty-four hours, had been handed over to me by Etem Bey, who was at Ankara.

I naturally found these telegrams very significant. In the attitude of the flying columns I saw a peculiar state of affairs which required that certain steps should be taken. For this reason, in my telegram of the 25th November I told İsmet Paşa that Etem Bey had informed me of the contents of the telegrams in question: "I beg you to inform me to-night what has been done in reply to this step taken by Tevfik Bey, which I regard as a very important one, and what is going to be done about it."

İsmet Paşa sent me a detailed report on the correspondence.

Meanwhile, from the 28th November, 1920, I began to receive direct the morning and evening reports signed by "Mehmet Tevfik, acting commander of all the flying columns."

I sent this telegram to Tevfik Bey:

Ankara, 29th November, 1920.

To Tevfik Bey, Acting Commander of the 1st Flying Column.

Our attention has been directed to the fact that the reports which you have been sending direct to me for the last few days do not bear any notification at the end of them that they have been communicated to the Officer Commanding-in-Chief at the Western front.

Has there been any error about this, or has this been omitted for some particular reason? I am waiting for your reply.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Tevfik Bey did not reply to this telegram. Etem Bey, who was at Ankara, wrote the following letter to the late Hayati Bey:

30th November, 1920.

To my brother Hayati Bey.

On account of the misunderstanding between Tevfik Beyefendi and İsmet Beyefendi, I am sending you the original text of the correspondence that has been exchanged on this subject. I beg you to lay it before His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa and ask him to read it, so that any false interpretation might be avoided.

Etem
Commanding the Flying Columns
and the District of Kütahya.

The most noticeable points in the correspondence accompanying this letter were the following: Tevfik Bey told his brother that there was absolutely no need for the "Simav and District of Simav Detachment" and that he had just ordered the officer commanding that district to return to Eskişehir. Tevfik Bey explained İsmet Paşa's statement to the people in the following words:

"This statement declares that we are acting dishonourably and without any sense of justice in these localities and that we are alienating the population. The flying columns are not willing to suffer this statement to be made."

"Until this has been made clear the command of the flying columns will not recognise the command of the Western front."

Then, in a telegram to İsmet Paşa, Etem Bey refers to the fact that his brother is offended and asks him to defer these measures until he returns. He

wrote to his brother telling him that he had communicated with the Commander-in-Chief at the Western front and spoke of the necessity of behaving moderately and politely. In a reply telegram which Tevfik Bey sent to Etem Bey on the 28th November he said: "I had written to the effect that in the future I would not recognise the command of the Western front, who is making game of our honour, and that I had given the order to the commanding officer who had been sent to Simav to return to Eskişehir to-day with those under his command;" and he continued: "I cannot think otherwise about this affair and it is impossible for me to do so."

In another telegram from Tevfik Bey to his brother, dated the same day, he said: "... if they become at all conspicuous, I shall send the entire force under escort back to the Western Army. I insist that İsmet Bey, commanding the Western Army, shall command this front no longer."

After this, the reports on military events from the flying columns were addressed to Etem Bey at Ankara and transmitted by him to the Western front.

The command of the flying columns had instituted a censorship over the correspondence of the Western front. Under the pretence that the telegraph and telephone lines were engaged by the commander of the flying columns, all communication and intercourse with the front had been openly and officially prohibited. Simultaneously, the news was spread that the flying columns would attack in the direction of Eskişehir.

I hope that the information I have given you will help you to form an exact opinion of the situation.

It was easily to be understood that the brothers Etem and Tevfik, together with some of their friends who shared their opinions, had decided to revolt against the National Government. Whilst Tevfik Bey was looking out at the front for an opportunity to carry out his resolution to assemble his forces and leave the front, Etem Bey and Reşit Bey, his brother, who was a deputy, and some of the others, occupied themselves with the political side of their enterprise. To secure the success of this plan of revolt they had first to make sure of getting the command over the army by discrediting and overthrowing the leader at the head of the Army at the Western front, whom they considered was standing in their way.

Another question was to win the opinion of the whole of the Assembly to their side, in order to facilitate the overthrow of the Army commanders, the Ministers and the Government.

There could no longer be any doubt about this being their intention. It was scarcely possible to avoid assuming that some reconciliatory and amiable words which Etem Bey employed in his telegram to İsmet Paşa and his brother Tevfik Bey were based on the intention of gaining time, for they were meant to show modesty and complete subjection by interpreting the question as being due to a certain feeling of bitterness resulting from a misunderstanding between İsmet Paşa and Tevfik Bey. This implied that Tevfik Bey, after having permitted himself to be overcome by nervous excitement, had gone too far.

Personally, we had recognised the seriousness of the situation and had consequently taken the necessary military and political precautions.

I wish to assure you, Gentlemen, that I had done everything that was necessary from every point of view, both at the front and at Ankara. I had no fear at all of the revolt by Etem Bey and his brothers. I was convinced that if they did break out into open revolt, they would be suppressed and punished, and I proceeded, therefore, with great forbearance and equanimity. I preferred as far as possible to try to reduce them to obedience and a better disposition by giving them some good advice. If I could not succeed in this I decided to act in such a manner that their acts and provocative behaviour necessitated and would then expose them to the public in their true light. With this in view, I resolved to go on the 2nd December personally with Etem Bey and Reşit Bey, who were at Ankara, and some others to Eskişehir to meet İsmet Paşa and come to an understanding with them.

I expected that Etem Bey would avoid accompanying me on this journey, but it was crucial to take him with me. I arranged, whether he wished it or not, that he should come, and in case he would not do so I decided to act accordingly.

The next day Etem Bey made the excuse that he could not go because he was ill, and Dr. Adnan Bey stated that the condition of Etem Bey's health would not allow him to make this journey. But I insisted on his coming with me.

At last, we left in a special train for Eskişehir on the evening of the 3rd December. In addition to Etem Bey and Reşit Bey, these very important persons accompanied me: Kâzım Paşa, Celâl Bey, Kılıç Ali Beey, Eyüp Sabri Bey, Hakkı Behiç Bey and Hacı Şükrü Bey.

While I was still asleep, early on the morning of the 4th December, 1920, the train arrived at Eskişehir.

As I had heard that İsmet Paşa was still at Bilecik, we decided to go on to the railway station there without stopping at Eskişehir. When I awoke at Eskişehir I inquired why the train was not going on. My orderly officer replied that our comrades had gone to the restaurant opposite the station to get some breakfast and that they would be back immediately. A few minutes later I was told that everything was ready. I asked whether our comrades were all there. A rapid count was made, and it was found that the number was complete, with the exception of Etem Bey and one of his companions. I felt certain at once that Etem Bey's flight had been pre-arranged; but I did not mention my suspicion to anybody. I was content to assure myself that it was of no use to go on to Bilecik without Etem Bey, and I decided to order İsmet Paşa to come to me.

After I had had a private conversation with him by telegraph, İsmet Paşa came to Eskişehir. As I wished to have a private conversation with him first, I went to meet him at a station some way off, and in the evening of the 4th December we arrived at Eskişehir together. We dined at a restaurant with our comrades who were waiting there for us. Etem Bey was not present. I asked his brother where he was, and he replied: "He is ill in bed." A meeting had been arranged for that night at İsmet Paşa's headquarters between Reşit Bey, Etem Bey and ourselves, in the presence of Kâzım Paşa, Celâl Bey and Hakkı Behiç Bey. When Reşit Bey told me that Etem Bey was ill he had added that he would be able to come to the meeting at the headquarters. After dinner we went there; but Etem Bey had not arrived. I asked Reşit Bey when his brother was coming. He replied: "At the present moment Etem Bey is at the head of his troops."

Notwithstanding this news, we preferred to keep quiet and to go on with our meeting. I must point out here that I had not gone to Eskişehir in my official capacity. I said that I had come as an impartial friend to speak to İsmet Paşa in the presence of some of our comrades. İsmet Paşa gave his explanations about the situation, the correspondence and the insubordination of Tevfik Bey in his capacity as acting commander of the flying columns.

Reşit Bey spoke in the name of his brothers and himself. He was bold enough to say that his brothers were heroes and that they would not take orders from anybody, whoever he might be, and that everyone had to take matters as they were. He would not even listen to any remarks about principles of discipline made in the name of the Government or of the issuing of commands or about claims based on such principles. Then I declared:

"Hitherto I have been speaking in my capacity as an old friend of yours,

animated by the sincere desire to arrive at a result that could be favourable to you. From this moment, however, our comradeship and private relations with one another must be set aside. You have before you now the President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and of her Government. In my capacity as the head of the State, I order the Commander of the Western front to make use of his powers and to act as the situation shall demand."

İsmet Paşa replied to this: "Some of those in command under me may have refused to obey me. I can punish them and teach them a lesson. Hitherto I have shown myself weak in this direction towards anybody, nor have I asked any one to help me in the duty which I have to perform. In the future I shall do what is required."

Following the decisive attitude shown by myself and İsmet Paşa, Reşit Bey, who spoke in a very high voice, immediately assumed a humble attitude and declared that we must not be in a hurry to push things as far as that, for he would find a way out if he were to go to his brothers. It was quite clear that this would have no result and that he only wanted to inform his brothers and gain time.

Nevertheless, we agreed to Reşit Bey's proposal. We consented that he should leave for Kütahya to see his brothers by a special train which İsmet Paşa would arrange for him on the following day. We thought it advisable that Kâzım Paşa should accompany Reşit Bey, and so they left together.

Let me interrupt my story to speak of İzzet Paşa's deputation that was waiting on the same day, the 5th December, 1920, at the railway station at Bilecik.

You remember that following İzzet Paşa's action and proposal, a meeting had been decided upon to take place at Bilecik. The deputation had been waiting for me at the railway station at Bilecik since the previous day. It consisted of İzzet Paşa, Salih Paşa, Cevat Bey, the Minister Plenipotentiary, Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, Minister of Agriculture, Münir Bey, the legal adviser, and Hoca Fatin Efendi.

We met in a room at the railway station. İsmet Paşa was also present. I was the first to speak. After I had introduced myself as "President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and her Government," I asked: "With whom have I the honour of speaking?"

Not having understood my intention, Salih Paşa began to explain that he was Minister of Marine and İzzet Paşa Minister of the Interior. I said

immediately that I recognised neither the Government of Istanbul nor themselves as members of such a government. I said that I did not feel inclined to carry on a conversation with them if they wished to appear at this interview in their capacities as Ministers of a Government in Istanbul.

Thereupon we agreed to proceed to an exchange of opinion without touching the question of our respective positions and authority.

I allowed some of the deputies who had accompanied me from Ankara to take part during certain stages of the conversation. During the course of the interview, which lasted for several hours, it became evident that the deputation had no fixed information or convictions.

In the end, I told them that I would not allow them to return to Istanbul and that they would have to come with me to Ankara.

We left by the train that was just ready to start. We arrived at Ankara on the 6th December. The deputation from Istanbul had been detained by me against their will; but I did not consider it advisable that this fact should be publicly made known. I wanted to preserve their dignity, because it was my intention to make use of İzzet Paşa, Salih Paşa and the others in the affairs of the National Government. In the communication that I issued to the Press with this view, on our arrival at Ankara, I spread the information that the persons in question had left Istanbul with the object of coming into touch with the Government of the Grand National Assembly and that they had joined us so that they could work more effectively and fruitfully for the welfare and the salvation of the country.

On the 5th December — the day we were with İzzet Paşa's deputation on the way from Bilecik to Ankara — I received a telegram from Reşit Bey in which he told me of his arrival at Kütahya, of the meeting he expected to have on the following day with Tevfik Bey, and of the arrival of Etem Bey; but this telegram did not contain anything of a positive character. Four days later Reşit Bey said in a telegram, dated the 9th December and sent on his departure from Eskişehir: "The incident with Tevfik Bey has come to a satisfactory conclusion." Another sentence in this telegram ran as follows:

"But we have noticed, over and over again, that the persons whose acquaintance we wanted to make and to whom we wanted to show who we are, cannot or do not wish to think in a reasonable manner adapted to the situation."

Reşit Bey had also informed İsmet Paşa, commanding the Western front, at Eskişehir, that the question was settled, that telegraphic communication

was restored, and that the Simav command could be re-established. Etem Bey endeavoured to show us in a telegram in cipher, which I received on the 9th December, that the question had been put forward intentionally and inappropriately by İsmet Paşa. Etem Bey further remarked that they had been informed of all the steps taken presumably by Salih Bey, who was at that time my principal A. D. C. He added that he was in possession of certain proof, based on irrefutable evidence, of the fact that an erroneous suspicion had taken hold of me. Then he tried by an insidious effort to secure that a detachment of the flying columns that had been sent to the Southern front by order of the General Staff and which returned from Maden on its way back from the front, would be placed under his command. Referring to the fact that the flying columns had been provided for in the budget under the head of gendarmerie at the time of Fuat Paşa, he wanted to get some more money.

In the favourable reply I sent to him three days later, I said: "I must admit that appearances during these last days, although they did not cause me any fear, gave rise to some doubts in my mind," and I urgently asked him to act very strictly towards anybody who would try to disturb the order and concord prevailing in our general situation.

In reality, the difficulty had not been solved. From what I will now tell you you will see that Etem Bey and his brothers were trying to mislead us with the object of gaining time. Their intention was to recruit and collect as many men as possible, to act in such a way that Sari Efe's fighting troops from Düzce and the Gök Bayrak battalion at Lefke would rejoin them. They wanted to incite Demirci Mehmet Efe to revolt with them and then compel the officers commanding at the front to desert. This would offer them an opportunity of spreading propaganda among the troops and to get the officers and men to refuse to fight against them.

In fact, Etem Bey and Tevfik Bey asked the commander of the district of Simav to come to them, and ordered him to remain at Kütahya, so that he could serve under their orders and at the places that would be pointed out to him. On the 10th December they asked the command at the front to confirm this order.

It was evident, therefore, that in spite of everything having been reported to be regulated, their former insubordination still continued.

Etem Bey sent agents, whom he called liaison officers, in every direction, including Konya, Ankara and Haymana. They were provided with special cipher-keys, and he began to collect ammunition and animals.

So that you may be able to form your own judgment about the duties which these men had to perform and the communications that were sent to the officials of the State, I will read you the entire text of the letter that was addressed to the Kaymakam of Kalecik, north of Ankara, on the 7th December:

Kütahya, 7th December, 1920.

To the Kaymakam of Kalecik.

Ismail Ağa, divisional commander of the flying columns, whose personality and rank you will appreciate herein, has been sent to Kalecik to procure ammunition and animals within your district, to collect the combatants who are on leave, or not, belonging to the flying columns, and to arrange their transport and that of all the men who will join them.

I beg you, Sir, to give all possible facility and patriotic assistance to Ismail Ağa as far as you are able to do so.

Etem

Commanding all the flying columns
in the District of Kütahya.

When the officer commanding the Western front had asked the commander of the flying columns how much rifle and artillery ammunition had been expended in the battle of Gediz, he received from "Tevfik, acting commander of the flying columns," the following reply: "Your question convinces me that you have no confidence in us. Ammunition is neither eaten nor drunk, it is only used against the enemy. If you have no confidence in us, you need not take the trouble to send us any ammunition at all."

I want particularly to call your attention to this point. You can see that Tevfik Bey was still acting commander and that in that capacity, although Etem Bey was at the head of his forces at the front, he carried on correspondence, which meant that there were two chiefs at the head of the same forces exercising the same full authority.

The officer commanding at the front had sent me a copy of the document containing the question that was put on the 13th and the reply to it, for my information.

The employment of a cipher the key to which was not in the possession of the Government, as well as private ciphers, had been universally prohibited; but, in spite of this prohibition, Etem Bey's agents, and some deputies who were his companions, continued to communicate in cipher. This practice was obviously forbidden. Thereupon Etem Bey addressed himself to İsmet Paşa

on the 13th December and told him that it had been reported that telegrams sent to the liaison officers belonging to the flying columns at Ankara and Eskişehir, referring to certain requisitions and sundry other matters, had been intercepted, and he begged him to cause these orders to be cancelled because they interfered with their communication and led to difficulties.

Liaison officers had not been forbidden to send open telegrams; it was only private ciphers that had been forbidden. The correspondence of officers who were at Ankara and Eskişehir, to whom Etem Bey refers, had never been intercepted. These officers had no reason whatever to complain to Etem Bey.

About this time a telegram in private cipher, the use of which had been forbidden, had been handed in at Eskişehir, but it came from a friend of Etem Bey's and was signed "Commander and Deputy." For that reason İsmet Paşa had asked Etem Bey in his reply to tell him who had given him the information.

I shall now refer to an incident which in itself is worthy of notice. At this time there was an acting Mutasarrif at Kütahya in the person of Kadı Ahmet Efendi. A certain Aptullah who had been appointed commandant of the town by Etem Bey happened also to be at Kütahya. The latter handed over to Ahmet Asım Efendi, acting Mutasarrif of Kütahya, a number of families of deserters for deportation. The acting Mutasarrif sent the documents concerning this to the commandant, declaring that according to the Act that had just been passed the deportation question was one for the Independence Court to deal with.

Thereupon the commandant of the town asked the acting Mutasarrif to come to him during the night. The answer he received was that the Mutasarrif was too busy that night and he would arrange to see him the next day. Then some soldiers sent by the commandant broke forcibly into the acting Mutasarrif's house by smashing in the doors of the harem. They took him away with much violence and treated him in an insulting manner. After he had been tried he was taken during the same night to the commander of the flying columns, who was fourteen hours' distance from there, and then he was expelled from Kütahya.

This act and the attack on a person who, as Kadı and acting Mutasarrif, was a senior official in several Ministries constituted a direct blow against the Government.

The Government was interrogated in the Assembly about this incident. The responsible Ministers asked the commander-in-chief at the front to put

the person guilty of this act before a court-martial. In the reply that was sent on the 19th December, which was signed "Mehmet Tevfik, acting commandant of all the flying columns and of the district of Kütahya", to the telegram from the commandant at the front requesting that an investigation should be made and that the result should be communicated to him, it was said: "Everything that Aptullah Bey has done has been by orders that I have given myself and which it was his duty to carry out. The reasons for this have been explained to the proper Ministries. Will you be good enough to inform me that categoric orders against his return have been given? In case he does return I shall have him executed."

Of course, the intention to execute an official whose return to his post had been ordered by the representatives of the nation was irreconcilable with the principles of the Constitution and the provisions of the Act. A lengthy exchange of telegrams between Etem Bey and his brother Reşit Bey, who was at Ankara, took place on the 13th December.

This telegraphic correspondence consisted chiefly of these points. Etem Bey said: "See that the question shall be discussed in the Assembly. Inform Sarı Efe that he must join the Gök Bayrak battalion with his detachment. See that the commanders are called back by the Assembly; if this cannot be done by the Assembly make sure that this matter will be attended to by the authorities." He declared amongst other things that the explosion he should make would be heard by the English and that the day was not distant when this explosion would take place.

Reşit Bey's replies included such strange remarks as these: He demanded that the flying columns not be used against the enemy and that this duty be left to the regular troops. He wanted to come into touch with Edip and stated that if he met with resistance he would break off all relations with the commander at the front.

Reşit Bey sent me all this correspondence just as it was. He did not come personally to see me. By the way, he had not been with me since he had gone from Eskişehir to Kütahya and came back from there. I sent for him and asked him what he wanted. "Change the commanders at the front," he said. I replied: "We have no one to replace them." "Why not appoint me? I shall fulfil this task better than anyone else," was the reply. "It is a very serious matter to change the commanders at the front," I pointed out. "It might weaken the whole position. It is not easy or right to agree to such a suggestion."

In a telegram that I sent to Etem Bey on the same day, the 13th De-

cember, 1920, I told him that I had read the telegrams that had passed between him and Resit Bey and added that it was not well to discuss the matter officially in the Assembly but that Edip should not be removed.

In the reply he sent on the same day he declared that the situation was serious and used some offensive expressions about the commanders.

Etem Bey and his brothers did not consider the commanding officers at the front useful for their purposes and they refused to obey them. In the same manner they did not recognise the Ministries and the Government. Apparently they only obeyed me and they hoped to make the Assembly agree to their ideas. Pretending to agree with us, they were daily trying to hasten on their preparations. Etem Bey asked me in another telegram on the 18th December to order Edip's troops to join him, and to justify this request he said:

"In view of the fact that we are approaching the borders of Izmir it is natural that the best use would be made of Etem Bey's troops belonging to the 1st Flying Column, which I had been obliged to leave at Biga during the operations and the suppression of the revolt in Anadolu and which had been sent later on temporarily to Düzce.

"This detachment consists of 250 cavalry, 200 infantry, a section of mountain artillery, two machine-guns and thirty mounted men as an escort. This actual strength is composed, for the greater part, of volunteers from the district of Izmir. As, on the one hand, continual claim is put on our troops and, on the other, Edip Bey informs us that perfect security is prevailing in his district, I beg you to replace the troops in this district by others and to give the necessary orders to the competent authorities for Edip Bey's detachment with their war material to rejoin the flying columns."

Could anybody believe that the reasons contained in this telegram would convince even the most simple-minded and inexperienced man? A man who is at Kütahya tells me that he is approaching the district of Izmir; he is better informed than I am about the security prevailing in the district of Düzce, and, after having given me minute details about the actual strength of Edip Bey's detachment, he imagines that I would favourably consider his request and order that this detachment with all their munitions should rejoin him.

When I received this telegram I wrote personally and privately on the 19th December, 1920, to Edip Bey at Düzce, informing him of Etem Bey's request and of his own reported desire that this request should be granted.

I explained to him at the same time that the presence of his detachment was absolutely necessary in the district where he was.

On the same day Edip Bey in his reply agreed that his detachment was urgently needed there. On this occasion he did not fail to beg me to allow the same rate of pay to his men as to those of the flying columns.

Etem Bey and his friends began to collect special troops at Haymana in the neighbourhood of Ankara. A man named Musa Bey Zade Abbas, a fugitive from Van who had been in prison at Ankara for theft but who had subsequently been released, provided with an official document and accompanied by five or ten individuals, began to recruit men in the district of Haymana.

They had succeeded in arresting this man on the 19th December and handing him over to the Independence Court at Ankara. Special steps had to be taken in all haste for the purpose of arresting him and dispersing his accomplices. Special troops demanded by Recep Zühtü Bey, who is a deputy to-day, had been sent to Haymana for this purpose.

Recep Zühtü Bey, as he anticipated a violent attack after he had arrested Abbas and three of his companions, had seen himself obliged to alter the route of the transport of the prisoners and had sent them by rail, via Polatlı, to Ankara.

Demirci Efe assumed a strange attitude after he had come into connection with Etem Bey. As soon as we noticed this, Refet Bey's cavalry at the front were immediately sent out against him. In an attack during the night of the 15th December, 1920, on the village of İğdeçik, Efe's troops were dispersed in the neighbourhood of Dinar. Accompanied by about ten men, he fled. A long time afterwards Efe surrendered and was pardoned.

From his own house on the night of the 20th December, Reşit Bey sent four men to bribe the officers and particularly the men in the army in case they had to meet the flying columns. These four men were Hayri Bey, of the journal "Yeni Dünya," Nizamettin Bey, the nephew of Arif Oruç, Hidayet Bey, son of Marshal Fuat Paşa, and his companion Şükrü Bey.

Accompanied by a man who was discovered to be Etem Bey's secretary, they went by train to Eskişehir on the 21st December. Before the train left, one of these men came secretly to the place where I lived, near the railway station, and told me all about it. This man was engaged to organise and conduct the propaganda. The leader of this party was Hidayet Bey.

It was he also who had the necessary authority to act as treasurer. The

intention was that the man who informed me should go to Kütahya alone to receive instructions from Etem Bey and then return to Eskişehir, where the others were to await him.

I said to this man: "We have friendly feelings towards Etem Bey and his brothers. You are unnecessarily alarmed. They are doing this to injure me, but I would like to know what instructions Etem Bey will give with the object of bribing the Army." I allowed him and his companions to move about freely.

I informed İsmet Paşa at Eskişehir and Fahrettin Paşa at Afyonkarahisar all about this affair and pointed out to them the necessity of having these men watched.

My informant proved later on by his actions that what he had told me was quite true.

After Kâzım Paşa, accompanied by Reşit Bey, had had his interview with Etem Bey and Tevfik Bey at Kütahya, he gave me the important points contained in the statements made by Etem Bey in this condensed form:

1. The Government of Ankara is neither fit nor able to realise the national aims. We cannot tamely submit to this Government.
2. The character of our enterprise will be unfavourably construed. If, however, I do succeed in the end, everybody will say that I am right.
3. The question between Refet Bey and ourselves is one of personal dignity. Mustafa Kemal Paşa prefers to respect Refet Bey's pride and hurt ours. In any case, I feel inclined to oppose Refet Bey and to pursue him as far as Ankara; if I have to die I would prefer to do so in pursuit of him.
4. We would have finished this affair long ago if it had not been for Reşit's position in the Assembly at Ankara, which has misled us. What is the Assembly and what importance is to be attached to it?

After having listened to these expressions, Kâzım Paşa had been trying to preach calmness and moderation to these people by telling them that, in addition to the western front, Turkey had armies also in the east, south and centre of the country, that these armies had capable leaders and officers of high merit at their head and in their midst, and that, finally, the nation were on the side of all of them.

Reşit Bey was working feverishly in the Assembly with his plans and the weight of his influence. Forty or fifty of the deputies in the Assembly had shown doubt on a certain day about the situation at the front and had

expressed their wish to call the Council of Ministers together with the object of getting information about this. The late Yusuf İzzet Paşa, who was deputy for Bolu, wrote to me about the situation and the wish of the deputies who had met. I was then in the Council of Ministers who were sitting. The Council did not think it right that the Government should be called upon by the deputies assembled in such circumstances to make any statement on the question, and we declared that we could not accede to their request.

In giving this statement through Yusuf İzzet Paşa, I added as a personal observation: "You are a deputy and I am your President. If you desire to speak to me on any question, I shall be glad to hear you."

After Yusuf İzzet Paşa had given my reply to the assembled deputies, Reşit Bey got up and said:

"This reply means, 'button up your tunics'. You know that military discipline demands that soldiers shall wear their tunics buttoned up close."

As you can see, Reşit Bey wanted to give the impression that the President's intention was to impose military discipline on them. Of course, it was Reşit Bey and his friends who had organized this meeting.

As the result of interviews and meetings which he had with İzzet Paşa's deputation at Ankara, he had spread the opinion that the Paşas had been detained notwithstanding the fact that they had come to assure us that a peace could be concluded by which both İstanbul and İzmir could be saved.

On the 22nd December, 1920, I invited Reşit Bey and about fifteen of his companions, Ministers and Deputies, to come to my office.

Among them were Celâl Bey, Kâzım Paşa, Eyüp Sabri Bey, Adnan Bey, Vehbi Bey, Hasan Fehmi Bey, İhsan Bey, Kılıç Ali Bey, Yusuf İzzet Paşa and Emir Paşa. His Excellency Fevzi Paşa was also present. I clearly explained to this committee the whole sequence of events on the question on which we were engaged by showing them all the necessary documents. Reşit Bey did not contest anything I said. He declared that the only troops that could resist the attack of the enemy were Etem Bey's columns, that the formations organised by us would run like hares at the first noise; and he added that Etem Bey's force must be increased and reinforced by all possible means. I replied to him that the forces which Etem Bey could personally depend upon and on which he could have direct influence did not exceed more than 1,200 to 2,000 men and that it would be dangerous to increase this number because of the lack of discipline that would follow. I told him that the fate of the country could not possibly be confided to forces that

were dependent upon one particular man but only to regular troops which were subject to the laws of the Grand National Assembly: the flying columns could only be effective if they were part of an organized command and were subject to the orders they received.

The position that Reşit Bey took up seemed to indicate that he recognised these truths. Thereupon we resolved that as a last resource Reşit Bey, accompanied by some of his companions, should go to his brothers and give them advice.

Then I declared to the persons who were present that I would put an end in the future to all the personal efforts I had hitherto made to settle this question.

The committee was instructed to inform the flying columns of the following points which contained the last emphatic demands of the Government:

1. The flying columns were to submit completely, as all the other troops had to do, to orders and should abstain from every undesirable and illegal act.
2. The flying columns are never and under no conditions to recruit reinforcements for their forces, and they are immediately to stop the activity of people who had been appointed to undertake this. In the same manner as the other troops, the need of reinforcements should be supplied by order of the commander-in-chief at the front.
3. The flying columns are not to undertake steps for the arrest of deserters, who shall be followed and arrested by the Commander-in-Chief at the front as is the practice in the other parts of the Army.
4. The Government is to be informed of all particulars about the liaison officers serving with the flying columns in certain places, in order that the families of the officers and men belonging to the flying columns shall be cared for. A copy of the cipher-key used by these liaison officers is to be given to us.

If these conditions are fulfilled, the flying columns will be permitted to continue their services as before within certain limits.

Celâl Bey, Kılıç Ali Bey, Eyüp Sabri Bey and Vehbi Bey, together with Reşit Bey, left Ankara at noon on the 23rd December and arrived at Kütahya at 4.45 p. m. on the 24th December.

I learned that Etem Bey and Tevfik Bey, without the knowledge of the commander at the front, and without asking for his consent, had distributed

regular troops that were in their zone at the front and had later on concentrated the flying columns at Gediz and the detachment of Pehlivan Ağa at Kütahya. In an open telegram that I sent to Celâl Bey and his comrades at Kütahya on the 25th December I said:

"I want to know immediately what this means. I am waiting at the telegraph instrument for your reply."

I sent a copy of this telegram to İsmet Paşa, Refet Paşa and Fahrettin Paşa and directed their attention to it. They sent the following short reply which was signed by them jointly:

"Do not be uneasy. There is nothing to be anxious about. Tevfik Bey will arrive here to-morrow. We shall then have a general discussion about it; we shall let you know the result in detail."

From this reply I came to the conclusion that our comrades there had either been deceived or ill-informed about the situation or, on the other hand, that they had been arrested and were compelled to write what they were told to. Pretending that I had not understood the position, I wanted to give the impression that I was satisfied with the assurances they had given me in their short message.

Consequently, I replied that I had no doubt as to their having come to an agreement with Tevfik Bey after their meeting concerning the principles which would secure the greatest benefit to the country and the nation; that I would succeed in clearly proving that the communications which had reached me were nothing but gossip, of which fact I was convinced myself; that it was unnecessary for the Government to do anything in the matter; that I was only waiting for the news that the question that affected the good understanding had been settled; and that I finally demanded from them not to disturb me any more.

The main points of the open telegram which arrived now and which was sent by the deputation with their joint signatures on the 26th December were these:

1. There is no doubt that measures for security have been taken. They are solely defensive. The troops that have been concentrated will not think of advancing if the outposts are retired to their original position.
2. They have taken a solemn oath that unless they should be attacked they will refrain, out of respect for the person of Your Excellency and in their anxiety for the future salvation of the country, from making any active move.

3. You are requested not to prevent the eighty men whom Fahrettin Paşa had arrested when the flying column under Lieutenant (Sadrettin Efendi came from Konya and Alaca) or Kurt İsmail Ağa, one of the commanders of the flying columns, from joining the men in connection with those from Kalecik who, although not of proper age, had assembled with the intention of taking part in the fight.

4. You are requested to ask the Mutasarrif of Kütahya to provide funds for the flying columns.

5. To recall Fahrettin Bey and Refet Bey from the front in order that confidence shall be restored.

What sense could be gathered from these points? Was it possible that all the comrades who had gone to Kütahya could not have grasped the meaning of them?

As I have already remarked, the deputation that had gone to Kütahya had actually been arrested. The wording in the sense you are aware of had been dictated to them. I knew before the deputation left what would happen; that is why I had Kâzım Paşa, who by chance sat on my left hand during the interview, given to understand that he must not go, although Reşit Bey insisted that he should accompany him. For, if they kept Kâzım Paşa under arrest, not temporally but permanently, they could gain great advantage by the use of his signature.

During the same night I sent this reply: "I shall submit your telegram to the Council of Ministers to-morrow." On the night of the 27th December I sent the following telegram in cipher at the same time to İsmet Beyefendi, in command of the western front at Eskişehir:

"I send you herewith the exact wording of the telegram sent by the deputation that went to Kütahya. I beg you to forward a summarised account of the most essential points telegraphically to Refet Bey and Fahrettin Bey.

"The telegraphic reply which I had sent personally to the deputation was simply this: 'I shall submit your telegram to the Council of Ministers to-morrow.' Following the resolution of the Council of Ministers, I shall inform the deputation to-morrow that their mission is fulfilled and that they shall return to Ankara as soon as possible. Then I intend to explain the matter in detail to the Assembly. I request İsmet Bey and Refet Bey to keep their troops where they are concentrated and ready for action against the flying columns and to pay more attention to the general dispositions that have been decided upon.

"In any case, I consider that we must not come into action before they have begun the attack themselves."

Mustafa Kemal

President of the Grand National Assembly.

On the following day this telegram was sent to the western and southern fronts:

In cipher.

27th December, 1920.

To the Commanding Officer of the 1st Division on the Western Front.

To the Commanding Officer of the 1st Division on the Southern Front.

For Refet Beyefendi and İsmet Beyefendi.

The telegram from the deputation that was sent to Kütahya has been read at the Council of Ministers who have decided that the following resolutions shall be sent directly to Kütahya to-night by the President of the Grand National Assembly in an open telegram, declaring that the work of the deputation is regarded as completed. Be good enough to take the necessary steps and give me your opinion. (Fevzi, Acting Chief of the General Staff.)

Salih

Chief of the Operations Department.

Decree.

27th December, 1920.

Considering the fact that the necessity of the continuance of unity and the unconditional obedience of the troops must be placed above everything else for the salvation and actual liberation of our country, the Council of Ministers — after having taken notice of the telegram sent by Celâl Bey, Reşit Bey, Eyüp Sabri Bey, Vehbi Bey and Kılıç Ali Bey, members of the National Assembly, on the 26th December, and having considered the facts produced by it — have come to the following decisions:

1. The 1st Flying Column must obey the laws of the Grand National Assembly and the regulations and orders of the Government unreservedly and unconditionally, and it must submit to military discipline in the same manner as the other troops.

2. The suggestions and observations concerning the fulfilment of military obligations and the affairs of the command of the 1st Flying Column are

exclusively under the authority of the command under whom they serve and, through this command, of the other competent authorities.

3. It is the duty of the Chief of the Staff to take the necessary steps in this matter.

(Signed) Mustafa Kemal

Fehmi, Minister of Public Worship and Education. .

Fevzi, Minister of National Defence.

Ahmet Muhtar, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Adnan, Minister of the Interior.

Fevzi, Acting Chief of the General Staff.

Ferit, Minister of Finance.

On the 27th December I answered the telegram from Celâl Bey, Reşit Bey, Eyüp Sabri Bey, Vehbi Bey and Kılıç Ali Bey, members of the National Assembly. I communicated to them word for word the resolution of the Council of Ministers, and added:

"In terms of this resolution, I request you to return to Ankara, since the special mission which we asked you to fulfil has been accomplished."

I received the following telegram from the deputation on the 28th December:

Kütahya, 28th December, 1920.

To the President of the Grand National Assembly, Ankara.

We considered your telegram containing the resolution of the Council of Ministers yesterday. We have all come here in full sincerity and obedience to your commands for the salvation of the country and nation. We have convinced ourselves about the state of affairs here and at Eskişehir from what we have seen.

We have examined the question in dispute impartially and in a spirit of perfect justice. We have explained to you the stages and development of the negotiations as they took place and have written to you as to how, in our honest conviction, a solution would be possible. From what we have written it is impossible for us to understand what the resolution of which we have been informed can mean. On the contrary, we observe that our report, which was intended to secure the salvation and welfare of our country, has not been interpreted in a favourable light. We beg you to understand that the question will not admit of being further prolonged.

Celâl, Reşit, Eyüp Sabri, Vehbi, Kılıç Ali.

This was my reply to this telegram.

In cipher. At the instrument.

To Celâl Bey, Reşit Bey, Eyüp Sabri Bey, Vehbi Bey, Kılıç Ali Bey,
Members of the National Assembly, Kütahya.

Reply to your telegram in cipher of the 28th December, 1920.

The cordial interest which you take in the salvation of our country and nation fills me with gratitude.

I had officially brought the question before the Government before you left, and, after having given you instructions and shown you the documents, I asked you to take the trouble to undertake this journey for the purpose of explaining to our comrades in that part of the country what the guiding lines are that they should follow.

The point that you mention in your telegram has, by the way, also been considered here. I had declared that the general measures and regulations of the Government could not have the object of securing to any special party a particular position of predominance.

Moreover, the resolution of the Council of Ministers contains once more in a definite official form the points which are well known and which it is everybody's duty to obey. Your communications have not in any way been unfavourably interpreted. It only shows me — as I have also maintained here — that my perfectly sincere efforts and the personal and private steps I have undertaken for the last month and a half have, unfortunately, not been appreciated. This has compelled me to delegate the duty of considering and trying to solve this question to competent and responsible authorities.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

It was discovered that the members of the deputation to Kütahya had succeeded in escaping from the hands of Etem Bey and his brothers by convincing them that it would be better for them if they gave an account of the situation before the Assembly. Reşit Bey had naturally remained at Kütahya.

After I had communicated the resolution of the Council of Ministers to Kütahya and informed the deputation that they were to return, I ordered the commanders at the fronts to proceed simultaneously against the mutineers Etem and his brothers.

We conceived it to be an imperative duty to record an example in the

history of our revolution of a wholesome punishment to these brothers and their followers, as well as the enemy on whom they leaned for support, by reducing them to impotence and chastising them. These were the brothers who regarded military operations as a pillaging expedition, the organisation and administration of the State as an enterprise of brigands, in which innocent children were kidnapped and concealed in the mountains for the purpose of extorting ransom. These were the insolent, shameless and impudent men who infested the whole of our Turkish country and filled the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Nation with their clamour and their deception — these were the creatures who were so low and despicable that they became the spies and creatures of any enemy for a crust of bread! With this aim of inflicting chastisement we took these measures:

We had left a division of infantry at Bursa facing the Greek troops; two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry had been concentrated in the direction of Kütahya and south-west of Eskişehir. Only a single battalion had been left to oppose the Greek troops at Uşak. Two divisions of infantry and seven regiments of cavalry had been concentrated in the Dumlupınar towards Kütahya.

As soon as our troops had received the order to advance they immediately marched against the forces of Etem, the rebel, which were at Kütahya. They occupied Kütahya on the 29th December. All our troops coming from the western and southern fronts restored their communication three days later on a line that ran in the direction of Gediz, thirty to forty kilometres in front of Kütahya. The rebellious Etem had retired as far as Gediz without having had the courage to bring his troops to a halt anywhere or to offer any resistance.

The armies of the Grand National Assembly, conscious of their duty, pushed forward with irresistible energy and force, with the object of inflicting well-deserved chastisement on the rebels, who, in their stupidity and foolish pride, had gone so far as to despise the Grand National Assembly and their Government.

Etem, the rebel, who fled in breathless haste, sent the following telegram to the Grand Vezir at Istanbul:

"I forward you herewith the wording of the telegram of protest which I have sent to the President of the Assembly at Ankara regarding the release and return to Istanbul of your honourable colleagues who are detained at Ankara.

"On the strength of a resolution of the National Assembly, I am an object of attack at the present moment.

"Although my troops are sufficient not only to defend me but also to attack, and as I am in touch with the Greeks on my front and on my flanks, and, notwithstanding that I have come to an understanding with the Greek commander as to the best way of acting, I consider it necessary to apply to Your Highness for your consent.

"In order to keep in touch with you so that Your Highness's orders can be transmitted, I beg that the telegraph line at Gediz may be re-established."

Etem

Late Commander of all the Flying Columns and of the District of Kütahya, now in Chief Command of all the National Forces.

This creation of Etem's mind which was called in the telegram a protest had, indeed, been received by the President of the Assembly and had been read at a secret sitting. The expressions employed in it were so vulgar and impudent that after it had been read once nobody could stand hearing it read a second time. I do not think it is necessary to give you any further particulars about this stupid subject. Accompanied by many insults against the deputies and complaints against the lawfulness of the National Assembly it was claimed that İzzet Paşa's deputation should be set free and allowed to return to Istanbul.

Whilst our troops were marching into Kütahya I felt that I ought to reply to the objections of certain deputies in the Assembly. Protests were made about the action taken against Etem and his pursuit. Because Fuat Paşa was able to influence and guide Etem and his pursued brothers, it was stated that he ought not to have been removed. It was also held that all the conflict had resulted from the inexperience of the commanders whom I had lately appointed, that they had not behaved according to the necessity of the situation, and so forth. It was said that the moment had at last arrived when seriousness and order ought to be maintained in the Army. What would I do if — God forbid it! — Etem would split up the Army? Who has decided what would be done in such a serious case and how? How could such a resolution be arrived at without informing the Assembly about it?

After all these questions had been asked and these criticisms advanced, it was demanded that Etem Bey and his brothers should be pardoned. During

all the sittings of the 29th December and some of the secret sittings of the 30th, I put forward explanations. I endeavoured to describe the situation as it was in its full reality, supporting my statements by irrefutable documents and proofs. In spite of all I said, the discussions continued. Without taking anything else into consideration, the telegram with the objection to the lawful character of the Assembly was sufficient in itself to bring the law concerning treason against the country into operation against these rebels, and yet nobody seemed to remember the fact that they had had this mutinous attitude for many a month, that they had resolved to carry out their plans with the object of overthrowing the national government and forming another one to suit their own plans — indeed, it even seemed that the attempt was made to relieve them from submission and punishment.

Let me tell you why this was so. Some deputies thought that the situation was the result of personal friction and of temperament. Lively propaganda to this effect had actually been spread to mislead public opinion. Due to exaggerated fancies, they imagine that Etem's forces were considerable and difficult to reduce to submission, that in case of an encounter with them the regular army would flee in every direction, and that, in short, the position would really become tragic. With this idea it was thought right to prevent them from coming into contact with one another.

Is it possible, Gentlemen, not to observe that to adopt such a point of view and to act on such lines would have meant the surrender of our whole Turkish country to the dictatorship of this Etem, who had been nothing better than a dispatch rider and whose mental faculties were equivalent to those of one?

After we had spoken in a manner that was calculated to allay the excitement and doubts of the Assembly, we concluded our discussions in the secret sittings in the anticipation of actual events.

Our troops, following Etem Bey's forces, occupied Gediz on the 5th January, 1921, and consolidated themselves in this district. Etem and his brothers with their force occupied the most suitable position for them, namely in the ranks of the enemy. The "Affair of Etem" no longer existed. This latter enemy who was born in the bosom of our own Army was expelled from it and had been pressed back into the enemy's front.

We shall have to concern ourselves now with the movements of the enemy and the enemy's front.

A day later, on the 6th January, 1921, the whole of the Greek Army delivered an attack on the whole of our line.

I shall now explain to you very simply the military position on this day.

Imagine a line running from İznik via Gediz to Uşak. The portion of this line north of Gediz is two hundred kilometres long; that part of it between Gediz and Uşak is about thirty kilometres. The enemy advanced with three divisions from the northern point in this line in the direction of Eskişehir.

The main body of our troops at Gediz had to go by Eskişehir to meet the enemy.

They met him and defeated him. Our revolution had won the Victory of İnönü I.

The troops on the south front were sent back to their old positions at Dumlupınar. The 61st Division, about two regiments strong under the command of İzzettin Bey (İzzettin Paşa, Army-Inspector), were the only troops left at Kütahya.

I explained the position to the Assembly in a public sitting on Saturday, the 8th January, 1921. On this occasion everybody recognised the truth. Even those who had held the opinion that we ought to show a conciliatory spirit towards Etem and his brothers were now in a state of indignation against them. Protests were heard when, in the course of my statements, I referred to them as 'Etem Bey, Tevfik Bey, Reşit Bey.' I heard somebody remark: 'Your Excellency, do not call them 'beys' but 'traitors'.' To this I replied: 'I would very much have preferred to have called them 'traitor Etem' and 'traitor Tevfik,' but then I would have had to apply this expression also to Reşit Bey, who is still a member of the Grand National Assembly. My respect for you will not allow me to venture to apply it to him. I must first beg you to deprive Reşit Bey of his position as deputy.'

The President then said: "Will those who wish to deprive Reşit Bey, Deputy for Saruhan, who is working with the enemy and who has turned his arms against the country and the nation, of his position as a deputy, hold up their hands?"

Everybody present held up his hands and the motion was therefore carried.

In this offensive undertaken by the Greek Army, Etem Bey and his brothers did not fail to do what was expected of them. They marched again towards Kütahya and opened an attack on the weak force we had left there. The skilful leadership and decision on the part of İzzettin Paşa and the splendid heroic courage of the Turkish soldiers under his command, overcame the treacherous force that was advancing to attack them under Etem Bey and his brothers and compelled them to retire.

If they were successful in escaping complete annihilation of their force, I have to admit that they owe this to Refet Paşa, whom they disliked. Let me explain how this happened.

Refet Paşa had two cavalry detachments at Küçükköy, about ten kilometres east of Dumlupınar. The 61st Division at Kütahya was ordered to advance and quickly destroy Etem's troops, which were attacking from the west.

Refet Paşa was to engage the flank and rear of Etem's forces with his cavalry. If you look in the direction of Kütahya from the point where he was to the north, you will easily see that this plan could easily have been carried out by an ordinary march. But Refet Paşa did not advance towards the places where he was intended to go, but in the opposite direction — instead of going to the west of Kütahya, he went in an easterly direction to Alayunt. The cavalry reached Alayunt at about noon on the 12th January. Refet Paşa went to Kütahya to discuss the position with İzzettin Paşa. The latter had proposed to send the cavalry, passing south of Kütahya and west of the Yellice Mountains, against the rear of Etem's forces, which consisted only of cavalry.

Refet Paşa maintained that he was not well informed about the position of both fighting parties and decided not to carry out this manoeuvre. If İzzettin Paşa's troops were withdrawn to the east across the river Porsuk, he proposed to attack the rebels in their flank and rear through the valley of Kütahya.

The rebels had dismounted. Facing a commander who hesitated to advance against them when they, as cavalry, would have had to fight on foot, which would have been specially disadvantageous for them, they remounted. Meanwhile our troops retired, which gave the rebels courage. Our commander was still hesitating as to how and where he should attack the enemy.

These were erroneous tactics. Ought not this body of enemy cavalry to have left alone the infantry, which they had forced to retire, and thrown themselves on Refet Paşa's cavalry?

If troops following the sound of rifle and gunfire arrive on the field — even if they only had a single rifle themselves — wait for the defeat of that part of the army to which they belong and which is still fighting, and think that they will be only then useful, such an idea, it seems to me, must appear to be illogical not only to military experts but even to the most simple-minded person. Duty and courage of sacrifice demand that the at-

tempt should be made to obtain success before part of the fighting force is beaten and retires.

Commanders who look on while their comrades are fighting and needing help, and who only watch their comrades being defeated, lay themselves open to remorseless criticism and blame in history.

In the course of the violent and critical fighting that took place from noon on the 11th January, 1921, till midnight on the 13th January, İzzettin Paşa had informed the General Staff that the hour had come for the cavalry also to join in the attack. Refet Paşa told his troops that he intended to begin his attack on the 14th January if the 8th Division, which he had ordered to come up from the south, arrived in good time. After İzzettin Paşa had been fighting alone on the 11th, 12th and 13th January, he defeated the rebels in a counterattack which he delivered as night was falling and compelled them to retire. By looking on as a spectator throughout this battle, Refet Paşa missed a great opportunity and enabled Etem and his brothers to carry out their retreat. On the 14th he put all his cavalry under the command of Derviş Bey (now Derviş Paşa, commanding an Army Corps), who commanded a cavalry division, and ordered him to pursue Etem. As a result of the heavy blows which Derviş Paşa inflicted upon the enemy at Afşar and particularly at Gediz by keeping on the heels of Etem's troops even during the night, the brothers Etem, Tevfik and Reşit lost their heads. Derviş Paşa did not give their force time to re-form. From the 14th to the 22nd January he pursued Etem and his brothers without giving them a moment's rest.

All of Etem's men were eventually taken prisoners and the brothers Etem, Reşit and Tevfik alone were able to escape to the enemy's headquarters, where they and were appointed to take up new duties there.

II.

Gentlemen:

I am sure that every opportunity was given to us to show many an interesting thing to our guests who came from Istanbul and who were now at Ankara during their sojourn with us, which lasted five or six weeks. The forces of Etem and his brothers were annihilated.

In three days we defeated the Greeks at İnönü. A new phase, which could satisfy and at the same time disturb the Grand National Assembly, had been entered upon. İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa, however, did not seem

to be at all satisfied with it and wanted at any price to leave for the capital, as though they were homesick. We also observed that their colleagues in Istanbul were equally upset.

Ten days after their arrival at Ankara a telegram was received at Zonguldak through the French wireless service. It read as follows:

16th December, 1920.

To His Highness İzzet Paşa,

Through the Mutasarrif of Zonguldak.

Not having heard anything yet from Your Highness, I beg to inform you that we are awaiting news of the arrival of the deputation.

Mustafa Arif

Two days later the following was received via Adapazarı:

To His Excellency İzzet Paşa, Minister of the Interior.

As I have not yet received any reply from Your Excellency, I earnestly beg you to reply to the telegram sent via Zonguldak in which you were asked to announce your arrival.

Mustafa Arif

Acting Minister of the Interior.

A special agent who was sent to İnebolu by Ziya Paşa in the name of Tevfik Paşa's Cabinet brought this intelligence on the 10th January, 1921:

"The news according to which İzzet Paşa's deputation had joined Anatolia had been confirmed in Istanbul... The Cabinet ask for explanations from İzzet Paşa... Ziya Paşa, Safa Bey, Mustafa Arif Bey and Reşit Bey are reported to have said: "If the interests of the country require that the deputation should remain at Anatolia, we have nothing to say against it... In that case the Cabinet will certainly be overthrown... We are also sons of our country... They ought at least to have given us information about the situation and sent us news so that we would know how to act..."

Ziya Paşa referred to the contents of a letter which he had received from Ahmet Rıza Bey in Paris and to information he had received from a reliable source in Istanbul.

It seems that Ahmet Rıza Bey had told him that, if the military position of the national forces were satisfactory, the Izmir question could be settled

by creating an accomplished fact; i. e., by carrying out a well-prepared attack. The information that he had received confirmed this. They began to support King Constantine.

With regard to the special information from Ziya Paşa, it related to a great offensive which the Greeks intended to undertake with increased forces before the final Conference.

Damat Ferit Paşa displayed feverish activity . . . The drawing up of numerous lists of Ministers had been begun at Baltalimanı . . . In the reply which I sent by the special agent who had come to İnebolu to Ziya Paşa and his colleagues, after I had thanked him for the information he had sent me, I said:

"İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa stayed at Ankara because it was most urgently necessary for them to do so in order to carry out our common aim. If it should seem advisable that they retain a prominent position in İstanbul, it is in the high interests of our country that before they are overthrown they should come to Anadolu by a route that shall be arranged for them. The service they will render to the country and the devotion they will show thereby will be accepted with gratitude by the nation."

In his telegram in cipher which the agent sent to İnebolu after he had returned to İstanbul, and which was forwarded from there on the 10th January, he informed me that Ziya Paşa and his colleagues had decided to act in the manner I had suggested.

A week later I received the following telegram from the command at Kocaeli.

Geyve Station, 26th January, 1921.

To the President of the Grand National Assembly.

"A telegram from the General Director of Telegraphs in İstanbul, dated 4.30 p. m., 26th January, 1921, informs us that the Grand Vezir desires to discuss with you personally at the instrument an important question which relates to the higher interests of the country. I am awaiting Your Excellency's orders about this."

In the reply which I sent on the same day to the command at Kocaeli, I asked: "How can İstanbul come into direct communication with Geyve? Before I can enter communication with Tevfik Paşa or anybody else in İstanbul for the purpose of a discussion, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the Council of Ministers and, perhaps, even the Assembly. For that reason,

I cannot say anything at the present moment. It is not proper that the telegraph official is in open communication with Tevfik Paşa, because this might give rise to confusion in the minds of foreigners regarding our attitude towards İstanbul. If, however, Tevfik Paşa desires to enter into negotiations, not with me personally but with the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, this would naturally be agreed to. There is no objection to this being communicated non-officially through the same channel."

There was a telegraph line connecting İstanbul and Adapazarı, and another under military control between Adapazarı and Geyve.

As Tevfik Paşa was desirous of entering into secret telegraphic communication with me, the İstanbul line was connected with Ankara.

I received the following open telegram from Tevfik Paşa:

Istanbul, 27th January, 1921.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

In virtue of the resolutions arrived at by the Council assembled on the 25th January in Paris, a Conference is to be held in London on the 21st February, in which the delegates of the Allied Powers as well as those of the Ottoman and Greek Governments will take part; the object will be to consider a solution of the Eastern question. It is believed that current events will necessitate alterations being made in the existing Treaty.

The collaboration of the Imperial Government is made dependent on Mustafa Kemal Paşa and all the other delegates from Ankara, provided with the necessary full powers, being members of the Ottoman delegation. These resolutions have been made known through the representatives of the Allied Powers in İstanbul. I await your decision and your reply, in order that the persons whom you will chose will meet those we shall gather here and shall leave with them together. In view of the special importance of this I request you to give orders that the telegraph lines shall be kept free for communications on this subject.

I am awaiting your answer at the telegraph instrument in the hope that it will be possible for you to reply at once. A telegram in cipher will follow this one.

Tevfik

The telegram in cipher was worded thus:

Istanbul, 8 p. m. 27th January, 1921.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

We have just this moment heard from a reliable source that the Greeks, in order to obtain more influence at the London Conference, are sending an Army Corps to Izmir and that they are moving the troops they have in Trakya to Anadolu. It is expected that they will begin their attack in about ten days.

Tevfik

I sent the following reply:

Ankara, 28th January, 1921.

To His Highness Tevfik Paşa, Istanbul.

Reply to your telegram of the 27th January, 1921.

The only lawful and independent sovereign power which is based on the national will and which governs the fate of Turkey is the Grand National Assembly, which is permanently sitting in council at Ankara. It is the Government of this Assembly alone which is authorised to settle all questions relating to Turkey, and to it alone every appeal must be made on questions that relate in any way to foreign countries. No other body existing in Istanbul has any lawful and legitimate authority.

Consequently, the fact that such a body calls itself a government is in clear contradiction to the sovereign rights of the nation; it is not entitled to make use of the expression "Government" in respect to itself in dealings with foreign countries nor to claim to be an authority that must be appealed to on questions that concern the life of the country and of the nation. The duty which your body has to fulfil and which conscience and patriotism dictate is to accept and to proclaim according to the actual condition of affairs that the lawful Government of the nation and the one to whom everybody must appeal is at Ankara. Although there is no doubt that the Entente Powers are perfectly clear about the fact that the Government possessing the lawful power in the name of our nation and our country is at Ankara, the hesitancy which these Powers show in proclaiming their point of view on this question is due to their belief that it would be better for them if there were a mediatory body in Istanbul.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey have repeatedly declared that they are earnestly and sincerely desirous of peace; they have formulated their conditions, which consist in demanding the re-

cognition of their national rights, and have declared themselves ready, if these rights are recognised, to enter into negotiations which would be proposed to them. If the Entente Powers have resolved to settle the Eastern question on principles of right and justice at the Conference which they are going to hold in London, they must address their invitation to it to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. We declare once more that an invitation proffered under the above-mentioned conditions will be favourably accepted by the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

After this telegram I sent officially and personally the following one:

Ankara, 28th January, 1921.

To His Highness Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul.

We are convinced that a special opportunity of historical importance is offered as a prominent statesman to Your Highness, who throughout your life has always rendered invaluable services to this country and this nation, to complete and crown all the services you have hitherto rendered.

For our part, we are desirous to proceed in perfect unity. We are convinced that you will have a proper judgment about the inconveniences which would arise if the country were to be represented by two delegations at the Conference, to which we have been indirectly invited.

The efforts which the nation has made for the sole purpose of obtaining its sovereign rights, the blood that has been willingly shed, the resistance and firmness it has shown in all the difficulties of an internal and external description are responsible for the new situation which we have to face to-day. On the other hand, the events in the world are taking such a shape that our independence, which is the aim we have put before us in the steadfastness of our resistance, will be secured. While we are preparing ourselves to defend our national rights before the Governments who want to condemn us to slavery and annihilation, it is imperatively necessary that all the material and moral forces of the country should act in perfect concord. It is therefore necessary that His Majesty should officially declare that he recognises the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as the only body in this country able to express the national will.

In this way the abnormal situation prevailing in İstanbul, the fatal experiences of which have proved that it has continually done harm to the

country and has existed for such a long time to the great advantage of foreigners, would come to an end.

It becomes evident from the communication from the representatives of the Entente Powers that the participation of delegates from Istanbul is only possible if there are such among them who are appointed by the Government at Ankara and who have been furnished by them with full powers.

Thereby the Entente Powers have recognised in a sufficiently clear way that the delegates who will negotiate for Peace in the name of Turkey can be appointed solely by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In virtue of our full powers and in the name of the duty which we have undertaken before history and on behalf of the nation, we propose to you to alter and clear up the position by joining us and accepting the principles advanced by us and proclaimed by the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which is the only actually and justly lawful government in the country. By doing this you will facilitate the recognition of these principles by our enemies and thus hasten the happy end of all our struggles. If the sincere proposals which we are making with the object of our working together and of defending our national aims with our united strength should not be accepted and adopted, fear must be felt that the position of His Majesty, the occupant of the Throne of the Sultans, and the dignity of the Caliphate may run the risk of being shaken, and we declare now, in our capacity as the Government who have been endowed with all real and lawful power which the nation has confided in them, that the responsibility for such a catastrophe with all its incalculable consequences will fall directly on His Majesty.

Taking all this in consideration, we are firmly convinced that Your Highness will perform the duty of historical importance which your conscience imposes upon you and that you will definitely and clearly inform us of the result.

On this occasion I beg you to accept the expression of my respectful sentiments.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Gentlemen:

Now everything depended on getting rid of a Government in Istanbul which no longer had any moral or material power but whose existence was very harmful. At the head of those who stood in the way of doing this was the Sultan and Caliph, so that the first thing to be done was to ensure

the recognition of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and their Government by him. As a matter of fact, it was impossible at the moment to do otherwise with the Sovereign who was not in our power and with whom we were not in direct connection. Therefore, I sent the following, which was the third, telegram to Tevfik Paşa on the same day:

Ankara, 28th January, 1921.

To His Excellency Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul.

We send you herewith a short summary of the proposals and considerations contained in our official and private telegram, begging that you will do what is necessary in this matter and inform us that you have attended to it:

1. His Majesty will proclaim in a short Imperial decree that he recognises the Grand National Assembly. This decree will set forth that His Majesty has recognised the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which has acknowledged the principle of the integrity of the Caliphate and the monarchy, in its present form and character and with its present rights. To add the details and the developments which the case would require might cause confusion at this juncture.
2. In case the conditions mentioned in first article are fulfilled, the regulation of our internal situation — a question, so to say, of an intimate character — might be settled in this way: His Majesty will remain in İstanbul, as heretofore. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, possessing authority and responsibility which is protected against any kind of attack and which combines all the qualifications necessary for their independence, will, together with the Government, remain at Ankara. Naturally any body functioning under the title of Government in İstanbul will cease to exist. Taking into consideration the peculiar position of İstanbul, there will be a delegation of the Grand National Assembly with His Majesty which will be provided with full powers and entrusted with certain duties.
3. Later on care will be taken to provide means for the organisation of the administration of the town and district of İstanbul and establish it.
4. As soon as the above conditions shall have been accepted and carried out, the Government will guarantee and arrange for the payments connected with the Civil list and the emoluments due to His Majesty, the Imperial dynasty and all the officials and other persons who have claims to pensions and salaries.

The Budget passed by the Grand National Assembly already provides for this expenditure. Our exchequer enables us to cover these expenses.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Tevfik Paşa's reply to my long telegram was a very short one.

It ran:

Telegram.

28th January, 1921.

"I have received your telegrams. I shall summon the Council to meet to-morrow and at six o'clock. I shall inform you of the decisions they have arrived at."

Tevfik Paşa called the Council together, after which he sent me his reply. I am reading it to you verbatim.

Istanbul, 29th January, 1921.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

Reply to your three telegrams of the 28th January, 1921.

The present Government who have for a long time recognized the necessity of an union between Istanbul and Anadolu have assumed power with the view to secure such unity and have hitherto made efforts to this effect.

We are convinced that the endeavours which you have made in this direction, namely, to safeguard the sovereign rights of the nation, as well as the sacrifices you have made in human blood, have contributed in a large measure to bring about the satisfactory state of affairs which now prevails. Consequently, we are prepared to accept proposals which are for the benefit of the nation.

In respect to this, I inform you in what follows of our point of view concerning the matter you have brought to our knowledge.

The fact that you have been indirectly invited to attend the Conference is evident, for the representatives of the Entente Powers are here. For this reason it appears to be quite natural that communication should be established with the Government which is in Istanbul and which is endeavouring to work in harmony with you.

The fact that the European Powers, who have hitherto not felt themselves called upon to recognise Anadolu, especially request the presence of delegates from Anadolu at the Conference is a matter that can give you satisfaction.

Consequently, it would not be necessary regarding the task which you

have taken upon yourself on behalf of the nation to raise the question of form without taking advantage of this favourable change. On the other hand, our delegates will not constitute two delegations when we have shown that we are united, but only one.

We need not fear any inconvenience about this, because the language we shall use will be in conformity with the principles that have been adopted. Our duties towards the State and the nation, therefore, imperatively demand that we should derive the greatest advantage from the fact that a hand is held out to us at this historic moment. Will you be good enough to recognise that your absence would completely tie our hands with regard to the Greek claims and that our country would remain — who can say for how long? — a theatre of the horrors and sufferings of war?

The fact alone that we formulate our claims before the Conference, that we publish the name of our plenipotentiary throughout Europe, would not be injurious to us, even if the Conference should not lead to satisfactory results. The patriotism of Your Excellency and of your colleagues is a guarantee that this opportunity will not be missed.

As it is natural that the resolutions adopted by former Cabinets will be annulled, resolutions which have had bad results for both parties, there is no longer any ground for dissension between us. If the executive power should be suppressed here, the fact that Istanbul is dominated by the occupation could result in the Entente Powers taking the administration of all governmental affairs entirely into their own hands and carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty concerning Istanbul. On the other hand, the fact that Greek troops are at the present moment in Istanbul and the surrounding territory makes these proposals impracticable. I do not even consider it necessary to confirm that the desire of maintaining power is not important in these circumstances for our Council of Ministers.

The question that must be settled as quickly as possible is the sending of our delegates to the Conference, the date of which is approaching. The Greeks will also take part in this Conference even if we are not represented there ourselves. If that should happen, we would lay ourselves open to a kind of judgment by default being pronounced against us, which would mean placing our cause in jeopardy. Therefore, I maintain that we could not accept the responsibility for this, and, as it is essential to our interests to arrive at this Conference before the appointed date, I beg you to send your delegates here as quickly as possible.

Tevfik
Grand Vezir.

Tevfik Paşa and his Government say that they have been working for unity between İstanbul and Anadolu. That is perfectly true. We have also been working for this, but with the one difference that Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues — as has been happening hitherto — intended to annex Anadolu to İstanbul and make it subservient to an İstanbul occupied by the enemy's troops. Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues were endeavouring to unite Anadolu to the İstanbul Government — a government that had the peculiar characteristic that, if no objection to its existence was raised by the world, it owed this fact to its capability of facilitating the realisation of the enemy's designs.

According to Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues, Anadolu's struggle had had a great share in creating the present favourable state of affairs; but it is by no means due to this struggle alone on the part of Anadolu that the present situation has been created. Perhaps this old diplomatist attributed the whole merit in this affair to the fact that he had come into power.

I sent this reply to Tevfik Paşa:

Ankara, 30th January, 1921.

To His Highness Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul.

I am certain that in the three telegrams which I sent on the 27th and 28th January, 1921, I had explained to Your Highness clearly and explicitly all the conditions the carrying out of which was absolutely indispensable. From your telegram of the 29th January, 1921, however, I observe that you have not yet arrived at the state of contemplating the situation with the necessary distinctness and practical knowledge. The importance of the situation and the difficulty of the moment impose upon us the duty of explaining the question once more and of enlightening Your Highness, your honourable colleagues and above all, His Majesty on every detail.

To help you to deduce from your considerations and judgment some appropriate results with greater ease, I will point out to you verbatim the fundamental provisions of the Constitution Act.

THE CONSTITUTION

General Principles

1. Sovereignty is vested in the nation without reservation and condition. The system of administration is based on the principle that the people guide their own destiny.

2. The executive and legislative powers are vested in the Grand National Assembly, the one and only representative body of the nation.
3. The Turkish State is governed by the Grand National Assembly, and this government bears the name of "Grand National Assembly of Turkey."
4. The Grand National Assembly consists of members elected by the population of Vilayets.
5. Elections to the Grand National Assembly are held every two years. The term of office of elected members expire in two years, but they are eligible for re-election. The power of the National Assembly continues until a new National Assembly is elected. If new elections cannot be held due to prevailing reasons, they may be postponed for one year. Members of the Grand National Assembly represent neither their constituencies nor their constituents, but the nation as a whole.
6. The Grand National Assembly convenes the first day of November each year without summons.
7. The power to execute decisions regarding religion and to enact, amend and repeal laws, and to ratify treaties and state of defence is vested in the Grand National Assembly. In making the laws and regulations the principle is to comply with the provisions concerning the religious and legal rights of the people as well as customary usage. The duties and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers are determined by special laws.
8. The Grand National Assembly administers the different departments of the Government by Ministers elected according to a special law. The necessary lines of direction, which may be altered if it should become necessary, for the affairs of the executive power are indicated to the Ministers by the Assembly.
9. The Grand National Assembly elects a President for the duration of the legislative term. In this capacity, the President is competent to sign on behalf of the Assembly and to sanction the resolutions of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers elects a Head from among themselves; the President of the Grand National Assembly is, however, at the same time by right President of the Council of Ministers.
10. The provisions of Kanunu Esasi which are not in contradiction to the above clauses still remain in force.

I call Your Highness's attention specially to the fact that it is impossible for us to act in a manner that is contrary to the fundamental pprovisions I have just quoted, for we have no authority to do so. The Council of

Ministers has been authorized to consider the question referred to in correspondence with the President of the Assembly.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

*
* *

Gentlemen:

The Constitution Act, the fundamental clauses of which are quoted in the telegram I have just read to you, had been passed by the Assembly barely ten days before this date, that is to say, on the 20th January, 1921.

This is the first act that describes and defines the position, rights, and character of the Assembly and the National Government. The Assembly commenced its sittings on the 23rd April, 1920, and about nine months elapsed before the Assembly was able to pass this fundamental act. Let me tell you briefly why this was necessary.

You are aware that after the opening of the Assembly I introduced a motion explaining the fundamental principles which had unconditionally to be observed. The Assembly and its Council of Ministers had from the very first day begun to adopt these principles in practice. On the other hand, the committee that drafted the Constitution Bill had been appointed to draft it on the basis of these principles.

At last, after four months had elapsed, this committee submitted eight clauses of the Bill under the title of "Legal provisions concerning the constitution and character of the Grand National Assembly." These clauses, the discussion of which had begun on the 18th August on an urgent motion, were attached to a long covering memorandum.

One paragraph of the draft submitted by the committee contained the following with regard to the definition of the Grand National Assembly:

Considering that it would mean giving a final character to the exceptional and critical situation if we were to accept the permanency of our Assembly which has been formed under the stress of necessity due to an accumulation of facts, such as the imprisonment of the Caliph and Sultan, and on the principle that abnormal situations cannot last for ever, it has been regarded as appropriate that the Assembly should continue until respect for the rights of the Caliphate and the Monarchy has been restored and the independence of the nation and country have been assured. The Assembly will assume

a normal form only when these sacred aims, which are paramount, are realised. For this reason, the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 2 has been limited to the expression: "Until this aim has been realised." In reality the sitting of the Assembly had neither been fixed nor limited to a definite period.

Therefore, and in consideration of these remarks, it becomes evident that the idea still prevailed in August, 1920, that the position and permanent character of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey were not normal.

The first clause of the Bill was drafted to this effect:

"The legislative and executive power is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is actually and in an independent form above the administration and the State Government." As the law stands, it is evident that the full power vested in the Assembly by this was only of a provisional nature. The authority of the Assembly as a provisional institution could similarly only be of a temporary character.

The conceptions and opinions of the committee on the Constitution Act were expressed to the same effect in the Assembly. There were even some deputies who, in order to define the intention in a clearer way, put forward proposals which were contrary to the *exposé* of the committee. They said: "At the beginning of the first article there must be specially added the words: 'Until the liberation of the Caliphate and the Sultanate and the attainment of the independence of the country and the nation.'"

It was demanded that instead of the words appearing in the second article "until the realisation of the aim," the same long formula be employed. This question produced long discussions. Some deputies were of opinion that only the word "Caliphate" should be used, because it included the "Sultanate".

Some of the Hocas did not agree and maintained that the Caliphate was a purely spiritual matter. This gave rise to the objection that the Caliphate had no sacerdotal character, to which the Hoca Efendis replied by saying: "The Monarchy comprises only the land over which it rules; but the Caliphate embraces Islam, which exists all over the world."

These discussions lasted for many days. One of the arguments was: "The Caliph and Padişah exists and will continue to exist. As long as he exists, the present régime is only provisional. When the Caliphate and Monarchy have the opportunity of again exercising their functions, the Constitution and the political organisation will take their regular form."

There will be nothing new in this line. Until the Caliphate and the Monarchy are able to exercise their functions once more, a number of men assembled at Ankara will work with the help of temporary measures."

The ideas in opposition to this were not very clear. It was not declared openly that the sovereignty had been transferred to the nation; there is no longer any monarchy. Caliphate has the same meaning as Sultanate and consequently has no longer any right to exist.

Thirty-seven days later, on the 25th September, I considered it necessary to make certain explanations to the Assembly at a secret sitting. After I had satisfied the prevailing conceptions, I developed the following ideas:

"It is not necessary that the Turkish Nation and the High Assembly occupy themselves so minutely with the Caliphate and the Monarchy, with the Caliph and the Sultan, while we are struggling to secure the existence and independence of our country. Our higher interests demand that we do not discuss this at all at the present moment. If the question should arise as to whether we ought to remain loyal and true to the present Caliph and Sultan — well, this man is a traitor, he is a tool of the enemy employed against our country and our nation. If the nation considers him in the light of Caliph and Sultan, it will be obliged to obey his orders and thereby realise the enemy's plans and designs. Moreover, a personage who would be a traitor and could be prevented from exercising his authority and making use of the power bestowed upon him by his position could not hold the exalted title of Caliph or Sultan. If you want to say: 'Let us depose him and choose someone else in his place,' this would lead to no way out of the difficulty, because the present state of affairs and the conditions prevailing at this hour would not allow of it being done. For the person who must be dethroned is not in the midst of his nation but in the hands of the enemy, and if we intended to ignore his existence and recognise someone in his stead, the present Caliph and Sultan would not surrender his rights, but would retain the seat he occupies to-day with his Ministry in Istanbul and would continue to carry on his office. Will the nation and the High Assembly in such an event abandon their high aims and throw themselves into a fight for a Caliph? Shall we then once more witness the times of Ali and Muaviye?* In short, this question is of far-reaching importance and difficulty. Its solution is not one which we are struggling to discover to-day.

"If we would undertake the task of finally settling this problem, we

* The fights of the immediate successors of Mohamed.

would not succeed in this at the present moment; but the hour for that will come later.

"The legal foundations that we want to lay to-day will establish and guarantee the necessary authority for the purpose of strengthening the National Assembly and the National Government which will save our existence and secure our independence."

A week before I had made these statements I had laid a draft before the Assembly which was dated the 13th September, 1921. This draft, which contained the decisions regarding the organisation of the administration and all the political, social, civil and military points of view in a condensed form, was read at the sitting of the Assembly on the 18th September. And thus the first Constitution Act, which was passed four months later, was based on this draft.

*
* * *

I will ask you now to let me continue to give you an account of our correspondence with Istanbul.

In a telegram dated 29th January, Tevfik Paşa repeated the contents of his telegram of the 27th.

The President of the Council of Ministers sent him this reply:

Ankara, 30th January, 1921.

To His Highness Tevfik Paşa, Istanbul.

The change which has recently taken place in the policy of the Entente in favour of Turkey is the result of the devoted determination and courage of sacrifice that has been shown by the nation. The advantages arising from this situation, which has been brought about by a formal rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, advantages which are most in accord with the national interests, can only be attained if the delegates who are to take part in the London Conference are authorised directly by the Grand National Assembly, which represents the national will.

The delegates of your body, which is the immediate successor of the one that signed the fatal Treaty of Sèvres, will not be in a position to obtain favourable conditions for the State and the nation. Consequently, in the higher interests of our country it is essential that you should keep away from these Peace negotiations and leave the question entirely to the delegates of the Grand National Assembly to represent the national unity.

You are asked, therefore, to accept and carry through the following resolutions as soon as possible on the lines of our last communications:

1. The Turkish delegation that will take part in the London Conference will be appointed and dispatched solely by the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

2. You will be requested to prepare and send certain documents and special advisers, whom we believe to be expedient to add to the delegation.

3. You will inform the Entente Powers that the delegation sent by us is the only one representing the interests of the whole of Turkey.

4. In the event of your body not accepting these resolutions which, as time is pressing, are final and definite, it will have to bear all the responsibility in the eyes of history and of the entire nation.

Fevzi
President of the Council of Ministers.

We thought it advisable that İzzet Paşa, Tevfik Paşa's assistant, who was at Ankara, should also send a telegram.

İzzet Paşa's telegram was as follows:

Telegram in cipher.

Ankara, 30th January, 1921.

To His Highness Tevfik Paşa, İstanbul.

We have been made aware of the open correspondence which has been carried on between the President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Your Highness regarding the Conference which is to take place in London at the end of February. Although we scarcely consider ourselves justified to express an opinion after the failure of our mission, our patriotic feelings impel us to give you a picture of the present situation and the views that are current here. It is considered natural that the occupation of İstanbul renders it impossible for the Government there to safeguard the vital interests of the nation.

Dreading that it will pave the way for discord later on between Anadolu and İstanbul, the idea of two separate delegations taking part in the Conference is not favourably considered here. His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa himself has no authority to depart from the opinions he has expressed in his telegrams. With God's help, the upheavals in Anadolu and the activities of the rebel bands have been suppressed. A strong army and a strong government have been organised here. Sentiments of loyalty towards your

person move me to urge you to act in a way that will not result in failure of the negotiations which may induce Europe to alter the Treaty of Sèvres in our favour.

A discussion on certain details and formal questions is feasible, provided that the fundamental condition remains intact, namely, that His Majesty recognises the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. I beg you to keep me well informed so that we shall not fail to make the best of this opportunity.

Ahmet İzzet

If I am not abusing your patience I would like to read you the reply Tevfik Paşa sent to this telegram:

Telegram in cipher.

Istanbul, 31st January, 1921.

To His Excellency İzzet Paşa, Ankara.

Reply to your telegram of the 30th January, 1921.

The question must arise as to what point we can bring into agreement with the clear wording of the law the fact that essential alterations are made and confirmed in the Constitution — to maintain which we have all pledged ourselves — and which are contrary to its provisions. This question is of a domestic nature and can only be settled in the necessary way if efforts are made to secure the acceptance of the alterations demanded from us and explained in the telegram which His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa sent to us through . . . by the Entente Powers, and when this desired aim has been reached. As we explained in our telegram yesterday, if we should act in a manner contrary to this, it would result in our presence at the Conference being refused; the Ottoman sovereignty over Istanbul would be immediately abolished and no further resistance could be offered to the Greek claims, which might even be regarded as just. It is evident from the telegrams that one aspect of the question has not been clearly understood. What suggests the idea that two delegations will be sent to the Conference — "ours" and "yours"? As the object and means of defence are identical if complete unity prevails, a delegation consisting of deputies appointed by Ankara, which would leave at the same time with those sent by the Government that is recognised by the Entente Powers, would be a united delegation comprising a single body, endowed with the necessary full powers. They will be able to defend the national cause unanimously and without fear.

The fact that we are requested to induce the Entente Powers to recognise the delegates shows that Ankara, also, have a just appreciation of this necessity. The Note sent to us as well as your explanations clearly prove that the Entente Powers will not agree to the delegates from Anadolu going alone to the Conference. They will be admitted if they come with the delegates sent by the Government. If you insist on this dual representation, it is more than likely that no delegation at all, representing either one party or the other, will be admitted. If in this connection it is probable that delegates from here will be admitted as the only ones, the same does not apply to delegates from Anadolu.

Therefore, this alteration, which is the result of heavy sacrifices, will not be to our advantage, because, as the friends of the Greeks are in the majority in Entente circles, they will be able to draw those who are favourably inclined towards us over to their side by spreading the rumour that the Turks are in favour of the continuation of war in the Orient and that they do not desire unity and peace. Thereby we should have taken an opportunity to put ourselves in the wrong and our enemies in the right.

If we were to send a united delegation — even should our demands not be accepted — we would be in the position of not having turned general opinion against us, and we might even succeed in gaining over an important number of those who are antagonistic to us to advocate our cause. Time is pressing; we have no time to lose in carrying on further correspondence. The interests of the country and nation require that the delegates shall be sent immediately. It is also necessary that Your Excellency and your honourable colleagues should return, because we are convinced that the time has arrived when we ought to make use of your personal experience and your familiarity with the opinions prevailing where you are; we are in agreement as to the necessity of winning opinions for them.

Tevfik
Grand Vezir.

I shall now read Tevfik Paşa's telegram in reply to His Excellency Fevzi Paşa:

Telegram in cipher.

Istanbul, 1st February, 1921.

To His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Ankara.

Reply to your telegram of 30th January, 1921.

Although a changed attitude in regard to Greece since the return of King Constantine to Athens is noticeable in the circles of the Entente and

in public opinion, which has caused Europe to alter their opinion in our favour, there are some politicians who defend the Greeks and obstinately maintain that Turkey, by the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, must be either annihilated in her present form or severely altered. According to reliable information which we have received, the fact that these politicians have adopted and represent the idea of inviting representatives of Anadolu also to the Conference is to be attributed to their conviction that Anadolu will not accept this invitation, their intention being to make this refusal a pretext to justify coercive measures against us and to win public opinion in favour of their policy. For these reasons it is imperatively necessary that we should go to the Conference immediately and unitedly work in harmony for the recognition of our rights. If we discover that our just and legitimate claims are to be rejected and if it should prove necessary for us to leave the Conference, this will not be used as an effective weapon against us in the hands of our enemies. It is impossible for us to accept the demands expressed in your telegram, chiefly for the above-mentioned reasons and also on account of the special conditions prevailing in Istanbul. By obstinately insisting on this question, you shall prevent the opportunity of taking part in the Conference in good time, whereby the following serious consequences might ensue:

1. Istanbul and the Straits would be finally lost to Ottoman sovereignty if unity could not have been established.
2. The Entente Powers would be able to support Greece financially and militarily, and they would commence a united offensive in Anadolu which would expose the Turkish element, which has already been terribly decimated by all the previous wars, to further annihilation.
3. Turkey would be forced at the price of great sacrifices to ask for foreign aid and would thereby surrender her independence, which is our ultimate aim. It is absolutely necessary that the delegates should leave for Istanbul.

Tevfik
Grand Vezir.

The Ottoman Grand Vezir gives us further advice and sends us more communications. Let me read them also to you:

Telegram in cipher.

Istanbul, 5th February, 1921.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

The Greeks, who were annoyed that the Ottoman Empire had also been invited to attend the Conference to be held in London, increased their

propaganda against us. According to the information we have received from our delegates in Paris, they are spreading the rumour in French circles that there is a German military mission in Anadolu and that your actions and policy are inspired by this mission. They are doing this for the purpose of turning French opinion against us. On the other hand, the same delegate writes to tell us that he has learned that on account of the rumour that the massacres of Christians in Turkey are still going on, the Pope has appealed to the Parliament of every country to demand the protection of the Christians. I urge and advise you immediately to contradict these rumours, which may possibly produce a very bad impression.

Tevfik
Grand Vezir.

Telegram in cipher.

Istanbul, 8th February, 1921.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has learned from a reliable source that the Greeks will begin an offensive on the 21st February with a force of about seventy or eighty thousand men, with the object of influencing the Conference. It is expected that the offensive will be in the direction of Karahisar and Eskisehir. Our representative declares that the delegates from Ankara will not be allowed to attend the Conference if they come alone.

Tevfik
Grand Vezir.

Was this telegram sent with the intention of letting us know that the Greeks would begin an offensive or was the intention to let us know that the delegates from Ankara would not be allowed to attend the Conference if they came alone? It is very difficult to say. Or, did they want to emphasise the second part of the telegram by putting forward the threat of an offensive by hostile troops to the number of seventy or eighty thousand men?

Was it that Tevfik Paşa had informed the representatives of the Entente of our opinion with regard to sending delegates, as we had told him, and did he mean in the second part of his telegram to imply the answer that he had received? This question also was not quite clear.

Istanbul, 8th February, 1921.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

As a result of the advice given him by some French politicians, whose kindly feeling towards us is beyond doubt, our delegate in Paris recommends

us not to carry out an attack in Cilicia, so as not to provoke public opinion in France.

The Grand Vezir.

We had received a great deal of advice of this description from the different Governments in Istanbul. Had the man who had spoken to this "well-meaning" person who had advised us to abstain from making this attack and who, like a phonograph, had repeated all he had heard, perhaps by chance, asked this "well-meaning" person whether he had also advised the competent authorities to abstain from attacking us? If the answer were in the negative, how could he have put faith in the "well-meaning" intentions exhibited by this person. There were men who seemed to tender advice not to provoke public opinion in the country belonging to those who occupied another country; but why had the Ottoman statesman the strange peculiarity of never asking such persons why they had injured the nation whose country they occupied and why they continued to occupy it?

In short, Gentlemen, you will see that it was impossible to come to an understanding with Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues, either on principles or on ideas and conceptions in particular. Eventually the question was brought before the Assembly.

I put forward two proposals to the Assembly. The first was that we should inform Istanbul definitely as to the conditions and intentions of the country and the nation, and the second was that we should send an independent delegation to London in case we should be specifically invited to do so. Both proposals were agreed to.

The telegram in which the standpoint and the resolution of the Assembly were communicated to Tevfik Paşa read as follows:

"The correspondence between His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of the Grand National Assembly, His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, President of the Council of Ministers, and His Highness Tevfik Paşa in Istanbul on the subject of the invitation to attend the London Conference has been read at a full sitting of the Assembly, where it has been taken into consideration. The considerations advanced by His Excellency Tevfik Paşa have shown us, to our great regret, that he is far from having a clear perception of the present situation in Turkey. Since the Armistice, two kinds of government have followed one another in Istanbul. At first there were those under the presidency of Damat Ferit, which included different personalities who expressed the idea of absolute subjection at any price to the Entente Powers and who, in co-operation with the enemy, had adopted the

principle of condemning the sacrifices which the nation had declared itself willing to undergo for the purpose of maintaining its sovereign rights. The partisans of this thought have enlisted the services of all the ungrateful sons of our country who were capable of any kind of baseness and treachery and have armed them and continually made use of them against the patriots who had dedicated themselves heart and soul to the defence of the nation. For many a month Anadolu has had to fight against false Fetvas which were spread abroad in the name of the sacred religious law, against the poisonous forces of intrigue and corruption of a material and moral description which had been employed against the idea of the independence and defence of our country by people like Anzavur, who have been overwhelmed with honours. How often they have attacked our fronts and our people on behalf of our enemies in the back, this nation that has fought since the first century of Islam for honour and for the true religion, that has never hesitated from the first days of our history to shed its blood in streams whenever the State and the country were in danger. While they, taking refuge in the last bulwark in the last corner of their wide fatherland that was left to them, were making their last stand, men acting in the name of the Government were working for the enemy and in the enemy's ranks against their own nation. The Government of the present Caliph and Sultan, the successor of a dynasty that had inherited the throne of the last Byzantine emperor who, in the latter days of Byzantium when the Fatih* who demanded from him the surrender of the town, had replied: 'I can only surrender this country which has been entrusted to me by God to God alone,' — this same Government, I say, is now at work trying to bind the hands of this people that does not want to become a slave and to hand them over to our enemies. This first phase came to an end through the defeat of the Government and its allies. The second kind of Government is the Council whose President is Tevfik Paşa, who, regarding his intentions, declares himself to be on the side of the struggle for the defence of Anadolu, but who in his unaccountable blindness and obstinacy is standing in the way of the conclusion of a peace which the country is striving to obtain. The statesmen and dignitaries who are members of the Council and have accepted the decree of slavery presented to them by the Entente Powers with expressions of esteem, and who have signed this decree, are to-day nothing but a discarded authority no longer wielding any power in the country. Anadolu and İstanbul have become two separate parties representing the contradiction and antagonism between independence and slavery, between freedom and subjection.

* Fatih: Conqueror. Surname of Sultan Mohamed II. who occupied İstanbul in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine Empire.

"We want to incorporate that part of the country which has lost its free right of determination and has been subjugated with the free and independent part. The statesmen in Istanbul want to incorporate the free part, which constitutes the majority and which is resolved resolutely and gloriously to defend itself against a world of enemies, with the subjugated and enslaved part. We shall never be able to consent that the Grand National Assembly, which represents the whole of Anadolu — all children of the country who love their freedom and independence, as well as the oppressed soul of Islam, to-day — should be subordinated to a weak body in Istanbul which is deprived of its freedom."

"In virtue of the Constitution Act passed by our Assembly and observed throughout the country, the sovereignty belongs to the nation unreservedly and unconditionally, and the legislative and executive power is comprised in the Grand National Assembly, which is its sole and actual representative. In consideration of these principles it is not possible for our delegation to go to Istanbul to be absorbed in a delegation formed there and undertake before the whole world to defend our cause with powers bestowed upon it by Istanbul. If you wish to do this, you will recognise, as the only delegation that can represent the country, the delegation of our Assembly which lawfully and actually possesses complete independence, which governs the country through its administrative organisation and whose armies, by beating back the enemy in the East and in the West, is paving the way for peace. Moreover, we have decided to send our own delegation. We should be glad if the reply to our determination consisted in future of deeds and not merely words."

An independent and separate delegation was formed under the presidency of Bekir Sami Bey, the Foreign Minister. It was intended that this delegation should not take part in the London Conference unless it was specially invited to do so, but in order to save time they left for Rome via Antalya.

After having been informed by Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, that they had been explicitly invited to attend the Conference, they went on to London.

The London Conference lasted from the 23rd February to the 12th March, 1921. It did not produce any positive result. The Entente Powers wanted us to promise that we would accept the result of an inquiry which they proposed to make regarding the population at Izmir and in Trakya. At first our delegation had agreed to this, but after receiving a hint that came

from Ankara they proposed that this inquiry should be made dependent on the abolition of the Greek administration. We had become clear about the fact that the Entente Powers intended to guarantee the sincere execution of the other stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres without any opposition from our side. The proposals made to this effect had been replied to by our delegation in a way that was tantamount to a refusal. As for the Greek delegation, they had declined to accept an inquiry on principle. Thereupon the delegates of the Entente Powers had presented to both delegations — the Turkish and the Greek — a draft which contained certain suggestions and had asked them to give the Conference the replies that they would receive from their Governments to these proposals.

The draft handed to our delegation concerning the alterations in the Treaty of Sèvres contained these points:

Increase of the actual strength of the special troops and gendarmerie which had been allowed to us to a very slight extent; a slight decrease in the number of foreign officers who were to remain in the country; a slight reduction of the zone of the Straits; a slight alleviation of the restrictions which had been imposed on our Budget and of our right to impose a tax on concessions in the sphere of public works . . . ; and, finally, some indistinct promises which could raise some hope of alterations being made in the Treaty of Sèvres regarding the Capitulations, judicial affairs, foreign postal matters, Kurdistan, etc.

The delimitation of the frontiers of Armenia according to this draft were to be entrusted to a Commission appointed by the League of Nations. A special administration was to be established in the district of Izmir. The province of Izmir was nominally to be restored to us, but Greek troops were to remain in the town of Izmir: order in the Sancak was to be secured by Entente officers, and the gendarmerie force in this Sancak was to be composed of different elements in proportion to the composition of the population. A Christian governor was to be appointed over the province of Izmir, which was to pay an annual tribute to Turkey and which would be liable to be increased in proportion to the augmentation of the revenues.

This proposed *modus vivendi* for the province of Izmir was put forward in such a way that it could be altered by the League of Nations after the lapse of five years on application from either side.

Without waiting for the reply which the Entente Powers would receive concerning the proposal they had made through the delegation and while

our delegation was still en route, the Greeks opened their offensive with all their troops and on all the fronts.

You see, Gentlemen, that the Greek offensive compels us to leave our description of the London Conference. Let me now tell you about this offensive and what was the result of it.

A strong part of the Greek army was at Bursa and to the east of this town; another part was at Uşak and to the east of Uşak. Our troops were in two groups, to the north-west of Eskişehir and at Dumlupınar and to the east of it. In addition the Greeks had a division at Izmit, against which we had troops at Kocaeli at our disposal. We had other forces to oppose the Greeks along the river Menderes. On the 23rd March portions of the Greek army at Bursa and Uşak began to advance. As I have already mentioned, our troops on the western front under the command of İsmet Paşa were concentrated north-west of Eskişehir. We decided to accept battle in the position at İnönü, and the necessary dispositions and preparations were made. On the evening of the 26th March the enemy approached the advanced positions which İsmet Paşa had ordered to be taken up on the right flank. The next day we were in touch with the enemy along the whole line of the front. On the 28th the enemy began to attack our right. On the 29th they attacked both flanks. The enemy gained important local successes. The 30th March was a day of violent fighting. These battles ended in favour of the enemy.

Now it was our turn. On the 31st March İsmet Pasa began a counter-attack, defeated the enemy on the same night and forced them to retire. This victory was the second at İnönü recorded in the history of the revolution.

The correspondence exchanged with the commander of the western front when the enemy was retreating on the 1st April contains documents describing the impressions of the day. To re-awaken these feelings I will read you some of the telegrams that passed on that day:

From Metristepe, 1st April, 1921.

Position observed at 6.30 p. m. from Metristepe.

An enemy division, in all probability a rear-guard, which since the morning has been in a position north of Gündüzbeý is retreating in disorder as the result of an attack from our right. It is being closely followed up. In the direction of Hamidiye we are not in touch with the enemy and there is no fighting going on. Bozüyük is in flames. The enemy has left the field

to our troops; it is covered with the bodies of thousands of Greeks who have been killed.

Ismet
Commanding on the western front.

Ankara, 1st April, 1921.

To Ismet Paşa, Commanding on the western front. Chief of the General Staff, Metristepe, battle-field of İnönü.

There have rarely been commanders in history who have taken upon themselves so difficult a task as you have in the battles at İnönü. The independence and the existence of our people were hanging on the patriotism and courage of their leaders and comrades in the army, who gloriously fulfilled their duty under your exceptional command. You have not only defeated the enemy but at the same time have reversed the unhappy fate of the nation. The whole of our country, including the unfortunate districts occupied by the enemy, is celebrating your triumph to-day. The storm-wave of the enemy's attack has been shattered against the hard rock formed by your patriotism and energy.

In congratulating you on your great triumph and this victory, which will record your name honourably in the annals of history and which fills the whole nation with eternal gratitude to you, I want to tell you here that the high pinnacle on which you stand overlooks a glorious battlefield strewn with the bodies of thousands of the enemy; and from its summit the eye can also discern the horizon of a future for our people and yourself that is resplendent with glory.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa. President of the Grand National Assembly.

Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of the Grand National Assembly, who through the fire of his soul has concentrated and put into effect all the moral and material forces and capabilities of our nation, which stood alone and powerless against the cruel storm of the tyranny of the whole world:

In the name of our heroic men and officers and of all officers commanding Divisions and Corps who have been fighting shoulder to shoulder with

our men in the firing line, I offer to you my devoted thanks, with the sentiment of the greatest pride for your praise and congratulations.

Ismet
Commanding on the western front.

I shall not enter into details about the heroic deeds performed by our infantry and cavalry in the pursuit of the defeated enemy, who abandoned the battlefield of İnönü for the second time and retired to their old positions in the direction of Bursa. I will only ask you to allow me to complete my account of the military operations by giving you a short report of what took place in the zone of our southern front.

Three infantry divisions under the command of Refet Paşa, who commanded the southern front, were in a prepared position at Dumlupınar. Besides these, there was a division and a brigade of cavalry. They were on the left of our position. The object of the commander of the southern front was to hold the enemy in his position. Three divisions of infantry and some of the cavalry, which came from the positions east of Uşak, came into action and attacked the positions at Dumlupınar. On the 26th March our troops were obliged to abandon these positions. The commander of the southern front divided his forces into two parts because he was not able to bring his troops to a halt on a firm line and make new dispositions. One part consisted of the 8th and 23rd Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Cavalry Division, and these retired under his orders in the direction of Altıntaş. The other part, under the command of Fahrettin Paşa who was in command of an Army Corps, consisted of the 57th Infantry Division and the 4th Regiment of Cavalry. The enemy turned against Fahrettin Paşa with all his troops and advanced eastwards, leaving only one regiment to face Refet Paşa's force. Later on Refet Paşa ordered the 23rd Division to join Fahrettin Paşa and marched southwards via Altımbaş. When it was discovered that the enemy made no move in the direction of Altıntaş, Refet Paşa was called to the north with all the troops he had with him.

The advance of the enemy towards the east compelled Fahrettin Paşa to retire to the east of Afyon, fighting in different positions. The enemy, after having occupied Afyonkarahisar, advanced to the line Çay - Bolvadin, where they halted. Against these enemy troops Fahrettin Paşa extended a line consisting of the 25th and 23rd Divisions, as well as the 41st Division, which had arrived from the district of Adana in the south.

Although I think that I ought to abstain from too many observations

of a strategical nature, I would like to point out to you an error in the general offensive plan of the Greek army which commands attention.

The Uşak force belonging to the Greek army ought to have advanced from Dumlupınar in the main direction of Eskişehir. The enemy, by sending his troops via Afyon in the direction of Konya, removed them from the place where a decisive result could have been reached and, condemning them to inactivity, put them in a dangerous position.

As we had gained the victory at İnönü, there was no doubt that nothing was left to do but to secure their retreat as soon as possible to save them from danger.

It was probable that the troops who had been victorious at İnönü would advance on Dumlupınar via Eskişehir and Altıntaş and, being able for a great part of the distance to make use of the railway, they would intercept the line of retreat of the Greek army which was east of Afyonkarahisar and would inflict upon it an annihilating defeat. Indeed, no time was lost in carrying this out. The first divisions that were disengaged were immediately placed at the disposal of Refet Paşa, commanding the southern front, and were sent forward.

The Uşak troops of the Greek army began to retreat immediately after the battle of İnönü had come to an end. On the 7th April, 1921, Refet Paşa had his headquarters at Çekürler; the 4th and 11th Divisions were in the Altıntaş zone; the 5th Caucasian Division and the battalion of Guards of the Assembly to the strength of one regiment, south of Çekürler; the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Division in the district of Kütahya.

While Fahrettin Paşa pursued and harassed the enemy who retired from Çay and Afyon, Refet Paşa, with the troops I have just mentioned, namely, three divisions and a battalion of infantry, attacked an enemy regiment which was in the district of Aslıhanlar, whilst two other divisions, the 24th and 8th, were sent southwards. The Greek regiment at Aslıhanlar held back Refet Paşa's attack, by which it gained much time while it was reinforced by about two divisions which came up from the rear. The troops retiring from Afyon succeeded in joining them. The entire strength of the force under the command of Refet Paşa which began the attack from the north to the south and from the east to the west on the 12th April consisted of the following:

The 4th, 5th, 11th, 8th and 24th Divisions coming from the north and the 57th, 23rd and 41st Divisions advancing from the east, that is to say,

a total of eight divisions and a battalion of infantry. The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions had been ordered to go to Banaz, which was in the enemy's rear, and having been led there by long detours, they could only come effectively into action if the enemy was defeated. They took no part at all in the battle on that day. The troops under Refet Paşa's command were not successful in their attack, but, on the contrary, suffered heavy losses. The enemy consolidated his position commanding Dumlupınar and remained there. As for Refet Paşa's troops, they retired and halted on the line Aydemir — Çalköy — Selkisaray, ten kilometres from Dumlupınar. Thus ended this operation, which has been called the battle of Aslıhanlar.

One fact misled Refet Paşa as to the issue of the battle. Thanks to a turn which had taken place in the firing line during the battle and on account of the impossibility of our troops beating and putting out of action a regiment which the enemy east of Afyonkarahisar had left at Dumlupınar, the advanced part of the Greek army had retired to their main position which they intended to hold after their retreat to Dumlupınar. Whilst Refet Paşa was actually defeated himself, he thought that the enemy was beaten and in retreat, and he reported this to us in a telegram in which he said that after the battle of Dumlupınar had been going on for five days he had given the enemy his deathblow. Naturally, this news was very satisfactory to us and we hastened to send him our praises and congratulations. However, from the replies I received to questions which I sent to him personally from the telegraph instrument, we became doubtful whether the position had been described to us as it actually was. Eventually we found out that the enemy had taken up a strong position which commanded the surrounding country, was easy to be defended and, in the opinion of the enemy, perfectly satisfactory. Refet Paşa felt himself compelled to retire further with his troops to the line Aydemir — Çalköy — Selkisaray.

When the situation had quieted down to some extent we understood that the army commanded by Refet Paşa had lost confidence in him. In order to examine the situation on the spot, His Excellency Fevzi Paşa and İsmet Paşa, the former from Ankara and the latter from the western front, started for Refet Paşa's headquarters. As it was considered advisable to let Refet Paşa remain in command for some time longer, they tried to look upon the matter and settle it with this in view. Both were convinced, however, that it was impossible to let matters rest as they were, so I went personally to see Refet Paşa, accompanied by Fevzi Paşa and İsmet Paşa. I went into the matter very carefully and soon came to this conclusion: Combining

the southern front, commanded by Refet Paşa, and the western front, I placed both under the command of İsmet Paşa and ordered Refet Paşa to return to Ankara and take up his duties there.

When Refet Paşa returned to Ankara I thought over the following solution: İsmet Paşa would resign his post as Chief of the General Staff and would devote himself exclusively to the extended western front. His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Minister of National Defence, would take over the duties of Chief of the General Staff — he had hitherto been acting in that capacity. Refet Paşa would become Minister of National Defence, which office had fallen vacant.

Refet Paşa much preferred on principle to accept a military appointment and was not satisfied with my solution. He said: "There is no reason why Fevzi Paşa, Minister of National Defence, should resign. If you think it unavoidable that İsmet Paşa should resign his position as Chief of the General Staff and if you contemplate giving me an appointment at the present moment, so it is possible to consider this one."

I do not know how it was possible that I was not able immediately to detect the secret intention concealed in Refet Paşa's suggestion, for I had never considered the point of view that came to my mind a little later. To clear up the point which appeared doubtful to me, I asked him this question: "If I understand you rightly, this means that you want to become Chief of the General Staff?" I must admit that he did not give me a direct reply, but I assumed that this is what he had in his mind. Then I remarked: "The administration of the General Staff is, according to our organisation, actually the position of the Commander-in-Chief. You do not possess the qualifications that are necessary for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army. Put this idea out of your head for the moment." Refet Paşa replied: "In that case I shall not accept the appointment of Minister of National Defence." "That is your affair," I said, and so the conversation came to an end. He actually declined the offer, went on leave and retired for some rest to a place called Ecevit in the forests of Kastamonu. It was only in a later situation that Refet Paşa became Minister of National Defence.

Our delegation which had gone to London returned to Ankara after the second victory of İnönü. You are aware that the Conference had not led to any result. Bekir Sami Bey, Foreign Minister, who had been at the head of the delegation, had, however, entered on his own account into connection and discussion with the statesmen of England, France and Italy and had signed a number of special agreements with each of them.

According to one of the agreements between Bekir Sami Bey and England, we were to release all the English prisoners of war who were in our hands. England in exchange was to return ours, with the exception of those of the Turkish prisoners who it was alleged had brutally or badly treated English prisoners or Armenians.

Our Government could naturally neither approve nor ratify such an agreement because this would have meant recognising a kind of right of jurisdiction on the part of a foreign Government over the acts a Turkish subject in the interior of Turkey herself.

As, however, the English released some of the prisoners, although we had not ratified the agreement, we on our part released some of the English prisoners.

Later on, following an arrangement which took place on the 23rd October, 1921, between Hamit Bey, Vice-president of the Red Crescent, and the English Commissioner at Istanbul, the exchange of all the Turkish prisoners at Malta and all the English prisoners in Turkey was decided upon, a decision which was duly carried out.

It appears that Bekir Sami Bey, besides his official negotiations and discussions, had had an interview of a strictly private nature with Lloyd George... The actual words that passed between them had been taken down in shorthand... A protocol had been signed... I do not remember that I had been informed of the contents of the copy which was in the possession of Bekir Sami Bey. Although I have recently asked him through the intermediary of the Foreign Office for a copy of it, Bekir Sami Bey has informed the Minister by letter that translations of this copy had been put before me at that time and that the original as well as the translations had remained among the documents to which they belonged when he left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This document, however, could not be found among the others. Nobody in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knows anything about it or what it contained. As far as I am concerned, I do not remember ever having been informed of the existence of this document.

Another agreement was also signed on the 11th March, 1921, between Bekir Sami Bey and M. Briand, President of the French Council of Ministers. According to this agreement the hostilities between France and the National Government were considered to be at an end... The French were to disarm the bands and we, on our part, the armed volunteers... French officers were to be employed in our gendarmerie. The gendarmerie organised by

the French was to be retained . . . The French were to have the preference in enterprises for the economic development of the districts evacuated by France, as well as the provinces of Mamuretülâzîz, Diyarbakîr and Sivas, and, in addition, were to be granted mining concessions in Ergani, etc...

I do not consider it necessary for me to refer to the reasons which led our Government also to reject this agreement.

Last of all, Bekir Sami Bey had signed another agreement with Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, on the 12th March, 1921. According to it, Italy undertook to support our claims at the Conference for the restitution of Trakya and Izmir, in exchange for which we were to cede to them a prior right for economic enterprises in the Sancaks of Antalya, Burdur, Muğla, Isparta and in parts of the Sancaks of Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, Aydin and Konya, which were to be specified at a later date.

In this agreement it was agreed also to cede to Italian capitalists all those economic enterprises which would not be carried out by the Turkish Government or by Turkish capital and to transfer the mines of Ereğli to a Turco-Italian company.

Naturally, this agreement could only have the fate of being rejected by our Government.

It is perfectly evident that the terms of these agreements which the Entente Powers had induced Bekir Sami Bey, the leader of the delegation which we had sent to Europe to conclude Peace, to sign, had no other aim than to cause our national Government to accept the Treaty which the same Powers had concluded among themselves, under the name of the "Tripartite Agreement", after the Sèvres plan, and which divided Anadolu into three spheres of interest. The statesmen of the Entente had also succeeded in inducing Bekir Sami Bey to accept these plans. As you can see, Bekir Sami Bey was taken up in London more with these three individual agreements than with the discussions at the Conference. The contradiction between the principles of the National Government and the system followed by the personage who was Foreign Minister can unfortunately not be explained.

I must admit that when Bekir Sami Bey returned to Ankara with these agreements I was very much astonished, and my attention was aroused. He expressed his conviction that the contents of the agreements he had signed were in accord with the higher interests of the country and maintained that he was able to support this conviction and defend and prove it before the Assembly. But there is no doubt that his opinion was wrong and his ideas illogical. It was certain not only that they could not be approved by the

Assembly but also that he would be overthrown as Minister of Foreign Affairs. As, however under the conditions prevailing at this time I did not believe it necessary to involve the Assembly in long discussions and dissertations on political questions, I pointed out his error to Bekir Sami Bey personally and proposed that he should resign his office as Foreign Minister. Bekir Sami Bey consented to my proposal and resigned.

Nevertheless, influenced by the impression which the different conversations he had had during his journey in Europe as leader of the delegation had made on him, Bekir Sami Bey was persistent in his conviction that it was possible to come to an understanding with the Entente Powers powers within the scope of our principles. He maintained that it would be a good thing to arrive at such an understanding. This induced me to write him the following private letter:

19th May, 1921.

To Bekir Sami Bey, Deputy for Amasya.

You are aware of the principles which the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey have hitherto proclaimed to the world on different occasions and in different ways. The main lines of these principles can be comprised in the following short phrase:

"Security of the integrity of our country and of the absolute independence of our nation within the recognised national frontiers." It is conceivable that after the impressions you have gained and the relations you have had on the recent journey you have made as leader of our delegation, you have arrived at the conviction that the Entente Powers are inclined to come to an understanding with our country without injuring our principles. Up to the present moment, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey cannot perceive any serious and sincere acts and results which could confirm such an inclination on the part of the Entente. If you think that you can render the realisation of your supposition concerning this feasible, I assure you that the Grand National Assembly and its Government would willingly agree.

Mustafa Kemal

Subsequently Bekir Sami Bey made a second journey to Europe, but this also had no good result.

However, the Government considered it necessary, after it had been discovered that the negotiations carried on with M. Franklin Bouillon at Ankara had been complicated by certain steps that Bekir Sami Bey had taken

in Paris, to make known through their agency that Bekir Sami Bey had not been entrusted with any official mission.

During his second visit to Europe, Bekir Sami Bey had also sent me some communications, and after his return he sent a report to me. Certain considerations contained in these communications and in his report were unfortunately not calculated to remove all doubt and hesitation on the question as to whether Bekir Sami Bey had completely grasped the ideal of the Turkish nation we were striving to reach and whether he had acted in the spirit of this ideal.

Bekir Sami Bey expressed his opinion in conformity with the influences and opinions that had affected him in Europe. After having criticised our policy, he said in a telegram in cipher on the 12th August: "While the opportunity is still given to us, prudent policy might save the country from the abyss into which it has fallen. Studying events carefully, an attitude must be assumed that is necessitated by the anxiety for the salvation of our country. If this is not done, none of us will be able to withdraw from the responsibility imposed upon him before history and the nation. I beg you in the name of the prosperity of our nation and of the salvation of Islam to adopt a fitting attitude and to tell me immediately that you have done so."

Bekir Sami Bey became an adherent of peace at any price.

In his report on the 24th December, 1921, he explained his point of view on this question in these words:

"I firmly believe that the continuation of war will destroy and annihilate our country to such a degree that its existence as well as that of the nation will be jeopardised and that the sacrifices which have been borne will have been in vain.

"I am firmly convinced that by a continuation of war we are working for our internal and external enemies and thereby ourselves pushing the nation into the misfortune and misery which we are dreading.

"The duty imposed upon Your Excellency is such a heavy burden as has scarcely ever been borne by any statesman. You have taken upon yourself a task of such magnitude as has seldom fallen upon a man in the course of the history of — I will not say five or six but, perhaps, ten or fifteen centuries. Your Excellency can win an immortal name in history and become the reviver of Islam if, together with the future of the Turkish race, the future of the whole of the Mohamedan world will be secured without falling from one extreme to the other and without sacrificing the

true interests of the future to the advantages of the present moment, and if the national and Mohamedan aim, which can be realised even to a greater extent than we desire at the price of a preliminary sacrifice, will be secured and strengthened. Otherwise, there is no doubt that the Turkish nation, and with it the entire Mohamedan world, will be condemned to slavery and humiliation. I consider that it is a sacred duty imposed upon me by my patriotism and adherence to Islam to beg Your Excellency not to let pass the opportunity and the glory of leaving to all Mohamedan generations to come, until the last Judgment Day, a memory and a name which only stand second to that of our Prophet.

In short it means this. In all his suggestions he advised us to put an end to the national fight so as to escape from slavery and humiliation on the lines of the agreements which he himself had concluded in London.

These considerations of Bekir Sami Bey's had made no actually positive impression on me. The ideas he developed and his manner of thinking had brought me to the conviction that there would be no advantage or object to be gained by discussing or arguing with him.

* * *

I would now like to tell you something about the situation that had arisen within the Grand National Assembly itself.

You are aware that the committees of the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli were among the electors of the second class during the elections for the first National Assembly. In these circumstances, it might be said that the Assembly, taken as a whole, had the character of a political party which had developed from the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli: and this actually was so at first. The chief aim of the Assembly *in corpore* served as the basis of the chief aim of the union. You know that the principles put forward at Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, after having received the approval of the last Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul, had been combined and united into a whole under the title of the "National Pact." These principles having also been adopted by the Grand National Assembly, we were now working within its compass to achieve a peace which would secure the integrity of the country and the independence of the nation. In proportion, however, as time advanced, difficulties began to crop up regarding the organisation and aim of the common struggle. Votes were divided, even on the simplest questions, and the work of the Assembly was condemned to futility. To

remedy this state of affairs some people took the initiative in the middle of the year 1920 in forming certain organisations. All these efforts were made to render regular debates possible and to reach positive results by firmly uniting the votes on questions which formed the subject of the discussion.

I have had an opportunity of explaining to you that on the 13th September, 1920, I laid before the Assembly the programme that forms the foundation of our first Constitution Act. Part of this programme was read in the Assembly during the sitting on the 18th September. Together with this part I had a motion printed and circulated which I had laid before the Assembly which served as a basis for this programme and which contained everything under the title of "Programme of a Popular Policy." This motion, which was read when the Assembly was opened and passed by them, defined the essential character of the Grand National Assembly and developed the policy of our administrative system. The organisations of which I have spoken, influenced by my programme, began to adopt a number of titles and to formulate their programmes. To give you an idea of this, I will mention the most important titles of these organisations:

- A. The "Union" Party (Tesanüt).
- B. The "Independence" Party (İstiklâl).
- C. The "Union for the Defence of the Rights" Party.
- D. The "People's" Party (Halk).
- E. The "Reform" Party (Islahat).

Besides these parties there were still some minor ones which had no name and had been formed for personal aims.

All the parties whose names I have just mentioned, although formed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and securing unanimity of voting during the debates, brought about contrary results through their existence.

As a matter of fact, these parties, whose number was considerable and whose adherents rivaled with one another, declined to listen to each other and had actually led to disturbances in the Assembly.

When the Assembly had passed the Constitution Act, that is to say, at about the end of January, 1921, the fact became especially evident that it was very much more difficult to secure unity and cooperation among the members and parties in the Assembly in a general way on any question. This was to be attributed to the circumstance that the ideas and desires which had been united unconditionally and unrestrictedly concerning the principles of the National Pact were far from presenting the same appearance

when the question of the various points of view involved in the Constitution Act arose.

I was hard at work indirectly trying to bring forward a union between the parties in existence by strengthening one or the other of them, in order to be able at last to get on with some actual work. But after I had found out that the results attained in this way had no lasting effect, I felt myself compelled personally to interfere.

Eventually I took recourse to forming a party myself under the name of the "Party for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli."

At the head of the programme which I prepared for this party I put a fundamental article, the meaning of which I summarised in two points. The first was this: "The party will secure the integrity of the country and the independence of the nation on the principles laid down in the National Pact. It will employ all the material and moral forces of the nation to guide them to this end and to obtain peace and quiet. It will press all the organisations and institutions in the country, public and private, into the service of this aim." Secondly: "The party will henceforward exert all its efforts within the compass of the Constitution Act for the purpose of preparing and defining as far as possible the organisation of the State and Nation."

Gentlemen:

After having called together all the parties and most of the members of the Assembly, I succeeded in establishing a union on these two principles. The fundamental article which I have just quoted, as well as the other clauses that were drawn up relating to the inner regulations of the party, were agreed to at the sitting on the 10th May, 1921. I took over the chairmanship of the party, to which I was appointed at a general meeting.

In the same way as there was already in the country a "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli", the Assembly now had a party bearing a similar name which had its origin in this union. What the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul had omitted to do was only realised at Ankara fourteen months after that Chamber was abolished.

This party allowed the Government to exercise its functions during the whole of the first legislative period.

However, there were some people who believed the second point in the main article regulating the party to be contrary to their opinion.

People of this type, who by no means expressed their feelings, were, nevertheless, immediately active in trying to prevent me from fulfilling the aim which this point expressed.

Efforts of this description, to which we might give the name of negative activity, became evident in two forms.

It was first of all displayed within the party itself for the purpose of confusing their minds and prejudicing them against me, and the same thing happened all over the country and in the circles of our own organisation. The most striking example in support of this assertion is shown in the attempt undertaken by Hoca Raif Efendi, a man of religion and deputy for Erzurum, together with some of his colleagues, after the Constitution Act was passed and before the party had been formed. With your permission, I will give you some further details about this. Hoca Raif Efendi and his colleagues changed the title of the local organisation at Erzurum from the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli" into the "Union for the Salvation of the Sanctuaries." Besides this, Raif Efendi added at the head of the principles containing the chief ideas of the union some clauses which aimed at the maintenance of the Caliphate and Sultanate and of the form of the Government.

He also intended to extend his efforts to other Vilayets — especially the Eastern Provinces — by sending all kinds of proclamations into these districts.

As soon as I was informed of this, I called the attention of Kâzım Karabekir Paşa 'who commanded the eastern front' to it, and asked him to bring Raif Efendi, the man of religion, as well as his comrades, to reason and to induce them to abandon their intentions. After some correspondence had passed between Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, who was at Sarıkamış, and Raif Efendi, who as at that time at Erzurum, Raif Hoca went personally to the headquarters of the Pasa. Raif Efendi told him of the reasons that had led him to use the title "Union for the Salvation of the Sanctuaries" and declared that the aim he had before him was to preserve the Caliphate and Sultanate and to prevent, at all costs, the establishment of a Republican Government which, according to him, would be in the present and future life of the country and, the Mohamedan world a source of great trouble and internal dissension. After having expressed his opinion that from certain symptoms he had come to the conclusion that the party for the "Defence of the Rights" formed in the Assembly had the intention of replacing the

Government of the Caliph and Sultan by a Republican Government, he said that it would be unpardonable not to recognise the lawfulness of his activities.

In his telegram in cipher of the 11th July in which Kâzım Karabekir Paşa sent me this news he also mentioned, among other matters, the following: "We observe that the Constitution Act passed by the Grand National Assembly has also sanctioned the principles concerning the form of government. Anticipating difficulties in the carrying out of the provisions of this Act, I conceive it to be more advantageous if these provisions adopted the form of the programme of a political party.

"I would like to explain this idea from the point of view of general sentiment and of the opinions prevailing in my district. Let me tell you about the tendency of which I am well informed.

"Most of the adherents of the party which has been formed in the Assembly with the programme in favour of the Constitution Act are those who are apparently driven by ambition to play a rôle in the destiny of the country in favour of a political change; but among the people there is only an infinitesimal minority who support the new conceptions of the organisation. If the deputies are supporters of the Constitution Act this is only a matter of their personal opinion. In these enterprises, which mean nothing less than a radical change in the form of Government and which must mark an epoch in history, I am convinced of the necessity of consulting our military and civil authorities as well as the local committees of the 'Union for the Defence of the Rights' in the proper way, because all of them are bearing their share of responsibility for the destiny of our country. In the same way, the question ought also to be submitted to the investigation of an extraordinary Assembly, and only after this has been done shall we be able to come to a decision."

Gentlemen:

After the decisive victory and the proclamation of the Republic by the second Grand National Assembly, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa summarised the feelings and objections to which he had given vent long before in the statement he made in the Istanbul Press in the following form:

"We have not been consulted with regard to the proclamation of the Republic."

In his observations Kâzım Karabekir Paşa seemed to have forgotten that the Grand National Assembly was just such an extraordinary Assembly consisting of representatives who had been endowed with extraordinary full

powers by the nation. He simultaneously gives us to understand that he disapproves of the Act passed by this Assembly as well as the Constitution Act.

It is still more remarkable when he says that he was convinced of the necessity of consulting the military and civil authorities and the local committees of the "Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli" in cases where the question arises of adopting resolutions which could lead to an alteration of the State system.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa also raises objections to the fact that I am connected with the party for the "Defence of the Rights." He said: "I have always considered that Your Excellency should hold yourself aloof from... political parties of this description," and he advises me to maintain a neutral attitude towards all parties. I replied to this telegram on the 20th July, 1921. I shall content myself with quoting here a few sentences of the somewhat lengthy reply which might throw light on certain points. I said: "The party of the 'Defence of the Rights' has been formed with a clear and precise aim before it, which consists in securing the complete independence of the country. The passing of the Constitution Act is also included in these aims. The Constitution Act is neither a complete statute nor one that enters into details regarding the whole legal position of the Turkish State and the subsidiary question relating to administration. The Act is confined to introducing the popular principle into our civil and administrative organisation as demanded by the exigencies of the time. There is nothing in this Act that expresses the idea of a Republic. Raif Efendi's opinion that it indicates the speedy substitution of the monarchical régime by a republican one is founded on mere imagination. Regarding the assertion that among the persons entrusted with the central administration there are some whose personalities and past lives give rise to criticism, these assertions must be supported by more concrete evidence.

"The idea of entrusting administrative duties only to men who are trained and who are thoroughly educated, as well as being in possession of administrative qualifications and all personal advantages, is at best a very fascinating dream which is very alluring.

"It is not only impossible for us, but for all the progressive nations in the world, to discover men in sufficient numbers who enjoy public esteem in all of the professions, circles and districts.

"The endeavour to weaken the combined and unified organisations which must support the country under the influence of deceptive and vague

thoughts and claims could only be regarded as an act of insanity, if not even of treason.

"Your Excellency is well aware of the fact that every important enterprise leading to progress must inevitably be connected with serious difficulties according to circumstances. The important point is that nothing should be lacking in the selection of the means and the measures to be adopted which are most suitable to reduce these difficulties to a minimum."

Then I explained my ideas regarding the proposal for consulting the military and civil authorities and the organisations for the "Defence of the Rights" in drafting the Constitution Act, as follows:

"As Your Excellency is aware, we have a constituted Government and we must adopt all the conceptions that result from this condition. You will probably agree with me that it is not possible, under the effect of ideas that come from a distance, to exercise any influence on the form which the Constitution Act has finally agreed upon after having discussed it in Committee and at the full sitting."

Kâzim Karabekir Paşa had also asked to be informed of the reasons which had caused the haste in which, in his opinion, the Constitution Act had been drafted and, in addition, about the eventual difficulties of the application of the Act, as well as our opinions on the question of the Caliphate and the Sultanate.

Referring to these points, I had said in my reply: "The reason for the attitude which had appeared to Your Excellency to have been hasty, is only the anxiety to guide the democratic current which reveals itself to-day in our country, as well as everywhere else, into a sound course and to prevent further complications which might arise on this question of the preservation of national rights, which have been misinterpreted and injured for centuries by incapable men. Also, we hasten to secure the possibility to the nation, which is the real possessor of these rights, to make its voice heard and, finally, to make the most of the extraordinary occurrences of the moment which are so favourable for the development of this noble idea.

"For the purpose of carefully considering the possibility of putting this law into force, we ought to take into account the degree of administrative energy and the capability of those who will have occasion to preside over its application. The question of the Caliphate and the Sultanate is not to be treated as one of the first importance. The principal question is to define the rights of the sovereign, in the settlement of the determination and limitation of which rights we must be guided by the experience of past centuries and

the exact limitation of the rights of the nation included in the conception of the State. We do not yet possess a clearly defined formula grounded on this basis."

In my reply to Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's proposal that I should remain neutral instead of being chairman of the party, I said:

"I am not the President of an Assembly like the Chamber of Deputies; but even if I were it would be natural for me to be a member of a political party. As the Grand National Assembly exercises at the same time the executive power, it means that I am the President of an Assembly which has, in effect, the character of a Government.

"The head of the executive power must necessarily be a member of the majority party. There is nothing to prevent me under these conditions from being chairman of a political party which has thrown itself into the conflict with a programme that enters into details. Just as it is impossible for me to withdraw from the union with which I have identified myself with my whole being, in the same way it is absolutely necessary that I should take my place in the ranks of the party which this union has produced. In truth, the party has a crushing majority, comprising nearly all the members of the Assembly. Those who have held themselves aloof from the party are Celâlettin Arif Bey and Hüseyin Avni Efendi, deputies for Erzurum, with others like them, and some who were anxious to preserve their freedom of action."

*

* *

Izzet Paşa and Salih Paşa, who were at that time still at Ankara, did not feel at home there. They continually appealed to us, directly and indirectly, begging to be released and to be allowed to return to their families in Istanbul. They assured us, over and over again, that they would keep entirely aloof from political life when they returned there.

At the beginning of March, 1921, while Ismet Paşa was at Ankara, where he had arrived with the intention of attending to certain affairs, the Paşas renewed their appeals.

One day while the Council of Ministers was holding a sitting, Ahmet Izzet Paşa came to the Government building and asked to see Ismet Paşa, who was attending the meeting of the Council. Ismet Paşa had an interview with him. Izzet Paşa assured him in a long explanation regarding the proposal made by us that he would give his word of honour that he would not accept an official position in Istanbul, and he renewed his request to be allowed

to return to his family. He added that Salih Paşa, for his part, also pledged his word of honour and begged that he might be allowed to go.

İsmet Paşa informed the Council of these declarations and requests. The Council of Ministers were of the opinion that the presence of these two Paşas at Ankara had not been of any advantage to us in our work, but that they were rather a useless burden and that, moreover, they offered a pretext for certain antagonistic feelings towards us: consequently, there was no objection to the return of the Paşas to İstanbul.

I pointed out, however, that I did not think that the pledge given by them was straightforward and sincere and that I was convinced beyond doubt that they would resume their duties in the Government when they returned to İstanbul, thus causing us further annoyance. They pointed out the fact that the Paşa had given his word of honour. I held that permission should only be granted to them if they consented to give an undertaking in writing; for hitherto they had only expressed themselves verbally. İsmet Paşa told İzzet Paşa, who was in the adjoining room, what I had proposed. He immediately picked up a pen and wrote out an undertaking to hand in his resignation to the Cabinet and signed it. If my memory does not deceive me, he made Salih Paşa also sign the document.

But this short undertaking did not seem sufficient to me. It had not the same meaning as the pledge he had given verbally. I called the attention of my colleagues to the fact that there was some trickery and that İzzet Paşa ought to draw up and sign the same declaration that he had given verbally to İsmet Paşa. But they would not admit that after so many assurances and declarations İzzet Paşa could have given his undertaking with any other intentions in his mind; therefore, they pleaded that this document should be accepted as sufficient.

Through this deception, İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa succeeded in obtaining permission to return to İstanbul.

When they returned, the two Paşas actually handed in their resignations; but a very short time afterwards they accepted other ministerial appointments in the same Cabinet and informed us by telegram that they had done so. İzzet Paşa, who had become Foreign Minister in the İstanbul Government, told us that he had only taken up this office to guard against the misfortune threatening the nation and the country, and then he gave us a great deal of advice. I sent him this reply:

29th June, 1921.

To His Highness Ahmet İzzet Paşa, İstanbul.

I have received your telegram through the Director of the Intelligence Department at Zonguldak. I can only say that your position is not in accordance with the undertaking you and His Highness Salih Paşa gave. There is one point that I consider in your favour, and that is, in taking over your office this time you may be in a position to avert the misfortune threatening the country and the nation. At our first interview you yourself admitted how weak the reasons were with which you supported your acceptance of a post in the Ministry; this actually occurred before you came to Ankara with the good intention and in the hope of being useful to the country.

Your telegram does not show clearly enough what reasons led you to take up this new position.

We are paying the greatest attention to your advice, which is in accord with the interests of the country and the nation, with the Treaties that have been concluded, in short with the National Pact, and we are doing all we can to follow it.

On account of the general situation and the ideas instilled into Your Excellency, I cannot help fearing that again, as happened formerly, your credulity has been taken advantage of. We would be glad to receive explanations that would help us to change this opinion and to see a concrete development of events in this direction.

Mustafa Kemal

İzzet Paşa replied to this in the following telegram in cipher on the 6th July.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Ankara.

The pledge which Salih Paşa and I gave was to the effect that on our return we would hand in our resignations. We have carried out that undertaking. I do not know whether it would have been possible for us permanently to retire from the service of the State and, above all, to withdraw from the sacrifice that was suggested to us in these dark days when the Entente Powers materially support Greece and the possibility begins to take shape that İstanbul will be ceded to Greece and serve her as a naval base. I do not think that you would be likely to approve of this.

At Ankara and Bilecik I had found that it was not advisable to continue our discussions in the presence of persons whom I did not know. As a pre-

caution, therefore, I gave the impression that I was convinced by your arguments. After my return I had even shown enough courage in the explanation which I deliberately made to take all the responsibility for the events upon myself.

The attitude assumed later on by persons who were present at our first interviews has proved that I was quite right in being on my guard. But I do not admit that I have been deceived at any time by anyone. I have remained faithful to the idea of an understanding which had led me to you, as is shown by the discussions in the Council of Ministers and the memorandum I laid before them. Far from admitting the credulity which is attributed to me, I am strengthened in confidence in my own personality and my opinions by the collection of evidence that I had correctly judged the political situation in all its details then, as I do now. It is not for me to raise the question as to whether it was appropriate or not that we should have accepted office at this moment. I would be very grateful to you if you would explain what objection you have to it. Taking into account the lawful position of the Government here and the presence of Missions of the interested Powers in Istanbul, the fact is evident that it is neither possible nor right to ignore the situation here. Besides, the majority of the present Cabinet does not follow any personal aim either at the present time or for the future; it is devoted exclusively to the welfare of our country. With this intention, it desires with all its heart to come to a reasonable understanding with the people at Ankara, in the reconciliation and unification of opinions and efforts. If its sincerity meets with a fitting response, it will even be able to co-operate and render valuable services. But if its hopes should be deceived, I have the honour to declare to you that it will decline the moral responsibility for the errors and misfortunes that might result from the failure of such an understanding.

Ahmet Izzet

I endorsed this telegram with the following words in pencil:

The Council of Ministers have decided to retain this document among the official records in the expectation that at the proper time the necessary action will be taken.

Mustafa Kemal.

Ahmet Izzet Paşa had preferred rather to make himself a servant of Vahdettin than to remain in the midst of the Turkish people, who had fed him and reared him, and come to their aid in the days of their darkest despair. He bowed to the Fetva of Dürri Zade Esseyit Abdullah and took care not to disobey the Sultan's orders and not to lay himself open to the sentence

of canonical excommunication. Ahmet İzzet Paşa also involved himself in some other deceptions, about which I shall also speak to you.

Whilst the fighting continued with our enemies and we were endeavouring to oppose them with all the material and moral forces of the nation, İzzet Paşa continued to disseminate the poison of his pessimism, causing despair and fatigue by addressing letters to those men who were entrusted with the command of the principal forces of the nation. He found reasons to mock at my statements when I expressed the certainty that we would defeat the enemy's army and save our country. As a kind of threat, he indicated the movement of the Greek army, which after the second battle of İnönü again advanced eastwards as far as the Sakarya, intending thereby to teach us a lesson.

By a strange coincidence, on the same day on which we had forced the enemy to retire by our counter-attack on the Sakarya, I was shown for official reasons a letter, which had originated from this brain affected by megalomania, in which it was maintained that my behaviour would lead to our breakdown. This letter had caused us great astonishment.

After having witnessed the retreat of the Greek army, first from the Sakarya and afterwards from Izmir, and after having read the Treaty of Lausanne, had İzzet Paşa quoted this sentence in his telegram of the 6th July, 1921, once more in which he had said: "Far from admitting the credulity which is attributed to me, I am strengthened in the confidence in my own personality and my opinions by the collection of evidence that I had correctly judged the political situation in all its details then as I do now"?

I am tempted to believe that he did so.

İzzet Paşa and Salih Paşa had stayed for many a month at Ankara. We were ready to offer them positions in the National Government on condition that they accepted our national principles. They remained deaf to this. They did not once set foot in the Assembly. But in every case they were informed of the laws enacted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; they were completely familiar with the provisions of these Acts and the attitude of the Grand National Assembly and their Government towards Istanbul, which was so clearly defined. Now, totally disregarding these Acts and this attitude, they were again at the head of affairs in Istanbul and devoted themselves exclusively to the task of annihilating the authority and the influence of the nation and of exposing their enterprises with the object of maintaining the authority of Vahdettin, who had become a mere puppet in the hands of the enemy.

I will not attempt to explain the importance of these occurrences. I leave this task to the Turkish people and to coming generations.

I would like to take this opportunity to advise my honoured nation not to refrain for an instant from carefully analysing the character and conscience of the men whom they have raised and on whom they will some day bestow the honour of their confidence.

Let me now return to the events connected with the great battle on the Sakarya, but with your permission I will make some preliminary remarks by way of introduction. Nearly three months passed between the second battle of İnönü and the general attack which the Greeks began on the 10th July, 1921.

The position of the enemy in the days preceding this date was as follows:

Our army had been mainly concentrated at Eskişehir, in the positions at İnönü in the north-west and in the district of Kütahya - Altıntaş.

We had two divisions in the district of Afyonkarahisar, one at Geyve and another in the Menderes district.

The Greeks had an Army Corps concentrated at Bursa and two others east of Uşak. They had also one division in the Menderes district. The offensive of the Greeks was the signal for a series of battles known as the battles of Kütahya - Eskişehir, which lasted for a fortnight. The main body of our troops had retired on the evening of the 25th July eastward across the Sakarya.

I would like to mention here the chief reasons that had necessitated this retirement.

The Greek army, which had been ordered to mobilise after the second battle of İnönü, was far superior to ours in regard to men, rifles, machine-guns and artillery.

Since the enemy's attack began in July, the progress made till then in the activity of the National Government and the command at the front did not seem sufficient to justify us in giving the order for a general mobilisation on our part; we could not oppose the enemy with all the auxiliary reserves and means which were at the disposal of the nation without allowing ourselves to be influenced by other considerations. In this fact you must seek the most evident reason of the disparity which existed in so many respects between the two armies facing each other. As we had not yet

succeeded in procuring for our army the necessary means of transport which was so vital, the mobility of our troops was practically negligible. The main task we had taken upon ourselves from the military point of view, against this attack which the Greek people, gathering all their forces, had begun against us, still remained the same as had been decided upon at the beginning of the national struggle. It can be summarised thus: To render assistance whenever the Greeks attacked, to hold them back, to meet them with adequate military tactics and to gain time while the new army was being formed. This main plan had not to be lost sight of, especially after the enemy's last attack. This consideration induced me, after the visit I paid to İsmet Paşa at his headquarters at Karacahisar, south-west of Eskişehir, where I had carefully studied the position, to indicate the general course to be followed:

"After the army has been concentrated north and south of Eskişehir, we must establish a large area between it and the enemy's forces so that we shall be able to carry on our reconstitution, reorganisation and reinforcement. For this purpose we would be able to retire even to the north of the Sakarya. If the enemy should pursue us without coming to a halt he would be getting farther away from his base of operations and would be obliged to take up new positions. In any case, he would find that there were many difficulties in front of him which he would have to provide for: Taking this into account, our army will be able to rally and meet the enemy under more favourable conditions. The disadvantage of such tactics would be the moral shock which might be produced in public opinion by the fact that a wide territory and places so important as Eskişehir would be abandoned to the enemy. But these disadvantages will automatically disappear in a short time as the result of the successes which we shall achieve.

"Let us carry out without hesitation what the exigencies and the strategy of the moment demand from us. As for the disadvantages, we shall know how to overcome them."

The damages to morale, which I had foreseen, soon became manifest.

The first excitement became apparent in the Assembly. Above all, the representatives of the opposition immediately began to make pessimistic speeches and express themselves in all possible tones: Where is this army going? Where are the people being led? There must surely be somebody who is responsible for what is being done! Where is the person? He is invisible. We would like to see at the head of the army the actual originator of the sad and deplorable position in which we are to-day.

There was no doubt that the person to whom these people were alluding was none other than myself.

Finally, Selâhattin Bey, deputy for Mersin, mentioned my name from the tribune and asked me to take over the command. The number of those who shared his opinion grew, while there were others who opposed them. We must now consider in a few words the reasons for this difference of opinion. Those who proposed to entrust me with the actual supreme command may be divided under two heads: From what I knew personally and from the impressions of many others, some had come to the conviction that the army had been completely defeated, that there was no longer any hope of saving the situation and that the national cause which we were defending was irretrievably lost. Imbued with this conviction, they wanted to relieve themselves by pouring out all their wrath upon me; they wanted me to perish at the head of the army which, as they thought, was in danger of dissolution and could not be saved. On the other hand, there were others — I might well say the majority — guided by their feelings of confidence, who wanted to see me at the head of the army.

Those who held a contrary opinion had doubts about my taking over the supreme command and expressed their opinion in this way: It is not probable that the army will be capable of gaining success in any later fighting and so it will be compelled to retire still further. If in such an event the President of the Grand National Assembly were actually in supreme command himself, it might happen, judging from the prevailing public opinion, that the idea would spread that the situation was hopelessly lost. The general position, however, is not such that we should be called on to sacrifice our last strength, forces and resources. Consequently, the moment has not yet arrived for him to lead the military operations personally if we desire still to support a last hope in the opinion of the public.

With all the possible care that the case demanded, I studied the opinions which had been formed during the course of these discussions. Those who thought as I have just now explained advanced important arguments. The clamour of those who brought forward insincere demands influenced in a considerably disturbing way those who proposed in good faith that I should take over the chief command. The entire Assembly came to the conclusion that my taking actual charge of the supreme command was to be regarded as the last step and the last resource left to us.

The point of view expressed by the Assembly about the situation also

rapidly spread outside the Assembly. My silence and the fact that I showed no disposition to take over the actual supreme command in a hurry turned the fear of an inevitable and impending catastrophe into a positive conviction. As soon as I observed this, I mounted the tribune.

The position of which I am speaking developed at a secret sitting of the Assembly on the 4th August, 1921. After having thanked the members of the Assembly for the devotion and confidence they had shown towards and in me I put forward the following proposal, which I handed in at the office of the Assembly:

4th August, 1921.

To the Honourable President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

At the request of the members of the Assembly and according to the general desire expressed by them, I accept the supreme command. I will take over this position provided that I shall actually exercise the full powers appertaining to the Assembly, for the purpose of being able to pursue as rapidly as possible the advantages resulting from the fact that these functions have been bestowed on me and that we may be able rapidly to increase and reinforce the strength of our army in material and morale and secure for it a strong leadership. In order to show the nation once more that I have been throughout my life the most faithful advocate of the idea of national sovereignty, I request at the same time that these full powers shall be limited to the short period of about three months.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

My proposal offered an opportunity for the disclosure of the secret designs of those who tried to conceal their real intentions; objections were soon put forward. For instance, they began to say: "We cannot confer the title of Commander-in-Chief, for that is an office that is morally inherent to the Assembly itself. We ought to say, 'Deputy Commander-in-Chief.'" The opinion was also expressed that there was no question of endowing me with such comprehensive privileges as to employ the full powers of the Assembly. I insisted on my point of view by maintaining that I could not accept an obsolete title which had once been bestowed by the Padisahs and Caliphs, all the more so because I could not see why they should refuse me the corresponding title if I actually exercised these functions. We were passing through extraordinary conditions, of which fact the Assembly was

well aware and as had been explained by its members. Consequently, my actions and the decisions I had to make had also to be of an extraordinary nature. It would be absolutely necessary for me to be in the position to carry out my plans and decisions energetically and rapidly. Cases might occur where the situation would not admit of any delay, which would necessarily be caused by an appeal to the Council of Ministers or by demanding the authority from the Assembly.

If I would have to ask every Minister or the Council of Ministers for their opinions or consent in every communication I had to make or with respect to every command I had to give, particularly when it was a question of communications and orders referring to the country and the employment of its resources, it would destroy all the advantages everybody was hoping for and which were expected to accrue from my personally taking over the supreme command. For these various reasons it would be necessary for me to be in the position to give orders unconditionally, which I only could do if the full powers of the Assembly were transferred to me personally. Consequently, I persisted all the more strenuously in making this demand because I believed that their consent was absolutely necessary to enable me to succeed.

Some deputies, like Selâhattin Bey and Hulûsi Bey, maintained that the Assembly would be condemned to inactivity if they were to transfer their powers to somebody else, that they had no right to do so, that above all it could not be thought of that the full powers of the Assembly should be transferred to the man who commanded the army, and that from every point of view this was superfluous.

Some of the deputies went so far as to maintain that members of the Assembly would feel doubtful about their own personal safety towards any person who could dispose of the full powers of the Assembly.

I did not attempt to refuse any of these opinions. I declared that I found all of them to be quite justified. I merely said that the Assembly must attribute great importance to the examination of this question and study it with the utmost care. I added that those who were afraid of their own safety were quite wrong. As the question had not been decided on the 4th August, the debate was continued on the following day. It was found on this day that the reasons that had led some deputies to hesitate revolved around two points: Firstly, the question whether the Assembly would not be reduced to impotence and inactivity in some way or another, and, secondly, whether any of the members of the Assembly would be liable to be treated in an arbitrary manner.

After I had given them assurances to dispel these fears, I declared that it appeared to be necessary to add reservations and restrictions to the law which had to be passed.

I altered my motion, therefore, into the draft of a Bill, which I laid before the Assembly. Based on the discussions which had taken place on this draft, the Act conferring the functions of Commander-in-Chief on me was passed on the 5th August. Clause 2 of this Act defined the full powers given to me in these terms: "In order to develop the forces of the army materially and psychologically to the fullest extent, so as to secure and consolidate the leadership and administration of these forces, the Commander-in-Chief will be authorised to exercise full powers in the name of the Assembly in these matters."

This clause gave lawful authority to my command.

Following this appointment being conferred on me, I declared to the Assembly that "I shall prove myself worthy in a short time of the confidence which you have reposed in me," and I laid before them some requests, among them being the separation of the duties of the Chief of the General Staff from that of the Minister of National Defence, which were still combined in the person of His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, so that he would be able to devote himself exclusively to the affairs of the General Staff. I also requested that Refet Paşa, Minister of the Interior, should be appointed Minister of National Defence, and someone else should be selected to fill the office that would thus fall vacant.

I took special care to explain to the Assembly that it would be very important for them and for the Council of Ministers to preserve a calm and firm attitude towards the country itself and foreign countries, and that it would be wrong to shake the position of the Ministers by trifling suggestions.

The draft of the Bill was read to a public sitting on the same day, and was hurriedly discussed and put to the vote. It was passed unanimously.

Let me quote a few words of the short speech I made on this occasion. I said: "My confident belief that we shall be able completely to defeat the enemies who want to subjugate our unhappy nation has not been shaken for a single moment. I declare this unshakable faith of mine on this occasion in the presence of this High Assembly, before the entire nation and before the whole world."

Having taken over the supreme command I still worked for several days at Ankara.

After I had given them assurances to dispel these fears, I declared that it appeared to be necessary to add reservations and restrictions to the law which had to be passed.

I altered my motion, therefore, into the draft of a Bill, which I laid before the Assembly. Based on the discussions which had taken place on this draft, the Act conferring the functions of Commander-in-Chief on me was passed on the 5th August. Clause 2 of this Act defined the full powers given to me in these terms: "In order to develop the forces of the army materially and psychologically to the fullest extent, so as to secure and consolidate the leadership and administration of these forces, the Commander-in-Chief will be authorised to exercise full powers in the name of the Assembly in these matters."

This clause gave lawful authority to my command.

Following this appointment being conferred on me, I declared to the Assembly that "I shall prove myself worthy in a short time of the confidence which you have reposed in me," and I laid before them some requests, among them being the separation of the duties of the Chief of the General Staff from that of the Minister of National Defence, which were still combined in the person of His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, so that he would be able to devote himself exclusively to the affairs of the General Staff. I also requested that Refet Paşa, Minister of the Interior, should be appointed Minister of National Defence, and someone else should be selected to fill the office that would thus fall vacant.

I took special care to explain to the Assembly that it would be very important for them and for the Council of Ministers to preserve a calm and firm attitude towards the country itself and foreign countries, and that it would be wrong to shake the position of the Ministers by trifling suggestions.

The draft of the Bill was read to a public sitting on the same day, and was hurriedly discussed and put to the vote. It was passed unanimously.

Let me quote a few words of the short speech I made on this occasion. I said: "My confident belief that we shall be able completely to defeat the enemies who want to subjugate our unhappy nation has not been shaken for a single moment. I declare this unshakable faith of mine on this occasion in the presence of this High Assembly, before the entire nation and before the whole world."

Having taken over the supreme command I still worked for several days at Ankara.

I formed my headquarters by uniting the official offices of the General Staff with the Ministry for National Defence. I installed a small office for my personal use in view of the effort to secure the unification and co-ordination in the common work of these two departments, as well as to settle with the aid of the authority of other departments questions which related to the army and the intervention of the Commander-in-Chief.

My work at Ankara was exclusively directed to the measures to be taken to increase the actual strength of men and means of transport, and to secure and regulate the provisioning and clothing of the troops.

I would like to mention briefly a number of communications I made during the 7th and 8th August to guarantee the settlement of these questions, which I had published under the title "Orders respecting Requisitions."

I consider that I ought to make this explanation so as to give you an idea of the great number of details that have to be thought of when the object is to win a war.

By my Order No. 1, I established a "National Commission for Requisitions" in every kara. I regulated the method of the distribution of the result of the work of these Commissions to the various parts of the army. According to Order No. 2, every house in the country was required to prepare an equipment consisting of a parcel of linen, a pair of socks and a pair of shoes, and to hand it over to the Commissions.

On the strength of Order No. 3, I confiscated, on the undertaking of later compensations, 40% of the following goods in store in the hands of merchants or the population: Linen, American cloth, cambric, cotton, wool and mohair, raw and manufactured; all kinds of material for the manufacture of men's summer and winter clothing, rough linen, calfskin, vaquette, sole leather, brown and black leather, Morocco leather, shoes, boots, iron shoe-nails, brass tags, cobblers' and saddlers' thread, iron for horse-shoes, nails, feeding bags, halters, horse-blankets, girths, curry-combs, pack-saddles, serge gloves, ropes, etc.

Order No. 4 provided for 40% of the following goods in store also being confiscated: Corn, straw, flour, barley, beans, oats, chick-peas, lentils, slaughter beasts, sugar, petroleum, rice, soap, butter, salt, oil, tea, candles.

Order No. 5 imposed upon the population the duty of conducting military transports free of charge once a month by such means as still remained at their disposal after the requisitions for the needs of the army had been made.

By Order No. 6, all unclaimed goods which could serve for the clothing and provisioning of the army were to be confiscated.

By Order No. 7, all arms and ammunition suitable for military purposes in the possession of the population were to be given up within three days.

On the strength of Order No. 8, I requisitioned 40% of all the stores of gasoline, fats, vacuum-oil, tallow, machine-oil, pocket-watches, sole-leather, vaseline, motor-car tires, lorries, solutions, candles, cold glue, French glue, telephone instruments, cables, electric poles, wires, insulators and similar articles, sulphuric acid.

In virtue of Order No. 9, I commanded a list to be made of all smithies, joineries, foundries, saddlers workshops, harness-makers workshops, cartwrights and planing workshops, with the names of the craftsmen and the capacity of each workshop. I had a list made of all armoury artificers who could make swords, daggers, lances, bayonets, and saddlery.

By Order No. 10, I also confiscated 10% of four-wheeled spring carts; of ox and horse harness for four-wheeled carts, "Kağrı" (two-wheeled carts) with harness, as well as 20% of draught animals, riding animals and others suitable for artillery purposes; of beasts of burden, camels and donkeys.

In the district of Kastamonu, Samsun, Konya and Eskişehir I ordered the Independence Courts which I had established to begin their work with the object of securing the execution of my orders and instructions.

Such a Court had also to sit at Ankara.

On the 12th August, accompanied by His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, I left for Polatlı, where the headquarters at the front were. We had arrived at the opinion that the enemy, as soon as they came into touch with our front, would attempt an enveloping movement on our left flank. In view of this possibility, I courageously took all the necessary steps. Events proved that we were right. On the 23rd August, 1921, the enemy's army came into serious contact with our front and opened an attack on it. Many sanguinary and critical phases, advances and retreats, took place on both sides. The enemy, superior in number, broke through our line of defence in several places, but each time he did so we succeeded in throwing our forces against him.

The battle took place on a front of a hundred kilometres. Our left wing had withdrawn to a distance of fifty kilometres south of Ankara. Our front, which was facing westward, turned to the south. The rear part of the army leaning on Ankara was pushed to the north. Thereby we changed

the direction of our front, but this was not to our disadvantage. Our lines of defence were broken through, one section after another, but every place where it was pierced was immediately reinforced in as short a time as possible.

For the purpose of destroying the theory according to which all hope of success is to be placed on the lines of defence so that if these are broken through the army must retire to a distance corresponding to the strength of the men engaged, I thought it well and proper to express my ideas about the defence of the country in another way, and I energetically insisted on my view. I said that there was no line of defence but a plain of defence, and that this plain was the whole of the country. Not an inch of the country should be abandoned until it was drenched with the blood of the citizens.

Every unit, large or small, can be dislodged from its position, but every unit, large or small, re-establishes its front in face of the enemy at the first spot where it can hold its ground, and goes on fighting. Units which observe the neighbouring ones forced to retire must not link their own fate to these; they must hold their positions to the end.

Every man of our troops obeyed this principle and fought step by step with the greatest devotion; and thus we crushed the superior hostile forces, deprived them of their power of attack and the possibility of continuing their offensive, and defeated them.

As soon as we were sure of this phase of the battle, we went over to a counter-attack, especially with our right wing east of the Sakarya river against the left wing of the enemy, and then against the chief parts of the front. The Greek army was beaten and was forced to retire. On the 13th September, 1921, no trace of the enemy was to be found east of the Sakarya.

The great battle of Sakarya, which lasted from the 23rd August to the 13th September, both days included, continued without interruption for twenty-two days and twenty-two nights and constitutes an unique example of a battle of the widest extent, not alone in the historical records of the new Turkish State but also in the pages of the world's history.

I believe that I fulfilled the first moral duty which I had taken upon myself when, on the occasion of my actual acceptance of the supreme command, I expressed before the Assembly and the nation my unswerving conviction that we would gain the victory, a conviction which I supported with the whole weight of my personality.

But, in addition, I had other important duties to fulfil, duties of a

material nature. One of them related to the attitude which I had led the nation to adopt while the war was going on.

You are well aware that speaking of war does not mean two armies fighting against one another but two nations who are both risking their existence and who summon for the fight all their resources, all their possessions and all their material and moral forces.

For this reason, I had to interest the Turkish nation in the war in all their actions, their sentiments and their conceptions, in the same way as the army at the front. Not only those who were facing the enemy, but every single individual in the village, in his home, in the fields, had to consider himself in the same manner as those fighting at the front as being entrusted with a special mission to dedicate himself with his whole heart to the conflict.

Nations that fail to sacrifice their material and moral possessions to their fullest extent in the defence of their country, or that even do this reluctantly, cannot be looked upon as being determined to carry on a war or as being convinced that they will bring it to a successful issue. In future wars, also, the decisive element of victory will be found in this conception. The great military nations of Europe have already officially begun to adopt this principle.

When we took over the supreme command we did not demand from the Assembly a "Law for the Defence of the Country," but we tried to achieve the same aim by issuing commands which, supported by the full powers bestowed on us by the Assembly, had legal force.

In a more extensive, more positive and more definite manner, the nation will establish the means and conditions in the future which are adapted to render our dearly beloved country unconquerable, by studying the experiences we have made today and allowing themselves to be guided by them.

But I had yet another duty to fulfil, namely, to take part personally in the fight, to join the ranks of the army and to carry on the fight myself. I consider that I also fulfilled this duty well within the limits of possibilities, although accidentally I broke one of my ribs. I held no military rank until after the battle on the Sakarya. After it was over the Grand National Assembly promoted me to the rank of Marshal, with the title of "Gazi." You are aware that the military rank conferred on me by the Ottoman Government had been taken away from me by the same Government.

*

* *

The Agreement of Ankara after the battle on the Sakarya signifies the satisfactory redemption of our relations with the West. This agreement was signed at Ankara on the 20th October, 1921. I will now give you a short account so that you may have an idea of the situation. You know that after the London Conference in which a special deputation of ours, under the leadership of Bekir Sami Bey, had taken part, the Greek offensive had been repulsed ending in our second victory at İnönü.

Then followed a lull in the military position for some time. We had concluded the Treaty of Moscow with Russia by which the position in the East had been made clearer. We thought it desirable to come to an understanding with the Entente countries who seemed to be inclined to respect our national principles. We attached special importance to the liberation of the districts of Adana and Antep from foreign occupation.

We noticed that the French, who occupied these Turkish provinces as well as Syria, were also inclined for various reasons to come to an understanding with us. Although the agreement made between Bekir Sami Bey and M. Briand — an agreement that was found to be unacceptable by the National Government — had been rejected, neither the French nor ourselves showed any desire to continue the hostilities. The attempt was made, therefore, on both sides to get into touch with one another.

The French Government had at first unofficially sent M. Franklin Bouillon, the former Minister, to Ankara. For about two weeks I negotiated with him myself in the presence of Fevzi Paşa and Yusuf Kemal Bey, the Foreign Minister, after M. Franklin Bouillon had arrived at Ankara on the 9th June.

After a private conversation for the purpose of making our mutual acquaintance, we had our first meeting in my quarters near the railway station at Ankara on Monday, the 13th June. After we had begun to exchange our views at this meeting the question before us was to define what should be the starting of our negotiations. I suggested that on our side it should be the National Pact. M. Bouillon pointed out the difficulties that would arise from a discussion about this and suggested the Treaty of Sèvres. Then he remarked, as though it were a foregone conclusion, that it would be advisable if we took the agreement that had been made in London between Bekir Sami Bey and M. Briand as the basis of our negotiations, reserving discussion on the points which were in contradiction to the Pact. To support this proposal, he asserted that our plenipotentiaries had not spoken about the National Pact in London, and, moreover, that nobody in Europe or even

in Istanbul had yet sufficiently grasped the sense and real bearing of the Pact and the national movement. In my reply I remarked that a New Turkish State had arisen from the old Ottoman Empire, that it must be recognised, and that this New Turkey would, in any case, secure for herself the recognition of her rights in the same manner as the rights of any independent nation. "The Sèvres Treaty," I said, "is such a death sentence for the Turkish nation that we demand that its very name shall not be mentioned by anybody who calls himself our friend. Its name must not be referred to in the course of these negotiations. We cannot enter into confidential relations with countries that have not banished the Sèvres Treaty from their minds. In our eyes this Treaty does not exist. If the leader of the Turkish Delegation which went to London has not spoken to this effect, it signifies that he has not acted in accordance with the instructions and within the compass of the full powers which were given him. He has made himself guilty of a mistake. We are well aware that this mistake has led to unfavourable impressions in Europe and particularly in the public opinion of France. If we were to follow the same course as Bekir Sami Bey, we would be committing a similar error. It is impossible that Europe is ignorant about our National Pact. It must have been brought to its knowledge. Europe and the whole world, however, witnessing how we have been shedding our blood for years, must surely have reflected on the causes of these sanguinary struggles. There is no truth in the assertion that Istanbul knows nothing about the Pact and the national struggles. The population of Istanbul together with the whole of the Turkish nation are fully informed and entirely approve of these struggles. The persons who seem not to support it, and all those who allow themselves to be influenced by them, are only a small group and are known to the nation."

In reply to my statement that Bekir Sami Bey had exceeded his instructions, M. Franklin Bouillon asked whether he might speak about this subject. I told him that he could do so to whomsoever he wished. Then he tried to make excuses so as not to be obliged to depart from the agreement made with Bekir Sami Bey. He maintained that the latter had never spoken of the existence of the Pact nor of having been instructed to keep within the limits of this Pact. If he had done so, they could have discussed and acted as the necessities of the situation demanded, but considering the present state of affairs the question had become a much more difficult one. He added that public opinion would inquire: "Why have these Turks never had this question put forward by their representative? Now they are trying continually to raise new question."

After long negotiations, M. Franklin Bouillon finally proposed that the

discussion should be adjourned so that he could read the Pact and grasp its meaning. Then the Articles of the Pact were read, one after the other from the beginning to the end, and after that been done the negotiations were resumed. The Article that delayed us most was the one that referred to the abolition of the Capitulations and our complete independence. M. Franklin Bouillon remarked that these questions required more thorough study and deeper consideration. My explanations on this point may be condensed thus: "The attainment of our full and complete independence is the very essence of the mission we have taken upon ourselves. It is the duty we have undertaken before the nation and before history. It is certain that before undertaking this obligation we have thought a great deal about the prospects for its fulfilment. But in the end we are convinced that we shall succeed in our enterprise. We are people who have learned how to be practical and to face things in a proper manner. As a result of the faults committed by our predecessors, our nation, nominally independent, found itself in reality subject to numberless restrictions in its actions.

"Everything invented hitherto with the object of depicting Turkey in the eyes of the civilised world as bristling with faults has its origin in this false impression and the consequences produced by it. To be governed by this error can only result in the country and the nation being deprived of their dignity and their vitality. We are a nation that wants to live and that desires to do so in full possession of our dignity and honour. We cannot be content to see ourselves deprived of these attributes because we succumb to an error. All the individuals constituting our nation, whether ignorant or educated, have without exception rallied around one principle, perhaps even without being conscious of the difficulties lying before them, and they have resolved to shed the last drop of their blood to carry out what they have to do in order to defend it. This principle is the attainment and maintenance of our full independence. Whoever speaks of complete and full independence means thereby unlimited independence: political, economic, legal, military, cultural, and the rest. If in any of these spheres of independence there should be something lacking, it would be equivalent to saying that the country has not yet gained its independence in the fullest meaning of the word. We do not believe that we can enjoy peace and rest until we have achieved this aim. We may conclude peace and enter into purely formal agreements; but our nation will never be at rest nor mistress of her own existence under a peace or an agreement which does not bestow complete independence on her. It could never happen that the nation would have given up the material of struggle and consented to their destruction. But if they would have been

inclined to be satisfied with such conditions as these, why would they have gone on fighting for two years?

"On the day of the Armistice they could have taken refuge behind a condition of inactivity and pacification."

M. Franklin Bouillon's observations in reply to my elucidations showed his seriousness and sincerity. In the end he expressed his conviction that after all it was only a question of time.

For many a long day we carried on an exchange of views with M. Franklin Bouillon on a number of questions, some important and others of a minor character. I believe that at length we arrived at the stage of knowing one another as we really were in regard to our thoughts, sentiments and characters. But some time had to elapse before we could settle the points for a final understanding between the National Government and the French Government. What was to be expected? Perhaps, that the national existence ought to be confirmed by something still more impressive than the two battles at İnönü?

The Agreement of Ankara signed by M. Franklin Bouillon after he had obtained the final consent of his Government is a document which, as I have already pointed out, actually came into force on the 20th October, 1921, thirty-seven days after the great battle on the Sakarya. Thanks to this agreement, valuable parts of our country were freed from occupation without the slightest measure of our independence in political, economic, military or any other regard being sacrificed. Through this agreement our national efforts were for the first time admitted and formulated by a Western Power. M. Franklin Bouillon came to Turkey again several times later, and each time took an opportunity to express the friendly feelings which had been established between us from the very beginning at Ankara.

*

* * *

Gentlemen:

In the introduction to my general statements I spoke about the Pontus question. Everybody can read the requisite information about it in the documents concerning it. As, however, this question has done us a great deal of harm I will refer once more to several points which I consider it necessary to mention.

Since the year 1840, that is to say, nearly three-quarters of a century ago, there were some Greeks who were engaged in reviving the old forms of Hellenism on the Black Sea, between Rize and the Bosphorus. A Greek monk named Klematios, who had emigrated to the United States and had returned, founded the first institution on a hill that is to-day called Manastir (convent) at İnebolu, which served as a meeting place of the adherents of the Pontus persuasion. The members of this institution appeared from time to time in the form of separate bands of brigands. During the World War, the Greek villages in the neighbourhood of Samsun, Çarşamba, Bafra, and Erbaa had nearly all been turned into arsenals containing rifles, ammunition, bombs and machine-guns, which had been sent from foreign countries and distributed among them.

After the Armistice had been concluded, the Greeks, impelled by the Hellenistic ideal, assumed an arrogant and provocative attitude nearly everywhere.

Prepared morally by the propaganda of the "Ethniki Hetairia" and the American institutions at Merzifon, and encouraged materially by the foreign countries who supplied them with arms, the mass of the Greeks, on the other hand, began to cast amorous glances in the direction of an independent Pontic State. Led by this idea, the Greeks organised a general massacre, seized the mountain heights and began to carry on a regular programme under the leadership of Yermanos, the Greek Metropolitan of Amasya, Samsun and the surrounding country.

On the one hand, Tokamanidis, the leader of the Greek Komitacis of Samsun, who was manager of the Tobacco Régie in that town, began to get into touch with Central Anadolu. Certain foreign Powers promised to aid in the erection of a Pontic State; they collected the Armenians and the Greeks living in Russia at Batum with the intention of sending them into the district of Samsun to reinforce the ranks of the Greek population. After equipping these individuals with the arms taken from Turkish troops in the Caucasus, which had been stored at Batum, they proceeded to land them on our shores. In this manner several thousand Greeks were collected at Sohum with the intention of committing robberies, and a certain Charalambos was put at the head of them. Those who had been assembled at Batum were taken to Charalambos to reinforce his band.

The whole of this rebel band was under the protection of some foreign representatives at Samsun who were also busy arming these men. After the members of these bands had been landed on our shores, they were provisioned

and equipped by certain foreign Powers under the pretence that steps were necessary for the provisioning of the emigrants. On the other hand, it was perfectly clear that the foreign officers who had arrived with the deputations of the Red Cross had been ordered to form organisations and undertake the military instruction and training of the members — in short, to lay the foundations of the future Pontic State.

In a leading article on the 4th March, 1919, the newspaper "Pontus," which made its appearance in Istanbul, announced that the aim of their endeavours was the erection of a Greek Republic in the Vilayet of Trabzon. On the 7th April, 1919, the anniversary of Greek Independence, meetings were organised to be held everywhere in the country and especially at Samsun. The insolent intrigues of Yermanos completely revealed the Greek plans. The Greeks living in the district of Bafra and Samsun continued to hold meetings in their churches, augmented their organisations and supplemented their equipment. On the 23rd October, 1919, Istanbul was proclaimed to be the centre of the movement for "Eastern Trakya and the Pontus." Venizelos, postponing the settlement of the question of Istanbul, held that all efforts should be directed to the foundation of a Pontic State and had given instructions to this effect to the Patriarch in Istanbul.

Simultaneously Alexandros Simbrakakis, who was commissioned with the organisation of the secret Greek police in Istanbul, had sent a Greek corps of officers to Samsun on board the Greek torpedo boat Eiffel with instructions to organise the gendarmerie at Pontus. At the time that this was taking place in Turkey, a Greek Government under the name of the "Greek Pontic Government" was formed on the 18th December, 1919, at Batum, which on its side also undertook the formation of organisations. A congress of the Greeks of the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Southern Russia took place on the 19th July, 1919, at Batum, to discuss the Pontic Question. The memorandum drafted at that congress was sent by a member of it to the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul. Towards the end of the year 1919, the members of the Pontic organisation redoubled their activities and began to work quite openly, thereby compelling us to take decisive steps.

The Pontic organisation which had been formed in the mountains was composed in this manner:

- A. Bands of armed men under the command of a number of leaders.
- B. Elements capable of production among the Pontic population, whose occupation was to provision them.

C. Administrative and police organisations and transport columns, whose duty it was to transport provisions from the towns and villages.

The bands were operating in different zones. At first, each band comprised six or seven thousand men. Augmented by adherents streaming in from all directions this number subsequently rose to about twenty-five thousand men. Divided into small parties, these bands entrenched themselves in different localities. The work of this mob of brigands, who occupied themselves with burning down Mohamedan villages and committing indescribable cruelties against the Turkish population, was nothing but the work of bloodthirsty brigands.

As soon as we landed in Anadolu, we warned the Turkish population to be attentive and watchful, but confined ourselves to taking precautionary steps against the threatened dangers. The IIIrd Army Corps, with its headquarters at Sivas, devoted itself exclusively to the persecution and annihilation of these bands, whose activity had been observed in different districts.

The Eftalidi band and that of "Köroğlu," who were ranging about in the district of Trabzon, as well as some others, were followed and suppressed one after another by the XVth Army Corps, which was in garrison at Erzurum. In addition to this, the population was armed and national forces formed in the districts were infested with these bands.

Besides the internal upheavals which, as you are aware, took place at Yozgat and north of Sivas, other incidents of a similar kind occurred in different districts at the end of the year 1920. Adventurers like Küçük Ağa, Deli Hacı, and Aynacioğulları fostered unrest at Zile in the centre of Anadolu; Kara Nazım and Çopur Yusuf did the same in the neighbourhood of Erbaa, whilst Deli Hasan and Küçük Hasan and the bands that had been formed by the Circassians at Yozgat and Çayözü operated elsewhere. In the beginning of the year 1921, Haydar Bey, one of the leaders of the tribe of the Koçkiri at Diyarbakır, had also risen in revolt at the instigation of Seyit Abdülkadır and with the secret co-operation of Alişan, Naki, Alişer and other kinsmen of the latter. At the same time, our troops were engaged in the suppression of these upheavals and the Greek bands.

You will remember that, after the first Greek offensive, Nurettin Paşa had expressed himself in inappropriate and senseless terms, which fact prevented us from appointing him to a command. He had also told us in a letter that he could no longer work with us and had gone to Taşköprü on leave.

Five months later some persons — for instance, His Excellency Fevzi
A Speech By Mustafa Kemal Ataturk

Pasa — apparently influenced by him, had appealed to us in his favour and had offered to guarantee on his behalf that he would perform his duty in a spirit of devotion and sincerity if we would entrust him with any appointment. Considering that it would be well on our part to amalgamate the troops which were destined to restore quiet and order in the interior of Anadolu under the order of an officer of superior rank, we resolved on the 9th December, 1920, to disband the IIIrd Army Corps at Sivas and to transfer its duties to a newly-formed "Central Army" and to give the command of it to Nurettin Paşa.

Nurettin Paşa was in command of the central districts for about a year.

However, we soon received complaints from deputies pointing out that Nurettin Paşa had abused his authority and interfered with the rights of the population. At the instigation of the Ministry of the Interior, who had found that the complaints of the population were justified, Nurettin Paşa was recalled from his command at the beginning of November, 1921, by demand of the Assembly.

The Assembly resolved to bring Nurettin Paşa before a Court of Law, and this led to a disagreement between myself and the Council of Ministers. I did not approve of the Paşa being treated in this manner. His Excellency Fevzi Paşa shared my opinion. The disagreement thus brought about between the Council of Ministers and ourselves was laid before the Assembly. I took Nurettin Paşa's part and saved him from being exposed to this humiliating treatment.

We shall see Nurettin Paşa eight months later at the head of the 1st Army.

III

Gentlemen, after the battle on the Sakarya, the chief command and the administration of the General Staff were busy at Ankara. I occupied myself at the same time with other duties. Scarcely three or four months had elapsed since those members of the Assembly who had forgotten the victory on the Sakarya and intended to persevere in their method of opposition had thrown off their masks. We had noticed that some of the persons who had formerly been interned in Malta, and who were gradually returning before the battle on the Sakarya, played the part of agitators in this question.

Allow me briefly to tell you something else also.

Rauf Bey had arrived at Ankara on the 15th October, 1921. On the 17th October we had chosen him to be Minister of Public Works, which post

had become vacant. I had also had Karavasif Bey, who had arrived at Ankara after Rauf Bey, elected member of the Executive Committee of the Party for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli. I had actually considered it advisable to make use of the services of these two men by putting one of them into the Cabinet and the other into the party.

Shortly afterwards, I heard that during a sitting of the Cabinet Rauf Bey had asked for information on a certain question. But I had heard that Karavasif Bey had raised the same question at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the party. This question, about which the two had apparently come to an understanding from the beginning, was this: "What policy has been followed from the military point of view?" What could such a question mean? What did these gentlemen want to find out? Our military and political views were already known to everybody, for they were that we should fight and conquer the enemy until we had attained our complete and absolute independence and that we would continue the war with the unshakable determination to win. In putting this question they inquired whether we were sure that we would achieve our aim by continuing the war unconditionally and whether, in prospect of the probability of a contrary result, it would not be advisable to put an end to this critical situation by adopting other steps, which they understood would be of a political nature.

Naturally, I did not allow such a question to be discussed either in the Council of Ministers or in the committee of the party.

Thereupon these two persons sent in their resignations to the Council of Ministers and the committee of the party. When Rauf Bey's resignation was read in the Assembly on the 13th January, 1922, another letter of the same kind and date arrived, and this was also read. It had come from Refet Paşa, Minister of National Defence.

I would like to tell you shortly the reasons that induced Refet Paşa to resign.

On the 4th January, 1922, the secret sitting of the Assembly was taken up with the following question: The Chief Command and the Administration of the General Staff had taken up their quarters at Ankara. This led to the conclusion that difficulties must have arisen in connection with the presidency of the Assembly and the chief command. It was stated that on account of this fact military affairs were not progressing well and that the Assembly would have to appoint a War Council to study the military situation.

As the Chief of the General Staff was at the same time President of the Council of Ministers, it was also assumed that the affairs of the General Staff

could not go on well. It was said: "Let Fevzi Paşa remain at the head of the Cabinet," and it was added that the duties of the Chief of the General Staff and of the Minister of National Defence ought to be combined in one and the same person. Refet Paşa, Minister of the latter department, personally defended the proposal in question from the tribune.

In answer to these views, I said:

"The chief command and the administration of the General Staff have acted wisely in choosing Ankara as their headquarters.

"From here the occupants of these two posts can best fulfil their dual functions. It is for them to decide when and where they will have to go when the necessity arises. There is a commander at the front who is engaged personally with the position. There is no sense in removing me from Ankara without any reason. The administration of the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defence, who are under the orders of the Chief-in-Command, constitute his headquarters. They are not two different things. The requirements of the day necessitate that Fevzi Paşa, being at Ankara, should also be the President of the Council of Ministers, because in his absence Refet Paşa has temporarily taken his place in the presidency of the Cabinet and this experiment has not proved successful.

"Anarchy had broken out in the Cabinet; it went so far that the Ministers no longer met.

"Fevzi Paşa's return had been due to complaints brought forward by the Ministers themselves. I do not see what is wrong in the Assembly appointing a commission to control our actions in regard to the army, but I must be chairman of this commission."

The commission was actually formed in the manner I had indicated. Cemal Paşa, the former Minister of War, was elected a member of it.

The opinion of Refet Paşa and those like him on other questions also had no effect. For this reason Refet Paşa, who had already been intending for a considerable time to resign, did so on the same day that Rauf Bey resigned.

*

* * *

I had the opportunity to tell you that the Party of the Defence of the Rights which we had formed in the Assembly, had consistently helped to secure the regular course of the debates in the Assembly and to prevent any interruption in the work of the Council of Ministers. On the other hand,

those who fostered sentiments and ideas that were contrary to our own hampered the work of the party in proportion as they obtained new adherents. The origin of the idea of an opposition lay in the second paragraph of the fundamental article of the regulations of the Party for the Defence of the Rights, namely, in the organisation of the State on the basis of the Constitution Act.

The last paragraph of the first article of the programme constituted a permanent obstacle to a complete reconciliation of the thoughts and feelings. The difference of opinion and the lack of discipline within the party itself was due to it. Many persons withdrew from it. Those who left made common cause with those who had remained outside the party and were energetically trying to destroy it. But the steps taken hampered it. In the end another party was formed under the name of the "Second Party."

The founders of it pretended to have maintained their connection with the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli and to pursue the aims put forward originally at the Congress.

Outwardly, Hüseyin Avni and Selahattin Bey were the leaders of this "Second Party," but it became evident that those who worked and agitated more than any others were Rauf Bey and Karavasif Bey.

Emin Bey, deputy for Samsun, one of the most energetic and obstinate members of this party, had had an opportunity a little time before to come to Ankara.

When he thoroughly understood the whole truth he began to curse the intriguers and promoters of this party.

He informed me the following: Rauf Bey was said to have been active in inciting the party to proceed to extremes. Whereupon Emin Bey had said, "the affair in which you want to involve us might bring us to the gallows. Will you be on our side then?"

Then Rauf Bey was reported to have replied: "I would be a coward if I deserted you!"

You know that according to the law then in operation I had the privilege of proposing to the Assembly candidates for the posts of Ministers. The deputies voted either for or against it or abstained from voting.

The deputies of this "Second Party" were in the habit of rejecting my candidates and preferred to vote for members whom they put up on behalf of their own party, disregarding the letter of the law and thereby interfering with the formation of the Government.

A movement hostile to the army had also been created in the Assembly. "Why," they said, "does the army not attack after months have gone by since the battle on the Sakarya? The army must go over to the attack at all costs. An attack on one part of the front, at least, must be undertaken, so that we may get an idea of its offensive strength."

We shattered this movement. We could not consent to the idea of a partial attack. As our well-defined plan consisted in carrying out a general attack which would lead to decisive results and as this plan could only be fulfilled when all our preparations were complete, we could not approve of the idea of a partial attack; besides, this would be of no use. The conviction which had been formed in the ranks of the opposition was to the effect that our army would not succeed in being strong enough to carry out an attack.

In this way the opposition impeded the movement which aimed at an attack and, changing their tactics, they advanced another theory. They said: "Our real enemy is neither Greece nor the Greek army. Even if we were to succeed in completely defeating them, our cause would not have been improved. We have yet to beat the Entente Powers — especially England. For this purpose we must leave a screen in front of the Greek army, concentrate our main forces in Eastern Irak and attack the English. This is the only thing left for us to do if we uphold the theory of achieving the success of our cause by force of arms."

These ideas, as senseless as they were illogical, were not favourably received. Then the leaders of the opposition began a new propaganda: "Where are we going to?" they demanded. "Who is leading us and whither are we being led? Towards the unknown? Is it right to drive the whole nation recklessly towards dark and uncertain goals?" This propaganda emanated from the body of the Assembly itself and from Ankara circles and penetrated into the ranks of the army.

Attempts to instil these malicious ideas into the army in all manner of ways were carried on. Rauf Bey very often said in confidence: "At least tell me about the actual position. How is the army going on? Will it really be in a position to attack?"

I had fixed my departure from Ankara to inspect the front for the evening of the 4th March, 1923. On this occasion I made certain statements on the same day and made several requests to the Assembly at a secret sitting. I explained that after the general action on the Sakarya it was not the whole army that had followed the enemy to the main line Eskişehir —

Seyitgazi — Afyonkarahisar but only our cavalry and one division that had been pushed forward to act as a reserve to support the army.

The army is determined to attack, but we are still postponing the moment for it because we still require time fully to complete our preparations. To depend upon half measures and only to be partially prepared for an attack is worse than not to attack at all. It is not advisable to explain our waiting attitude by saying that we had abandoned our determination to attack or that we were doubtful whether we would be able to launch our attack.

After explaining this, I made the following remarks:

"The Ottomans, having seen themselves forced to retire after they had reached the gates of Vienna, because they did not understand how to show wisdom and precaution to the extent that the magnitude of their enterprises demanded, allowed themselves to be led by their sentiments and their ambition. Consequently, they could not maintain their position in Buda Pesth. They retired further, were defeated at Belgrad and were forced to retreat from there also. They abandoned the Balkans. They were driven out of Rumeli. They left us this country invaded by the enemy as a heritage. Let us put aside our sentiments and passions; let us show ourselves to be at least cautious in defending what remains to be saved of this our country's territory. To safeguard our salvation and our independence there can, first and last, be only one single way, one single resolution, and that is to defeat the enemy and to dedicate the entire strength of our souls to this object.

"No faith nor importance should be attached to words or advice that could produce a destructive influence on our nervous system. The mental attitude which has developed under the governmental system and under the policy of the Ottoman régime is deplorable. The independence of a country can never be secured by following advice that is tendered by foreign countries with the intention of raising the belief that an enterprise such as ours cannot be crowned with success by the army, by war, or by pertinacity. History has not recorded a single instance of this kind. There is no doubt that those who allow themselves to be guided by contrary opinions will find themselves face to face with fatal consequences. In this way Turkey in each century, each day and each hour, has declined and degenerated more and more, because there were men who permitted themselves to be misled by erroneous ideas of this description.

"If this decline had only been felt materially, it would have been of no importance. But, unfortunately, we can observe moral consequences also.

There is no doubt that this was the main factor that brought this great country and this great nation to their downfall."

At the time of which I am speaking those members of the Assembly who were most troublesome and showed the greatest pessimism were exactly those, as you are aware, who had formerly held the opinion that the Turkish people could not obtain their independence by their own power.

These were the people who had insisted on demanding a mandate from this or that country. This is what moved me to continue my remarks as follows:

"Material and, particularly, moral failure begin to take shape in fear and incapacity. Weak and faint-hearted people influence the nation in a manner that draws them into passivity in face of every catastrophe and that leaves them no energy for action. In their weakness and hesitation they go so far as to humiliate themselves by repeating to themselves, 'We are no men; we cannot become men. There is no possibility of doing so with our own strength. Let us entrust our destiny unreservedly and unconditionally to some foreigner'.

"Those who were at the head of the nation and, chiefly, of the army after the Balkan war were of the same mental calibre, although this evinced itself in another form.

We must rescue Turkey from the hands of those who choose the wrong road and lead her to her destruction and her downfall. There is only one truth that can help this aim, a truth that has already been discovered and that consists in inspiring the thinking minds in Turkey with a new faith and impressing on them a more elevated moral outlook.

"It only remains for me now to explain to you what are the military means we have to prepare or reinforce before we can carry out our final determination of attacking the enemy.

"I want to see our preparations assured in three directions.

"The first of them, the principal and most important one, is the nation itself; it is the steadfastness of the endeavours firmly rooted in the spirit and soul of the nation for a free and independent existence. In proportion as the nation will express these endeavours by increased strength, they will also give proof of a stronger will and faith in their fulfilment, and I shall be convinced that I possess the means to deal with the enemy.

"The second consists in the will and the courage which the Assembly, the representative of the nation, show in the manifestation of their national efforts and the decisive execution of the measures resulting therefrom.

"We dispose of a superiority in means compared with the enemy, which becomes more apparent in the extent to which the Assembly will develop the national efforts in a pronounced spirit of decision and unity.

"The third is our army, comprising the armed sons of a nation confronting the enemy.

"We can imagine the front which these three causes present against the enemy in two ways. To make my thoughts easier for you to appreciate, I shall speak separately of the inward front and the outward front. The more essential one is the inward front. This is the front which is formed by the whole country and the entire nation. The outward front is the armed front of the army which opposes the enemy directly. This front may waver and undergo change; it may be broken through. But such a possibility can never result in the annihilation of a country or a nation. The factor which is of vital importance is the destruction of the inward front which leads to the crumbling of the country to its very foundations and which may reduce the nation to slavery. The enemies, who know this truth better than we, have been working for centuries and are still working for the purpose of destroying this front. So far they have been successful in this. It is, indeed, much easier to take a fortress by attacking it from the inside than to assault it from outside.

"We can assert that there are influences and factors of corruption that have been able to reach us personally for this purpose.

"It is barely possible or probable that our inward and outward front can be shaken so long as the mentality, the actions and attitude of the Assembly are not such as to encourage the enemy. We cannot be in any doubt of the fact that they will even seek means to utilise the pessimistic speeches which have been made by one or more members in the Assembly. Among the documents in the Foreign Ministry there are many which give evidence of this. I emphatically maintain that as long as any hope, even involuntarily, is given to the enemy the national cause will suffer delay thereby."

After making these statements I requested the Assembly especially to avoid any public discussion which could produce discouragement in the army while I was at the front.

Then I listened to the statements of the deputies belonging to the opposition. One of them considered that my tone was too commanding. Another imagined that he felt some doubt in my words as to the integrity of the feelings of the Assembly. A third told me at last that: "The impossible is not realisable. You will push the army into disaster."

I will not detain you too long with the speeches of the opposition, for they were nothing but an echo of the twaddle of misguided and ignorant brains. On the whole the Assembly had received my explanations favourably. I had been trying in vain for five or six days to find a way to reply to the observations of the commander on the eastern front.

However, I sent this reply before I went to the front, that is to say, on the 4th March, 1922. To help you to understand this I will first read you the observations of the commander on the eastern front:

Personal.

18th February, 1922.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Commander-in-Chief.

I have just heard of the debates on the organisation of our administrative affairs. I consider that the most important thing to be done now during the elections which will follow the restoration of peace is to prevent the Conservatives from replacing to any great extent the valuable men we have.

If the Assembly does not comprise prominent personages among its members, two great obstacles to the resuscitation of the country from its present ruin will result. Primarily, the thought of revival will not gain ground; and further, the most important legislative projects will be rejected without discussion, under the influence of some sentiment or other.

I believe that it would be well to counterbalance an Assembly composed in this way by a second Assembly consisting of specialists of great merit.

This second Assembly would have a kind of compensating influence over the first and lead it on the way progress.

Resolutions of vital importance, whether declined or agreed to by the first Chamber of Deputies, would be balanced by the proposals of the second Chamber and the evil would thus be averted.

So as not to re-awaken memories of the Senate of the former régime the second Assembly might be called the "Council of the Great Specialists", or any other suitable name.

Its members could be elected in the same way as the deputies but under certain conditions, such as, for instance, the attainment of the highest degree of knowledge in the profession concerned or the exercise of a representative position in Turkey, such as that of a Vali or a military commander.

By studying the systems in other countries we shall be able to settle all the details of the question. As soon as the formation of the "Council of

"Specialists" is agreed upon, committees belonging to each Ministry, such as that of War, Public Works, etc., could be formed consisting of members appointed by this Council.

In order to put our programme on a firm basis approved of by both Chambers, not losing sight of the aim in view while this programme is being carried out, I consider that the formation of these committees is an absolute necessity.

Otherwise, the programme, as well as the persons who are appointed to carry it out, will be changed each time there is a change of Ministers. Besides, every resolution which does not emanate from the competent department of the Council of Specialists will give rise to criticism. The nation must take this question into serious consideration.

The Assembly has the right to accept or reject every motion that is laid before it, as well as to examine it in the name of the nation. However, this has nothing to do with what the "Council of Specialists" will do nor with what they will decide upon.

These considerations and this uneasiness refer to the time when normal conditions will be restored to the country. I beg you to let me know what you think about this matter.

Kâzim Karabekir
Commander of the Eastern Front.

Personal.

4th March, 1922.

To His Excellency Kâzim Karabekir Pasa.

Reply to your telegram in cipher of the 18th February, 1922.

Your Excellency's opinion regarding the question of the inconvenience resulting from the absence of a Council consisting of specialists, whose duty it is to examine the resolutions of the Grand National Assembly, the only supreme power which has the general administration of the country in their hands, is in principle completely justified.

It would, however, be irreconcilable with the spirit of the principles followed by us in the general administration to subject the main resolutions of the Grand National Assembly, which has been or shall be elected by the nation as the guardian of their rights and authority, to the control of another body, although this might not be called a Senate.

In case this "Council of Specialists" were to be elected, as you suggest,

in the same way as the deputies by the nation, we would have two supreme powers which would derive the same identical authority from the same source. The fact that both these powers would exert an influence on the general administration of the country simultaneously would produce a kind of dualism, and lead to confusion in the legal as well as in the practical sphere, which would necessitate the appointment of a third power, encroaching on the life and the rights of the nation, whose work would be to restore the equilibrium in such circumstances.

In my humble opinion, the only way to obviate the dissensions foreshadowed by you is to take care that the members of the Assembly shall be elected as far as possible from among distinguished men and experts and to watch that very special importance is put on the internal organisation of the Assembly for the election of members of committees on questions regarding their knowledge and experience.

Our present system of Government, which has been established under the influence of the consequences of our tragic past, is best adapted for the administration of the nation and represents the most reasonable form from the point of view of constitutional rights.

If we strengthen this system of government and show ourselves watchful during the elections, we shall have created an administrative machine that will produce the happiest results in the sphere of national revival and development now and in the future.

Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of
Turkey.

Gentlemen:

Official and non-official relations with different Powers took place during the course of the year 1921. Turco-Russian relations developed very favourably.

In addition to the French, we came into touch with the Italians and the English. Let me mention a matter here which led to a misunderstanding in June 1921. On the 3rd June two officers, Major Henry and Major Sturton, who according to their assertion belonged to the suite of General Harrington Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, arrived on board a motor-boat. They requested me on behalf of the General to go on board a torpedo-boat from İnebolu to General Harrington's yahı on the Bosphorus and come to an agreement with him about the foundation of peace. They said that England

had recognised our complete independence and that the Greeks would be taken away from our territory; moreover, added that it would be possible to discuss other questions as well.

I replied to these officers that I would not go to Istanbul and that it would be more appropriate if General Harrington came to Inebolu to have an interview with Refet Paşa, who was there at that moment.

On the 18th June a telegram came from Hamit Bey in Istanbul. It ran as follows:

"An Englishman who holds an official position here has appealed to me in the name of the highest English authority in Istanbul and has asked me to inform his Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa that the English are willing to enter into negotiations for a speedy peace, that they are desirous with this aim in view to enter into communication with his Excellency, and that they are expecting an immediate reply."

Homit Bey answered that we were prepared to enter into negotiations.

On the 5th July an English torpedo-boat arrived at Zonguldak bringing me a letter from General Harrington. This letter, the translation of which was wired to me at Ankara, was worded thus:

"According to Major Henry's communication, your Excellency desires to have an interview with me and to make certain statements to me in conversation as one soldier to another.

"That being so, I have been authorised by the British Government to leave on board the English cruiser Ajax to meet your Excellency at Inebolu or Izmit on a day that it will be convenient to you to arrange.

"If you desire it, I am perfectly ready to have a completely clear and frank exchange of views with you about the situation. I am authorised to listen to your considerations and lay them before the English Government for examination. But I have no official authority either to negotiate with you or to discuss matters in their name.

"The meeting will have to take place on board the English cruiser. Your Excellency will be received with the honours due to your rank and will enjoy complete freedom until you return to land.

"If you agree to this, will you please inform me of the date and hour which would suit you?"

Judging from the contents of this letter, it would appear that it was I who had expressed the desire of getting into touch with General Harrington

and to speak to him. In reality, this was not at all the case. Consequently, I sent the following reply to General Harrington:

"I have received the translation to-day of the letter you sent to Zonguldak.

"I feel obliged to call your attention to the following points to avoid our meeting being based on a misunderstanding.

"Major Henry and his friends who arrived at İnebolu on the 13th June had declared that your Excellency is desirous of having a conversation with me about the principles laid before Refet Paşa by Major Henry. And this is actually confirmed by the letter to your Excellency from the Major, a copy of which signed by him has been placed at our disposal.

"This was the prelude to the direct correspondence which has been carried on between us.

"Your Excellency is cognisant of our national demands. I declare myself ready to enter into negotiations, provided that the deliverance of our national territory from the presence of its enemies and the recognition of our complete independence in political, financial, economic, military, legal and cultural respects will be agreed to.

"For reasons explained by Major Henry, we believe it appropriate that the negotiations should take place at İnebolu and on land, where the most agreeable reception will be prepared for your Excellency.

"I await your reply, which I hope will state whether we are in agreement on the opinions mentioned above.

"If your Excellency has no other purpose in view than to exchange opinions about the situation, I shall send my comrades for the interview."

No reply was sent to this letter. On the 7th July Mr. Rantigan, the English chargé d'affaires, told Hamit Bey, whom he had seen in Istanbul, that General Harrington had advised Major Henry, who had come to Anadolu as a merchant, to inquire about the health of the English prisoners and, if possible, to learn from me, Mustafa Kemal Paşa, whether the efforts in Istanbul would still continue, but that Major Henry had no authority to undertake any other steps.

Until August, 1922, we had no serious relations with the Western Powers in a concrete form. We had the permanent and firm conviction that we could not flatter ourselves that there was any hope of success in a diplomatic way until we had driven the enemy out of our territory by force of arms.

and had given evidence of our national existence and our national strength by deeds.

It was natural to admit that this was the most reasonable conviction we could have at that time and subsequently.

It is for the individual just the same as for a nation a futile attempt to demand consideration before actual proof of power and capability has been afforded. Those who fail to furnish this proof will not meet with any consideration.

Only those who are possessed of these qualities can claim humane, just and generous treatment.

The world is an arena of trials. After so many centuries, the Turkish nation finds itself again subject to trials. This time they are of an especially hard nature. Were we permitted to reckon on benevolent treatment without any hope of being successful? While preparing ourselves seriously for this kind of trial which we had to undergo before the whole world, we thought it well not to lose sight of the position and mentality of the spectators. We had, as you know, first sent Yusuf Kemal Bey, who was Foreign Minister at that time, for this purpose to Europe and later on Fethi Bey, Minister of the Interior.

We entrusted Yusuf Kemal Bey, who was to go to Europe via Istanbul, with some private affairs which he was to settle in that town.

One thing, for instance, was that he should have a conversation with İzzet Paşa and his colleagues, and with Vahdettin also if he considered that this was really necessary. He was to propose to the latter that he should recognise the National Assembly and impress upon İzzet Paşa and his colleagues the necessity of proceeding in a way that was indicated by the aim we had in view.

Yusuf Kemal Bey acted in Istanbul within the limits of his instructions but, unfortunately, he was misled by İzzet Paşa and his colleagues, who took him to the Sovereign as a petitioner.

But not satisfied with this, the Cabinet, for the purpose of confusing and rendering more difficult Yusuf Kemal Bey's work in Paris and London, sent İzzet Paşa before his own departure (Yusuf Kemal Bey's) to these cities, enabling him to travel through the territory occupied by the Greeks.

İzzet Paşa kept his journey a secret till the last moment.

Yusuf Kemal Bey's interviews in Paris and London were of no avail. It was only stated that the Foreign Ministers of the Entente would meet at a Conference in a short time and that they would make us peace proposals. Although the evacuation of Anadolu had been agreed to in principle, it was apparently necessary that we should conclude an armistice with the Greeks, because the steps for the conclusion of peace would be doomed to failure if war were resumed during the negotiations at the Conference. Yusuf Kemal Bey, who was informed of this by Lord Curzon, replied that a resolution of the Conference prescribing the evacuation of Anadolu beforehand, which would be communicated to both the interested parties, would be more effective than the armistice. But Lord Curzon insisted on the necessity of the armistice and asked Yusuf Kemal Bey to move the Government to this effect and to inform him of the answer that he would get.

Before Yusuf Kemal Bey's return on the 22nd March, 1922, the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Entente proposed an armistice to the Turkish and Greek Governments.

At this time I was at the front. I was informed of this proposal by Celâl Bey, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The outlines of the proposed armistice were these: A demilitarised zone of ten kilometres was to be established between the forces of both sides. The troops were not to be reinforced by men or ammunition.

No alteration was to be made in the position of the troops. Warlike material also was not to be transported from one place to another. Our army and our military position was to be under the control and inspection of the Military Commissions of the Entente. We were loyally to accept the decisions of these Commissions.

Hostilities would be suspended for a period of three months. This period would automatically be extended for three months longer until the preliminaries of peace had been accepted by both parties.

In the event of one of the belligerents desiring to recommence operations, it would have to give notice to the other party, as well as the representatives of the Entente, at least a fortnight before the expiration of the armistice.

The Greeks immediately accepted this armistice. The Greek army had been both materially and psychologically defeated on the Sakarya. It was difficult for this army to tempt fortune again and undertake an attack on a wide scale. It was surely easy for everybody to realise the fact that it was impossible to employ the Greek army in operations with the idea that they

could lead to a decisive result: It was a very serious matter for us to agree that our army, to prepare which we had been working for nearly a year, should be placed in a state of inactivity and that the National Government should be left in a state of suspense after their hopes had been raised to such a pitch, for we thereby ran the risk that during the intervening time the National Government and our army might become demoralised.

Consequently, we studied the conditions of the armistice which the Entente Powers proposed for the evacuation of Anadolu and the solution of the Orient question with the greatest care.

The first thing we did was to put ourselves into direct communication at the telegraph instrument with the Council of Ministers at Ankara for the purpose of exchanging views. The first reply which we considered expedient to give to the representatives of the Entente through our representative in Istanbul, in the name of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was as follows:

"I have received today, the 24th March, at . . . o'clock the Note containing the proposal of the armistice, which is in continuation of your telegram of the 23rd March. I have communicated its contents concerning the position at the front to the Commander-in-Chief at the front and have requested him to inform us of his views before I lay it before the Council of Ministers or, if necessary, before the National Assembly.

"Will you inform the representatives of the Entente Powers of this, and tell them that in conformity with their wish I will send them the reply of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as soon as possible?"

On the 24th March I informed the President of the Cabinet of my opinion by telegram, as follows:

"In the first place, it would be inadvisable to answer by a refusal or in a manner that betrays disinclination or distrust of the proposed armistice which the Foreign Ministers have jointly suggested. On the contrary, we must favourably consider the proposal of an armistice. Consequently, our answer must be in the affirmative and not in the negative. If the Entente Powers have no good intentions, it is for them later on to take up a negative attitude.

"If we cannot consent to the conditions proposed, we will make counter-proposals."

On the following day, the agencies and telegrams referring to the Note from different sources gave the following items of news:

"It is declared in Government circles that the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has favourably received this proposal, which it is assumed has been made for the purpose of restoring peace in the Near East and of leading to the evacuation of Asia Minor without further bloodshed and devastation. It is firmly hoped that the Government, confident of the goodwill and the impartiality of the Allied Powers, will give a favourable reply.

"We hope that the proposal in question contains reasonable and practicable conditions and that the period of time foreseen for the conclusion of peace will be as short as possible."

The Council of Ministers were inclined to postpone our reply till the return of our Foreign Minister, who was in Europe. Replying that this was not necessary, I drew up my decision regarding the reply to be given, to this effect:

"We agree to the armistice on principle. However, we shall not desist for a single moment from pushing forward our preparations and improvement of the army. We do not consent to foreign Control Commissions being established over our army. We shall make conditions which can be fulfilled, provided that the armistice which we shall agree to will include the evacuation. The most essential condition is that this evacuation shall commence immediately after the armistice is concluded."

On the 24th March I sent personally at the telegraph instrument to the Council of Ministers the reply to be given to the Note.

The Council on their part had sent me a copy of the reply prepared at Ankara. I noticed certain differences between the two drafts of the reply Note.

At last we resolved to have a meeting with the Council of Ministers during the night of the 24th March at Sivrihisar and to draft the text of the reply Note.

According to a telegram in cipher which our special agent in Istanbul had sent on the 25th March to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had had a conversation with Tevfik Paşa and the latter had told him that the High Commissioners had handed a similar Note to the Government of the Padişah, with the request that it should be sent to Ankara and that they be informed of the reply received.

Our agent asked Tevfik Paşa whether the right conceded to Ankara of expressing their opinion referred only to the proposal of an armistice or

whether it embraced all other questions. Tevfik Paşa did not reply. To the question asked by our agent as to what news had arrived from İzzet Paşa, Tevfik Paşa replied: "İzzet Paşa announces that the Conference will soon meet, and he remarked that matters ought not to be driven to extremes."

The Council of Ministers returned to Ankara after having decided at Sivrihisar upon the text of the Note to be sent in reply to the proposal of the armistice. But before they had had time to send it off, a second Note arrived from the Conference of Ministers in Paris on the 26th March. This Note contained the proposals of the Entente Powers regarding the foundation of peace. The main points were the following:

"Participation in the League of Nations to protect the minority rights in Turkey and in Greece, as well as the application of the conditions laid down on this question; the creation of a home in the East for the Armenians, and participation of the League of Nations in this undertaking; the establishment of a demilitarised zone in the districts of the Gelibolu Peninsula and of the Straits to safeguard the freedom of the Straits; the settlement of the frontiers of Trakya in such a way that Rodosto will be surrendered to Turkey, Kırkkilise, Babaeski and Edirne to the Greeks; the acceptance of a system guaranteeing to the Greeks in Izmir, which remained in our possession, and the Turks of Edirne, which came under Greek sovereignty, the possibility of taking part in a fair manner in the administration of these two towns.

"Evacuation of İstanbul by the Allies after the conclusion of Peace.

"Increase of the strength of the Turkish army, which had been fixed at 50,000 men by the Sèvres Treaty, by 35,000 men, so that it would amount altogether to 85,000 men, and the transformation of the Turkish army into a waged army, as provided for by the Sèvres Treaty.

"Abolition of the Financial Commission as provided for in the draft of the Sèvres Treaty and the introduction of a system reconcilable with Turkish sovereignty for the protection of the economic interests of the Entente Powers and for securing the payment of interest to the Dette Publique, as well as the war indemnity which would be imposed upon us.

"Appointment of a Commission for the modification of the legal and economic Capitulations."

Having examined the text of the first Note of the Allied Powers for the proposal of an armistice and having heard of the conditions set out in the second detailed Note, we had naturally come to the conclusion that

these Powers, who were supported by the Government of Istanbul, had introduced a new phase in their destructive enterprise against us. In the face of this fact, the situation had to be regarded as very serious and a terrific fight was anticipated. The first thing was to explain to the nation and to the public opinion of the world the nature of the conditions which had been proposed to us. I wrote to the Council of Ministers to this effect.

Allow me to quote the essential points of the reply which we gave on the 5th April to the two Notes I have been speaking about.

We agreed in principle to the armistice; but we considered it to be an indispensable and essential condition that the evacuation should commence after the armistice had been concluded. We proposed to fix the duration of the armistice and the evacuation of Anadolu at four months and agreed that the term of the armistice should be automatically extended for three months if the preliminary Peace negotiations should not have led to any result when the evacuation was complete.

Our proposal regarding the details of the evacuation was as follows: The main line Eskisehir — Kütahya — Afyonkarahisar to be evacuated within the first fortnight from the date of the armistice; all the other occupied territories, including Izmir, to be evacuated within four months from the same date.

We made known that in case our proposals regarding the armistice were accepted by the Allied Powers, we should be inclined to send our plenipotentiaries within three weeks' to the town which would be agreed upon for the purpose of studying the Peace conditions.

We received an answer to our Note on the 15th April, 1922. This answer was, naturally, in the negative.

We replied on the 22nd of the same month. At the end of our reply we stated that even in case no agreement could be reached on the question of the armistice, it would not be desirable to postpone the Peace negotiations.

We proposed that a Conference should be held at Izmit; but this, also, produced no result. A Conference to meet at Beykoz or Venice was mentioned several times, but none of these suggestions was carried out up to the moment of our decisive victory.

The Act of the 5th August, 1921, relating to my appointment as the Commander-in-Chief, has a special history. If you like, I will give you some particulars about it.

This Act was renewed for the first time on the 31st October, 1921, for the second time on the 4th February, 1922, and for the third time on the 6th May, 1922.

Each time these renewals were accompanied by criticisms of every description from the side of the opposition.

The third renewal, in particular, took the character of rather an important incident.

During the period before the 6th May, 1922, the question of renewing this Act, which was approaching expiration, was raised in the Assembly. On account of illness, I was unable personally to be present in the Assembly. The Council of Ministers, who came to my house on the evening of the 5th May, explained the position to me and said that the deputies of the opposition did not wish that I should continue to hold the post of Commander-in-Chief.

After a long debate, the question was put to the vote. The necessary majority was not obtained, consequently the renewal of the Act was not agreed to. The Council of Ministers and especially the administration of the General Staff, as well as the Ministry of National Defence, were quite taken aback.

On account of the attitude of the Assembly, the Ministers asserted that they could no longer see what use there was in carrying on their duties, and they considered that they ought to resign.

From the moment of the vote in the Assembly, the army was without a leader.

If the Chief of the General Staff and the Ministry resigned, the outbreak of a great crisis in the general administration would be inevitable. For this reason, I requested the Chief of the General Staff and the Ministers to be patient for another twenty-four hours. For my part, I determined to continue to hold my position as Commander-in-Chief in the best interests of the country and the common cause. I informed the Council of Ministers of this resolve.

On the next day, the 6th May, 1922, I announced that I would give some explanations at a secret sitting in the Assembly. I had previously sent for the protocols of the Assembly and the arguments put forward by the

speakers who had opposed the chief command, having examined them one after the other.

So as not to weary you too much, I shall content myself with condensing the statements I made at the secret sitting I have just mentioned.

"Gentlemen," I said, "as happened when the question of the chief command and of the Act relating to it was first introduced, so there are to day some members who speak of this Act as being unnecessary; moreover, some insist it is necessary to amend it, and there are still others who even complain that there is a chief command. As you are aware, these discontented persons are always the same. I am not in favour of a superfluous office or a superfluous authority, and still less of an Act that would give full powers to an authority without responsibility."

"A close study of the general and military situation, however, is absolutely necessary to enable us to decide on the necessity or uselessness of the chief command and of the Act conferring this authority with certain full powers. Before I explain my opinion on this question, let us examine some of the statements that have been made by the speakers who have referred to the uselessness of the Act relating to the chief command."

"For instance, Salih Efendi, deputy for Erzurum, has said that I desired to usurp the rights of the Assembly and that I had done so, and he shouted out: 'We shall not abandon our good right.'

"Pardon me if I speak quite frankly. It was I who was responsible for the election of each one of you, with the far-reaching powers bestowed on you, for the formation of an Assembly disposing of extraordinary powers and for the adoption of the character of an institution determining the fate of the country through this Assembly. For the purpose of achieving this, I had to fight a storm of opinion with my comrades nearest to me. I risked my life, my existence, my honour and my dignity. It is, therefore, my own personal work and I would surely prefer to exalt it than humiliate it."

"I ask Salih Efendi at least to believe that I uphold the rights of this Assembly quite as much as he does. I do not ask for more than that."

Then I entirely rejected Salih Efendi's remark about my alleged usurpation of the full powers of the Assembly. There is no question and never can be one about this.

A motion to the effect that it would be appropriate to discuss the question of a chief command at a secret sitting had been introduced. This motion also was wrongly explained in many respects. A discussion at a public

sitting had been demanded. Mehmet Sükrü Bey, deputy for Karahisan Sahip, said that our taking refuge in a secret sitting would mean that we were trying to conceal the truth from the nation. I continued:

"Now, in the first place, I want to mention that the Grand National Assembly is not only a legislative assembly but also an executive power. But even if that were not so, in what part of the world can it be found that the resolutions concerning the affairs of the country, of the State, have ever been discussed or prematurely disclosed in public? If, above all, the question brought up for discussion concerns the Commander-in-Chief of an army facing the enemy, what national advantage would be gained by discussing it in public and letting the enemy know all that has been said for or against it?

"The authority and the influence of the Commander-in-Chief over the army must be very great, and it is most necessary that he should be held in great respect by the enemy.

"It would even do harm if my illness, to which Hüseyin Avni Bey has referred here, were to come to the knowledge of the enemy...

"Why was it necessary for him to do so? You can well see that our intention to hold a secret sitting was not in any way to conceal the truth from the nation, as Mehmet Sükrü Bey has said: I wish it were possible to discuss in public all that Mehmet Sükrü Bey shouted out and all he wished to say from the tribune, without it having an injurious effect. I wish that I, on my part, would have been able to explain and interpret to the nation the true meaning, the hidden meaning, of his words, Mehmet Sükrü Bey must know that the nation does not think as he does. He ought to know that we are not play-acting, as he pretends. No, Gentlemen, we have not assembled here to act a comedy. The man who is acting and causes others to act is Sükrü Efendi himself, but he may be sure that we shall not be caught in his trap. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to enable Sükrü Efendi to forget the humiliating circumstances under which he succeeded in escaping from prosecution by law, to which he had exposed himself through the comedy he intended to play and make others play as well.

"Hüseyin Avni Bey is said to have made use of strange expressions when he spoke about the Act relating to the chief command. It is reported that he said: 'By the way you are acting, you will lead the Assembly to be an agent for the degradation of the nation in the eyes of the world.'

"He is said to have used the word 'weakling' and to have advocated principles such as: 'Persons do not represent their offices. There are no individuals: there is only the nation.'

"Certainly the nation, the community, forms the base of all and their will is embodied in the Assembly. This is the case everywhere. But, nevertheless, there are also individuals.

"The Assembly administers the affairs of the State and of the country with the aid of individuals, of persons. It is evidently a man or men who carry on the affairs of every Government. It is futile to deny these truths by putting forward senseless theories."

Hüseyin Avni Bey continually interrupted me with stupid remarks. I warned him several times and told him that the Assembly is not a café on the boulevards, and I asked him to respect the tribune, which is, so to say, the sanctuary of the nation.

Another person who spoke was Salâhattin Bey. He stated that he had asked whether we were going to attack and that when I answered in the affirmative he had said, "No, you cannot do it"; to which he added that we had definitely decided not to attack and that he had been right.

"It appears to me, I have sufficiently explained on different occasions the reasons which have led us to postpone our attack. I repeat that we shall attack and that we shall drive the enemy out of our territory. We shall persist in this determination. There is no reason for hesitation. Salâhattin Bey has also said that our army has reached the highest degree of perfection. It is sure that our army is in an excellent condition, but it had not yet reached perfection.

"A comrade who considers himself justified in making such statements to the Assembly must be thoroughly acquainted with all military affairs, but Salâhattin Bey is far from being that. The opinion of all those who are in direct touch with the army, the opinion of all the commanders, and not mine alone, contradicts that of Salâhattin Bey. But there is no doubt that we shall succeed in bringing the army to a higher level which is worthy of their prestige. Among the important observations made by Salâhattin Bey is one in which he expressed the view that our chief work consists in politics.

"No, our real task and our main object does not concern politics. Our only duty, and that of the whole country and the whole nation, is to drive the enemy out of our country by the force of our bayonets.

"Until we have done that, politics is an empty word. But let us take Salâhattin Bey's words seriously for a moment. Is it I who stands in the way of the realisation of our cherished aim?

"Is the Commander-in-Chief an obstacle in the way of this aim? What relation do these words bear to the Act concerning the chief command? They are apparently intended to raise opposition and difference of opinion. I say that the only means to secure our national aim is war — success in war.

"All our strength, all our resources, all our possessions will be dedicated to the army. I say that we shall make our power recognised by the world at large, and only then will it be possible for us to secure an existence to the nation worthy of a human being.

"Salâhattin Bey wrongly believes that this way of thinking interferes with politics and that a solution to the question could be found by means of politics. He says, among other things, that the existence of a Commander-in-Chief is an obstacle to the estimation of the expenditure necessitated by the present military position.

"This assertion is not true. When has the Commander-in-Chief prevented the Assembly from going into the question of our financial resources?

"I have occupied myself, perhaps more than anybody else, with the question of ascertaining what degree of freedom of action is allowed to us by our revenues.

"However, I am not one of those who support the theory that the army and its strength must be in proportion to our financial means. In my opinion, the question cannot be put in this way: 'We have money, let us create an army. We have no money left, let us disband our army.'

"Whether there is money or whether there is none, what does it matter? Whether there is any or not, the army exists and will continue to exist."

"I would like to take this opportunity to tell you something that comes to my mind. In the beginning, when I had undertaken to solve the question that I am dealing with now, some persons who are regarded as wise men and thinkers, asked me: 'Have we money, have we arms?' 'No,' I replied. 'What are you going to do?' they said. — 'We shall have money,' I remarked, 'and we shall have an army, and this nation will secure its independence.'

"You all know that this has happened and will happen again in future.

"Some other gentlemen are reported to have said: 'The Commander-in-Chief imposes compulsory service on the nation; but this is prohibited by law.'

"That is quite true, but necessity and danger justify everything in my eyes. If the needs of the army demand compulsory service, we shall impose it. This is the most equitable law of all. I would not hesitate if the law were standing in my way to adopt this or that measure which I consider necessary to avoid the army being defeated.

"Karavasif Bey is supposed to have said that there were chiefs-in-command everywhere, but there was not a special Act concerning the chief command anywhere; the military laws in existence defined and limited the authority and power of the Commander-in-Chief like those of any other commander and science requires such stipulations.

"It is well known that States are administered by Governments in different ways. According to their Constitutions, they have kings, emperors, sultans at their head. Some have leaders such as presidents of a republic. In such cases the commander-in-chief is the head of the State. This person performs the duties of the commander-in-chief either personally or by deputy. According to our present form of Government the commander-in-chief is absorbed by the moral personality of the Assembly. If, therefore, the Assembly declare that they elected this or that person commander-in-chief, such declaration constitutes a law. In the same way as the declaration of the king, the sultan, the emperor is called a decree, so are the national decrees emanating from the Assembly called laws. Consequently, the law exists. The chief in command who is entrusted by an Assembly in extraordinary circumstances with an extraordinary mission is not a commander who is subject to the limitations of the penal code of the military regulations which stipulate and restrict the authority and power of the commander, as Karavasif Bey seems to think. That which, according to Karavasif Bey's opinion, is defined by science is something quite different. Science and military discipline explain and teach the soldier's profession and the qualities which must be combined in the person called upon to exercise the chief command. It is quite another thing when the commander-in-chief is chosen by the actual Lord of the Army or by his Ministers in office. That anybody who pretends to have the qualifications necessary for the chief command can reach that position by himself is a circumstance of quite other importance.

"Moreover, Karavasif Bey is reported to have said that the chief in command need not concern himself with what is happening behind the front.

This is an error. The commander-in-chief, who has to direct his attention to the actual strength of his men, their provisioning, clothing, arms, ammunition and other questions, must surely concern himself with the source of all these supplies behind the front. In what book, on what battlefield or where has Karavasif Bey discovered these ideas? It is certain that it is difficult for anybody to be occupied simultaneously with the front and with a great number of other matters behind the front. How is it possible for one man commanding at the front to conduct the military operations and secure the carrying out of a multitude of other things behind the front? Undoubtedly, he can do this. But when I say that he can do it that does not mean that he has first to give orders at the front and then go somewhere else to regulate the questions of provisioning and then again to go elsewhere to reinforce the gaps that have been made in his troops. The hesitation and confusion of such persons who have no important duties to perform is excusable. I will give you an example: I have had commanders with very little experience under me. One regimental commander, for instance, had just been promoted to the command of a division. If a divisional commander has been made commander of an Army Corps only for a very short time, he is lacking in experience. Assume that he finds himself in a critical position before he has had time to glean experience. Having been accustomed all through his service to command a single division, he will naturally feel uncertain and experience difficulties when he is called upon to command two or three divisions simultaneously in the presence of the enemy. An inexperienced commander, who would be capable of supervising and leading all the units of a division, if he has only a single one to command, would, were he compelled to conduct the military operations of two or three divisions that are out of his sight, ask himself these questions: 'To which division shall I attach myself? To this one or that? Here or elsewhere?'

"No, you will do neither. You will go to a point whence you will be able to command all of the divisions.'

"But,' he will continue to argue, 'in that case, I shall not be able to concentrate my attention on either of them.'

"Certainly you will not be able to see them, but it is not with your eyes but with your intelligence and your perspicacity that you should follow the operations.'

"Among other remarks, Karavasif Bey is said also have made the following:

"After the battle on the Sakarya we were no more able to move;

'we cannot move now.' It is reported that these words were greeted by some with shouts of 'Bravo!' and applause.

"It has been very painful and sad for me to hear this report. I have felt ashamed of it. It is, indeed, very remarkable that the speeches of a misguided man should meet with applause, a man who maintains that the army is incapable of movement and that it will not move. I ask you, let us bury these sayings here and let them not be referred to again."

"These are the most important speeches among all that have been delivered to prove the futility of the chief command. You have heard the arguments which I could put forward to contradict them.

"It is now the question for the Assembly to judge and decide upon. However, I feel obliged to call your attention to another fact: Although there is no doubt that the High Assembly is convinced of the necessity of the chief command, the unfounded manifestations of the opposition have led to a resolution which did not correspond to the one that was hoped for. What was the consequence of this? Do you know? The question of the chief command had been hanging in the balance for two days and is still undecided. The army has no commander-in-chief at the present moment. If I continue to carry on my command I shall be doing so illegally. According to the opinion expressed by the Assembly I ought to have already laid down my command. I had previously told the Government that my authority as chief-in-command had expired. I felt, however, obliged not to admit that an irreparable disaster could happen. Our army at the front could not be left without a commander. Consequently, I did not leave, and refused to; I shall never leave it in this way."

During this secret sitting, violent discussions and even quarrels took place on other questions which the deputies of the opposition were putting forward with the object of bringing about the overthrow of the Government and the dissolution of the army. Finally, the Assembly, having been duly informed, gave their decision to the effect that they agreed to the renewal of the Act relating to the chief command by 177 votes to 11, with 15 abstentions.

Three months later, on the 20th July, 1922, the Act relating to the chief command was again brought up for discussion according to the provisions of the Act. Let me quote some of the general remarks I made on this occasion:

The moral and material forces of the army have reached a degree of

perfection that allows me to feel that the national efforts will certainly be realised without it being necessary to take any extraordinary steps. Therefore, I feel convinced that it is no longer necessary to maintain the extraordinary powers. I hope that in the future no other occasion will arise when this would be considered necessary. The duties of the Commander-in-Chief can at the utmost continue till the day when we shall have attained a decisive result corresponding to the spirit of the National Pact. There is no doubt that we shall achieve this happy result. On that day our precious town of Izmir, our beautiful Bursa, our Istanbul and our Trakya will all be re-embodied in our mother-country. On that day, together with the nation, we shall live to experience the greatest happiness, and I, for my part, will also realise another joy, namely, that I shall take up the place again which I occupied on the day we began to defend our sacred cause. Is there a nobler joy than to be a free man among a free people? For those who are aware of truths, for those who know no other joys than the moral and sacred delights of the heart and conscience, material dignities, high as they may be, have no value."

These conferences ended with my being entrusted for an unlimited period with the supreme command.

*

* *

The activity shown by the opposition party in the Assembly will have to engage our attention for a little while longer.

The party known under the name of the "Second Party" still tested their strength for a long time by passive resistance. Through the Act of the 8th July 1922, relating to the election of Ministers, they secured that the Ministers and the President of the Council were elected directly by the Assembly by secret ballot. I was thus actually removed from the presidency of the Council of Ministers and the provision that the Ministers were to be elected from among the candidates which I had selected was abolished.

After the opposition party began their attack, they undertook to make Rauf Bey President of the Council and succeeded in doing this. I understood the secret designs of the opposition; nevertheless, I asked Rauf Bey to come to see me. I told him that the majority of the Assembly was inclined to elect him President of the Council and that I was myself of the same opinion. Rauf Bey gave the impression as though he hesitated. "The Presidency of the Council of Ministers," he said, "is not connected with

privileges." He intended to point out thereby that the President of the Grand National Assembly was actually President of the Council of Ministers and that the decisions of the latter could not be carried out before the consent of the former had been obtained, and that, consequently, the President of the Council had neither any special authority nor freedom of action.

As a matter of fact, this was so according to the Constitution Act. Notwithstanding this, Rauf Bey accepted the presidency of the Council and held it from the 12th July, 1922, to the 4th August, 1923.

Another point must also be brought to your attention. From the very first day Karavasif Bey and Rauf Bey are working hand in hand in the organisation of the opposition party, leading it and strengthening it. But Rauf Bey does not join the "Second Party" publicly, preferring to remain with us. This state of affairs lasted for three years. In the end, Rauf Bey sees himself obliged to reveal his dissenting opinion, when — according to his own words — he says: "There is no possibility left of keeping up the appearance of being on our side."

The movement provoked in the Assembly against the army was carried on by the opposition. The members of it constantly spoke emphatically and violently of the incapability of the army to begin the attack and the necessity of settling the question by political means.

* * *

In reality, our army was on the point of perfecting equipment and filling out its gaps. Already in the middle of June I had decided to open the attack. The commander at the front as well as the chief of the General Staff and the Minister of National Defence were the only persons who were aware of my decision. At this time I had to make a journey in the direction of İzmit — Adapazarı, and before I left Ankara I had a conversation with His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff. Then I talked to His Excellency Kâzım Paşa, who was Minister of National Defence at that time and whom I had taken with me as far as the station of Sanköy, where his Excellency İsmet Paşa, who commanded the front, had arrived at my request. We decided what was to be done to rapidly perfect our preparations for the attack.

The moment has now come to speak about the great attack. You know that the enemy's army, after the great battle on the Sakarya, had a very strong force between Afyonkarahisar and Dumlupınar. There was another strong force also in the district of Eskişehir. The reserves were concentrated

between these two forces. The right wing was protected by some divisions which were lying in the district of the Menderes and the left wing by others that were south of the lake of Iznik. It may be said that enemy's front extended from the Sea of Marmara to the Menderes.

The enemy's army comprised three Army Corps and some independent contingents. The three Army Corps consisted of twelve divisions, and the independent contingents were three divisions strong. We had formed and organised two armies out of our troops on the western front. We disposed, in addition, of several formations which were directly under the chief command. Our troops consisted in all of eighteen divisions. In addition to this, we had one cavalry corps of three divisions and two other cavalry divisions of minor strength. Although the two armies of the enemy consisted of different troops, they were equally strong comparatively in regard to the number of men and rifles. With regard to machine-guns, artillery, aeroplanes, means of transport and technical material, the Greek army was noticeably superior to ours on account of the support they received by the free industry of the whole world. On the other hand, our army was superior in number in respect to cavalry.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress one point. The commander of our second Army was his Excellency Şevki Paşa, now a member of the supreme Military Council. The command of the first Army had been transferred to İhsan Paşa, who had arrived from Malta. On account of certain of his acts, which had brought him before a court-martial, he had to be dismissed from his command. İhsan Paşa had actually behaved in a manner that was detrimental to discipline and the general administration of the army. For instance, he had created situations which would have led inferior commanders to disobey their superiors. For several days he sent in no reports about his provisions and declined to do so just at a moment when there was a general crisis taking place about provisions, when he informed us that his stores were exhausted and that those under him were in danger of starvation. We came finally to the conviction that he was capable of intriguing to such a degree that he played with the discipline and sense of duty of the army, going so far as systematically to encourage the inferior commanders to refuse obedience and to neglect their duty.

This is a characteristic instance of the behaviour of Ali İhsan Paşa: he tried to implant the idea in his army, from the lowest to the highest in rank, that he alone could settle and decide the least as well as the most important questions and to inculcate the belief that he alone had power and authority.

He had only one idea, to show everybody that he was superior to his chiefs and to discredit his superiors as to their capacity in all their official duties as well as their private conduct.

Although we have had no opportunity to find out whether he had energy of resolution and of putting his strategical capabilities and strength of nerve to test, we were satisfied that in case of any failure he continually endeavoured to exonerate himself by putting the responsibility on his subordinates or on his superiors.

Ihsan Paşa's character necessitated that we should treat him severely and officially, rather than with politeness and amiability.

I will now read you literally some paragraphs of an official report which Halit Bey, Chief of Staff (later deputy for Kastamonu) sent in before he was forced to resign, to the commander of the western front on the 20th January, 1922, relating to Ihsan Paşa's character. Halit Bey had been associated with Ali Ihsan Paşa in the Irak during the World War. The paragraphs I am referring to in this report read as follows: "... I state with real regret and sorrow that my comrade Ali Ihsan Paşa since his arrival has shown behaviour that is calculated to hurt the pride and injure the zeal of the commanders under him. As your Excellency must have observed in the correspondence, he has made such absurd remarks in his letters in regard to the front that the effects are noticeable even in the lower ranks.

"A very pronounced spirit of conceit and self-satisfaction is to be observed in his opinions. He behaves in a manner that gives the impression that he is trying to lower the authority of the headquarters at the front, which has gained the esteem and respect of the whole world. All these unfortunate facts have given me cause for reflection. I have tried to bring him to his senses as far as I could, but I have not been able to notice any important change in him... His vanity, his ambition, his jealousy, his unbounded selfishness, as well as his undisciplined speeches in the presence of his inferiors, distinctly betray his desire to be the chief. The commander of the 11th Division told me that, when he heard of my resignation, Ali Ihsan Paşa had sent several letters from Malta to Ferit Paşa, appealing for his release; in his presence he has openly advocated for hours the idea of accepting the English mandate."

Regarding Ihsan Paşa's attitude, I found that these remarks were worthy of consideration.

Besides this, we observed that Ali Ihsan Paşa behaved in a manner

which was calculated to shake the mutual confidence that must prevail in the army, literally transmitting certain reports which he received from his subordinates to the front and others which he received from the front to them. Thus, for instance, the correspondence relating to the loss of Mount Seyhelvan was forwarded to the Vth Army Corps and, on the other hand, some reports from this corps were sent to the front. Nevertheless, he put the responsibility for this on the commander of the Vth Army Corps and sent in complaints about him to the command at the front, which is irreconcilable with the dignity of a superior.

In the story of his heroic deeds which was published in the newspaper "Tevhidießkâr" he accused Lieut. Colonel Ismail Hakki Bey (he was now commanding a division at the eastern front) alone of having been guilty of the defeat of the so-called Dicle Force which had been captured at Şarkat, south of Mosul, the day before the armistice. This is also an instance of Ihsan Paşa's character.

The Dicle Force consisted of the 7th, 9th, 43rd, 18th and 22nd Regiments and a battalion of riflemen. Besides these, the 13th and 14th Regiments of the 5th Division had been captured with their full strength. The fact that 13,000 men had been taken, as well as about 50 guns, just on the eve of the armistice was the result of an order that had been given which was contrary to the requirements of the situation. This event caused the loss of the Vilâyet of Bosul. Everybody knew, however, that we were on the eve of an armistice. If this force had been ordered to retire to the position of Keyare, the English could never have defeated them and still less have made them prisoners. The 5th Division could also have joined this force, so that we should have had the eight regiments of infantry that were captured at our disposal and would not have lost Mosul when the armistice was signed. But an unworthy consideration was stronger than common sense. In his stories he attributes all the successes that were gained along the Dicle, as well as the capture of Townshend, solely to himself. His object in all his publications, in which he attributes to himself all the successes that were attained, is to mislead public opinion so as to obtain for himself a reputation and a position. It is beyond doubt that the publication of the memorable deeds of celebrated men fortifies the national pride; consequently, such publication is necessary. But it is an insult to history and an instilment of false ideas into the minds of coming generations when the deeds of persons who will be called into account by history are glorified. After having received the command of General Marshall to leave Mosul before noon on the following day lest he be made a prisoner of war, this proud Paşa,

in an official communication to the General, requested that armed motor-cars should be placed at his disposal for his protection so that he could go across the plain of Sincar to Nusaybin. And under the protection of these armed cars he actually went to Nusaybin, accompanied by Âşir Bey (now Âşir Paşa, assistant to the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of National Defence), and left me at Mosul.

He destroyed the moral authority of the Government in the eyes of the tribes. Those who witnessed these acts were considerably disturbed. He could have gone via Zaho without any escort or he could have crossed the plain with an escort of a few horsemen. At Aleppo, he demanded from the English General that a special train should be put at his disposal, and he did not hesitate to request that an escort should accompany this train so that he would not be exposed to attacks from the population during the journey. I have merely mentioned these facts as examples showing you the character of his Excellency, who sacrificed the national dignity for the sake of his life and comfort . . .

I was not in good favour with my former commander, for I neither flattered his ambition nor himself . . . The nation requires leaders who are possessed of greatness of soul and honest intentions, such as is shown by the great commanders who have understood how to create an army and to gain victories. Those who disturb union and harmony in the army and reduce its zeal are destructive persons even if they happen to be men of genius. Because I know the sufferings that have been endured and am desirous of the victory we have begun to achieve, I have taken the liberty of using this language which — I swear it on my honour and upon everything that is sacred to me — is not dictated by any ulterior or dark motives. Major Cemil Bey (now chief of the active section of the 1st Army), who had been for a long time his A.D.C. in Persia and the Caucasus, said recently that: "It was lucky that Ali İhsan Paşa was detained in Malta and was not present when the national movement began in Anadolu. If he had been, he would surely have chosen the wrong way."

Cemil Bey, who knows his character, was perfectly right . . . "I implore the Almighty that the torpid serpent will not see the sun again."

Ali İhsan Bey was also in correspondence and in close touch with the leaders of the opposition in the Assembly.

On the day following the 18th June, when I had put an end to his duties as commander and put him at the disposition of the Ministry of National Defence, reserving until later the constitution of legal proceedings against

him, that is to say, on the 19th June, I received a telegram from Rauf Bey, who was at that time Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly, which was sent off while he was personally at the instrument and which revealed his particular interest in Ali İhsan Paşa. As I have already had the opportunity of remarking, I was then travelling in the district of Adapazarı and İzmit. Rauf Bey telegraphed to me: "The rumour has been spread that Ali İhsan Paşa will be dismissed from his post as commander of the 1st Army and that he will be brought to Konya to be put before a court-martial. This rumour is strongly criticised in the circles of the Assembly . . ."

Is it not remarkable that the recall and the appointment of a commander and his being summoned to appear before a court-martial should become the subject of remarks in the Assembly in less than twenty-four hours, and that the Vice-President should take such an interest in it that he appeals to me for information? I sent Rauf Bey a fitting reply. The command of the 1st Army was to be given to an acting commander for some time, but it was necessary to appoint a new commander. I asked Fuat Paşa, who had just returned from Moscow, whether he would accept the command of 1st Army, although I was aware that he, who had been the commander at the front, would not feel inclined to serve in a subsidiary position.

Through the mediation of Kâzım Paşa, formerly Minister of National Defence, I offered the command of the 1st Army to Refet Paşa. He declined. In the end, we appointed Nurettin Paşa, who was without an appointment at that time and who had declared himself ready to serve, without any reservation or condition, under a superior officer at the front.

I spoke to you just now about the front and about the organisation of the enemy's army, as well as of the reform and reorganisation of our western troops on the basis of two main armies. Allow me now to describe to you the principal outlines of the plan for the general attack which we had prepared long before.

Our idea was to fight a decisive battle by concentrating our main forces on one flank, if possible the outer wing of the enemy's force. The arrangement which we had considered to be the right one was to concentrate the main body of our force to the south of the enemy's right wing, which was in the neighbourhood of Afyonkarahisar and the district reaching from Akarçay to the line of Dumlupınar. This was the most important and vulnerable position of the enemy. Attacking him from this side offered the prospect of bringing about a rapid and decisive result.

Ismet Paşa, who commanded the western front, and Fevzi Paşa, Chief

of the General Staff, had personally made the necessary inquiries and had examined the position from this point of view. Our plan of manoeuvring and attacking had been decided upon for a long time.

On the pretext of meeting General Townshend, who after his arrival at Konya had expressed a desire to see me, I left on the evening of the 23rd July for Akşehir, which was the headquarters of the western front. We believed it appropriate to discuss the operations in the presence of the General Staff. I went on the 24th July to Konya and returned to Akşehir on the 27th. His Excellency Fevzi Paşa had also arrived there on the 25th. When the discussions, which took place on the night of the 27th July, were over, we decided to do everything to complete our preparations before the 15th August and, according to our plan, to begin the general attack.

Pretending to let them look on at a football match on the afternoon of the 28th July, we invited the commanders of the Armies and some of the Army Corps commanders to come to Akşehir. On the night of the 28th July I, discussed the attack generally with them; and, in another discussion with the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander of the Western Front, we settled all the details of it. Kâzım Paşa, Minister of National Defence, whom we had called from Ankara, also arrived at Akşehir on the afternoon of the 1st August 1922. The steps were then agreed upon which his Ministry was to undertake in order to complete the preparations of the army.

After I had given the order to carry out these preparations and to hasten the attack, I returned to Ankara. On the 6th August, the commander of the western front gave his armies the secret command to be ready for the attack.

The Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of National Defence also returned to Ankara.

Before returning to the front there were some affairs I had still to settle at Ankara. I had not completely informed the Council of Ministers of my order for the attack. The moment had not yet arrived for me to inform them officially about the position. At a sitting which we had with the Ministers we agreed upon the question of the attack after having examined and discussed the internal and the external military situation.

Another question of equal importance still remained open. The deputies of the opposition had been successful in spreading their propaganda in which they maintained that the army was demoralised and incapable of any action,

and that hope, under such dark and doubtful conditions, would end in a catastrophe. It must be admitted that the reaction produced by this opinion was rather favourable in so far that the enemy was deceived about the actual course of our preparations, which I was anxious carefully to conceal from the enemy. But this hostile propaganda had begun to exercise a fatal influence on persons who were most convinced of the correctness of our opinions and who were nearest to us, and it gave rise to a certain amount of uncertainty also in them.

I considered it necessary to calm them to enlighten them about the attack and to spread my conviction that we would be able to defeat the enemy's main forces in six to seven days. Then I left Ankara. The Chief of the General Staff had left for the front before me, on the 13th August. My departure took place several days later. I kept it a secret from the whole of the town of Ankara.

Those who knew about it — they were only a very few — had to behave as though I was still there. They had even to publish in the papers that I had given a tea at Çankaya. You must have heard of it at that time. I did not make use of the railway. I left during the night by motor-car to cross the salt desert to Konya. I had announced my arrival at Konya by telegraph. On my arrival I put the telegraph office under control and made sure thereby that my presence at Konya was not announced anywhere.

At 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th August, I was at the headquarters of the western front, namely at Akşehir. After a short consultation, I ordered the commander of the front to open the attack in the forenoon of the 26th August, 1922.

During the night of the 20th August I also invited the commanders of the Ist and the IInd Armies to come to the headquarters of this front.

In the presence of the Chief of the General Staff and the commander of the front I explained my point of view concerning the details of the attack, illustrating them on a map in the manner of a war-game. Then I renewed the order I had given on the same day to the commander of the front.

The commanders set to work at once. Our attack was intended to develop, both strategically and actually, in the nature of a surprise. For the purpose of bringing it to a successful issue, the greatest attention had to be paid to the secrecy of the concentration and disposition of our troops. For this reason, all the movements were to be made at night and our troops had to rest by day in the villages and under the shade of trees. So that we should not attract the enemy's attention by road-making and similar work,

we had to deceive them by pretending to carry out similar work in other districts.

On the 24th August we transferred our headquarters from Aksehir to Suhut on this side of the line of attack, and on the morning of the 25th August we moved to our camp south-west of Kocatepe. It was from here that we intended to overlook our military operations. On the morning of the 26th we were at Kocatepe.

Our attack was opened by the artillery at 5.30 in the morning.

On the 26th and 27th August, that is to say, in two days, we had taken the front defences of the enemy for a width of fifty kilometres south and from twenty to thirty kilometres east of Karahisar. On the 30th August we had completed the turning of the main force of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Aslahanlar. On the 30th August, the main body of the enemy was partly decimated and partly made prisoners by the time the battle was over, which was called the "Battle of the Generalissimus." Among the prisoners of war was General Trikupis, commander-in-chief of the enemy's army.

On the 31st August, our main army operated in the direction of Izmir whilst the other corps were manoeuvered with the intention of defeating the enemy north of Eskişehir.

Up to the end of the Battle of the Generalissimus our official despatches reported our forward movements, which were daily crowned with brilliant successes, as though they were unimportant operations. Our object was to conceal the situation as much as possible from the eyes of the world. We were certain that we would succeed in completely destroying the enemy. We deemed it advisable to guard against fresh attempts on the part of those who would desire to come to the assistance of the enemy when they guessed the true state of affairs. Indeed, several attempts were actually made when they guessed the nature of our operations after the attack had begun. During the operations I received, among others, a telegram from Rauf Bey, President of the Council, on the 4th September, announcing that a communication had arrived from Istanbul concerning the armistice. I sent him the following reply:

Telegram. Personal.

5th September, 1922.

To the President of the Council of Ministers.
Reply.

The Greek army has been decisively defeated in Anadolu. Any serious

resistance in future will be impossible. There is no reason to enter into any negotiations with regard to question of Anadolu. The armistice can only be discussed with reference to Trakya. If the Greek Government should appeal to us before the 10th September, directly or through the official mediation of Great Britain, they must be answered by a communication containing the conditions as follow. After this time has elapsed, that is to say after the 10th September, our reply could possibly be formulated differently. In that case I must personally be informed to that effect:

1. Within a fortnight from the date of the armistice, Trakya must be unconditionally restored up to its frontiers of 1914 to the civil and military authorities of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
2. Our prisoners of war in Greece will be transported within a fortnight to the harbours of Izmir, Bandirma and Izmit.
3. Greece will bind herself forthwith to repair the devastations made by her army during the last three-a-half years in Anadolu, as well as those she is still making.

Mustafa Kemal
Commander-in-Chief
President of the Grand National Assembly.

In a wireless telegram which was sent to me personally, I was informed that the Allied Powers had given the requisite authority to their consuls at Izmir to enter into negotiations with me and I was requested to decide what day and at what place I would grant them an interview. I replied that we would be at Nif* on the 9th September, 1922. It happened that I was at Nif on that very day, but those who had begged for the interview were not there; for our armies, which were already on the quais at Izmir, had reached the first aim which I had indicated to them in pointing them to the Mediterranean.

I do not think it is necessary to describe the battle of Afyonkarahisar and Dumlupinar or the operations which resulted in the Greek army being destroyed and their remanants being driven into the Mediterranean and the Marmara Seas. These operations, that had been developing for a long period of time, that were prepared in all their details and carried out in such a way that they were crowned with success, constituted a sublime action which once again in history proves and confirms the strength and the heroism of the Turkish army, Turkish officers and their commanders. This action is an immortal monument to the spirit of freedom and independence of the

* Nif: a small place east of Izmir.

Turkish Nation. I am proud and am ever happy to be the son of a nation and the commander of an army that can perform such deeds.

* * *

Now, Gentlemen, we can revert to the realm of diplomacy. It is a fact that I had imposed a long period of waiting upon those who, despairing of a military victory, had been fostering for a long time the hope and conviction of reaching a settlement by way of diplomacy. They ought, in any case, at last to have been satisfied when they saw me working seriously in support of the efforts they displayed in the sphere of diplomacy. We shall see whether this was so or not.

When, after the reconquest of Izmir and Bursa, our armies continued their march to Istanbul and the Çanakkale with the object, also, of delivering Trakya from the hands of the Greek army, Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at that time, had adopted a determined attitude in favour of war and had appealed to the Dominions for reinforcements. To judge from events that followed, we can assume that this appeal was unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, General Pellé, the High Commissioner of France in Istanbul, came to Izmir for the purpose of interviewing me. He advised me not to allow our armies to enter the zones which he described as neutral. I declared that the National Government did not recognise the existence of any such zone and that it was impossible to hold our armies back before they had delivered Trakya. General Pellé showed me a private telegram which he had received from M. Franklin Bouillon in which he had expressed the desire of having an interview with me. I told him that I would receive him at Izmir. M. Franklin Bouillon arrived at that time on board a French man-of-war. He stated that he had been sent by the French Government, with the acquiescence of the English and Italian Governments. During the course of our interview with M. Franklin Bouillon, a Note came from the Foreign Ministers of the Entente, dated the 23rd September. It related specially to two essential points. One referred to the cessation of hostilities and the other to the Peace Conference.

We could not abandon our operations before we had reconquered the whole of Eastern Trakya as far as our national frontiers. If, however, the enemy's troops could be induced to evacuate these parts of our territory, further operations would automatically come to an end.

Asking in the above Note whether we would agree to send delegates to a conference which was to take place at Venice, or elsewhere, and to

which Great Britain, France, Japan, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia and Greece would be invited, they declared that our desire for the restitution of Trakya as far as the Meriç, including Edirne, would be taken into consideration, on condition, however, that we would not send troops against the neutral zones of the Straits whilst the negotiations were still pending.

In addition, the Note touched upon the questions of the Straits, the minorities and our inclusion in the League of Nations. We were promised in it that steps would be taken to compel the Greek troops to retire behind a line to be fixed by the commanders of the Entente armies before the conference met. The proposal was made to hold a meeting at Mudanya or Izmit for this purpose.

In a clear reply which I gave to this Note on the 29th September, 1922, I informed them that I agreed to the proposal of a conference at Mudanya. But I demanded that Trakya as far as the Meriç should be immediately restored to us. I added that I had chosen İsmet Paşa, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Armies, who was furnished with extraordinary powers to enable him to negotiate in the name of the Commander-in-Chief, to take part in the Conference at Mudanya, which, as I have said, was to meet on the 3rd October, 1922; the Government also sent a detailed reply, dated the 4th October, to the Note in question and proposed Izmir as the meeting place; in addition, they demanded that the Russo-Ukrainian and the Georgian Republics should also be invited to attend the conference in connection with the question of the Straits. Our views regarding other questions were also put forward in detail.

The Conference, consisting of General Harrington as the plenipotentiary for Great Britain, General Charpy, plenipotentiary for France, and General Monbelli, plenipotentiary for Italy, met at Mudanya under the chairmanship of İsmet Paşa. The Armistice of Mudanya, after violent discussions which lasted for a week, was signed on the 11th October. In this way, Trakya was re-incorporated with the mother-country.

In the course of our political meetings after the victory, I noticed that the Cabinet of Ankara, or rather some of the Ministers, showed a certain amount of uneasiness. They asked me to return to Ankara and did so in a tone that was intended to give me to understand that my military functions had terminated and that political questions belonged exclusively to the Council of Ministers. But my military duties had not come to an end, nor could I cease from taking an interest in political and diplomatic questions. For this reason, it was impossible for me to leave the army, which was at

Izmir, or to interrupt the political negotiations in which I was engaged. I proposed, therefore, that the Cabinet or the Ministers concerned should come to me at Izmir, as they so strongly insisted on coming to an understanding with me. Rauf Bey, President of the Ministers, and Yusuf Kemal Bey, Foreign Minister, came there.

Rauf Bey put forward certain desires of a personal character at Izmir. Thus, for instance, he asked me as a sequence of the victory to promote Ali Fuat Paşa and Refet Paşa by appointing them to suitable positions.

You will remember that before the battle I had tried to make these two Pasas participate in the military operations and that in this I had been unsuccessful. The commanders and officers who had taken part in the campaign and had rendered services that had made them worthy of recompense had naturally been promoted after the victory. But to bestow rewards on those who had kept aloof while others had risked their lives would be certain to produce a very bad impression. In short, I told Rauf Bey that I could not fulfil his desires. Ali Fuat Paşa, being Vice-President of the Assembly, already held rank and position that must be satisfactory to him. I only promised to try to find a suitable position for Refet Paşa and recommended that he should be told to come to Izmir. Refet Paşa actually did come there; but as he arrived exactly on the night of my departure for Ankara, we could not meet.

A post was subsequently found for Refet Paşa when I went to Bursa.

On my return to Izmir from Ankara we were principally engaged on the negotiations at the Mudanya Conference. In the Council of Ministers, in the Assembly as well as in committee, the question of the composition of the delegation that was to be sent to the Peace Conference was discussed. Rauf Bey, President of the Ministerial Council, Yusuf Kemal Bey, Foreign Minister, and Rıza Nur Bey, Minister of Public Health, were regarded as men who would naturally be members of the delegation. For my part, I had not yet come to any decision about it. I could not persuade myself that a delegation under the leadership of Rauf Bey could have any success on a question that was vital to us. I had the impression that Rauf Bey himself did not feel equal to this task. He proposed to me that I should give him İsmet Paşa as an adviser. I replied that I did not see what advantage it would be to send İsmet Paşa as an adviser but that I was convinced that he would render the best services if we would make him the leader of the delegation. The matter remained thus. Rauf Bey continued to be busy with the combination he had suggested for the composition of our dele-

gation. I did not pretend to place any importance on this. The Mudanya Conference had come to an end. İsmet Paşa and Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, were at Bursa. I went there to meet them. Kâzım Paşa, Minister of National Defence, was with me. I took Kâzım Karabekir Paşa with me; on account of the hostile manifestations to which he had been subjected and which had made it impossible for him to continue in his office in the East, he had found himself compelled to come to Ankara. Refet Paşa, too, whom I had chosen for a mission to Istanbul, was with me. During my stay at Bursa I sent him, as is well known, to that town. In spite of the numerous given facts I had before me, I re-examined the question as to whether İsmet Paşa would be able to fill the position of chairman of the delegation, and I took all the details into account concerning the way he had presided over the Conference at Mudanya. I did not say a word to İsmet Paşa himself about my plan. Finally, I came to a definite decision. I thought it would be best that he should first become Foreign Minister and then act as leader of the delegation. To carry out this idea I sent a personal and confidential telegram in cipher directly to Yusuf Kemal Bey, asking him to resign from his office as Foreign Minister and personally take steps to ensure the election of İsmet Paşa as his successor.

Before I left Ankara, Yusuf Kemal Bey had told me that İsmet Paşa was best qualified to occupy the position of chairman of the delegation. In his reply, Yusuf Kemal Bey told me that in obedience to my request he had done everything that was necessary. It was only then that I informed İsmet Paşa of an accomplished fact that he would become Foreign Minister first and then go to the Peace Conference as chairman of the delegation. İsmet Paşa seemed to be surprised. He excused himself by pointing to his capacity as a military man. Finally, he gave in and accepted my proposal as an order. I returned to Ankara. Meanwhile, that is to say, on the 28th October, 1922, the Entente Powers had invited us to the Peace Conference which was to meet at Lausanne. These Powers insisted on recognising the existence of a Government in Istanbul and invited them also to come to the Conference with us.

*

* *

This twofold invitation led to the final abolition of the personal monarchy. The Caliphate and the monarchy were actually separated from one another by the Act of 1st November, 1922. The national sovereignty which had been exercised for the past two-and-a-half years was confirmed. Without any explicit right, the Caliphate was still maintained for some time.

You have already been sufficiently informed about this fact. I shall, therefore, confine myself to giving you some information relating to certain details of the question which will surely interest you.

You know that the Sultanate and the Caliphate, taken separately or jointly, were regarded as questions of very great importance. To support this assertion, I will tell you something that I now remember. Some time before the 1st November, 1922, the opposition abandoned themselves to a lively agitation among the deputies of the Assembly on the question of the proposal to abolish the Sultanate that was attributed to me. One day Rauf Bey came to me in my room in the Assembly building, told me that he wanted to speak to me about some important matters, and suggested we could chat with greater ease if I would go to Refet Paşa at Kegiören. I fulfilled his wish. I likewise agreed that Fuat Paşa should be present at the meeting. Consequently, we had a meeting of four at Refet Paşa's house. What I learned here from Rauf Bey may be summarised as follows: The Assembly is grieved to observe that the aim for the abolition of the Throne and, perhaps, even the Caliphate is being pursued. They distrust you and the attitude you will adopt in future. I am, therefore, of the opinion that you ought to reassure the Assembly and, thereby, public national opinion.

I asked Rauf Bey to tell me what were his own convictions and views regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate. In his reply he furnished me with the following precise statements:

"I am," he said, "devoted heart and soul to the Throne and Caliphate because my father has received benefits from the Padishah and was one of the dignitaries of the Ottoman Empire. The recollection of these benefits is coursing through my veins. I am not an ungrateful man and could never become one.

"It is my duty to remain loyal to the Padishah. Regarding my attachment to the Caliphate, it is imposed upon me by my education. I might also mention considerations of a more general kind. It is difficult for us to make ourselves masters of the general situation; this can be secured by a higher office and the sublime dignity which everybody generally considers to be unapproachable. This office, this dignity, is the Throne and the Caliphate. The abolition of this dignity and the attempt to substitute it by a body of a different character would lead to disappointment and disaster. This is not to be thought of."

After Rauf Bey, I asked Refet Paşa, who sat opposite me, to give his opinion. His reply was: "I entirely share Rauf Bey's opinion. In fact, no

other form of Government can come into question for us than that of the Sultanate and Caliphate."

After this, I was anxious to hear Fuat Paşa's opinion also. He declared that he had only recently returned from Moscow and that he had not had time as yet sufficiently to study public sentiment and opinion, and he apologised for being unable to express any concrete opinion about the question under discussion.

I gave the following laconic answer to my interlocutors:

"What we are talking about is not the question of the day. The alarm and excitement shown by some members of the Assembly are unjustified."

This reply seemed to satisfy Rauf Bey. Nevertheless, he continued to expound this question from different aspects. Our conversation, which had begun towards evening, continued until the morning. I had the impression that Rauf Bey was trying to make sure of one thing, namely, that I would personally repeat in the Assembly from the tribune the words I had used regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate, as well as revealing the attitude I would adopt personally in the future, words which they had considered reassuring.

I said that I had no hesitation to repeat my statements to the same effect before the Assembly. Besides this, I wrote down everything I had said on a piece of paper with a pencil and promised to seize an opportunity the following day in the Assembly to repeat it as a formal declaration. I carried out this promise. In my declaration, the opposition saw that Rauf Bey had been successful and expressed their satisfaction to him.

It is possible that Rauf Bey had carried out a task which he had undertaken for certain persons. For my part, as I have already explained, I had fulfilled the phase of my general and historic mission relating to the period we passed through. But, when the moment came, I did not hesitate to carry out the essential point which was dictated to me by my general mission.

When I decided on the occasion of Tevfik Paşa's telegram to separate the Caliphate from the Sultanate and to abolish the latter, my first thought was immediately to ask Rauf Bey to come to my room in the Chamber. Standing erect before him and pretending not to know anything about his opinions and convictions which he took all night to explain at Refet Paşa's house, I made this demand to him:

"We shall separate the Caliphate from the Sultanate and abolish the

latter. You will make a declaration from the tribune to the effect that you approve of this fact."

No other word was exchanged with Rauf Bey. Before he left my room, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, whom I had invited for the same purpose, arrived. I asked him also to express himself to the same effect.

As may be read in the minutes of that day, Rauf Bey made the declarations from the tribune that had been agreed upon, once or twice. He even proposed that day the abolition of the Sultanate, which should be observed as a public holiday. One point might puzzle you here. Rauf Bey, who had regarded it to be his duty to remain loyal to the Padishah and had spoken of the fatal consequences which might follow an attempt to substitute the Sultanate by a body of quite another description — this same Rauf Bey had now succumbed to a new resolution after it had been brought to his knowledge and — what is still more remarkable — he even yielded to my proposal and my decision so far as to advocate the abolition of the Sultanate, without having expressed in any way his own opinion on the subject. How can such a proceeding be explained? Had Rauf Bey changed his mind? Or, rather, had he in principle been insincere when he had expressed his opinion? It is difficult to discern the truth and to come to a definite decision in favour of one or the other of these suppositions.

Instead of trying to throw light on this doubtful subject, I prefer to recall certain stages, certain incidents and discussions bearing on the situation, and thereby facilitate your study of it.

I had previously explained that the abolition of the Sultanate had resulted from the fact that an invitation had been addressed also to İstanbul to send a delegation to the Lausanne Conference and that this invitation had been accepted by İstanbul, that is to say, by Vahdettin, Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues, an acceptance which had to serve as a pretext for lessening the advantages which the nation had gained at the price of so many efforts and sacrifices and which might even deprive them of any importance.

Tevfik Paşa sent at first a telegram addressed personally to myself. In this telegram on the 17th October, 1922, he said that the victory that had been gained had done away with any conflict and dualism between İstanbul and Ankara and that national unity had thereby been assured. Tevfik Paşa wanted to make us understand that there was no longer any enemy in the country, that the Padishah remained in his place with the Government at his side, and that the duty henceforward imposed upon the nation was to obey the orders emanating from these authorities. Under these conditions,

no further obstacle stood in the way of national unity. Tevfik Paşa had employed special skill in rendering further services to Ankara. These services, considering the fact the İstanbul and Ankara were both invited to go together to the Lausanne Conference, were intended to assure the preliminary and most rapid despatch of a person furnished with secret instructions from my side to İstanbul. (Document 260.)

In a telegram which I sent to Hamit Bey in İstanbul to be communicated to Tevfik Paşa I informed him that "Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues, showing no hesitation to bring confusion into the policy of the State, were apparently taking a grave responsibility upon themselves." (Document 261.)

Unfortunately, Hamit Bey hesitated about the necessity of communicating this telegram to Tevfik Paşa and looked upon it as an instruction addressed to himself. Within the course of three days, nevertheless, he sent us five communications composed in the sense of the above telegram.

He even sent to the newspapers and agencies the draft of a communiqué containing the essential points of the declarations which were made with the object of preventing Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues from sending delegates to the Conference. (Document 262.)

It was easy to see that Vahdettin's gang, consisting of Tevfik Paşa and other Paşas of his type, this gang whose only interest consisted in clinging to the tottering feet of a sullied throne, did nothing else but make their secret plans to be agreed to at any price. After I had sent Tevfik Paşa a reply to the telegram sent to me which, however, he pretended never to have received, he appealed directly to the Presidency of the Assembly in a further telegram on the 29th October, in which he assumed the title of Grand Vezir. (Document 263.)

The form given to the contents of this message was of the type peculiar to the Tevfik Paşa of the old régime. In this telegram Tevfik Paşa and his colleagues went so far in their impudence as to speak of the services which they had rendered in the attainment of the successes that had been achieved.

It is idle, Gentlemen, to go on troubling ourselves with the last Ottoman Ministry, consisting of Tevfik Paşa, İzzet Paşa and others, who had been unscrupulous enough illegally to assume the title of a Government of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, I will now return to the debates in the Assembly.

The discussion on the question about which we are speaking began on the 30th October, 1922. There were many speakers and they talked a great

deal. They spoke about the different Cabinets which had followed one another in Istanbul, of the time of Ferit Paşa, which was succeeded by the comedy of Tevfik Paşa, of the types without conscience and without common sense who played a part in it; ultimately they demanded the application of the law in respect to them. "Persons of such mentality," they said, "persons who make us such idiotic proposals... are in reality people who give their signatures to prove the historical character of the Sublime Porte, and are more devoted to it than anything else."

Motions were introduced demanding that the crimes against the country committed by those people who had pretended to be representatives of a Government in Istanbul should be punished by the force of law.

A motion was drafted describing the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of a New Turkish State and confirming that, in accordance with the Constitution Act, the sovereign rights belonged to the people. This motion, signed by more than eighty comrades, also bore my signature.

After this motion had been read, two of the deputies placed themselves at the head of those who had taken up an attitude of serious opposition. One of these was Colonel Selâhattin Bey, deputy for Mersin, and the other was Ziya Hurşit, who was subsequently hanged at İzmir.

They openly declared that they were convinced that the Sultanate ought not to be abolished.

The Assembly did not sit on the 31st October. On that day a meeting of the Party for the Defence of the Rights took place. I made some statements there to prove the necessity for the abolition of the Sultanate. The same question formed the subject of long debates in the Assembly on the 1st November. I considered it necessary to make a long statement here also on this question. (Document 264.)

Speaking of the history of Islam and of Turkey, based on historical facts, I showed that the Caliphate and the Sultanate could be separated from one another and that the Grand National Assembly could possess the national sovereignty. I asserted that the execution of the Caliph Mutassam by Hulâgû had put an end to the Caliphate and that, if Yavuz, who conquered Egypt in the year 1517, had not attributed importance to a fugitive who held the title of Caliph, we should not have had the title handed down to our days.

Thereupon the motions concerning this question were referred to three Committees, that of the Constitution Act, of the Şer'iye and of Justice.

It was certainly difficult for these committees to meet and solve the question in conformity with the aim we were pursuing. I had to follow these matters very closely in person.

These three committees met in one room. After the election of Hoca Müfit Efendi as chairman, they began to deliberate. The gentlemen of the Hocas belonging to the Committee of the Ser'iye put forward the point of view that the Caliphate could not be separated from the Sultanate. They relied on the well-known fallacies and absurdities. Those who spoke openly in opposition to these assertions did not venture to come forward themselves. We followed the debates from a corner of the crowded room. It is evident that it would have been of no avail to expect a settlement of the question in the direction at which we were aiming from such a debate at this. I was perfectly certain about that. Finally, I asked the chairman of the mixed Committee for permission to speak, and, standing on a bench, I made this statement in a loud voice: "Gentlemen," I declared, neither the sovereignty nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and to maintain their rule for more than six centuries. It is now the nation that revolts against these usurpers, puts them in their right place and actually carries on their sovereignty. This is an actual fact. It is no longer a question of knowing whether we want to leave this sovereignty in the hands of the nation or not. It is simply a question of stating an actuality, something which is already an accomplished fact and which must be accepted unconditionally as such. And this must be done at any price. If those who are assembled here, the Assembly and everybody else, would find this quite natural, it would be very appropriate from my point of view. Conversely, the reality will nevertheless be manifested in the necessary form, but in that event it is possible that some heads will be cut off.

"With regard to the theological aspect of the matter, the anxieties and the alarm on the part of the Hoca gentlemen are quite unjustified. I will explain this to you," I said, and then I made a long statement. "Pardon me," responded Hoca Mustafa Efendi, deputy for Ankara, "we had regarded the question in another light. Now we are informed."

The question was settled in the mixed Committee.

The draft of the Act was quickly drawn up and was read on the same day in the second sitting of the Assembly.

Following a motion to proceed to nominal voting, I mounted the tribune and declared: "This procedure is useless. I believe that the High Assembly will unanimously adopt the principles which are destined to preserve the independence of the nation and the country for all time."

Shouts were raised: "Vote!" "Vote!" Finally, the chairman put the motion to the vote and declared: "It is unanimously agreed to." One single voice was heard declaring: "I am against it," but this was drowned in cries of "Silence!"

In this way, Gentlemen, the curtain fell on the last act of the overthrow and breakdown of the Ottoman Monarchy.

* * *

The first sentence of an official telegram on the 17th November, 1922, ran as follows: "Vahdettin Efendi has left the Palace to-night." You must have read some other sentences of this telegram in the protocol of the sitting of the Assembly on the 18th November. The original of this telegram, however, contained another part, the end referring to those persons who could possibly intervene in facilitating his departure and of the steps to be taken for the preservation of the sacred relics.

Let us also read the copy of a letter which was read at the same sitting, as well as the copy of a communiqué published by the agencies which was appended to it.

17th November, 1922.

Copy of the letter

As stated in the official communiqué, a copy of which is appended hereto, His Majesty has placed himself under the protection of England and has left Istanbul on board an English man-of-war.

(Signed) Harington

The annexed copy

"We announce officially that His Imperial Majesty, appreciating the danger that threatens his life and freedom in the present circumstances, has, in his capacity as Caliph of all the Mohamedans, appealed for English protection and has simultaneously requested that he may be transported from Istanbul to another place. His Majesty's desire has been fulfilled this morning. Sir Charles Harington, Commander-in-Chief of the English troops in Turkey, has accompanied His Majesty and conducted him to an English man-of-war.

His Majesty has been received by Admiral Sir Osmond de Beauvoir Brook, commanding the Mediterranean squadron. Mr. Nevile Henderson, acting British High Commissioner, has paid a visit to His Majesty on board and has asked him what desires he wishes to be made known to His Majesty King George V."

We are also in the possession of a letter which General Harington had addressed to a woman called Ulviye Sultan, endorsed "remained unanswered." The original of this latter had been sent to Refet Paşa, and he sent us a copy of it on the 25th November.

This is the text of it:

"Madame la Sultane, I have just received a wireless telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who at this moment is approaching Malta, wherein he asks me to inform him of the condition of his family. To ascertain this, I applied last Saturday at the Yıldız Palace; I learned that the wife of His Majesty was in the best of health and have informed the Sultan of this immediately. If you will be kind enough to give me information about the Imperial family I shall be glad to transmit it immediately to him. On account of the difficult conditions in which His Majesty now finds himself, I take the liberty of addressing to you, Madame, as well as to the Imperial family, my sincerest wishes, and I beg you to accept my devotion and the expression of my high esteem.

(Signed) Harington.

This last letter is not worthy of notice.

I also think it superfluous to mention to you the contents of a letter which General Harington had addressed to our military representative in Istanbul with an enclosure.

I prefer to confront public opinion with actual facts. By these means you will be able to understand in a natural manner into what degrading position a nation possessing pride and a noble heart can be brought by a wretch who, thanks to the fatal succession to the throne, had inherited a noble position and an exalted title.

Indeed, it is sad to think that a creature like Vahdettin, who was low enough to consider that his life and liberty could have been in danger, from whatever cause it might be, in the midst of his own people, had been able to stand even for a single instant at the head of a nation. It is fortunate that the nation has driven this wretch from his hereditary throne and has

put an end thereby to the long parade of this basenesses. This intervention of the Turkish people is worthy of the highest praise.

An incapable and low creature without heart or intelligence might well place himself under the protection of any foreigner who is willing to accept him, but it is surely inappropriate to think that such an individual should bear the title of Caliph of the whole of Islam. To make such an idea understandable, all Mohamedan communities would, first of all, have been reduced to the position of slaves. Is that actually the case in the world?

We Turks are a people who during the whole of our historic existence have been the very embodiment of freedom and independence. Now, we have proved that we are capable of putting an end to the comedy played by the Caliph who exposed himself to humiliations of every description for the miserable object of dragging out an unworthy existence for a few days longer. Acting as we have done, we have confirmed the truth that individuals, who are base enough to think only of their personal positions and their own lives — even to the injury of the state and nation to which they belong — cannot be of any importance in the mutual relationship of states and nations.

In international relations it must be the ardent wish of the whole civilised world to put an end to the time when the system of puppets governs policy.

* * *

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey proclaimed the fugitive Caliph to have been deposed, and in his stead Abdülmecit Efendi was elected the last of the Caliphs.

Before the National Assembly proceeded to the election of a new Caliph every possibility had to be excluded that the newly elected one would yield to the desire to rule and try to place himself for this purpose under any foreign protection. For this reason, I asked Refet Paşa, our delegate in Istanbul, to speak to Abdülmecit Efendi and to get him to sign a document in which he bound himself to complete subjection to the decisions respecting the Caliphate and Sultanate which had been arrived at by the National Assembly.

My instructions were carried out.

In the instructions which I sent to Refet Paşa on the 18th November, 1922, by telegraph in cipher to Istanbul, I had particularly emphasised the following points:

Abdülmecit Efendi shall bear the title of Caliph of all Mohamedans. No other title or quality should be added. He is first, through your mediation and first of all by telegram in cipher, to communicate to us the manifest to the Mohamedan world which he must prepare. When we have given our consent, the text will be returned to him, also through you and in a telegram in cipher, and not before then will it be published. The text of the manifesto is mainly to comprise the following points:

- (a) He shall explicitly express his satisfaction at having been elected Caliph by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
- (b) Vahdettin Efendi's conduct shall be submitted to thorough condemnation.
- (c) The manifesto shall contain in an appropriate form the first ten Articles of the Constitution, care being taken that their meaning and essential purpose are expressed in a precise form; it is also to emphasise the special character of the Turkish State, the Grand National Assembly and their Government and is to declare that their administrative system is the most appropriate and the most fitting one in the interests and desires of the population of Turkey, as well as of the whole Mohamedan world.
- (d) It shall mention in a praiseworthy manner the services which the popular Government of Turkey has rendered as well as the endeavours worthy of recognition that have been made.
- (e) Beyond these points that have been mentioned, the manifesto is not to contain any reference that could be of a political character.

In an open telegram which I sent to Abdülmecit Efendi on the 19th November, 1922, I informed him that "The Grand National Assembly, being in the possession of the legislative and executive power bestowed upon it by the Constitution Act, according to the wording of which the sovereignty of the Turkish State belongs without reserve or restriction to the nation, and which is constituted by the only true representatives of the nation, had elected him Caliph at their sitting on the 18th November, 1922, in accord with the principles and for the reasons unanimously agreed to by them on the 1st November of the same year." (Document 265.)

Refet Paşa replied to our telegraphic communication in a telegram in cipher on the 19th November. He said that Abdülmecit Efendi had expressed his opinion that it would be possible and opportune for him to put above his signature the title of "Caliph of all Mahomedans and Servant of the

Sacred Places," and that he should wear a cloak and turban, as worn by Mohamed the Conqueror, at the Selâmlîk.

Regarding the contents of the manifesto addressed to the Mohamedan world, he had excused himself for not being able to say anything with regard to Vahdettin, and he had proposed that the manifesto should be published in the Press of Istanbul, both in the Turkish and Arabic languages. (Document 266.)

In the answer which I sent to Refet Paşa at the instrument on the 20th November, I agreed that the title "Servant of the Sacred Places" should be added to that of Caliph. I regarded it abnormal that the costume of the conqueror should be worn at the Friday ceremonies. I insisted that a frock-coat or a "Istanbulin" might be worn but that a military uniform was quite out of the question. I also added that it would be necessary to characterise the moral presonality of the late Caliph without mentioning his name and to describe the decadence into which the nation had fallen under his rule.

In the first sentence of his telegram in cipher of the 20th November, Refet Paşa remarked that Abdülmecit Efendi, in his letter of the 29th had used the title "Caliph of the Messenger of God, Servant of the two Holy Cities" and had signed the letter "Abdülmecit, Son of Abdülâziz Han".

Abdülmecit, who had declared that he took our advice, had, therefore, been unable to resist the temptation of substituting for the expression "Caliph of the Mohammedans" the title "Caliph of the Messenger of God" and had used the title "Han" because of his father's name. After having made some other remarks, he still added that he had abandoned the idea of declaring anything with regard to Vahdettin because "for the reason of his character and his principles, it would be painful for him to make any such declarations, even if they only referred to despicable actions on the part of other people." This was the second sentence. The third contained the reply to the telegram I had sent him in my capacity as President of the Assembly to announce to him his election to the Caliphate. His reply was addressed to me presonally and was headed "To His Excellency Marshal Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ankara."

The fourth paragraph contained a copy of the manifesto to be addressed to the Mohamedan world. It was carefully pointed out in it that it had been composed in Istanbul, the "High Seat of the Caliphate."

In a telegram we sent on the 21st November we declared that the title "Caliph of the Messenger of God" must be altered to "Caliph of the Mo-

hamedans", as previously communicated. We reminded him that the reply to our telegram informing him of his election as Caliph must be addressed to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly and not to me personally.

We pointed out that his letter contained forms of expression which touched on questions of a political and general character and that he must abstain from that.

The essential point which I want to emphasise by these explanations, which can easily be regarded as unimportant details, is this:

With regard to myself, I was of the opinion that after the abolition of the monarchy, the Caliphate, being only an authority of a similar description under another name, was also abolished. I found it quite natural to express this opinion at a favourable moment. It cannot be maintained that Abdülmecit, who was elected to be Caliph, was quite ignorant of this fact. As, above all, some people were still dreaming of finding the means to bring him into government under the title of Caliph, it was impossible to believe in the *naïvité* of our correspondent and in that of his natural followers.

If you wish it, I will now give you a short account of the debates that took place during a secret sitting when the Caliph was elected on the 18th November, 1922.

There were many deputies in the Assembly who regarded the question as being very serious and important. The Hocas, in particular, were very attentive and alert, as they had at last found a subject that appealed to them.

The Caliph is a fugitive... he had to be deposed, another had to be elected. The new Caliph had not been left in Istanbul, he had to be transferred to Ankara, so that he should be brought as near as possible to the Head of the nation and the State.

In short, following the flight of the Caliph, the whole of Turkey, the whole of Islam, was overthrown, or was at least threatened to become so... they had to be on the watch. Such were the anxieties and fears that were uttered.

Some of the speakers on their part spoke of the necessity to define the character and powers of the Caliph who was to be elected.

I also took part in the debates. Most of my statements were replies to the observations that had been put forward. They can substantially be summarised in the following sentences: "Surely it is possible to analyse and discuss the question for a long time. But the more we listen to one another

and the more we loose ourselves in these discussions and analyses, the more difficulties and delays we shall encounter. I only want to draw your attention to this fact: This Assembly is the Assembly of the Turkish people. Your powers and authority can only extend to the Turkish people and our Turkish country and can only be effective in so far as the question concerns their lives and their destiny.

"Our Assembly, Gentlemen, cannot attribute to themselves powers that comprise the whole of the Islamic world."

"The Turkish nation and our Assembly, consisting of their representatives, cannot confide their existence to the hands of a person who bears, or will bear, the title of Caliph. No, they cannot do so."

"We are told that through this question confusion will arise in the Mohamedan world. Whoever stated that has lied or is lying."

To one interrupter I said quite openly:

"You may well lie. You have learned to do so very well."

After having explained that there was no cause to make such a fuss about this affair I declared:

"Our greatest strength, our prestige in the eyes of the world, depends on the new form and the new character of our régime. The Caliphate might be in a state of slavery. The persons who bear the title of Caliph might flee into foreign countries. Our enemies and the Caliph can join and together attempt any enterprise, but they can never shake the administrative system of New Turkey, nor her policy, nor her power."

"I state once more and in a formal manner that the Turkish nation is in full possession of their sovereignty without reservation and without restriction. This sovereignty does not suffer any partition in whatever form or colour it might be. Nobody, whether he is called Caliph or by any other title, can participate in the direction of the destiny of this nation. This nation cannot possibly allow this. There is no deputy of the people who could make such a proposition."

"We must, therefore, proclaim the deposition of the fugitive Caliph, elect a new one and proceed in everything that regards this question in conformity with the points of view we have expounded. It is quite impossible to act otherwise."

In spite of the somewhat tempestuous debates that took place, we

arrived at an agreement with the majority of votes in the Assembly as to the course to be followed.

Then you know what happened. I do not think it necessary to weary you with explanations of how after the abolition of the monarchy Tevfik Paşa, İzzet Paşa and their colleagues, who had assumed the semblance of a Government in Istanbul, handed in their resignations at the Palace, nor do I wish to speak about the orders and instructions which we gave for the organisation of the administration of Istanbul.

IV

The plenary sitting of the Lausanne Conference took place on the 21st November, 1922. His Excellency İsmet Paşa represented Turkey. Hasan Bey, deputy for Trabzon, and Rıza Nur Bey, deputy for Sinop, constituted the delegation under the leadership of İsmet Paşa. The latter left Ankara for Lausanne in the first days of November.

The results of the Lausanne Conference, which lasted for eight months in two sessions, are known to the world at large.

For some time I followed the negotiations of the Lausanne Conference from Ankara.

The debates were heated and animated. No positive results regarding the recognition of Turkish rights were noticeable. I found this quite natural, because the questions brought forward on the agenda did not exclusively concern the new régime, which was only three or four years old.

Centuries-old accounts were regulated. It was surely neither a simple nor convenient task to find our way through such a mass of old, confused and rubbishy accounts.

We know that the Ottoman Empire, whose succession the new Turkish State had accepted, was fettered by the Capitulations which existed in the name of ancient Treaties. The Christian elements enjoyed numerous privileges and favours. The Ottoman Government could not exercise the administration of justice in regard to foreigners dwelling in the Ottoman Empire. It was forbidden to impose taxes on foreigners as were raised from our own citizens. The Government was also prevented from taking steps against those elements in the interior that undermined the foundations of the State.

The Ottoman Government was also prohibited from securing the means of carrying on their existence in a manner worthy of human beings by the

Turkish people, the original element from which they emanated. They could not restore the country, could not build railways and were not even free to establish schools. If we tried to do so, the foreigners immediately interfered. In order to secure a luxurious existence for themselves, not only had the Ottoman sovereigns and their Courts placed all the revenues of the country and the nation at their disposal, but they had in addition floated numerous loans, thereby sacrificing not only all the resources of the nation, but even the honour and dignity of the State. And this was done to such an extent that the Empire had become incapable of paying the interest on these loans and was regarded in the eyes of the world as being in a state of bankruptcy.

The Ottoman Empire, whose heirs we were, had no value, no merit, no authority in the eyes of the world. It was regarded as being beyond the pale of international right and was, as it were, under the tutelage and protection of somebody else.

We were not guilty of the neglect and errors of the past and, in reality, it was not ourselves from whom they ought to have demanded the settlement of accounts that had accumulated during past centuries. It was, however, our duty to bear the responsibility for them before the world. In order to procure true independence and sovereignty for the nation, we had still to submit to these difficulties and sacrifices. As for myself, I was certain that we would achieve a positive result in any event. I had no doubt that the whole world would finally recognise the principles which the Turkish nation had to adopt and realise at all cost for their existence, their independence and their sovereignty; the foundations had actually and in reality already been laid by strength and merit. What we demanded from the Conference was nothing more than the confirmation in a proper manner of what we had already gained. We only claimed our well-known and natural rights. In addition, we had the power to preserve and protect these rights. Our strength was sufficient for this purpose. Our greatest strength and our surest point of support was the fact that we had realised our national sovereignty, had actually placed it in the hands of the nation and had proved by facts that we were capable of maintaining it. These were the considerations that allowed me calmly to follow the course of the negotiations at the Conference without attaching undue importance to the vexatious agitations through which they passed.

The monarchy having been abolished and the Caliphate denuded of its powers, it had become very important to get into close touch with the people and once more to study their psychology and spiritual tendencies.

On the other hand, the Assembly had entered upon the last year of their legislative period. I had resolved when the elections took place to transform the Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli into a political party. If peace should be restored, I considered it necessary that the organisations of our union should be converted into a political party; in this regard it also seemed advisable to me to study our army very carefully, for since the victory it had begun to devote itself to its training.

Such were the aims I had in view when I left Ankara on the 14th January, 1923, to travel through Western Anadolu.

I began at Eskişehir, İzmit, Bursa, Izmir and Balıkesir, collected the people in suitable buildings and had long conversations with those present. I requested that the population freely ask questions on subjects that were near to their hearts. In order to answer them, I delivered long speeches which often lasted for six or seven hours.

The main points on which the population everywhere wanted information were these:

The Lausanne Conference and its results; the national sovereignty and the Caliphate; their position and mutual relations; and, further, the political party which they knew I intended to create.

Everywhere I gave a comprehensive idea of the negotiations at the Lausanne Conference, as they took place, and I tried to calm the nation by expressing my conviction that we should arrive at a happy result.

The people were justified in showing their curiosity and anxiety about the question of the position of the national sovereignty and the Caliphate, as well as the character of their mutual relations; because, while the National Assembly, by their resolution of the 1st November, 1922, had ended the form of Government based on personal sovereignty, this, having become part of history from the 16th March, 1922, the Hocas — as for instance, Sükrü — had begun agitations pretending that the "public opinion of the Mohamedan world would be alarmed and perturbed." They said: "The Caliphate and the Government are the same thing, and no human being and no Assembly has the right to annul the rights and authority of the Caliphate." They dreamed of maintaining the personal monarchy abolished by the Assembly under the form of the Caliphate and to place the Caliph in the position of the Sultan.

In fact, a reactionary party published a pamphlet under the title of "The Islamic Caliphate and the Grand National Assembly," which was

signed by Hoca Şükrü, deputy for Karahisar Sahip. It was at Izmit that my attention was attracted to this pamphlet published at Ankara on the 15th January, 1923, and distributed among all the members of the Assembly. On its outside cover was simply "1923."

It was discovered, however, that the pamphlet, which had been prepared and printed while I was still at Ankara, had been distributed on the day following my departure, namely, the 15th January. Hoca Şükrü Efendi and his colleagues wanted to represent the national Assembly simply as an advisory council to the Caliph and the Caliph himself as President of this Assembly and thereby as the Head of the State. Their favourite stupidity was the statement that: "The Caliph is dependent on the Assembly which for their part are dependent on the Caliph."

On the other hand, the Caliph was the object of some signs of loyalty which could inspire him with a certain amount of hope. Our attention had been aroused. These manifestations, which had only been exhibited secretly, were in reality of far greater importance than we had judged them to be at first from their outward appearance. In order to give you some idea of this, I will read you a telegram in cipher which Refet Paşa, who was at that time our delegate in Istanbul and Thrace, had sent to the Caliph through his brother Rifat Bey, who was his A.D.C., about a stallion named "Konya" which he wanted to present to him, as well the answer the Caliph sent through his A.D.C.

Telegram in cipher.

5th January, 1923.

To Rifat Bey.

I have sent for "Konya" with the intention of offering him to His Majesty the Caliph. I have not had time as yet to see in what condition he is. I do not venture to present him. Having found out that it is impossible to find a good horse in Istanbul, I have asked the first A.D.C. of His Majesty the Caliph not to be in a hurry to get one. I shall look upon it as a divine favour if His Majesty will deign to accept this riding horse. I know that it is very bold on my part to offer it. Nevertheless, I beg the good services of Şekip Bey, the first A.D.C., to ask His Majesty the Caliph to be pleased to accept "Konya", which an old soldier offers to him in memory of the victory, — "Konya" being a historic souvenir of the War of Independence — and to add that I kiss the hands of His Majesty with feelings of humble and sincere loyalty. Let "Konya" and this telegram in cipher be brought immediately to Şekip Bey, the first Aide-de-Camp.

Refet

7th January, 1923.

To His Excellency Refet Paşa, Delegate Extraordinary in Trakya.

I have presented to His Majesty the Caliph the telegram given to me by Rifat Bey, your Excellency's brother. His Majesty was specially touched by the sentiments of sincere loyalty which you express and is very pleased with the horse "Konya." He feels honoured to possess such a beautiful and charming animal, named after one of the battle fields, on which your Excellency has distinguished himself by your bravery and self-sacrifice among the prominent men who have been working for the realisation of such a sublime and sacred aim as the independence of our beloved country. Like the angel Gabriel who had announced to our venerated Prophet the mission which was conferred on him, your Excellency has announced to His Majesty his designation as Caliph. Thus your presence will always serve continually to remind him of the most joyful event in the whole of his life. Your Excellency, being associated with this memory dear to His Majesty, he has often been cordially thinking about you; and when His Majesty will now, according to his usual custom, every day mount this fleet steed, the valuable memory of your Excellency will become all the more strengthened and revivified. I do not know to what point I have been successful in conveying His Majesty's feelings of sincere appreciation; if I have not been successful in doing this I can comfort myself that the proof of paternal affection and benevolence which His Majesty has showered upon you in such profusion must have supplemented from the beginning all that is lacking in my message.

In conclusion, I have the honour to convey to your Excellency the very special greetings of His Majesty, the Shadow of God, as well as His blessings, and I take advantage of this opportunity to beg you to accept the expression of my high esteem.

Sekip Hakkı
First Aide-de-Camp.

(It was only by accident that we heard of this exchange of letters and amenities, after the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the members of the dynasty.)

I must call attention to the fact that Hoca Sükrü Efendi, as well as the politicians who pushed forward his person and signature, had intended to substitute the sovereign bearing the title of Sultan or Padishah by a monarch with the title of Caliph. The only difference was that, instead of

speaking of a monarch of this or that country or nation, they now spoke of a monarch whose authority extended over a population of three hundred million souls belonging to manifold nations and dwelling in different continents of the world. Into the hands of this great monarch, whose authority was to extend over the whole of Islam, they placed as the only power that of the Turkish people, that is to say, only from 10 to 15 millions of these three hundred million subjects. The monarch designated under the title of Caliph was to guide the affairs of these Mohamedan peoples and to secure the execution of the religious prescriptions which would best correspond to their worldly interests. He was to defend the rights of all Mohamedans and concentrate all the affairs of the Mohamedan world in his hands with effective authority.

The sovereign entitled Caliph was to maintain justice among the three hundred million Mohamedans on the terrestrial globe, to safeguard the rights of these peoples, to prevent any event that could encroach upon order and security, and to confront every attack which the Mohamedans would be called upon to encounter from the side of other nations. It was to be part of his attributes to preserve by all means the welfare and spiritual development of Islam.

The absurd ideas which ignorant people like Sükrü Hoca and his companions were disseminating about the actual condition prevailing in the world, under the power of "religious prescriptions" and with the intention of abusing our nation are not worthy of being repeated here. In the course of centuries there have been people and there are still people to-day in the interior as well as in foreign countries who profited by the ignorance and fanaticism of the nations and try to make use of religion as a tool to help them in their political plans and personal interests. The fact that there are such individuals unfortunately compels us again to go into this question.

So long as the sentiments and knowledge of mankind with regard to religious questions are not yet freed from myths and purified in the light of true science, we shall find historians everywhere who play a religious comedy. We must actually belong to those "beings who live wholly in God," like Sükrü Hoca, not to be enlightened about the absurdities of the illogical ideas and impracticable prescriptions which they broadcast in all directions.

If the Caliph and Caliphate, as they maintained, were to be invested with a dignity embracing the whole of Islam, ought they not to have realised in all justice that a crushing burden would be imposed on Turkey, on her

existence; would her entire resources and all her forces be placed at the disposal of the Caliph?

According to their declarations, the Caliph-Monarch would have the right of jurisdiction over all Mohamedans and all Mohamedan countries, that is to say, over China, India, Afghanistan, Persia, Irak, Syria, Palestine, Hedjas, Yemen, Assyr, Egypt, Tripolis, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan. It is well known that this Utopia has never been realised. The pamphlet itself signed by Hoca Sükrü emphasises that the Mohamedan communities have always separated from one another under the influence of aims that were diametrically opposite to one another; that the Omayades of Andalusia, the Alides of Morocco, the Fatimides of Egypt and the Abbassides of Bagdad have each created a Caliphate, that is to say, a monarchy of their own. In Andalusia there were even communities embracing a thousand souls, each of which was a "Commander of the Faithful and a Torch of Faith." Would it have been logical or reasonable to pretend to be ignorant of this historic truth and to designate under the title of Caliph a ruler destined to govern all the Mohamedan States and nations, some of which were independent, while most of them were under a foreign protectorate? Consider the fact that a mere handful of men consisting of the population of Turkey were to be burdened with the enxiety of supporting such a sovereign. Would it not have been the surest means for strangling this people? Those who say: "The attributes of the Caliph are not of a spiritual kind," and "the basis of the Caliphate is material strength, the temporal power of the Government," proved thereby that for them the Caliphate was the State. And thereby it could easily be perceived that they pursued the aim of putting at the head of the Turkish Government some personality bearing the title of Caliph.

The attempts of Hoca Sükrü Efendi and his political colleagues to conceal their political designs and to represent them under the form of a religious question which concerned the entire Mohamedan world had the only result that this puppet representing the Caliphate was still more speedily swept off the stage.

I made statements everywhere that were necessary to dispel the uncertainty and anxiety of the people concerning this question of the Caliphate. I formerly declared: "We cannot allow any person, whatever his title may be, to interfere in questions relating to the destiny, activity and independence of the new State which our nation has now erected. The nation itself watches over the preservation and independence of the State.

which they have created, and they will continue to do so for all time." I helped the people to understand that neither Turkey nor the handful of men she possesses could be placed at the disposal of the Caliph so that he might fulfill the mission attributed to him, namely, to found a State comprising the whole of Islam. The Turkish nation is incapable of undertaking such an irrational mission.

For centuries our nation was guided under the influence of these erroneous ideas. But what has been the result of it? Everywhere they have lost millions of men. "Do you know," I asked, "how many sons of Anadolu have perished in the scorching deserts of the Yemen? Do you know the losses we have suffered in holding Syria and the Irak and Egypt and in maintaining our position in Africa? And do you see what has come out of it? Do you know?"

"Those who favour the idea of placing the means at the disposal of the Caliph to brave the whole world and the power to administer the affairs of the whole of Islam must not appeal to the population of Anadolu alone but to the great Mohamedan agglomerations which are eight or ten times as rich in men."

"New Turkey, the people of New Turkey, have no reason to think of anything else but their own existence and their own welfare. She has nothing more to give away to others."

To enlighten the people on still another point, I employed these expressions: "Let us accept for a moment that Turkey would take this mission upon herself and would devote herself to the aim of uniting and leading the whole Islamic world and that she would succeed in achieving this aim. Very good, but suppose these nations whom we want to subject and administer would say to us: 'You have rendered great services and assistance to us for which we are thankful to you, but we want to remain independent. We do not suffer anybody else to interfere in our independence and sovereignty. We are capable of leading and administering ourselves.'

"In such a case will the efforts and sacrifices made by the people of Turkey result in anything more than earning thanks and a benediction?"

"It is evident they intended that the people of Turkey should be sacrificed to a mere caprice, to a fancy, to a phantom. With this effect the idea of attributing functions and authority to a Caliph and a Caliphate can be credited."

I asked the people: "Will Persia or Afganistan, which are Mohamedan States, recognise the authority of the Caliph in a single matter? Can they do so? No, and this is quite justifiable, because it would be in contradiction to the independence of the State, to the sovereignty of the people."

I also warned the people by saying that "the error of looking upon ourselves as masters of the world must cease."

Let us put an end to the catastrophes into which the people had been dragged by following those who deceive themselves and misjudge our real rank and position in the world. We canot conscientiously permit this tragedy to continue. The English author Wells has written an historical work which was published two years ago.

The last pages of this work contain some contemplations under the heading of "History of Mankind in the Future".

These contemplations relate to the question of a Federal Government of the World.

In this chapter, Wells develops his ideas as to the form the Government of a World League would take and speaks about the essential fundamental lines of such a State. He depicts what might become of our earth under a Government of justice and a uniform law.

Wells says: "Unless all the sovereignties amalgamate into one single sovereignty, unless a higher power than nationalities appears, the world will perish," and he continues as follows: "The real State could not be anything but the Government of the United States of the World, which are necessarily brought together by the conditions of modern life," and "it is certain that sooner or later men will be compelled to unite if they do not want to succumb under the weight of their own inventions."

He also says that, "We do not know yet exactly what must be done and what must be prevented finally to attain the realisation of the great thought of human solidarity," and that a world federation of States will only succeed with difficulty in letting those powers join whose external policy has traditionally an aggressive character.

Let me also quote the following observations made by Wells:

"The joint sufferings and needs of Europe and Asia will, perhaps, to a certain degree, contribute to bring the peoples of these two continents nearer to one another," and "it is possible that a number of individual federations will precede the World Federation."

I will by no means deny the beauty of the idea of the "United States of the World", the establishment of which would produce the result that the experience, knowledge and conceptions of mankind at large would be developed and uplifted; that mankind would abandon Christianity, Islam, Budhism, and that a pure, spotless, simplified religion, understood by all and of a universal character, will be established; that men would understand that they have lived hitherto in a place of misery amidst disputes and ignominy, desires and gross appetites; and that they would decide to eradicate all infectious germs which had hitherto empoisoned both body and soul.

In our midst also a conception partly equalling this plan has been formed for the purpose of satisfying the adherents of the Caliphate and a Panislam, on the condition, however, that it would not become a source of difficulties for Turkey.

The theory put forward was this:

"Mohamedan communities dwelling in Europe, Asia, Africa and in other regions sooner or later in the future will attain the liberty and faculty of acting according to their will and carrying out their wishes. And then, if they think it expedient and advantageous, they will find certain points of union and concord in accordance with the exigencies of the century.

Every State, every community, undoubtedly has needs that could be satisfied and protected by other States and communities; the States have reciprocal interests.

If the delegates of these hypothetical independent Mohamedan States would unite in a congress and declare that this or that relationship has been established between certain States, that a committee had been formed for the purpose of maintaining such mutual relations and securing joint action under the conditions established by these relations, that the Mohamedan States united in this manner would be represented by the president of this committee, then they will, if so desired, give to these United States of Islam the title of Caliphate and to the person elected to be president of this united assembly the title of Caliph.

But neither common sense nor reason will ever admit that any individual Mohamedan State will confer on any man the authority of guiding and administering the affairs of the whole of the Mohamedan world.

During the time we had been engaged on the question of the Caliphate and of religion we had become clear with regard to the fact that one point

of the Constitution Act offered a problem to public opinion and, especially, to the intellectuals.

Those who after the proclamation of the Republic became aware, not only that this contentious point of the law was maintained but that a second point of a similar nature had been added, did not conceal their surprise either then or later.

Let me explain these two points to you:

Article 7 of the Constitution Act of the 20th January, 1921, and Article 26 of the Constitution Act of the 21st April, 1924, refer to the authority of the Grand National Assembly. In the beginning of the Article the first duty of the Assembly is laid down as "the execution of decisions regarding religion."

But now there are people who cannot understand the nature of this duty nor what is meant by "decisions regarding religion."

The Powers of the Grand National Assembly referred to and enumerated in the same Article clearly include "to enact, amend and repeal laws". Therefore the existence of an independent formula such as "the execution of decisions regarding religion" is unnecessary. Decisions regarding religion are already includes in the "laws".

Any other interpretation would be incompatible with the conception of modern law, unless a totally different meaning were to be attached to the expression "decisions regardine relision."

I was myself in the chair when the first Constitution Act was drafted. Many attempts were made to explain that the expression decision regarding religion had nothing whatever to do with the law which we were drafting. But it was impossible to convince those who, guided by a wrong conception, attached quite another interpretation to this expression.

The second point consists of the sentence at the beginning of Article 2 of the new Constitution Act: "The State religion of Turkey is the Mohammedian religion."

Long before this contentious sentence was incorporated in the text of the Constitution Act, during the course of long meetings and consultations with journalists from Izmit and Istanbul, one of my interviewers at Izmit put the following question: "Will the new State have a religion?"

I must confess that it was most undesirable that I should have to answer this question, because, in the circumstances then prevailing, I did not wish

to be compelled to give an answer which was evident — incidentally, a very short one.

If a State having amongst its subjects elements professing different religions, it is compelled to act justly and impartially towards all of them and to allow justice to prevail in its tribunals equally towards foreigners as well as its own subjects; it is obliged to respect freedom of opinion and conscience. It is surely not justified in making restrictions in this natural authority of the State by attributing other qualities to it which are capable of having an ambiguous meaning.

When we say that "the official language of the State is Turkish," everybody understands what this means; everybody understands that it is natural that the Turkish language should be used in official affairs. But will the sentence "The State religion of Turkey is the Mohamedan religion" be accepted and understood in the same way? It must naturally be criticised and explained.

I could not answer the question put to me by the journalist, my interviewer, with: "The State cannot have a religion." On the contrary, I answered: "It has one — the Mohamedan religion."

I immediately felt the need of commenting on and qualifying my answer by the following sentence: "The Mohamedan religion includes the freedom of religious opinion."

Thereby I wanted to express that the government is obliged to respect freedom of opinion and freedom of conscience.

Undoubtedly my interviewer did not find my reply reasonable and repeated his question in the following form: "Did you mean to say that the State will identify itself with a particular religion?"

"I do not know," I said, "whether this will be the case or not." I wanted to end the debate, but this was not possible. "Then," they told me, "the State will prevent me from expressing an opinion that corresponds to my views and thoughts on some questions. And if the case should arise I shall be punished for having done so."

"But will everybody discover a way to silence his conscience?"

At that time I was thinking of two things. The first was: Will not every grown up person in the new Turkish State be free to select his own religion?

Then I recalled Hoca Sükrü's proposal which was: "Some of my col-

leagues among the Ulema, as well as myself, consider it to be our duty to publish our common thoughts, as well the prescriptions of Islam, which are confirmed and set forth in the books of the Ser'i... to enlighten the minds of the Mohamedans, which have unfortunately been led astray."

I also recalled the following sentence: "The Caliphate of Islam has been entrusted by the Prophet to protect and perpetuate the religious prescriptions and to be the representative of the Prophet in the exercise of the Seriat."

But to quote the words of the Hoca would be equivalent to an attempt to abolish the national sovereignty.

On the other hand, we could not cosider the bulk of the knowledge of the Hocas, comprised in formulae which had been dictated in the time of Caliph Yezit* and appropriated to a régime of absolutism.

Consequently, who would be deceived if the expressions "State" and "Government" were enwrapped in the cloak of religion and the Seriat? Although the meaning of these expressions, as well as of the authorities of the Assembly, are now clear to everybody, what need is there for this deception?

This was the actual truth; but I did not wish to discuss this subject any longer with the journalist on that day at Izmit.

After the Republic was proclaimed and while the Constitution was being drafted, a formula was added in the same way to Article 2 of the Act, which deprived this Article of any sense. And this was done with the intention of not playing into the hands of those who are only lying in wait for a pretext to give the expression "Government of laymen" the signification of being hostile to religion.

The superfluous expressions which were incompatible with the modern character of the new Turkish State and our republican régime, contained in Articles 2 and 26 of the Act, constitute compromises to which the revolution and the Republic ought to have agreed, so as to satisfy the exigencies of the time.

When the first favourable opportunity arises, the nation must eliminate these superfluities from our Constitution Act.

I had long conversations everywhere with people on the formation of a political party.

* Caliph Yezit I, 680—683 is probably referred to.

On the 7th December, 1922, I declared, through the Press at Ankara, my intention of forming a new party on a popular basis under the name of the "People's Party." I called upon all patriots and men of Science for help and co-operation in drawing up the programme which should guide this party.

The views I received in writing from various people, as well, also, as the direct exchange of opinion with the people, were very helpful indeed to me.

At last, on the 8th April, 1923, I set down my views in the form of nine leading principles. This programme, which I had published during the elections for the Second Grand National Assembly, served as the foundation for the formation of our party.

This programme contained essentially all that we had carried through up to that day. There were, however, some important and vital questions which had not been included in this programme, such as, for instance, the proclamation of the Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate, the suppression of the Ministry of Religion, and that of the Medreses and Tekke and the introduction of the hat.

I held the opinion that it was not appropriate to give into the hands of ignorant men and reactionaries the means of poisoning the whole nation by introducing these questions into the programme before the hour had come to do so. I was absolutely sure that these questions would be settled at the proper time and that the people in the end would be satisfied.

There were some people who found that the programme which I had published was inadequate and too short for a political party. They said that the "People's Party" had no programme. The programme, which is known by the name of "Principles", was actually no book of the kind that these slanderers had seen and were accustomed to, but it was full of substantial and practical matter.

We could also have written a book in which to develop certain impracticable ideas and theoretical subtleties. We have not done so. In the way of reconstitution and material and moral development of the nation we preferred to make acts precede words and theories.

However, we did not omit in these principles certain formulas, which everybody had to know, such as: "The Sovereignty belongs to the nation," and "No authority except the Grand National Assembly of Turkey can decide upon the destiny of the nation," or "In the composition of the laws

for every kind of organisation, for all the details of administration, in public education and in the sphere of economics, we shall proceed according to the principles of national sovereignty," and "the decision regarding the abolition of the monarchy is irrevocable." In addition, some urgent and important needs were taken into consideration, such as the reform of the tribunals, the complete reorganisation of our legal code, in the sense of science and law, the transformation of the tithes, the increase of capital in the national banks, the construction of railways which will be necessary, the immediate unification of instruction, the reduction of active military service, the development of the country, etc.

As for our point of view on the question of peace, we declared that "we would work for the restoration of peace, on condition that it would be a peace that absolutely secured our financial, economic and administrative independence." Alluding to the Caliphate, we added that this could be an authority common to all Mohamedans.

The "Principles" sufficed for the foundation and activity of the People's Party; as is known to you, the title of the party was in course of time changed to the "Republican People's Party," by the addition of the word "Republican."

*

* * *

Gentlemen:

I shall now revert to the Lausanne Conference.

The Conference was interrupted on the 4th February, 1923.

The delegations of the Entente Powers presented the draft of a Peace Treaty to our delegation. This contained nothing but the summary of the debates that had taken place during the course of two months. This draft contained provisos that were contrary to the spirit and sense of independence. The judicial, financial and economic provisions were, above all others, unacceptable. We were absolutely compelled to reject this draft. In reply, our delegation wrote a letter to the following effect: "We want to sign a peace on the points about which we have come to an agreement."

Among the numerous points discussed at the Conference, there were actually some which were acceptable to us. In this letter it was also said:

"We shall examine the questions of second and third Orders. These proposals must be regarded as non-existing if they should be repudiated by the Entente Powers."

The proposal of our delegation was not taken into consideration; instead of a rupture they spoke of a suspension in the negotiations. The delegations of the individual states returned home. Our delegation did the same. Regarding myself, I was just on my return journey from Western Anadolu. On the 18th February, 1923, I met İsmet Paşa at Eskişehir and we returned together to Ankara.

After having heard that İsmet Paşa's return to Ankara coincided with mine, a strange and inexplicable mentality had apparently been shown at Ankara... It was regarded as a disadvantage that İsmet Paşa had met me and exchanged his views with me before he had come to Ankara and entered into touch with the Government and the Assembly... It was asserted that there might be people who would interpret this meeting unfavourably... The one who wrote this to me was Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers. I naturally placed no importance on this communication. On the contrary, I arranged my journey in a way that I should meet İsmet Paşa at Eskişehir, in order to be able to converse with him at the earliest possible moment. After our return to Ankara, İsmet Paşa explained the situation in the Council of Ministers and asked for further instructions.

It was thought necessary to ask for the advice of the Assembly. The question was put before them. The debates and the discussions of the Assembly on this subject lasted for many long days.

We felt that the adherents of the opposition had become irreconcilable enemies to our delegation and İsmet Paşa... After peace had practically been made he had not concluded it but had returned... The delegation had acted contrary to the orders of the Council of Ministers.

The attacks which began in secret sitting of the 27th February, 1922, were continued with the same violence and passion till 6th March; I was obliged to take part in these debates from the beginning to the end. The opposition verily gave the impression that they did not know what they wanted. The end was that the Assembly was not capable of coming to any resolution, either for or against.

We clearly understood that the opposition in the Assembly wanted to use the Peace question as a means for giving free course to their passion.

A certain section of the Press took the trouble to stir up these passion with an astounding ardour. It was evident that it would be difficult to arrive at a solution of the Peace question in an Assembly in such a frame of mind; this was indeed very sad by the way. In the general explanation which

I gave in the Assembly I represented the situation in all its points. I quoted all possible eventualities.

I said that the policy consisting of attacks against our delegation, made by regarding the declarations which some of the delegations of the Entente Powers had made before their return as to be true and well founded, was not a praiseworthy policy.

I declared that what we had to do was to listen to what our delegation had to say, to accept their explanations in good faith and to judge the situation accordingly.

I declared that it was the duty of the Council of Ministers present in the Assembly to give their opinion as to whether the delegation had acted according to the instructions of the Cabinet or not.

Finally, I declared that the delegation was responsible to the Council of Ministers, who on their part are responsible to the Assembly. The Assembly must give new directions to the Cabinet; based on these directions, the latter must give special instructions to the delegation. It was neither useful nor possible for the Assembly to occupy themselves with details.

I also expressed my point of view regarding these directions: "It would not be possible to bring on a discussion of the temporary suspension of the Mosul question, but it was most essential to enforce, in sure and uncompromising form, the independence and right of the nation and country in every administrative, political, economic, financial and other question and to obtain the complete evacuation of the redeemed territories."

I added to my remarks the following: "Our delegation has fully and completely fulfilled the duty entrusted to them. They have maintained the dignity of our nation and Assembly. If you are desirous of bringing the Peace question to a successful issue, the Assembly must also morally support the delegation to enable them to continue their work. When you act in this manner, we shall be able to hope that we might enter into an era of peace."

The debates of the Assembly regarding this question came to a standstill. But the opposition did not abstain from creating and inventing pretexts for attacks. It was nothing new to see the opposition of the Assembly combine attacks under different forms and on different subjects. I have told you already that the day after my departure a pamphlet under the title of "The Mohamedan Caliphate and the Grand National Assembly" had been published, in which attempts were made to incite the whole of the Assembly and the nation to revolt against us. But before this happened there was

still another manoeuvre of which I have not yet spoken to you for the reason that the effects of this intrigue, which had been prepared in the beginning of December, 1922, still continued during my journey. If you will permit me, I will now say a few words about the subject which will serve to refresh your memory.

Three deputies had prepared a motion proposing a modification in the draft of the law on the election of the deputies. I had been informed of the contents of this motion.

On the 2nd December, 1922, during a sitting presided over by Dr. Adnan Bey, the Vice-Chairman, the following words were heard from the Presidential seat:

"Gentlemen, a resolution of the Committee for the Modification of the Laws declares it to be indicated that we should enter into a discussion regarding the motion which demands the modification of the law on the election of deputies."

Voice in the room replied: "Let it be read!" Two deputies accelerated the general uproar by saying:

"This is important. Let us propose that it shall be read."

The Chairman replied: "Gentlemen, it is usual to send back the motion to the commission without it being read."

It is possible, Gentlemen, to read in the protocol of this sitting what was the matter in question and which were the debates that took place in the Assembly about this subject. But to save you this trouble I shall with your permission read to you verbatim part of the declarations which I made in the course of this sitting.

The Chairman, who wanted to send the motion back to the commission without having been read, gave me the word and I advanced the following observations:

"Gentlemen, this motion pursues a special aim; this special aim being directly intended against my person. I shall give you, with your permission, in a few words, my opinion about it. This motion presented by Süleyman Necati Bey, deputy for Erzurum, Selâhattin Bey, deputy for Mersin, and Emin Bey, deputy for Canik, has in direct view to rob me of my civil rights. Read the lines of Article 14, in which is said: 'To be elected a member of the Grand National Assembly a person must belong to the population of

those districts which are within the present frontiers of Turkey, and he must have his domicile in one of the present electoral districts.

"On the other hand, immigrated Turks or Kurds can be elected under the condition that a period of five years has elapsed since their domicile.

"The place of my birth is lying unfortunately outside our present frontiers; besides, I also have not since lived five years continuously in the same electoral district. My birthplace is outside our present national frontiers, but that is neither an intention nor a fault on my part.

"The reason for it is that we have only partly succeeded to arrest the efforts of our enemies who are aiming at the destruction and disintegration of our country and our nation.

"If our enemies had succeeded in realising their designs completely, the country of these gentlemen who have given their signatures here would likewise be outside the frontiers, which may God prevent.

"In addition, if I do not fulfill the conditions demanded in this Article, that is to say, if I have not been able to live for five years continuously in the same electoral district, the reason for this is to be found in the services which I have rendered to our country. If I had made it my business to satisfy the conditions of this law, I could not have defended Arburnu or Anafartalar, which has made it possible for us to keep Istanbul.

"If I had been condemned to live for five years in the same place I should not have been able to oppose the enemy who was advancing on Diyarbakir after having taken Bitlis and Muş; I could not have fulfilled my patriotic duty, the result of which was that Muş and Bitlis were saved.

"If I should have been desirous of fulfilling the conditions demanded by these gentlemen, I should not have been allowed to form an army at Aleppo out of the ruins of the armies that evacuated Syria, which I defended against the enemy, nor could I have effectively upheld the border which we call to-day our national frontier.

"I believe that the work to which I have dedicated myself henceforth is known to all of you. I have worked so much that I could not have lived for five years continuously in the same place. I believe that I have gained through these services the sympathy and love of my people and, perhaps, of the whole Mohamedan world.

"For this reason it has never entered into my mind that, instead of being the object of this admiration, I could be threatened with losing my

rights as a citizen. I believed, and I still believe, that our enemies would perhaps have even tried to deprive me of the possibility of serving my country by an attempt on my life. But not for a single moment could I have imagined that there were people, be it only two or three, in the High Assembly who shared the same mode of thinking.

"Consequently, I should like to know the following: 'Are these gentlemen really the interpreters of the thoughts and feelings of the people in their own electoral districts?'

"And in the face of these gentlemen I say in addition:

"As deputies each of you naturally represents the whole of the nation. Does the nation think as you do?

"Who, then, Gentlemen, has given you the commission of depriving me of my rights as a citizen? From this platform I officially address this question to the High Assembly, to the population of the electoral districts of these gentlemen, to the whole nation, and I demand a reply."

These words of mine were published by the agencies and in the Press. The nation was informed of my declarations and my questions. Protests poured in and were immediately sent to the Presidency of the Assembly from the electors themselves, from the electoral districts and from the whole country without exception, and from the whole nation. The people of the electoral districts of the deputies who had signed the motion likewise did not hesitate to express their disapproval to these deputies as well as to those who shared their views. These telegrams I keep as a precious memory because they contain a sincere proof of the love and confidence of the nation with regard to me. They form a voluminous bundle of documents. The contents of these documents has by the way been published. I will restrict myself to reading only one telegram which was addressed to me personally from a single electoral district, namely that of Rize:

"As we had the conviction that the deputies of our Sancak would not associate themselves with the well-known motion presented by three deputies, we had not considered it necessary to write about the subject.

"As, however, Osman Efendi, the deputy, boasts to the contrary, in a letter we have just now received, that he interested himself in this motion and that he belonged to the group of the opposition, we feel the necessity of making the following declarations:

"1. (The beginning contains cordial and flattering words.) We curse

this deputy who in the name of our Liva raises his voice against your honoured person and your worthy colleagues, who nourishes feelings of opposition against you and yours and who does not possess either authority nor position amongst us.

"He ought no longer to have the right to represent our Liva.

"2. Thanks be to God, there is not a single man in our Liva who shares the ideas of this deputy who recommends to us opposition and revolt at a moment when even those who do not profess to have a country would abstain from it.

"We send you our most humble greetings."

The confusion of the spirits in the First Grand National Assembly of Turkey at the time preceding the events of which I have spoken had created a situation which could actually give rise to serious reflections.

We began to see clearly that the whole nation had the feeling that the Assembly was no longer in a condition to work. Even the members of the Assembly who judged with moderation and clear sight could not help expressing their sorrow. We could no longer hesitate. It had become impossible to guide the serious and responsible affairs of the nation and the country unless the Assembly was dissolved. I also became convinced of this necessity.

One night I asked Rauf Bey, who lived in the building of the railway station, by telephone, to assemble the Council of Ministers in his house, and told him that I myself would come there.

I explained to the Council of Ministers assembled at Rauf Bey's the necessity of asking the Assembly to decide on new elections.

After a short discussion, we came to an agreement with the Council of Ministers. The same night I invited the officials of the Parliamentary group of the Defence of the Rights of Anadolu and Rumeli to attend the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Some of the members of this office were astonished and others found my proposal inappropriate. The debates and discussions lasted till the following day. Finally, we came to an agreement with the office.

Thereupon I immediately convened a general assembly of the group. I explained the general situation of the country and the national affairs which demanded urgent attention. I declared and proved that the Assembly was no longer capable of fulfilling this task, explaining the necessity of demanding from the Assembly the calling of new elections.

The general assembly of the group accepted my declarations favourably. Thereupon, on the same day, the 1st April, 1923, the question was brought before the Assembly. About 120 members presented a motion to proceed for new elections to the Assembly. The Assembly unanimously accepted a law to the effect that new elections should be ordered.

This vote of the Assembly is an important point in the history of our revolution, for through this decision the Assembly admitted the evil they were suffering from and manifested that they had understood the ill-feeling which existed amongst the people with regard to this spectacle.

The Lausanne Conference met again on the 23rd April, 1923. Whilst our delegation were endeavouring to restore peace at Lausanne I occupied myself with the new elections.

We entered into the new elections by publishing our "Principles," which are known to you.

The deputies who accepted our point of view and wanted to become deputies first of all told me that they accepted the "Principles" and shared our views. It was my task to present the list of candidates and to publish the names of those candidates at a given time in the name of the party.

I had chosen this procedure because I knew that there were many people with different aims in view while the elections were in preparation who were working to have themselves elected deputies by deceiving the people.

My declarations and explanations were accepted by the whole country with great confidence and sympathy.

The nation made the "Principles" which I had published completely their own. It became evident that it was impossible for those who were in opposition to the "Principles", and even to my own personality, to be elected deputies by the nation.

Some persons who individually presented themselves as candidates in some of the electoral districts actually suffered failure.

Amongst others, Nurettin Paşa, who was still in command of our 1st Army, tried to get elected. This proved to be impossible for him. Later on during bye-election at Bursa he succeeded in realising his ambition.

It was clear that the Paşa for a long time had not neglected anything in the way of propaganda for the purpose of securing his election as an independent deputy.

Among his attempts and publications in this line, his *Biography* was found most interesting by everyone.

Nurettin Paşa had a certain Abit Süreyya Bey publish a *Biography* with the initials "A.S." in 1923, the year of the new elections.

Abit Süreyya Bey is the son of the late Süreyya Paşa, one of the chief secretaries of Abdülhamit. Prior to the declaration of Kanuni Esasi he was, like Nurettin Paşa, voluntary aide to the Sultan. He worked as a contractor for the army in İzmir and Izmit, where Nurettin Paşa's headquarters were located during the World War and at the end of the War of Independence respectively. It was not Abit Süreyya Bey who actually wrote the *Biography* of Nurettin Paşa. The pamphlet was written for him. He was asked to put his initials and have it printed at the "Ottoman Printing Plant" of which he was a share holder. The following copy appears on the cover of this pamphlet.

"*Biography of His Excellency Gazi Nurettin Paşa, conqueror of İzmir, winner of the Karahisar and Dumlupınar Battles.*"

Gentlemen, I don't know the number of individuals that have read this nineteen page pamphlet comprising the *Biography*. I find it very useful and informative for all the educated people of this country. It is essential, however, that the individuals that have read or will read this pamphlet consult various other sources on the incidents and events referred to in it so that they become capable of comparing the contents of the pamphlet with their knowledge.

Let us study together some of the points that appear in this pamphlet, in order to have an opinion on its meaning and the mentality it represents.

Besides the copy that appears on the cover of the pamphlet, the following words appear on the title page:

"Surrounder of Kutulamare, defender of Bağdat, winner of Battles of Yemen, Selmanpák, western Anadolu, Afyonkarahisar, Dumlupınar, and İzmir and conqueror of İzmir."

Let us delay comments on the title such as "surrounder", "winner", "conqueror" which Nurettin Paşa attributes to himself and discuss the contents of the pamphlet.

Paşa is said to be the son of Marshal İbrahim of the Turkish Konyar tribe and grandson of the late Rıza Efendi of Bursa, a descendent of the Prophet and a member of Senate and Chief of Vezirs... According to this information,

Mehmet Nurettin Paşa is both Turkish and Arabic. He is also proud of his father and grandfathers. I cannot refrain from repeating the words of Attila, descendant from Turkish parents, who said to Theodosius, Emperor of Byzantium, who bragged about his parents, "I too am the son of a great and noble nation."

Nurettin Paşa, who "received private education in addition to regular schooling", is reported to have "graduated from the school of war and entered the staff of guards corps in 1893."

Nurettin Paşa was not trained as a staff officer and was never in the staff officer class. Therefore he could not enter the staff of any army. The only thing that might have occurred is his not being sent to an army unit but being assigned to service under the staff of an army. Naturally for a young lieutenant, it is not an honourable thing to start the military career with such an assignment. The principle is to start the career in a military unit where military discipline and difficulties can be exercised.

Nurettin Paşa is also reported to have voluntarily entered the Greek War in 1887, to have worked as an aide to Gazi Osman Paşa, the Commander in-Chief, and upon his return to İstanbul to have been appointed as an aide and guide to the Sultan.

As is well known, Gazi Osman Paşa travelled from İstanbul to Salonika and returned to İstanbul without entering the battle-field. I wonder what honour can be expected from mentioning the fact that one has been appointed as an aide to a commander who has not taken an active duty, or to Sultan Hamit.

Nurettin Paşa was "promoted to the ranks of Lt-Colonel and Colonel and was appointed as the director of the Commander's Private Section in the Staff of the 3rd Army in Salonika in the beginning of 1908." Although it is easy understand what sequence Nurettin Paşa's promotion to the rank of Colonel followed from the fact that he was degraded to the rank of major after the declaration of Kanuni Esasi, it is quite difficult to understand how he was appointed as the director of the Commander's Private Section in the Staff of the 3rd Army in Salonika, because the Staff of that army, where I have also worked, had no Private section. Probably his father, who was the commander of the Army, set up a Private section for his son.

Nurettin Paşa, together with his father who was the commander of the 3rd Army, "served the purpose of the revolution creating the declaration

of Kanuni Esasi and assisted in conducting the revolution in a disciplined and safe way."

In the pamphlet of *Biography*, it is stated that Nurettin Paşa was arrested and investigated twice by Sultan Hamit; he was punished by exile, discharge and six year imprisonment, but he escaped this punishment through the backing of his father. It is also stated that After running away from Istanbul, he went to Rumeli and served with his friends in the preparation and execution of the 1908 revolution which yielded the declaration of the Constitution (*Mesrutiyet*).

If we want to summarise the difficulties encountered by Nurettin Paşa, we can say that, whenever Sultan Hamit became angry with his way of thinking, he promoted Nurettin Bey to the ranks of Lt. Colonel and Colonel, increased his decorations and turned him into the loving arms of his father.

I would like to give some information about Marshal İbrahim's command of the 3rd Army, his son Nurettin Bey's service as an aide to his father and their relation to the revolution and the declaration of the Constitution. For this purpose, I shall tell you about an incident that has occurred in the past.

You may have heard that as soon as I became a staff captain I was appointed to Syria by Sultan Hamit. After I stayed there for three years, I was transferred to Macedonia, which was in the territory of the 3rd Army. The Army Headquarters was at Manastır. There was an "Office of Marshall of the 3rd Army" at Salonika. The Commander of the 3rd Army was resident at Salonika.

There was a "Staff of the Marshall" at Salonika. I was an officer in that Staff in the year of 1908 and my rank was adjutant-major. I had close contact with the secret party which was trying to provide freedom. Yanyalı Esat Paşa was the Commander of the 3rd Army. Our Chief of Staff was Süleyman Paşa Zade Ali Riza Paşa. Later Cemal Pasa and Fethi Bey (now Ambassador in Paris), both of whom were Majors then, and myself the Staff of the Marshall. All three of us were members of the Party. Our endeavours were aimed at providing success to the Party.

The commander of the Division at Serez, which was then under the 3rd Army, was a certain person who held the rank of Marshall. This person had the full confidence of Sultan Hamit. In spite of the fact that he was a Marshal and Esat Paşa had a lower rank, he was kept at Serez in order to have him maintain a safe area between Istanbul and Macedonia. This im-

portant commander was Marshal İbrahim. Nurettin Bey (Nurettin Paşa) used to stay with his father. In the days prior to the declaration of the Constitution, a major in the regiment of Marshal İbrahim commented against the autocratic regime. A spy reported it. Lt-Colonel Nizam Bey, who was the Provost Marshall at Salonika, was assigned by İstanbul to investigate the matter.

The Party had Nazım Bey shot in order to keep him from carrying out this mission. Nazım Bey, who was wounded, was taken to İstanbul. It was suggested that the investigation could be carried out by an officer appointed by the Army, not İstanbul. I was appointed. My duty, naturally, was to protect the major who had spoken against the autocratic regime.

First, I went to Serlez. I visited Marshal İbrahim. During the course of the interview, I found out that the Marshal had great anxieties. Marshal İbrahim had assured the Sultan that there wasn't and couldn't be a single person in his region who was against Sultan Hamit and the autocratic regime. The report about the major under investigation could spoil Sultan Hamit's confidence in Marshal İbrahim. The verification of the report would be against Marshal İbrahim. He did not want this to happen. I immediately understood the Marshal's anxiety and said, "It is not possible that there can be single person in your territory who would hold feelings against the Sultan. The investigation of the Report will only make clear the validity of your loyalty. If you wish, I shall send you a copy of my investigation report."

Marshal İbrahim was considerably relieved after my remarks. He seemed to like me; he called in his son Nurettin Bey and ordered him to show me due hospitality and facilitate my trip to the location of the incident.

My investigation saved the Major. The spy that had reported was condemned of calumny. Thus, Marshal İbrahim proved to the Sultan that there was nobody against him in his territory and the Sultan's confidence in him was reestablished.

The reestablishment of the confidence in Marshal İbrahim soon resulted in his being charged with the mission of clearing of all of Macedonia from opposers of the autocratic regime.

I shall clarify this point. The Party extended its organisation and activities to all of Macedonia. Activities were carried out most openly and boldly.

There was no confidence in Esat Paşa, the Marshal of the Army at Salonika. Ali Riza Pasa, our Chief of General Staff attracted suspicion. They were one by one called to Istanbul by Sultan Hamit without any investigation. Marshal İbrahim, who was trusted in many respects, was appointed as the Marshal of the Army.

When the rumour that Marshal İbrahim was coming to Salonika was received, Cemal Bey (the late Cemal Paşa) took the precaution of getting out of the town on some pretext or another.

My friend Fethi Bey had already been transferred to the command of the school of gendarmerie. I was the only person left at the headquarters to act for the commander of the army and the chief of staff. I was going to turn over the command of the 3rd Army to the new commander. That is what actually happened.

Marshal İbrahim, accompanied by his son Nurettin Bey, arrived at Salonika by train late in the evening. He came directly to the office of the commander. I briefed him about the situation. In spite of the fact that it was already night, he wanted to see every individual that worked in the staff of the Army. Everybody came one by one and presented himself. From the first moment the Marshall started terrorism by taking a position which demonstrated his will to show how violent he is, and that he can destroy a man, uttering certain unreasonable words and every so often hitting the floor hard with his boots.

I went to my home at night. Early the next morning a soldier brought a horse and told me that the Marshal wanted to see me. When I came to the office, I found out that the new commander had left orders for me to continue to work.

Now, gentlemen, let us come to the phase of revolution.

The terrorism of Marshall İbrahim met with a threatening position of the Revolution Committee. The Marshall felt the necessity of giving up his terrorism. Some friends, especially Cemal Bey (Cemal Paşa), informed Marshal İbrahim's son of the decisions and serious intentions of the Revolution Committee. He was warned that his father should not act against the Committee and the Marshal was requested to give assurance. For example, the Marshall was requested to go to a certain mosque for Friday Prayer and to stay in the second row to indicate that he accepts not to act against the Party. Thus, Nurettin Bey was being used as a means of communication between the Party and his father. For more serious affairs, however, the

messages were sent not by Nurettin Bey but by Captain Kâzım Nami Bey, the aide to the commander (now a writer and a teacher).

Marshal İbrahim was forced to comply with the warnings of the Party. He was never informed, however, about the organisation, intentions, decisions, and actions of the Party.

Neither Marshal İbrahim nor his son Nurettin Bey were informed about the declaration of freedom and the Constitution until they became an accomplished fact. Due to the fact that I have been closely and personally involved in all the phases of declaration of the Constitution, I have all the above mentioned facts very clear in my memory.

I had gone to Üsküp in order to tune the activities there with those in Salonika and other places, because we had felt that our Üsküp office was going a little too fast in their endeavours to declare the independence and the Constitution. Upon my retrn to Salonika, open demonstrations had begun and Marshal İbrahim invited me to him and made the following statement: "Will you keep me as the Commander of the Army or not? If not, let me go to Istanbul immediately, that is to say, before I am insulted or offended." After this statement the Marshal picked up the ink-pot on his desk and added the following words which I remember very clearly; "I have only an ink-pot here, I shall take it and go away."

I told him that I could answer his question only after I had spoken to appropriate persons. With other comrades who had authority, we discussed Marshal İbrahim's position as the Commander of the Army. We did not see any drawback in his maintaining the position for some time. I informed him about the Party decision for keeping him as the Commander.

A few days later, however, a lieutenant in the guerrilla forces sent Marshal İbrahim a cable which contained some insulting phrases. Marshal İbrahim sent for me and as soon as I entered his room he handed me the telegram and said, "you had told me that you were going to keep me as the Commander. What is the meaning of this telegram?"

I tried to console the Marshal by telling him that there had not been enough time to inform the whole organisation about the decision the Party had taken to keep him as the Commander, that it would be very difficult to prevent guerrilla officers from going to a telegraph office and sending a telegram of this nature and that he should be patient.

Before long, however, Muhlis Paşa, who was the commander of the Greek Border at that time, was invited to Manastir by the headquarters of

the Party which was at that town. Muhlis Paşa went to Manastir without securing travel orders from Marshall İbrahim, the commander of the Army. Marshal İbrahim, who was grieved by this, scolded Muhlis Paşa.

Upon this, the headquarters which had invited Muhlis Paşa sent Marshal İbrahim a long telegram. The Marshal invited me again and gave me the telegram asking me once again what it meant.

I read the telegram from the beginning to the last word. In this telegram, the life-history of Marshal İbrahim of the Konyar tribe was described. Insulting and vulgar words were used to indicate their astonishment at the defiance he demonstrated by trying to command those that fight for freedom while he is a rare specimen of parasitic followers of the autocratic regime and of Sultan Hamit, and he was given a notice and order to resign from the commanding position immediately.

After this incident, gentlemen, Marshal İbrahim could not remain at Selânik. He "took his ink-pot and went away" as he had said. After this information it can be understood how Nurettin Paşa and his father Marsal İbrahim, commander of the 3rd Army "served the purpose of the revolution, creating the declaration of the constitution" and how they "assisted in conducting the revolution in a disciplined and safe way." They could not even "discipline the revolution". The lack of discipline is demonstrated by the actions they were personally held subject to.

In the fourth page of the pamphlet that comprises the Biography, it is indicated that Nurettin Paşa has done a patriotic duty when he joined the "Army of Action" which moved from Rumeli to İstanbul. The commander of the forces which were sent from Rumeil to İstanbul on account of the 31st March incident was Hüsnü Paşa. I was the Chief of Staff of this unit. I was the person who called this unit the "Army of Action" and I organised and commanded its whole operation all the way to İstanbul. I don't remember Nurettin Bey's joining this unit. Nurettin Paşa, like many others, may have come to Ayastofenas or Makriköy to meet the Army.

It is stated that Nurettin Paşa "commanded some divisions and detachments during the battles that took place in Yemen for the purpose of saving the town and suppressing the rebels."

It is normal that commanders of all divisions maintain their positions when their divisions enter a battle.

Another thing he is reported to have done is to "command the military forces that were concentrated at Sava after the town was saved".

Gentlemen, those of you who have done military service know very well that when there are several military units in one location, a Provost Marshal is appointed. Was the duty carried out by Nurettin Paşa in Sava anything different than this?

It is reported that Nurettin Paşa "assisted Ahmet İzzet Paşa in concluding an agreement with İmam Yahya".

I have not checked this point with Ahmet İzzet Paşa, but according to the statements of reliable persons who have worked with Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Nurettin Paşa was not involved in concluding this Agreement.

It is also reported that Nurettin Paşa "wanted to join the Balkan War and in order to do it covered all the distance from North to South of Yemen, Aden, Egypt, Syria, Konya, İstanbul to Çatalca where the headquarters of the Commander in Chief was, and voluntarily commanded the Ninth Regiment on account of the fact that there was no other opening".

The distance covered by Nurettin Paşa to go from Yemen to İstanbul was the regular distance and route covered by any military or civilian person who wants to go from Yemen to İstanbul. That was the only road. I was in Africa in the same days. In order to reach İstanbul we had to cross the African desert to Egypt on camels from west to east and then cross the Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea south to north from Alexandria to Triest, and go on European soil from Triest to Bucharest; and finally, travelling on the Black Sea, we had reached the same headquarters. This was the only route that could be taken.

Nurettin Paşa conceals a fact here. After he was degraded from the rank of colonel to major, he was promoted to the rank of Lt-Colonel so that he could be appointed to an office in Yemen. Although he had to stay at Yemen for two years in order to promote, he found a way to escape this rule.

In the sixth and seventh pages of the Pamphlet there is reference to Nurettin Paşa's command of the Irak forces, and it is stated that he had "reorganised an army by using only local facilities and did wonders by providing victory in spite of contrary expectations of foes and friends".

Gentlemen: This is the actual situation of the Irak movement at the time of Nurettin Paşa:

After Süleyman Askeri Bey, the first Commander of Irak, was beaten and committed suicide, the battle in Irak continued completely dependent upon the wishes and speed of the English until new forces reached from

the Caucasus. Nurettin Paşa was beaten by the English at Kutulamare and retreated in disorder and confusion all the way to Selmanpák.

The English advanced all the way to Selmanpák, following Nurettin Paşa. The new forces sent from Caucasia met the English forces at Selmanpák. After a battle of three days Nurettin Paşa accepted defeat and ordered retreat. His forces retreated northbound all the way to the river of Diyale. Not even cavalry contact with the English was tried. The fact is, the English had simultaneously retreated. Nomadic Arabs informed Nurettin Paşa about this fact. After he received this information, Nurettin Paşa gathered his forces and advanced in the direction of Selmanpek-Kutulamare.

There was contact with the English forces at night, north of Kutulamare. In the morning, our forces were held subject to a surprise attack of the enemy on account of lack of order, organisation and administration. Many men, officers and commanders died. There was panic and the unit started to retreat. Order was restored when contact with the English was lost.

The serious battles in Irak with the newly established forces took place after these, and Nurettin Paşa has no relation whatsoever to them.

In the same pages of the Pamphlet it is said that Nurettin Paşa "showed the miracle of setting up an air squadron with the aeroplanes he obtained from the English".

I have to say that this statement reflects ignorance. Anyone who knows what an aeroplane or an air squadron is will easily understand why it is so.

In the eighth page of the Pamphlet there appears a photograph which shows Nurettin Paşa with field glasses. It bears the following sub-title:

"His photograph taken during the Great Attack on the 29th August, 1922 when he commanded from Kocatepe the pitched battle of Karahisar."

On that day we were all at Kocatepe. There were many that used field-glasses. Those that used them most were officers who were charged with look-out duty. As a matter of fact, I had observed that Nurettin Paşa preferred to watch the battle-field with a pair of field-glasses.

During the course of the pitched battle of Karahisar - Dumlupınar (on the day of the Battle of the Generalissimus) I found Nurettin Paşa watching the situation with a pair of field-glasses on the look-out spot of Kemalettin Paşa, Commander of the Army Corps (now Ambassador in Berlin). Our

forces had close contact with the enemy and a serious and delicate situation had been created. I said, "Stop watching the situation with field-glasses; we shall go to the furthest line of fire in order to command the battle closely and personally."

Nurettin Paşa refused to go, saying that it is very dangerous to get so close to the line of fire. I was upset. I told him he could stay where he was. I told Kemalettin Sami Paşa to follow me and walked to my automobile. Kemalettin Paşa said "Order is yours" and walked with me. After this incident, we saw that Nurettin Paşa, who was left alone with his field-glasses, was coming behind us. We went to the place where I said we would go. I was personally commanding the battle which resulted in the capititivity of the Greek Army and was giving orders directly to the commanders of the units.

While the orders I gave were carried out, Nurettin Paşa, the Commander of the Army, stayed beside me and watched all that was happening. Once he tried to give some orders to the commander of the corps while I was away. The commander of the corps found the orders inapplicable and started a discussion with the Commander of the Army. Kemalettin Sami Paşa left Nurettin Paşa after he made some harsh remarks. I found out about this incident. I called Kemalettin Sami Paşa and told him that it was absolutely necessary that he keep quiet and calm. After this, I talked to Nurettin Paşa alone. I asked him some general questions and tried to explain that the orders he had given to the commander of the corps were really inapplicable. Commanders do not give orders just for the sake of giving orders. They should give orders of absolute necessity and applicability, considering themselves in the place of the person receiving the order so as to know how the order will be carried out.

In the ninth page of the Pamphlet of *the Biography* it is written that Nurettin Paşa, who had gone to the Caucasian front after Irak, had commanded in the territory of the 3rd Army and acted as the Commander of that Army. It is necessary to question the nature and length of his duties.

It is also stated that after his return to İstanbul from the Caucasian front, he "went to Izmir with the title of Commander of the Aydin-Muğla-Antalya Region and by gathering together the scattered divisions he has found in that region set up the 21st Corps."

Setting up Army Corps, gentlemen, had become a sort of a fancy hobby during the World War. Especially in regions where no actual battle

took place, setting up an Army Corps meant almost nothing but setting up several draft-boards which recruited men. As a matter of fact, if the 21st Corps were a reliable unit, it would not have been left idle in the Aydin region while all the fronts were demanding reinforcements.

According to what is written on the sixteenth page of the Pamphlet, "Nurettin Paşa got into touch with the leaders of the national movement started by Mustafa Kemal Paşa in Anadolu and carried out some important missions in İstanbul until he was threatened by the English and called to Anadolu by Mustafa Kemal Paşa and went to Anadolu".

Gentlemen: I have already mentioned that Nurettin Paşa had reached an agreement with the English and Damat Ferit Paşa Cabinet when he was in İstanbul and that, in complete ignorance of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its government established in Ankara, he tried to make us reach an agreement with İstanbul, and I have shown the telegrams that we had exchanged on this occasion and I have related to you what he had done after he was forced to come to Ankara. I shall not repeat these.

On the eighteenth page of the Pamphlet the following sentence appears:

"Nurettin Paşa, who has successfully fulfilled the above mentioned patriotic duties had a disagreement on certain official matters with the Grand National Assembly and upon his immediate travel to Ankara this controversy was rectified."

I had related to you, on an other occasion, how the government dismissed Nurettin Paşa from command of the Army and brought him to Ankara to be courtmartialled, and how I defended Nurettin Paşa in my capacity as the Commander-in-Chief when the anger at the National Assembly had reached the stage where they would surely hang him. On this occasion I want to call your attention to only the following point:

According to this sentence the only two bodies that exist are the Grand National Assembly and Nurettin Paşa. They met each other, and rectified the controversy. As you know, it is only the Government that can meet the Assembly. The Assembly can question only the Government. A Commander, a Vali or any official cannot be directly questioned by the National Assembly.

The last lines in the eighteenth page of the Pamphlet are devoted to explaining that Nurettin Paşa was "the prime mover (with God's will) of

the great victory which saved the country from a disaster, and thus added again a page of unequalled glory to the national history."

It is impossible, gentlemen, not to be astonished with such a brave claim. It is a fact that Nurettin Paşa was the Commander of the First Army during the Great Attack. Like the other commanders, he endeavoured to carry out the missions that we had given him. There can be nothing as meaningless, baseless, and shameful as to claim that the honour belongs to Nurettin Paşa while it actually belongs to the whole Turkish Army and all the commanders, big and small, and every individual man in the army. It can only be an ironical statement that Nurettin Paşa was the prime mover of the victory. The fact is that Nurettin Paşa is among those that deserve the least honour of the victory.

It was only on the second day of the Great Attack that I left Nurettin Paşa alone at Kocatepe. This I did because I had understood that the enemy would retreat. It was necessary for me to move out of Kocatepe to another place where I could observe the general situation so that I could make general decisions to change the retreat of the enemy to complete defeat. Even under those circumstances it was deemed necessary to encourage Nurettin Paşa by a note which İsmet Paşa drafted and I signed.

From then on I decided to exercise strict and personal control over Nurettin Paşa and his army. If I had not done so it would have been very difficult compensate for the errors that Nurettin Paşa would have made. At Dumlupınar, Nurettin Paşa could not understand the contents of the forwardaction order which Emin Paşa, his Chief of Staff, had written, but did not want to appear not to have understood it and acted as though he wanted to improve it and was hesitant. I interfered and said that there was no time to lose with hesitations and gave the necessary orders personally. Nurettin Paşa said, "Paşa, you do not let us alone or free in operation". To this remark His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Chief of General Staff who happened to be there, gave this answer; "Paşa," he said "this army is the heart and soul of our country. We cannot leave its administration and organisation to chance".

If I had not noticed, on my way to Uşak from Dumlupınar, that Nurettin Paşa had not taken proper measures and if I had not given orders to his units, maybe Trikupis could not have been taken a prisoner. We could even have had to face a very unpleasant situation at Uşak. If, when I reached İzmir and entered the government building, I had not heard the sounds of rifles and guns coming from the south and, understanding the negligence of

Nurettin Paşa, had not taken immediate action, a panic would have spread among our men and even ourselves, for we had mixed up with the civilians in the streets of Izmir.

In Izmir, if I had not personally interferred and made corrections on the correspondence Nurettin Paşa, who claims to be a politician and a statesman, was holding with the foreign officials, maybe it would not have been possible to prevent certain unpleasant situations that would have broken the good spirit created generally.

All I have said, gentlemen, are facts known by the whole of the Army officers. Apparently there is one person who is not aware of these facts: Nurettin Paşa. I had once seen a call card bearing the title "Nurettin Paşa, Surrounder of Kutulamare", this card belonged to this Nurettin Paşa who had the intention of having people call him with such titles as "Surrounder", "Winner", "Conqueror", "Gazi", etc... Nurettin Paşa had given this card to Muhittin Paşa, Commander and Vali of Kastamonu and its region (now Ambassador at Cairo) when he was at Taşköprü, and wrote on the card, pointing an arrow to the title "They cannot take at least this away from me". Muhittin Paşa could not see how a sane person could have such a card and make such comments; he sent it to me to call my attention to this interesting situation. It is true that no one can take it away from him. On the other hand no one has given it to him. It is not ethical to assume to be the only responsible person for every one that has participated in a victorious battle. We cannot let the institution of distributing undeserved titles get settled in this country; we cannot pass over to the new generation an idea that one can become a "winner" and a "conqueror" without really doing anything.

As for the title "Gazi" on the cover of the Pamphlet of the *Biography*, it may be given to Nurettin Paşa by the holder of the initials "A.S." The truth and laws, on the other hand, can only mock with such a thing. It is true that when one goes to war the intention is to become either a Gazi or a Martyr; all those that fall in battle are called martyrs but not all that escape death became "Gazi". This title can be given only by law. The wars that civilised countries have to fight are not similar to the religious fights of the Arabic tribes. Even if it were so, probably only the parents of the victorious fighters would show their sympathy by saying "my dear Gazi son". But a nation and history are not so generous in distributing titles.

Let us end this subject by taking a sentence from the last page of the

Biography:

"Nurettin Paşa is honoured by holding in his possession a gift presented to him by the local people when he was the commander of Irak: the Holy Sword of His Holiness İmam Hüseyin, buried in Kerbela, descendant of the Prophet."

Gentlemen! What big words!

"Kerbela", "Descendent of the Prophet", "İmam", "The Holy Sword", "honoured"; people who employ the policy of corrupting the nation with such words please have at least a little bit of sense of fairness! And the nation be a little bit more careful and prudent.

Certain people, despairing of being successful, found ways by means of thousands of tricks to creep into our midst. Their true character became apparent when the Second Assembly met and began their work.

* * *

The second legislative period of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey coincided with a happy transition period in the history of New Turkey. Our four years' fight for independence was crowned by a peace worthy of our national past.

The Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, was ratified by the Assembly on the 24th August of the same year.

After the Armistice of Mudros, the enemy Powers had four times made peace proposals to Turkey. The first one was the draft of Sèvres. This draft had not been the result of any negotiation. It was drawn up by the Entente Powers with the participation of M. Venizelos, the Greek Minister, and had been signed by Vahdettin's Government on the 10th August, 1920.

This draft was not even regarded as a base for discussion by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The second Peace proposition took place on the 12th March, 1921, at the end of the London Conference which met after the battle of İnönü. This proposition actually contained some alterations of the Sèvres Treaty, but it must be admitted that it included the maintenance of all stipulations in this treaty of those questions which were passed over in silence.

These proposals remained without result, and without giving rise to a discussion on our part, as meanwhile the second battle of İnönü had begun.

The third Peace proposal was made by the Foreign Ministers of the Entente Powers, who had assembled in Paris on the 22nd March, 1922, that is to say, after the victory of the Sakarya and after the agreement arrived at with the French at Ankara, at a time when a speedy offensive from our side was expected.

In these proposals, the system of taking the Sèvres Treaty as a base was actually abandoned, but they were in substance far from satisfying our national claims.

The fourth proposal is constituted by the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty.

For the purpose of really showing the principles which the Entente Powers intended to apply to Turkey and the result which, thanks to the national movement, was attained, I believe it useful to put the most important points of these four proposals in a concise summary:

I FRONTIERS.

(a) Frontiers of Trakya.

At Sèvres: The line Podima — Kalikratia, a little in front of the Çatalca lines.

Proposals of March, 1921: No negotiations.

Proposals of March, 1922: A line leaving Tekirdağ on our side; Babasöki, Kırkkilise and Edirne on the Greek side.

Lausanne: The Meriç line, besides Karaağaç, on our side.

(b) Izmir zone.

In the Sèvres draft the frontiers of this zone were drawn more or less through the district of Kuşadası, Ödemiş, Salihli, Akhisar and Kemer İskelesi.

This zone was to remain under Turkish dominion. Turkey, however, had to cede the exercise of her sovereign rights to Greece, and as a sign that Turkish sovereignty continued to exist the Turkish flag was to be flown over the outer forts of the town of Izmir.

A local committee was to meet, who after the lapse of five years should decide upon the permanent annexation of the zone by Greece.

Proposal of March, 1921: The Izmir zone remained under Turkish rule. A Greek force was to be in the town, and in addition, there would be

a corps of gendarmerie in the other parts of the zone, consisting of different elements of the population in proportion to their numeric importance and which would be under the command of Entente officers. Also in administrative affairs the principle of numerical proportion was to be applied. This zone was to have a Christian Vali, who would be appointed by the League of Nations and assisted by a committee and a consulting corporation to be elected.

The Vilayet was to pay a tribute to Turkey increasing in the same measure as the revenues.

This agreement was to be in force for five years and could be modified after the expiration of this space of time by the League of Nations on the demand of one of the two parties.

Proposal of March, 1922: This contained a very far-reaching promise to the effect that the whole of Anadolu, and consequently also Izmir, should be retroceded to us. The Entente Powers were to come to an understanding with Turkey and Greece for the introduction of an administrative system securing in a just manner participation in the administration to the Greeks at Izmir, under the condition that the same right was granted to the Turks of Edirne who would remain in Greece.

At Lausanne: Questions of this sort were naturally not even brought into discussion.

(c) Syrian frontier.

At Sèvres: A frontier starting from the coast in the vicinity of Cape Karatas, and leaving rather to the south on Syrian territory Osmaniye, Bahçe, Gaziantep, Birecik, Urfa, Mardin and Nusaybin.

In March, 1921: A special agreement had been signed with the French fixing a frontier which was approximately the same as it is to-day.

At Lausanne: The frontier fixed by the Ankara agreement of 20th October, 1921, is maintained.

(d) Irak frontier.

At Sèvres: The northern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, İmadiye, was to remain on our side.

Proposal of March, 1921: Not treated.

Proposal of March, 1922: Not treated.

At Lausanne: The solution of this question is set aside.

(e) Caucasus frontier.

At Sèvres: The determination of the Turco-Armenian frontier is left to the care of Wilson, President of the United States. He indicates as frontier a line beginning east of Giresun on the Black Sea, running west and south of Erzincan, south of Elmalı; south of Bitlis and south of Lake Van, and following in many points the course of the river of the Turco-Russian frontier during the World War.

Proposals of March, 1921: The League of Nations was to appoint a commission for determining the districts of the eastern Vilayets to be attributed to Armenia, for the purpose of constituting an Armenian homestead; Turkey was to accept the decision of this committee.

Proposals of March, 1922: It is stated therein that the help of the League of Nations was to be claimed for the creation of an Armenian homestead.

At Lausanne: This question is avoided.

(f) Zone of the Straits.

At Sèvres: This zone comprises the whole of the European territory remaining with Turkey.

In Asia Minor, a district will have as boundary a line starting from the coast of the Ægean Sea approximately from the point where the Izmir district begins, running south of the Manyas Lake, then somewhat north of Bursa and Iznik, through the southern part of the Sapanca Lake and ending at the mouth of the river Ahabadr.

The right of keeping troops and undertaking military operations in this zone was to be given exclusively to the Allied Powers. The Turkish gendarmerie in this zone was likewise to be under the command of the Allied Powers.

The Allied Powers have the right to prohibit the construction of roads and railways in this zone which could be used for strategic purposes, and, in addition, to destroy those already in existence.

Proposals of March, 1921: This zone comprises the district north of a line beginning at a point on the coast opposite the island of Tenedos, in the south of the Dardanelles, and running to Karabiga; and, further, on the two sides of the Bosphorus to an extension of twenty to twenty-five kilometres.

It likewise comprises the islands which govern the Dardanelles on both sides.

The Allies were only to keep troops at Gelibolu, which would remain with Greece, and at Çanakkale, which would remain with Turkey; they would therefore evacuate Istanbul and the Izmit peninsula, allowing Turkey to keep troops in Istanbul and to bring them from Anadolu to Europe and vice versa.

Proposals of March, 1922: The Sancak of Çanakkale, without the peninsula of Erdek, south of the Dardanelles, and the territory south of the Bosphorus, which was regarded then as neutral; that is to say, approximately the Izmit peninsula as well as the islands to which we have referred, were to form the demilitarised zone. No allied troops of occupation were to remain in Turkey any longer.

At Lausanne: The peninsula of Gelibolu, the territory south-east of the line of Kumbağı as far as Bakla Burnu; a strip of twenty kilometres in width, in the zone of Çanakkale counted from the shore; a strip of fifteen kilometres on both sides of the Bosphorus, the islands of the Sea of Marmara, except the islands of Imralı and the islands of Imros and Tenedos, will be demilitarised.

No troops of the Allied Powers to remain anywhere.

II. KÜRDİSTAN.

At Sèvres: A commission formed by representatives of the Allied Powers would prepare a local autonomous administration for the district situated east of the Fırat, between Armenia, the Irak and Syria.

If after the conclusion of the treaty the Kurdish population of this region should address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations and proved that the majority of the Kurds wished to be independent of Turkey, and if the Council should accept this demand, Turkey would have to renounce all her rights in the districts in question.

Proposals of March, 1921: Taking the new situation into consideration, the Allied Powers declare themselves willing to consider alterations in the Sèvres Treaty regarding this question under the condition that we on our part would show ourselves inclined to favour local autonomy and sufficiently to protect the Kurdish, Assvrian, and Chaldean interests.

Proposals of March, 1922: Not treated.

At Lausanne: We naturally refused to discuss this question.

III. SPHERE OF ECONOMIC INFLUENCE.

In the three-partition Treaty which the Entente Powers had signed following the Sèvres Treaty there was comprised:

- (a) In the French sphere of influence, the district between the Syrian frontier on the one hand and a line which followed approximately the western and northern frontiers of the Vilayet of Adana north of Kayseri, and ran north of Sivas, approaching Muş and remaining on this side of the town, and from there towards Ceziret ibni Ömer on the other.
- (b) In the Italian sphere of influence the district between a line following the Anadolu railway from the Izmit peninsula to Afyonkarahisar, running from there to the Erciyas Mountain in the district of Kayseri on the one side and along the frontiers of the İzmir district towards the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean and the frontiers of the French sphere on the other.

March, 1921: According to the agreements signed between Bekir Sami Bey and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France and Italy, which were later on rejected by the Government, these should comprise:

- (a) The French sphere of influence, the districts which were at this time occupied by the French, as well as the Vilayets of Sivas, Mamuretülâziz and Diyarbakır.
- (b) The Italian sphere of influence, the Sancaks of Antalya, Burdur, Muğla, Isparta as well as certain parts of the Sancak of Afyonkarahisar, Küntahya, Aydın and Konya to be determined later on.

Proposals of March, 1922: Not treated.

At Lausanne: Not treated.

IV. İSTANBUL

At Sèvres: Istanbul was also to be taken from us if the treaty was not carried out quite honestly.

Proposals of March, 1921: It is mentioned here that this threat would be eliminated, that Turkey could maintain troops in Istanbul and that the march of troops through the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Bosphorus would be permitted.

Proposals of March, 1922: It is promised to remove the threat of our expulsion from Istanbul and to increase the strength of the Turkish troops which are allowed to be in this town.

At Lausanne: Nothing is mentioned about all this.

V. NATIONALITY

At Sèvres: The Turkish Government ought to pledge themselves not to put any hindrance in the way of those Turkish subjects who were desirous of adopting the nationality of any of the Allied Powers, including Greece, or one of the newly-formed states, Armenia and others, and to recognise the new nationality of those persons.

Proposals of March, 1921: Not treated.

Proposals of March, 1922: Not treated.

Lausanne Treaty: This question is not mentioned here either; but the Entente Powers had during the course of negotiations demanded that for the settlement of nationality the documents and papers delivered by foreign embassies and consulates in Turkey should be regarded as sufficient. This proposal was nothing more than a new form of Article 128 of the Sèvres Treaty, the contents of which have already been given. It was naturally rejected by us.

VI. JUDICIAL CAPITULATIONS.

At Sèvres: A commission consisting of four, representing England, France, Italy and Japan, in co-operation with experts of other states who benefitted by capitulations, were to work out a new system and recommend its adoption after having consulted the Ottoman Government about it.

The Ottoman Government had to pledge itself in advance to adopt this system.

Proposals of March, 1921: The Entente Powers agree that Turkey also should be represented on this commission.

Proposals of March, 1922: The same concession.

At Lausanne: No clause regarding capitulations.

We agree that some foreign experts should be engaged for five years as advisers.

VII. PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

Besides the stipulations contained in all treaties concluded after the Armistice of 1918 the following obligations were to be specifically imposed on Turkey:

- (a) To re-integrate all non-Turks who had left their abodes under the co-operation of a commission of arbitration, the presidents of which would be appointed by the League of Nations; to reinstate in their rights all non-Turks, and, in case this commission should demand it, to procure workmen, whose salaries had to be paid by the Government, for the purpose of restoring the property of the persons if it should have been destroyed; to banish all those who had been accused by these commissions of having participated in deportations or similar measures, etc.
- (b) The Turkish Government was to submit to the Entente Powers within two years the draft of an electoral law securing a proportional representation of the minorities in Parliament.
- (c) All privileges of the Patriarchs and similar institutions were to be strengthened and augmented. The right of control which the Government had hitherto still to a certain degree been exercising over schools, hospitals and other establishments administered by the institutions was to be abolished.
- (d) After consultation with the Council of the League of Nations, the Entente Powers were to determine the measures necessary to secure the carrying out of this decision.

Turkey was to pledge herself to accept any further measure undertaken on this question.

Proposals of March, 1921: The question of minorities was not treated. It will be presumed from this that the part of the Sèvres Treaty purporting alterations relating to minorities was not to be altered.

Proposals of March, 1922: It is mentioned in these that a number of measures regarding minorities in Turkey and Greece will be proposed and that the League of Nations would appoint commissioners to watch over the strict application of these measures.

The character of these measures was not specified.

At Lausanne: Here such stipulations are to be found as exist in all international treaties made after the World War, as we have adopted them in our national pact; they are only applicable to non-Mohamedans.

VIII. MILITARY STIPULATIONS.

At Sèvres: The armed forces of Turkey are not to exceed in number:

Imperial Guard	700
Gendarmerie	35,000
Special troops for the reinforcement of the Gendarmerie	15,000
	Total
	50,700 men.

In this number are included the staff, the scholars of military schools, and the recruits, as well as soldiers and officers appointed for special services.

The special troops could have fifteen batteries of mountain-guns, but they were not allowed to have either field-guns nor heavy artillery. The country was to be divided into different zones, each of which was to have a "Legion of Gendarmerie." The Gendarmerie was neither to have artillery nor technical equipment at its disposal. The reinforcements were not to be used outside their own zone. Among the officers of the Gendarmerie were to be foreign officers whose number was not to exceed 1,500.

Within the same territorial region foreign officers had to be of the same nationality. Although the number of these regions, which were to be determined later, was not mentioned, it can be concluded from some of the stipulations of the Treaty, and especially from the remark: "The strength of each legion must not surpass a quarter of the entire strength of the legions," that there were to be at least four regions according to the plan of the Allied Powers.

In the same way as there was to be a region for each of the groups of English, French and Italian officers, they had perhaps thought of entrusting one also to Greece and, later on, to Armenia.

The men of the special troops had each to receive wages and had to be engaged for twelve years. Obligatory military service was to be abolished.

The recruiting of men and officers for the legion of each zone was to be made from the population of the zone and efforts were to be made as far as possible to allow the different elements to be represented in the legion. Our naval forces were not to exceed seven sloops and six torpedo-boats.

We were neither to possess aeroplanes nor dirigibles.

The Control Commissions of the Army, Navy and Aeronautics were to have the right of practising every kind of supervision in the country.

The Military Commission was especially entrusted with settling the number of the Customs officials, police agents, keepers of forests and of similar officials which Turkey would have the right to retain; of seizing superfluous quantities of arms and ammunition; of marking the boundary lines of the zones; of distributing the gendarmerie and special troops for the reinforcement of the different regions; of controlling the conditions of the use of these troops; of fixing the proportion of foreign officers according to nationalities; of reorganising the new troops with the consent of the Government, etc.

Proposals of March, 1921: The actual strength of the gendarmerie is increased by 45,000 and that of the special troops by 30,000.

The distribution of the gendarmerie was to be undertaken as the basis of an understanding between the Government and the Control Commission.

The proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers in the gendarmerie was to be increased. The number of foreign officers was to be decreased and they were to be distributed according to an agreement between the Government and the Control Commission. "They probably had in view that there ought not to be officers only of the same nationality in each zone."

Proposal of March, 1922: The system of voluntary recruitment was maintained.

The actual strength of the gendarmerie was maintained with 45,000 men, that of the special troops was brought to 40,000 men; although the employment of foreign officers in the gendarmerie is recommended to Turkey, it is no longer made a condition.

At Lausanne: There is no longer any stipulation of this kind except the restrictions concerning the demilitarised zone in Trakya and the Straits. We even preserve the right of keeping 12,000 men in the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Bosphorus. We did not accept any control even for these zones.

IX. SANCTIONS.

At Sèvres: On demand of the Allied Powers, including Greece and those States which had received Turkish territory (from Turkey) (Armenia and others), Turkey was to surrender all persons who had committed actions contrary to the laws and customs of war and who had made themselves guilty of cruelties in Turkey and had been participating in deportations and other similar actions. These persons were to be judged and punished by the courts-martial of those States who had demanded their handing over.

Proposals of March, 1921: The Powers no longer mentioned this point. The fact, however, that, in the exchange convention signed by Bekir Sami Bey with the English, it is agreed to leave part of the Turks who were regarded as being guilty in the hands of the English whilst all English who were in our hands were to be released is nothing but a milder form of the preceding sanctions contained in the draft of the Sèvres Treaty.

Proposal of March, 1922: There is no question of this condition.

At Lausanne: No mention of this question.

X. FINANCIAL STIPULATIONS.

At Sèvres: For the purpose of coming to the aid of Turkey, the Allied Powers proposed to form a Financial Commission, consisting of English, French and Italian representatives, to which a Turkish commissioner (with a consulting voice) as an advisor should belong.

The attributions and privileges of this commission were the following:

- (a) Every suitable measure was to be made so as to maintain and augment the resources of Turkey.
- (b) The budget to be presented to the Turkish Parliament was to be submitted to the Finance Commission and was to be brought before Parliament in the form approved by this Commission.

Modifications introduced by Parliament were to become effective only after the approval of this Commission.

(c) The Finance Commission was to superintend the carrying out of the budget as well as that of the financial laws and orders of Turkey, with the help of the Turkish Finance Inspection, which would be under the Finance Commission, and their members were only to be appointed with the consent of this Commission.

(d) With the consent of the Administrative council of the Dette Publique and the Banque Ottomane, the circulation of money in Turkey should be regulated and the finances be put on a healthy basis.

(e) With the exception of those revenues which had been ceded to the Dette Publique, all means of Turkey were to be placed at the disposal of the Finance Commission, which should use them in the following manner:

Firstly, after the payment of the salaries and the current expenses of the Finance Commission as well as the normal costs for the Allied troops of occupation which would be kept in territories remaining Turkish after the

Treaty comes into force, there would be taken into consideration the costs of the Allied troops of occupation from the 13th October, 1918, onwards, in the territories which have remained Turkish and the costs of the Allied troops of occupation from the 30th October, 1918 onwards, in favour of another Power, which had borne these costs of the occupation.

Secondly, there would be taken into consideration the indemnity which Turkey would have to pay for the losses and damages which the subjects of the Allied Powers had suffered. It was only then that the needs of Turkey would be considered.

(f) The consent of the Finance Commission would be absolutely necessary for every concession granted by the Government.

(g) In accordance with the Commission, the system of direct collection of certain revenues, through the present administration of the Dette Publique, would be extended as far as possible and come into use for the whole of Turkey.

The Customs administration is to be placed under a General Director who will be appointed by the Finance Commission, to which he would be responsible and which could replace him, etc.

Proposals of March, 1921: The above-mentioned Finance Commission should be placed formally under the honourary presidency of the Turkish Minister of Finance. A Turkish member should belong to the Commission, who would have the right of voting on all questions concerning Turkish finances.

In questions concerning the financial interests of the Allies the Turkish delegate would only have a consulting voice. The Turkish Parliament should have the right of making amendments in the budget, which would be prepared by the Turkish Minister of Finance in accordance with the Finance Commission. But if these amendments were of a nature that could disturb the equilibrium of the budget, the budget was to be sent back to the Finance Commission for the purpose of approval.

The right of granting concessions is restored to Turkey. The Minister of Finance, however, would have to examine, together with the Finance Commission, the contracts of the concession to decide whether they were favourable or unfavourable to the Turkish exchequer, and he would make his decisions together with them.

Proposal of March, 1922: The establishment of a Finance Commission is abandoned. But the attempt will be made to reconcile the control believed

necessary for the payment of pre-War debts and a reasonable indemnity due to the Allied Powers with the principle of Turkish sovereignty.

The administrative council of the Dette Publique will be maintained in the same way as it existed before the War, and the Allied Powers will institute a commission of liquidation for the purpose mentioned.

At Lausanne: All stipulations of this kind were abolished.

XI. ECONOMIC STIPULATIONS.

At Sèvres: The system of the capitulations was to be restored in favour of the subjects of the Allied Powers who possessed these privileges before the War, and their enjoyment was to be extended to the subjects of those of the Allied Powers who did not possess them before (Greece, Armenia and others). (The importance of these stipulations will be better understood if the fact is taken into consideration that the exemption from many taxes belonged to these privileges, and that, as you have seen in the chapter about nationality, we were to be deprived of the right to prevent any Turkish subject from acquiring the nationality of one of the Allied Powers.)

For the Customs, the tariff of 1907 (8 per cent. ad valorem) is re-established.

Turkey gives at least the same rights to the ships of the Allied Powers as she grants to Turkish ships.

The foreign post offices are re-established.

Proposals of March, 1921: It is only said here that the suppression of foreign post offices would, under certain conditions, be considered; the other stipulations are therefore maintained.

Proposals of March, 1922: Within three months of the Peace Treaty coming into force a commission consisting of representatives of England, France, Italy, Japan and Turkey, as well as experts of other states possessing the rights of the capitulations, were to meet in Istanbul and draft proposals for the modification of the system of capitulations.

In the financial sphere, these proposals intended to put foreign subjects on the same footing as the Turks regarding the liability to pay taxes; they were also aimed at the realisation of the modifications believed to be necessary in the Customs rights.

At Lausanne: Capitulations of any description are completely and for ever abolished.

XII. COMMISSION OF THE STRAITS.

At Sèvres: This Commission, which was to have a special flag, a special Budget, and an organisation of police subject to them, was to deal with the passage of the ships through the Straits, the lighthouses, pilots, etc.; the functions formerly performed by the Superior Council of Health in Istanbul were to be in the future under the control of this Commission and practised as they should dictate.

In case the Commission were of the opinion that the free traffic through the Straits was obstructed, they were to notify the Allied Powers of this fact.

The United States of America, England, France, Italy, Japan and Russia would each have two members on the Commission.

The United States of America, in case they so desired and dating from the day they wished it, and Russia, if she should become a member of the League of Nations, and from that day onward, would be able to participate in this Commission.

The members of the Commission would enjoy diplomatic privileges and diplomatic immunity. The delegates of those nations which could claim two votes would in turn and for two years have the presidency of the Commission. Proposals of March 1921: The Turkish delegation will have two votes and name the president of the commission.

Proposals of March, 1922: The presidency of the Turkish delegates on the Commission Would be maintained.

All states interested in the Straits were to be represented on the Commission.

At Lausanne: The presidency of the Commission is given to us.

The task of the Commission will be restricted to watching that the passage of ships through the Straits takes place in accordance with the stipulations of the convention *ad hoc*.

The Commission has to give a yearly report to the League of Nations.

Through the same treaty, the International Council for Health in Istanbul is dissolved and the sanitary control is entrusted to the Turkish Government.

Gentlemen, I do not believe it necessary to continue with a comparison of the stipulations of the Lausanne Peace Treaty with the contents of the other Peace proposals.

The Treaty of Lausanne is the document which reveals in a decisive manner the failure of a vast plot which had been hatching for centuries against the Turkish nation, a plot which many believed they had carried to success through the Sèvres Treaty. It is a political victory which was not matched in the whole of Ottoman history.

*
* *

Gentlemen, I wish to enlighten public opinion by speaking about a question which had arisen during the negotiations at Lausanne and about which rumours had been spread after the conclusion of peace.

This question concerns the conflict which arose between İsmet Paşa, the leader of the Delegation, and Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers. Examining the documents relating to it, it appears to be difficult to explain this conflict by essential and serious reasons, and I am rather of the opinion that it must be regarded as an effect of motives of a psychological character. I have repeatedly had the opportunity of saying that, speaking of the Lausanne Conference, a desire to entrust Rauf Bey with the leadership of the delegation had become apparent. In fact, Rauf Bey aimed at becoming President of the Turkish delegation at the Conference. He had even asked me to give him İsmet Paşa as military adviser. I replied that İsmet Paşa could only be employed if we were to send him as leader of the delegation.

As is known to you, by the way, we did not send Rauf Bey. İsmet Paşa was countermanded from the Army, appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and made President of the Delegation.

I have explained to you the attacks and criticisms to which İsmet Paşa was exposed after the first Conference of Lausanne. In spite of them, he was sent for the second time to Lausanne. İsmet Paşa directed the negotiations with discrimination. He informed the Council of Ministers regularly of the individual stages of the negotiations.

In certain important questions he asked the advice of the Council of Ministers and demanded their instructions. The problems which had to be solved were especially serious; the fight was difficult and exhausting.

Rauf Bey was dissatisfied with the way and manner in which İsmet Paşa managed the negotiations. He endeavoured to instil the same feeling also into his colleagues in the Cabinet. When the reports of İsmet Paşa were read in the Council of Ministers, the opinion was from time to time expressed that İsmet Paşa would not reach the aim of his task. At

a certain moment even the question arose of putting forward a motion for İsmet Paşa's recall. Rauf Bey was said to have tried to bring it to the vote; but through the intervention of Kâzım Paşa, who was a member of the Cabinet in his capacity of Minister for National Defence, this idea was apparently abandoned.

The same feeling of distrust arose in the mind of İsmet Paşa against Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers. He began to look with suspicion at communications which he received with the signature of Rauf Bey, believing that he gave him instructions without my knowledge.

Finally, in a letter to me, İsmet Paşa pointed out that the negotiations had entered into a serious and critical stage, and he asked me personally to follow the course of the debates.

It is true that I was kept well posted regarding the reports of İsmet Paşa and the decisions of the Council of Ministers; but I did not control the script in which Rauf Bey transmitted the decisions. After İsmet Paşa had attracted my attention, I felt the necessity of personally following the negotiations of Lausanne in the Council of Ministers and sometimes even of composing the decisions of the Council of Ministers.

So as to give you a clear and precise idea of the question of which we are speaking, I shall examine in your presence the correspondence concerning one or two questions of the different problems which were discussed in the letters exchanged between İsmet Paşa and Rauf Bey.

Greece had adopted an unyielding attitude on the Reparations question. The negotiations regarding this question between İsmet Paşa and Venizelos had been broken off. The delegates of the Allied Powers proposed to İsmet Paşa to settle this question by leaving us Karaağaç in exchange for our renouncing the idea of reparations.

İsmet Paşa declared that Karaağaç could not be a compensation for the equitable reparations we demanded and that, on the other hand, since the reparations question, which was settled at an earlier date between us and the Allies, had not been resumed and confirmed in this Conference, he saw himself obliged to submit the two questions simultaneously to his Government.

İsmet Paşa actually informed the President of the Council of Ministers of this situation in a telegram in cipher dated the 19th May, 1923, and requested the "speedy transmission of the decision of the Government on this question."

Three days passed without İsmet Paşa getting a reply to this communi-

cation. On the 22nd May, 1923, he sent the following telegram marked urgent to the President of the Council of Ministers:

"In my telegram of the 19th May, 1923, No. 117, I had requested to be informed of the point of view of the Government on the question concerning the Allied proposal that Karaağaç and surroundings would be ceded to Turkey for the renunciation of Greek reparations. I ask Your Excellency urgently to hasten on these instructions."

Rauf Bey answered both these telegrams on the 23rd May. The first paragraph of this reply ran as follows:

"We cannot renounce our claim for reparations in exchange for the cession of Karaağaç," and after reflection he said in the third paragraph:

"It is strange and inadmissible that it should be the Allies who declare that the Greeks cannot pay the amount of the reparations."

After some further observations you find the following point of view in the fifth paragraph:

"So that the question of the conclusion of Peace with the Allies should not be impeded, it is preferable that they should conclude the peace with us and leave it to us to come to an agreement with the Greeks on this question."

Ismet Paşa on the 24th May, 1923, addressed four reports successively to Rauf Bey, in which he informed him among other things of the following:

1. "To-day General Pelle came to see me. He has informed me that the Greek Delegation had proposed to place the reparations question officially on the order of the day within two days, that is to say, on Saturday, and had declared that they would leave the Conference on the same day unless our answer to this question was received.

"Up to this moment I have not received a reply from you with regard to the reparations. I have contented myself to tell him that nothing can be done until I get a reply from my Government and that I had not been especially moved by this communication. I am convinced that we have entered the last stage of our negotiations. The rumours spread in public and the newspapers are in general pessimistic.

2. "I have received Your Excellency's reply to different questions. It is remarkable that the negative answer to Ankara on the reparations question has been known here before I received it. It is impossible that an indiscretion

has taken place in the circles here; for nobody knows yet the proposals that were made nor the answer we received . . .

Ismet Paşa expressed his idea on the affair of the Greek reparations as follows:

"It appears necessary to me to clear up this affair of the Greek reparations by accepting the offer of Karaağaç and surroundings.

"It is said to be impossible for the Allies to make the Greeks pay. Even if we should be sure of winning the war, thanks to the neutrality of all the Allies, it would mean for us to go into a *cul-de-sac* if we should insist on the principle of payment when there is no means of coercion really to get the possession of the money.

"Similar attempts have been made in all countries . . ."

Ismet Paşa explained his point of view in observations which were as sensible as they were perspicacious, and added:

"According to the present situation of the Conference, the economic and industrial questions, as well as those of the rights of abode and all other questions, have been solved favourably or are on the way to being solved favourably by an absolute majority . . ."

"The evacuation has not yet been settled; but there is reason to hope that it will be settled according to our wishes, which, by the way, is an essential condition for us."

In addition, he spoke of the results he had attained, or which he believed he would attain, on the other questions, and he continued:

"I have come to the conclusion that the hope of concluding peace is a very strong one, if the Government sticks to the essential points of our instructions, and if the Greek reparations are settled in the manner I have proposed. But if the Government wants to risk a rupture on the question of the Greek reparations, and if they continue to uphold fixed ideas regarding the discussions about the points which are not contained in our instructions, the signing of the Peace Treaty will be endangered.

"We upheld the principle that foreign coasting-trade should be unrestrictedly and unconditionally done away with, or that the question should be set aside till after the conclusion of Peace; but we have found that the only way for the settlement of the question would be to conclude a special convention of two years' validity under certain conditions. Send us, with regard to this question, too, unalterable articles."

"In short," said İsmet Paşa, "my last opinion is this:

"We are on the way to working out a Peace Treaty containing the maximum of conditions favourable to our interests which we can possibly obtain. If the Government insists in their belief that it is possible to attain more considerable advantages regarding the Greek reparations or other questions, and if they want to face a rupture for this reason, I on my part do not share this conviction. I ask the Chief of the State himself to give me immediate explanations about this point. If there is no accord between our views, it is my duty to return home, leaving the delegation here, and after having verbally explained the situation to the Council of Ministers, to put a limit to my responsibility for war or peace."

The last sentence of the telegram of İsmet Paşa read as follows:

"I ask you to bring my explanations in this form to the knowledge of the President of the Grand National Assembly."

That is to say, to my knowledge.

To summarise the communications which I have just given you, we can conclude the following:

İsmet Paşa believed that the question of the Greek reparations had to be solved by the regaining of Karaağaç; he was convinced that the Treaty which was in preparation contained the maximum of favourable conditions which we could obtain. Rauf Bey, on the other hand, said that we could not abandon our claim for the amount of the reparations against the cession of Karaağaç.

After having read the whole of the correspondence between Rauf Bey and İsmet Paşa, I joined in the main points the view of İsmet Paşa.

But both Rauf Bey and İsmet Paşa were very obstinate in their opinions and had used very energetic language in expressing them. Rauf Bey found himself in a sphere of propaganda where it was easy for him to shine in the eyes of the Assembly and of public opinion. He defended the following thesis:

"After the brilliant victory we cannot abandon our claim for reparations from the Greeks who have devastated our country. Would that the Entente Powers leave us alone and unimpeded facing the Greeks. We shall regulate our accounts with them."

İsmet Paşa, regarding the question of peace to its full extent and

aiming at its realisation on its great lines, found himself, during these days of conflict with the President of the Council of Ministers, forced into a situation in which he had to propose sacrifices with regard to the Greeks. It was naturally not very easy to explain to the public the justness of this point of view, or the necessity of its acceptance.

The problem had to be solved in such a manner that the conclusion of peace would be secured through the acceptance of İsmet Paşa's proposal; at the same time, Rauf Bey and the Cabinet whose President he was must remain in office and continue to work till the conclusion of peace!

The attitude which I assumed in general towards both of the parties was nothing less than amiable. I made use of the system of agreeing with one party and imposing silence on the other.

So as to explain to you how I faced the situation and in what form I settled my point of view, I shall submit to you verbally the text of the communication which was addressed to İsmet Paşa after the sitting of the Council of Ministers on the 25th May, 1923.

Two telegrams in cipher were sent to İsmet Paşa. The one containing the decision of the Council of Ministers bore the signature of Rauf Bey; it was dictated by me to Kâzim Paşa.

The second one was written and signed by me personally.

The telegram with the signature of Rauf Bey read as follows:

25th May, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

In the following we explain to you the decision arrived at by the Gazi Paşa, following your telegrams No. 141 and 144 of the 24th May. and categoric form we have indicated and to await their reply.

We treat as a unity the essential questions and those in suspense, which are impeding the conclusion of peace. If every time one of these questions is taking an unfavourable turn we are to be asked to offer sacrifices, and if we recognise the necessity of agreeing, we shall promote the possibility that one after the other of the questions in suspense will be solved likewise to our disadvantage. In case we should offer sacrifices on the question of the Greek reparations, these sacrifices should at least serve the cause of peace by promoting in our favour the solution of the other questions in suspense to which a favourable decision is absolutely necessary. Consequently, we must not decide to offer such sacrifices unless the ob-

ligation is undertaken of connecting the Greek reparations with the questions of the interests of the Dette Publique, of the speedy evacuation, of the judicial formula and of the indemnities of the Societies, giving them a solution satisfactory to us.

Convinced that it will be possible to attain a peace which secures a maximum of advantages by this method, and that long negotiations undertaken under other conditions could not bring us a happy peace, the Council of Ministers ask you to present to the Conference proposals in the ultimate and categoric form we have indicated and to await their reply.

Hüseyin Rauf

The telegram which I wrote myself, on the other hand, read as follows:

May 25th, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Paşa.

The contents of your telegrams of the 24th May, No. 141 and 144, have been examined and discussed by us together with the Council of Ministers. The decision which has been arrived at has been communicated to you by the President of the Council of Ministers.

My own observations regarding it are as follows:

1. The point on which we must be persistent and obstinate is not the question of sacrifices which Turkey offers in respect with the Greek reparations, but rather the fact that, before consenting to these sacrifices, we have not been able to see a settlement of the other important and essential questions which are in the way of the conclusion of peace. Thus, we have no convincing proofs yet that they will be settled according to our hopes.

The economic questions, which it is supposed are solved or can be solved, are actually depending on the result of the negotiations which will take place with the Societies whose representatives continue to remain assembled at Ankara. We have, however, already been able to observe that these Societies are putting forth exaggerated claims*.

2. It is seriously feared that the Entente Powers want to postpone the evacuation of Istanbul until the economic and financial questions are regulated according to their views, i. e., to our disadvantage. The assumption that this postponement could last until the Mosul question has been decided in favour of England is even very much substantiated.

* This refers to the question of foreign societies which raised claims based on concessions made to them by the former Turkish Government.

3. It seems also that the question of the interruption in the payment of our debts cannot be solved in our favour as long as they insist on the claim for a declaration concerning the maintenance of the Muharrem Decree*.

4. It must also be remarked that, in spite of our acceptance of the judicial formula as proposed by the Allies, they have later on retracted and renewed this question.

5. Consequently, I explain the reason through which they are trying to force us to bring the sacrifices in the Greek reparations question as follows:

The Greeks do not wish to keep their armies too long under arms, lest they exhaust themselves thereby. They are therefore forced to secure a safe and quiet situation by producing a settlement on the reparations question, which is still in suspense between them and the Turks, according to their wishes.

With regard to the Entente Powers, they have not the firm intention of solving the questions which we consider to be vital in our favour; rather, they intend to draw out the negotiations as long as possible for the purpose of tiring us over every point and finally to force us to make sacrifices in their favour. And on the other hand, not being inclined to permit the Greeks to take up arms for securing a satisfactory solution, they want to satisfy them and secure a quiet situation for them by producing the acceptance of their desire through pressure on us.

I do not believe that we serve the cause of peace by consenting to make sacrifices in answer to this pressure.

On the contrary, still more time will pass and we shall finally see ourselves forced to make more and more sacrifices for the restoration of peace. Nine months have gone by since the re-conquest of Izmir. Nine further months may pass in the same way.

It must seriously be considered that we cannot consent to remain indefinitely in this uncertainty.

6. It would bring us into a difficult situation and weaken us if we were to consent to make sacrifices which are to our disadvantage without at the same time securing the settlement of those questions the solution of which in our favour is indispensable.

* That is to say, the continuation of the Dette Publique, which had been established through the so-called Muharrem Decree of 1881.

The moment has also come for regarding the questions which must serve as a basis for the Peace Treaty as a whole; of proposing this to the Conference in an explicit and categorical manner; and of absolutely abstaining from any consent to a final solution of those questions which involve any sacrifice until we have received assurances in this regard.

7. I beg you not to hasten the execution of your conclusion which is expressed in your telegram of the 24th May, No. 144.

Do not insist too much on the necessity of sacrifices as we have not yet been able to obtain in a sure and complete manner the recognition of our vital rights and our independence on financial, economic, judicial and administrative questions which form vital points of the instructions emanating originally from Parliament.

8. As long as the Entente Powers have not absolutely decided to impose unfavourable conditions on us on the questions concerning our existence and our independence, they will not permit the Greek army to proceed to action because we have assumed a decisive attitude on the reparations question, nor will they give their consent to entering *en bloc* and effectively into war against us.

If their decision to maintain a hostile point of view is final, it will not be on account of the Greek reparations question alone but also on account of questions concerning the whole world, such as the evacuation of Istanbul or the interruption of the service of the interest on loans or judicial affairs. These Powers will proceed to action against us under conditions that are much more favourable to them.

The only difference would be that our position would become still weaker thereby.

9. It is not in our interest to accept the demands of the Greeks in order to prevent their leaving the Conference on Saturday; their departure would be of no importance and have no effect if it were not followed by the departure of the Entente Powers. If, by announcing their departure from the Conference, the Greeks mean that they will actually enter upon military operations, there would surely be points in this regard upon which we should be justified in appealing to the Allied Powers.

10. In short, face to face with the rapid and unexpected threat, the acceptance of a sacrifice on an individual question seems to us to be rather an impediment to a speedy peace. I repeat: Request the Allied Powers for a settlement of the essential questions.

Mustafa Kemal

Independently from the above I sent the following telegram in cipher to İsmet Paşa, marked "Personal":

"In cipher: Personal.

25th May, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

I consider it to be necessary to consider and examine once again the whole of the correspondence between the President of the Council of Ministers and the delegation. I understand from the tone of some of the telegrams that some misunderstandings are existing between the two parties. There is no obstinacy on the question of the acceptance or rejection of the reparations. For the purpose of explaining this to you I have told you my opinion about the situation and my points of view in a separate telegram.

Impatiently waiting to see you again, my dear brother, I embrace you cordially.

Mustafa Kemal

From the contents of these telegrams it became clearly evident that in principle we were willing to abandon our claims for reparations for the cession of Karaağaç.

We drew İsmet Paşa's attention, however, to the necessity of securing on the essential questions a favourable solution of those points which we regarded as being particularly important and in need of settlement. This was in fact also the sense and the intention which İsmet Paşa himself derived from these communications.

On the 24th May, 1923, the same day on which he asked Rauf Bey to bring his observations verbatim to my knowledge, he also addressed a telegram direct to me.

I received this telegram, which was sent off on the 24th May, on the 26th. It had arrived in the key for Foreign Affairs and was handed to me after Rauf Bey had read it. The contents of this telegram contained a sort of complaint against Rauf Bey.

This telegram of İsmet Paşa read as follows:

No. 145.

Lausanne. Transmitted on the 24th May, 1923.
Arrived on the 26th.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

I have sent a detailed report about the situation to the President of the Council of Ministers.

There is a fundamental difference of opinion between the Government and myself. In case no understanding is reached, I should be forced to return and I have decided to do so.

I have explicitly demanded that my report shall be communicated to you, the President of the Assembly. The sitting of the Conference approaches its end and the situation does not allow of any delay.

According to my conviction, peace can be secured within the compass of the suggestions which I have expressed.

Under these extraordinary conditions I beg Your Excellency closely to follow the general situation.

(Signed) İsmet

26th May, 1923.

This telegram arrived one day later than the other telegrams to be submitted to His Excellency the Gazi Paşa.

(Signed) Hüseyin Rauf

On the same day I sent the following reply to İsmet Paşa:

In cipher at the instrument.

Ankara, 26th May, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

I received your telegram in cipher, No. 145, dated the 24th May, on the 26th May.

I have already sent two telegrams, a short one and a more detailed one. Concerning your resolution to return over the question of a sacrifice on the reparations question, I cannot approve of it.

I believe that you will reach a more favourable stage if you continue to work within the compass of my suggestions. The difference of opinion between the Council of Ministers and yourself, of which you speak, will then be dissipated. I embrace you.

Gazi Mustafa Kemal

In reports which İsmet Paşa sent to the President of the Council of Ministers on the 26th May, 1923, he declared to have acted in accordance with the communications of the President of the Council of Ministers, with the contents of my telegrams and with the essential instructions given to the delegation, and he informed me that on the afternoon of the 26th May he had accepted the proposal of the Allied Delegates with regard to the resti-

tution of Karaağaç as part of the Greek reparations and that he hoped to arrive at a solution of the other questions within a few days.

Rauf Bey transmitted these reports to me on the 27th May, adding the following:

No. 154/155.

27th May, 1923.

To the High President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

I have the honour of sending to Your Excellency herewith a copy of the telegram of the 26th May sent by His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

(Signed) Hüseyin Rauf
Temporary Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the same day Rauf Bey sent the following communication to İsmet Paşa:

27th May, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

Reply to your telegram No. 151 of the 26th May.

We have found that the attitude of the delegation on the question of the Greek reparations is in clear contradiction to the instructions of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers, having been placed thereby in a difficult position, in view of the interests of the nation, not alter their attitude or view towards you in the expectation that according to your declarations the solution of the important questions will, as expected, take place in three or four days. It is naturally well understood that there can be no further question of sacrifice on the other essential points mentioned in the preceding telegram.

(Signed) Hüseyin Rauf

After having noted İsmet Paşa's reports regarding the renunciation of reparations towards the restitution of Karaağaç, I sent him the following telegram analysing the communication of the 25th May, which was signed by Rauf Bey:

27th May, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

The decision of the Council of Ministers contained three essential points:

1. The sacrifices to which we are to consent in the reparations question

must in return bring the favourable solution of the important questions which are still in suspense;

2. The four questions concerning the interests of the Dette Publique, the speedy evacuation, the judicial formula and the indemnification of the societies must be raised simultaneously with the problem of the reparations; that is to say, the acceptance of twelve million Turkish pounds by all societies, whoever their shareholders might be, or whatever their nationality, without referring any more to further indemnities. Unless these four questions are settled in our favour, we cannot consent to the sacrifice of the reparations.

3. These proposals must be brought before the Conference in final and decisive form and the reply awaited.

The points in which the delegation have deviated from the considerations and observations of the Council of Ministers in their conception and actions are the following:

1. The delegation have considered as a whole only the essential questions in suspense and have excluded the reparations question.

2. It is not considered advantageous that a rupture should take place through the departure of the Greek Delegation from the Conference, or that the Mudanya Convention should be broken through an offensive of the Greek army; and, on the other hand, it has been thought to be desirable that in case no agreement should be reached on the other questions the rupture should come from our side. This is a point which deserves consideration.

3. The principle of a sacrifice on the reparations question being accepted, it is important to receive in return the solution of the other questions within a few days. On this point the Council of Ministers have not yet made up their minds. If actual success should be reached in our favour concerning the important questions within three or four days, the doubts which were believed to be the necessary result of the reparations question being given precedence would be removed. Your Excellency, however, declares that after the solution of the questions which you are regarding hopefully, the affair of the confirmation of the Muharrem Decree preserves its fundamental importance.

4. You point out that an interruption of the Conference on account of the coupons* would strengthen our situation in the interior as well as towards foreign countries.

* The Turkish pre-War debts and the question of their paying interest.

This must also be taken into consideration. On this question all foreign countries are hostile to us; to explain this to the people is not so easy as that of the reparations affair.

On the reparations question, too, there are reasons that publicity in foreign countries should acknowledge our right.

5. A rupture coming from our side on the essential questions would correspond with the wishes of the Allies, if an immediate action did not follow it.

An idea would also be created that if a rupture must be produced for this reason the fact that it was provoked by an attack of the Greeks would be of a nature to justify our attitude.

6. In short, the points of the divergence of opinion between the Council of Ministers and the Delegation are important. The Council of Ministers was afraid of being put before accomplished facts.

For this reason it is necessary to show that the doubts which were raised about the reparations question being given precedence will be removed by laying the greatest stress on the solution of the essential questions within three or four days, as you have indicated.

It therefore depends entirely on your seriously declaring at once to the competent places that we shall consent to make this sacrifice if the questions in suspense are quickly solved in our favour; and if, after all, a rupture should take place, you will have to proceed in a manner showing that it is caused in a sphere in which the Allies are in the position of both provoker and attacker.

7. Will you inform us of the smallest modifications which take place in the situation during the next few days, especially in the state of mind which the Allies show after our consenting to the sacrifice?

The new hopes which may be raised in the Allies, after the success which they have achieved by threatening us, are feared for good reasons.

(Signed) Mustafa Kemal

In a telegram of the 28th May to Rauf Bey, Ismet Pasa said:

A difference as to the procedure had arisen between us; that is to say, whether precedence is to be given to this or that question, a fact which does not concern the essence of the directive lines but the way of their application.

The reparations question has not yet received definite confirmation; the other main questions will be discussed successively; it is believed that the Conference will take up a definite position on all questions on Friday or Saturday.

I told you that we had consented to the sacrifice on the reparations question on condition that the financial and economic questions which concern us should be taken into consideration.

Consequently, unless an agreement is reached on other questions, the question of the Greek reparations will be brought forward again for general decision.

If you should find that, although we have respected your instructions on the essential points, we do not completely and verbally follow your sudden orders, your categoric lines of conduct and the formal directions which you give us with regard to the treatment of different questions, you must know that this does not happen for lack of goodwill but because it is practically impossible for us to do so.

With regard to myself, I had noticed the difference of our points of view from the beginning, and I had asked you quite openly to express this fact.

Nothing has been signed yet; no obligation has been entered upon.

If our way of procedure seems to raise doubts in you, it is still possible to rectify it according to your own point of view.

In short, 95 per cent. of the Peace question is solved. The difficulties are smoothed and limited for the person who will assume this task after me.

On the other hand, if it should not be given to us to conclude the Peace and if a rupture should take place, the attitude adopted by us will not give to the latter a position more unfavourable to us.

It is your task and that of the Council of Ministers to make the necessary decisions in every way.

On the same day Ismet Paşa also replied to me as follows:

Lausanne. Sent off 28th May, 1923.

Received 29th May, 1923.

To the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

For His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

The situation can be judged from my report to the Council of Ministers.

We shall discuss the main questions during the next few days, at the rate of one question a day.

We shall naturally constantly use the question of the Greek reparations as an argument for the solution of all questions in suspense. We have reserved this possibility to ourselves.

The settlement of the Greek reparations question has not raised the hope that a satisfactory solution of other questions can be attained by threatening us.

On the contrary, the possibility of threats has been removed. The situation has become much calmer again. If it should sooner or later come to a rupture, the either Greek army will not march because they have no special reason for it, or we shall prove that they are marching with the others and on their account.

Both these eventualities appear to us more advantageous, morally and materially, than that the Greek troops should open a campaign under the pretext of reparations.

There is no reason to fear that the Council of Ministers will have to face a *fait accompli*.

Our procedure can at the utmost lead to differences with regard to the form which is due to our way of contemplating the situation as a whole.

Nevertheless, I had also anticipated this to you. I have the honour of informing you that within a few days one will be able to judge the essential questions as a whole.

Ismet.

I gave the following reply to Ismet Paşa:

In cipher. Urgent.

29th May, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Paşa.

I consider Your Excellency's communication that the Peace questions have to a great extent already been solved as being very gratifying.

If, according to your statements, the situation is cleared within a few days, we shall be reassured. I wish you success. His Excellency Fevzi Paşa is also at Ankara. He will remain here till the situation has imporved.

I embrace you.

Mustafa Kemal

After Ismet Paşa had received my telegram he continued his endeavours. I prevented Rauf Bey and the Council of Ministers from showing any further obstinacy in the matter.

For a month, it seemed as if both parties would preserve their stolidity. During this time Ismet Paşa asked the President of the Council of Ministers for his opinion on different questions.

A correspondence on the question of the coupons and the concessions again raised fresh irritation on both sides.

In the reply which Ismet Paşa gave on the 26th June to a communication of Rauf Bey, the following sentences are to be found:

"We shall not touch the solution of the question of the concessions before the question of the coupons is settled. Besides, the question which we put was intended to ask for instructions regarding the attitude which we should assume after the settlement of the question of the coupons. The Government passes over this question in silence.

"If in the course of the negotiations, all steps of the Delegation up to their minutest details and beyond the obligations imposed upon us by the fundamental instructions were to be directed from Ankara itself, that would mean depriving the Delegation of the possibility of directing the negotiations in a manner most advantageous to the country and bringing us nearer to the conclusion of peace.

"This procedure, which the Government prefers, does not differ from the manner in which the campaign of 1877 was directed from the Palace.

"As long as distrust and the conviction of our incapability last, the possibility of concluding peace through our mediation is out of the question.

"We ask, therefore, that a Delegation which is convinced that it can move the Allies to accept the views of the Government in their present form, and to which, naturally, Your Excellency and — on account of his office — the Minister of Finance should belong, will take the responsibility upon themselves and come to the Conference."

The Minister of Finance was Hasan Fehmi Bey. I was informed of this telegram. I prevented Rauf Bey giving a reply to it and wrote the following to Ismet Paşa:

Personal.

26th June, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

I have read your telegraphic reply of June 26th, 1923. It must have been written in a moment of special irritation. There is no feeling, no idea, no action which could have been spoken in support of it. I find that you are in the wrong.

We are well aware of the difficulties and impediments which you have to face. It is possible that they will even increase in future.

Those who provoke these differences are the people — not of Ankara, but down there — who daily prepare new intrigues. You must bring your task with firmness to a happy issue. I do not see anythink that could provoke a misunderstanding. The field of your activity is not limited; but the compass of your work, being circumscribed and confined to the most important questions, the atmosphere which you breathe is naturally oppressive.

Gazi Mustafa Kemal

I embrace you.

You see, Gentlemen, that in my correspondence with İsmet Paşa it occurred that I had used expressions which could hurt him.

Up to the end I sent him communications of this kind in severe language. There are also communications of İsmet Paşa to me which are made in the same tone.

Each time the necessity arose I told İsmet Paşa that the decisions of the Council of Ministers represented also my views.

Consequently some of the complaints which İsmet Paşa addressed to the President of the Council could not be regarded as exclusively relating to Rauf Bey. They concerned all Ministers and extended also to my own person.

I do not believe it justified Rauf Bey in regarding this conflict of opinion as a purely personal question between himself and İsmet Paşa, though he tried to propagate this idea.

In every situation and on every question a conflict of opinion can arise between he who gives instructions and he who carries them through from a far distance, especially under conditions which are unknown to the person from whom they emanate. In such cases one must act according to the exigencies of the situation at the moment under the conditions that the essential aim is maintained.

The fact that İsmet Paşa believed it necessary to ask me to follow the course of events was also excusable, for the question was crucial.

At last, Gentlemen, the Conference came to an end in the middle of July.

Before the signing of the Peace Treaty, İsmet Paşa had informed Rauf Bey, the President of the Council, that the Conference was at an end and how the question had been solved.

Rauf Bey had not given a reply, neither positive nor negative. Apparently İsmet Paşa suffered much during these days of expectation and anxiety. He attributed the silence of the Government to indecision at Ankara.

Three days after he had written to Rauf Bey, on the 18th July, he informed me of the affair. In this telegram he numbered and explained the points one after the other, on which, according to his view, the Government could hesitate, and concluded:

"If the Government has decided radically to reject all that we have accepted, it will not be ourselves who can undertake this.

"The only way which I have been able to find, after long consideration, would be to give corresponding notice to the High Commissioners in Istanbul and to withdraw from the signing of the commission. It is true that this would be a scandal on our part unprecedented in the world; but the great interests of our country stand above personal considerations and the National Government must carry out their convictions.

"We expect no thanks from the Government. It will be to the nation and to history that we shall submit the result of our endeavours."

It is superfluous to explain how remarkable the work was which İsmet Paşa had accomplished. It is natural that he should have expected a speedy reply to a communication which indicated that the work was accomplished and that the last day, that of the signature, had arrived.

Communication between Ankara and Lausanne could be secured within a day or, at the utmost, two days. The simplest explanation of the fact that no answer had arrived after three days was apparently presumed to be that the Council of Ministers had regarded the matter with negligence and indifference.

One could even believe that the work accomplished was regarded as being imperfect by the Government, that they wanted to denounce it, and

that it was on account of the uncertainty prevailing on this subject that they were not in a position to give an answer.

If in this case we take into consideration the fact that the person, for the purpose of bringing his task to an end, had to take upon himself before history the difficult responsibility of signing, and had to place himself in the most delicate situation, we must admit that İsmet Paşa had every reason to be hurt and distressed.

I sent immediately the following reply to İsmet Paşa's telegram:

Ankara, 19th July, 1923.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa.

I have received your telegram of the 18th July inst. There is no uncertainty with anybody. We expect that the signing shall take place as usual, in order to address to you our most sincere and warmest congratulations for the success which you have achieved.

(Signed) Gazi Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,
Commander-in-Chief.

İsmet Paşa replied to this telegram. I submit his reply verbatim to you, as it is a precious document, showing the degree of suffering which he had endured and at the same time his loyalty and, especially, his modesty:-

No. 338.

Lausanne, 20th July, 1923.

To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

As *Deus ex machina* you always intervene when I am in a difficult situation. Imagine the moral sufferings I had to endure for four or five days.

You are a man who can do great things. My affection for you has been doubled thereby.

I embrace you, my much-beloved brother and chief.

İsmet

İsmet Paşa signed the Treaty on the 24th July, 1923. The moment for congratulating him had arrived. On the same day I addressed the following telegram to him:

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
President of the Delegation at Lausanne.

You have brought the new mission entrusted to Your Excellency by the nation and the Government to a happy issue. You have thus crowned with a historic success a life which consists of a series of eminent services rendered to your country. At a moment when, after long struggles our country at last enjoys peace and independence, I address my most thankful congratulations to Your Excellency for your brilliant services, to Rıza Nur Bey and Hasan Bey, your honourable comrades, as well as to all members of the Delegation who have helped you in your task.

(Signed) Gazi Mustafa Kemal
President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,
Commander - in - Chief

Gentlemen, I had been informed that Rauf Bey, President of the Council, had not sent any congratulations. I reminded him that it was necessary to do so. Some of his comrades had made the same remark to him.

Later on I learnt that Rauf Bey, President of the Council, had thought it unnecessary either to congratulate İsmet Paşa on the important and historic work he had accomplished or to thank him for it.

Following the hints he had received, he wrote to Kâzım Paşa asking him to send a telegram to İsmet Paşa in his place. What could be the meaning of this step?

Kâzım Paşa received this letter at a moment when he was with İhsan Bey (now Minister of Marine). Hasan Fehmi Bey, Minister of Finance, was also with him. All three of them composed a telegram of congratulation and thanks to İsmet Paşa in the name of Rauf Bey, put the draft into an envelope, and sent it to Rauf Bey.

The latter did not approve of the text, but composed, or had composed, another telegram to İsmet Paşa.

When Rauf Bey saw Kâzım Paşa he said to him:

"According to your composition of the text, it seems as though it was İsmet Paşa who has done everything down there; have we done nothing here?"

The contents of the telegram which Rauf Bey wrote, or rather had written for him, concealed neither his feelings nor his views.

If you desire it, I will submit this document verbally to you:

In cipher.

27th July, 1923.

To the President of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne.

Reply to your telegrams of the 21st and 24th July, Nos. 347, 348.

In spite of the armistice of Mudros, which we signed to escape the numerous sufferings of the world war and for the purpose of actually proving the importance of our nation for the restoration of world peace, we have exposed ourselves to the most tragic and most cruel attacks which followed the Sèvres Treaty and which trod our right of existence and our independence under foot.

In view of the illegal and tragic attacks to which they were thus exposed, the noble people of Turkey, who have lived free and independent for centuries, have risen, fully conscious of their right and their strength, for the purpose of defending their existence and their independence; and with their glorious and invincible armies under the leadership of our great President and Commander-in-Chief as well as our brave commanders, they have gone from victory to victory.

The success and the victories which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Government have gained, thanks to the power and strength which they have sucked from the bosom of the nation and thanks to the eminent martial valour of their armies, have been crowned at last after long months of negotiation by a peace which constitutes their international consecration and which opens to our nation a new era of activity and tranquillity.

The Council of Ministers, appreciating the efforts displayed in the elaboration of a treaty which secures the right of existence and independence to our energetic Nation, which is always ready for sacrifices, address their congratulations to Your Excellency at the head, to Riza Nur Bey and Hasan Bey, our Delegates, as well as to our advisers.

(Signed) Hüseyin Rauf
President of the Council of Ministers.

Rauf Bey, taking the congratulations to İsmet Paşa, who had made and signed the Lausanne Treaty, as a pretext, believed it necessary to mention the armistice of Mudros which he had made and signed himself, and to explain in his defence what were the high and important considerations which had moved him.

The armistice of Mudros was the shameful result of the cruel defeat which the Ottoman Government suffered together with their allies. It was the stipulations of this armistice which exposed Ottoman territory to foreign occupation. It is the acceptance of the clauses of this armistice which has logically led foreign countries to believe that it would be possible in the same way to induce us to accept the stipulations of the Sèvres Treaty.

Although Rauf Bey says that he signed this armistice in order "actually to prove the importance of our nation in the restoration of the world peace," this phantastic phrase was not of a nature to convince and console anybody in the world except himself, because this intention was never in existence.

If we consider that Rauf Bey began his telegram with a reference to the quotation of the armistice of Mudros, we could be tempted to suppose that he wanted to make us believe that this armistice was a sort of preparation for the Lausanne Conference, and that the latter, on the whole, was a consequence of the Mudros act.

Rauf Bey in his telegram speaks of the attacks to which the Turkish nation was exposed through the Sèvres Treaty; how the nation reacted to it, how they formed bold and invincible phalanxes, and how, under the leadership of glorious chiefs, they marched from victory to victory.

And it was just to İsmet Paşa, the one who had left the command of this same glorious army in order to go to Lausanne, that Rauf Bey relates this story.

And for the purpose of saying that these successes and victories are due to the Government, Rauf Bey uses a mode of expression which is a really God-sent one. Mentioning that the Lausanne Conference has lasted for many a month, he cannot abstain from insinuating that the affair had been drawn out. Congratulating the Delegation on their "endeavours in the elaboration of the Treaty," he at the same time succumbs to his desire to explain the origin and the sense of the Treaty to the Delegation by giving a short history of the whole of the revolution, beginning with the Mudros Treaty.

The significance of this letter, which does not contain a single word

of thanks, surely cannot escape anyone, inattentive and lacking in prespicacity though he might be.

* * *

After their mission was accomplished, our Delegation left to return to Ankara. Everybody was impatient to express personally his esteem and thankfulness to the Delegates. On one of these days Rauf Bey, President of the Council, and Ali Fuat Paşa came to see me at Çankaya.

Rauf Bey said: "I cannot see myself face to face with İsmet Paşa. I cannot go to meet and receive him. If you will allow me, I shall not be at Ankara on his arrival but shall start in the direction of Sivas and undertake a circular journey in my electoral district."

I replied that there was no reason to justify such conduct; that he had to be present and receive İsmet Paşa in a manner that was due to the chief of the Government; and that he had to congratulate him by word of mouth for the successful accomplishment of his commission.

Rauf Bey answered that he was not master of himself and could not do it. He insisted on starting on his journey.

I consented under the condition that he resigned his office as President of the Council. Thereupon the following exchange of words took place between Rauf Bey and myself:

Rauf Bey: "Resigning from the Presidency of the Council, I implore you to strengthen and consolidate the Supreme Office of the State."

"Be absolutely sure," I replied to Rauf Bey, "that I shall do what you say."

I had very well understood what Rauf Bey wanted to say. The Supreme Office of the State he understood to be the Caliphate, and he begged me to secure more dignity and authority to that office.

It is, however, doubtful whether Rauf Bey had exactly understood the meaning of my affirmative answer. Later on, after the proclamation of the Republic, I asked him in the course of a meeting which I had with him at Ankara the reason for his opposition. I declared to him that what had happened was exactly what he had asked me to do when he left Ankara, and what I had promised him to realise. He replied:

"Speaking of the strengthening of the Supreme Office of the State, I did not consider for a moment or in any way the proclamation of the Republic."

The meaning of the answer which I gave him, however, was exactly the same for me. In my opinion the actual cause of this weakness was the fact that the administration of the State was entangled with that of the Grand National Assembly and, although the character of our National Government was republican, this was neither definitely expressed nor announced.

Therefore it was of importance officially to proclaim the Republic at the first opportunity and to consolidate the situation by personifying the Supreme Office of the State in the President of the Republic.

It was this that I had promised Rauf Bey to do. If he had not grasped my idea, I do not believe that blame could be imputed to me.

I had also a short exchange of opinion with Ali Fuat Paşa. He asked me the following question:

"Who are now your 'apostles'? May we know?"

I replied that I did not understand his question. Ali Fuat Paşa explained his thoughts to me. Then I made the following remark to him:

"I have no apostles. The apostles are those who serve this country and this nation and who show capacity and strength in that service."

*
* *

Rauf Bey resigned from the Presidency of the Cabinet. At the same time, Ali Fethi Bey, Minister of the Interior, was elected President. (13th August, 1923.)

Some time later, to be exact, the 24th October, 1923, Ali Fuat Paşa retired from the Vice-Presidency of the Assembly and asked me to appoint him to be an Army Inspector. I recommended him to maintain his functions, pointing out to him that, although he had the title of Vice-President, his position and his task were in reality those of the President of the Assembly, whose were very important. He replied that he was not fond of politics, that he desired to dedicate himself to a military career, and begged urgently that his desire should be fulfilled. Fuat Paşa was Brigadier-General, whilst there were commanders of Army corps in the Army, of which he was to take command, who had the rank of Divisional Commanders. In consideration of his former services, we appointed him Inspector of the Second Army, whose headquarters were at Konya, and conferred the rank of Divisional Commander on him.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa had also retired from the Assembly for the same reasons and was already at the head of the First Army as Inspector.

* * *

Gentlemen:

After the execution of the protocol for the evacuation, which forms an addition to the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey was completely freed from foreign occupation and had thus realised the integrity of her territory. It was a question of the future legally to fix the seat of the Government of New Turkey.

Considerations of all kinds categorically demanded that this seat could only be in Anadolu and at Ankara.

Geographical and strategical position was of the very first importance. The interior and exterior uncertainties had to be terminated by a possible speedy settlement of the seat of the State Government.

It is known that certain uncertainties had actually become apparent, before or afterwards, on the question as to whether the seat of government should remain in Istanbul or whether it should be transferred to Ankara. The Press published articles and comments about this.

Some of the new Deputies for Istanbul, with Refet Paşa at their head, used all their strength to prove the necessity that Istanbul must remain the capital, and they quoted some reasons in support of their assertions. They pretended that the town of Ankara was in no way suitable on account of its climate, its means of traffic, and the existing possibilities of installations and organisations. They said that Istanbul must remain the capital and was destined to remain it. When we study the language they use with care, we must notice the difference which exists between the sense that we attribute to the expression "seat of the Government" and the point of view of those who used the expression "capital." We had therefore to prove that this latter meaning had no longer any sense or right of existence in the new Turkish State by quoting the legal and official confirmation of our point of view which had already been settled.

Ismet Paşa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, introduced a bill in the Assembly, dated the 9th October, 1923. This bill, which had fourteen other signatures, was passed on the 13th October, after long discussion, by a great majority. The bill, read as follows: "The Seat of the Turkish State is the town of Ankara."

* * *

Gentlemen, soon afterwards violent criticisms began to be launched against the Council of Ministers, which was presided over by Fethi Bey, and, above all, against Fethi Bey himself. It seemed as though the ambition of becoming Ministers had grown in certain deputies who were discontented with the Ministers in office.

Some other deputies, whose election, however, had been assured in the name of our party, stimulated the hostile movement against the Cabinet, with the intention of preparing the ground for their plans. The aim pursued by these deputies, who apparently prepared themselves to go over to the opposition, was noticeably to gain influence in the Government and the Assembly by completely misleading the latter. For the purpose of being able to give his whole attention and energy to his authority as President of the Council, Fethi Bey retired from the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, the Vice-Presidency of the Assembly became vacant after the dismissal of Ali Fuat Paşa on the 24th October, 1923.

A party came into existence that worked secretly and independently without trying to establish either an agreement of views or a community of action with us. In the beginning they succeeded in gaining all the members of the party for their views by pretending to work sincerely and honestly. Thus, for instance, during a meeting of the party they succeeded in carrying through a resolution for the appointment of Sabit Bey, Deputy for Erzincan, as Minister of the Interior, and Rauf Bey, who was at that time in İstanbul, Vice-President of the Assembly. (25th October, 1923.) I, however, had not approved of the appointment of Sabit Bey as Minister of the Interior. I was not of the opinion that the fact of having been Vali of some provinces was sufficient proof that Sabit Bey would be capable of conducting the interior affairs of New Turkey under the conditions demanded by the Revolution.

I also disapproved of Rauf Bey's appointment as Vice-President of the Assembly, because only the day before he had been President of the Council of Ministers.

We knew the actions which had their origin in certain of his feelings, and we knew the reasons for his resigning the Presidency of the Cabinet.

The fact that, in spite of all, they wanted to enforce his appointment as Vice-President of the Assembly was a proof that they pursued the aim of showing that the whole of the Assembly was of his opinion, that is to say, against İsmet Paşa, who had concluded the Lausanne Treaty and who belonged to the Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The new Assembly risked, from the very beginning, running into the trap of a small faction that carried out a secret opposition. It was made impossible for Fethi Bey and his colleagues to direct the Government affairs quietly and unmolested. He repeatedly complained to me about it and wanted to retire from the Cabinet. The other Ministers put forward the same complaints. The evil had its root in the Cabinet being formed by election of the Assembly. I had found out this truth long before.

After I had discovered the existence of a secret opposition faction and ascertained that the work of the Assembly was dominated by personal sentiments, I came to the conclusion that the regular activity of the Government was daily disturbed for immaterial reasons and that the moment had arrived to carry out an idea for the realisation of which I had awaited a favourable moment. I must admit that. You will understand more easily the details and explanations which I will give you.

The day on which the People's Party had accepted the candidatures of Rauf Bey as Vice-President of the Assembly and of Sabit Bey as Minister for the Interior was Thursday, the 25th October, 1923. On the same day and the following Friday the Council of Ministers met with me at Çankaya.

I declared that the moment had arrived for Fethi Bey as well as for the other Ministers to resign, and that these resignations were absolutely necessary. We also adopted the principle that in case some of the dismissed Ministers should be re-elected by the Assembly, they should not enter the new Cabinet. Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, who at that time, exactly as was the case with the other Ministers, was appointed by election, and who belonged to the Cabinet, was the only one who was not included in this decision. We agreed that the leadership and command of the Army could not be entrusted to a person appointed through casual election.

An examination of this procedure and this decision led us to the following result: We left every freedom of action for the forming of a new Cabinet to this ambitious faction. We saw no objection to letting them guide the destiny of the country in forming, according to their wish, a Cabinet consisting of persons who were agreeable to them, without letting those Ministers who were at that time in office participate in it. We were, however, sure that the faction would not be able to form a Cabinet and, still less, to govern the country if they should be successful in doing so. Should the ambitious faction who tried to deceive the Assembly be successful in this or that way in forming a Cabinet, we were of the opinion that it would be good to carefully

follow for the time being the system and the capability of this Cabinet and even to help them.

In the eventuality, however, of the Government formed in this way proving incapable of administering the country, and deviating from the lines indicated by our new aims, the right thing for us to do would then be to disclose this fact and enlighten the Assembly.

It stands to reason that, if the faction was not successful in the formation of a Cabinet, the confusion resulting from it would serve to arouse the attention of the Assembly. As it would not be admissible to prolong the crisis, I had the idea of personally interfering by putting the question as I had proposed and solving the affair by radical means.

As the result of our meeting at Cankaya, the Council of Ministers sent in their resignations in the following letter which was signed by all of them.

"We are of the firm conviction that Turkey is absolutely in need of a very strong Cabinet, which possesses the absolute confidence of the Assembly, in order to bring the important and difficult task which she has to fulfil towards the interior as well as the exterior to a happy issue. We have therefore the honour of respectfully informing you that we send our resignations for the purpose of contributing to the formation of a Cabinet which in every respect enjoys the confidence of the High Assembly and is supported by their co-operation."

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 27th October, this letter was communicated to the party in a full sitting which was held under my presidency and was read afterwards officially in the Assembly, which met on the same day at about 5 o'clock. As soon as the resignation of the Cabinet was made known, the deputies began to put up Ministerial lists and met in groups, either in the rooms of the Assembly or their private dwellings. This state of affairs lasted till the late hours of the 28th October. No group was successful in putting up a list which would have been acceptable to the whole of the Assembly and suitable to be accepted favourably by the general opinion of the nation. Considering the respective candidates for each Ministry, they found themselves confronted by so many applicants that the difficulties in giving the preference to one of the lists which contained certain names to another one disheartened those who had charged themselves with making the lists and brought them to despair. It true that certain Istanbul journals did not lose the opportunity of attracting attention by the reproduction of the pictures of some individuals who were mentioned as "notable and ho-

nourable persons" and who would be suitable in their opinion of being chosen as President of the Council.

It is also true that an ardent journalist who arrived at the debarkation plank of Kalamış* at a very early hour of the 28th October met Rauf Bey on the way. "The town was scarcely free from the veil which the morning mist had woven around it; the sea reflecting the colours of the sky, and the shore was still motionless; a ship of the Seyri Sefain** crossed the calm bosom of the Marmara."

The journalist enters the richly furnished drawing-room of a beautiful villa at Kalamış, situated in the centre of a large garden. He does not hesitate to enlighten public opinion by reproducing in his journal the views of the lord of the castle about different questions and especially the advice which he gave him to "protect our national sovereignty against exterior and interior."

This opinion and advice, however, had no effect on Ankara.

The individual who recommended the protection of the National sovereignty against exterior and interior was the same who regarded the benevolence of the Caliph as a "feature of Divine grace"!

The telegrams published by some newspapers announcing the reception of Fuat Paşa, who was appointed for Konya, through Rauf Bey, Refet Bey, Adnan Bey and other persons, on his arrival in Istanbul on the 28th of the same month, as well as the reproduction of pictures of Rauf Bey and Kâzim Karabekir Paşa, and the publication of articles destined to revive the memory of the armistic of Mudros and the conquest of Kars, did not succeed in sufficiently attracting attention to these persons.

At a late hour on the 28th October I was asked by the leading Committee of the party to be present at their meeting which was then taking place. The President was Fethi Bey. He declared that the Committee had put forward a list of the candidates and they had asked me, as President of the party, to come as they wanted to hear my opinion about it. I ran through the list and declared that I approved of it but also that the persons who were mentioned on it ought to be asked for their opinions. Everybody agreed to my proposal. Thus we asked, for example, Yusuf Kemal Bey, who came into question for the Foreign Ministry. He told us that he declined to accept this office. I concluded from this fact, as well as from similar occurrences, that the leading committee of the party also was not able to put

* Suburb of Istanbul on the Asiatic coast of the Marmara Sea.

** Turkish Navigation Company.

forward a final and acceptable list. I left the members of the committee, advising them to produce a final list after further consultations with the persons who would come into question. It was already dark. At the moment I left the building of the Assembly to return to Çankaya, I met Kemalettin Sami Paşa and Halit Paşa in the lobby waiting for me. I had read in the papers under the heading of "Farewell and Reception Ceremonies" that these Paşas had arrived at Ankara exactly on the very day of Ali Fuat Paşa's departure. I had not seen them up to the hour of this meeting in the lobby. When I learned that they had waited till a late hour to see me, I asked them through Kâzım Paşa to come and dine with me. I also told İsmet Paşa and Kâzım Paşa, as well as Fethi Bey, to accompany me to Çankaya. When I arrived at Çankaya I found Fuat Bey, Deputy for Rize and Ruşen Eşref Bey, Deputy for Afyonkarahisar, there who had also come to talk to me. I also asked them to stay to dinner. During the meal I declared: "Tomorrow we shall proclaim the Republic." The Comrades present hastened to join in my opinion. We got up. Immediately afterwards I drafted a short programme of action containing the rôle which I assigned to each of the Comrades.

You will shortly hear details about the application of this programme and the instructions which I gave.

You have noticed, Gentlemen, that in order to decide on the proclamation of the Republic it was neither necessary for me to call together all my Comrades nor to debate or discuss the question with them. I did not doubt that they were naturally and in principle of the same opinion as I was.

Some persons, however, who were not at Ankara at this time and who, by the way, had nothing to say on this question, believed that they should use the fact that the Republic had been proclaimed, without previously asking them and getting their consent, as a pretext for dissatisfaction and contradiction.

The Comrades who were with me this night left early. Only İsmet Paşa was my guest at Çankaya. When we were left alone, we drafted a law. The articles of the Constitutional Law of the 20th January, 1921, referring to the State Constitution, I had altered as follows: At the end of the first article I added the sentence: "The form of Government of the Turkish State is a Republic." Article 3 was altered in the following way: "The Turkish State is administered by the Grand National Assembly. The latter directs the individual branches of the administration into which the Government is divided through the mediation of the Ministers."

We drafted, in addition, the following articles for the purpose of making Articles 8 and 9 of the Constitutional Law more clear:

"The President of the Turkish Republic will be elected by the Grand National Assembly from its members and for the time of a legislative period.

"The mandate of the President lasts till the election of a new President. The President is eligible for re-election.

"The President of the Republic is the head of the State. In this capacity he presides over the National Assembly as well as the Council of Ministers when he believes it necessary.

"The Prime Minister is elected by the President from the members of the Assembly, after which the other Ministers will be elected by the Prime Minister from among the said members. "Thereupon the President of the Republic submits the list of the entire Cabinet to the Assembly for approval. If the Assembly is not sitting, the approval will be postponed till the next sitting."

The Commission and the Assembly added to these articles the article which is known to you concerning religion and language.

With your permission, Gentlemen, I shall now describe to you what happened at Ankara on Monday, the 29th October, 1923:

On this day, the People's Party Group assembled at 10 o'clock in the morning under the Presidency of Fethi Bey, President of the Group. A discussion was opened with regard to the election of the members of the Cabinet.

"The Executive Committee," said the President, "has drafted a list of Ministers to present to you, which is not of a definite character. It is for you now to decide. If you will allow, the list will be read to you."

After having said that, he presented a list to the Assembly at the head of which was the name of Fuat Paşa; Celâl Bey (İzmir), designated as candidate for the Ministry of Economy, spoke and proposed that he be not elected by pointing out the importance of the Cabinet. Above all he said the following:

"The persons whose names are quoted on this list are not Stronger than those who have resigned. The nation demands from us that we put them in a favourable position and carry through reforms. The new Ministers must in any case have stronger personalities than the old ones. Let us not be in a

hurry with the elections. Let us think carefully about the election of the President of the Council."

Saip Bey (Kozan) expressed the opinion that Fethi Bey should be elected President of the Assembly and İsmet Paşa, President of the Council.

Ekrem Bey (Lâzistan): "Will the new Cabinet be able to fill the void which the old one has left?" Might His Excellency the President inform us about this?" (I had not yet arrived at the sitting.)

Zülfü Bey (Diyarbakır) declared that as this task belonged to the competency of the Superior Council of the Party the election did not appertain to the Executive Committee and finally demanded the convocation of this Council.

Mehmet Efendi (Bolu): "The new Cabinet that we are going to elect will not be able to remain in power for a month. These repeated elections bring the country and nation into a painful situation. Unless the Cabinet clearly explain the reasons for their resignation, I shall not participate in the election of any Cabinet. We must know the reasons and can only elect afterwards."

Faik Bey (Tekirdağ): "The persons mentioned in the list do not possess greater authority than the former Ministers. The Superior Council of the Party must meet to solve this question."

Vâsif Bey (Saruhan), after having spoken of İsmet Paşa's services, continued as follows:

"Why does he abandon the country and the nation? Our leaders have not informed us of the state of affairs. Why does our honourable President (referring to me) not enlighten us on this subject?"

Necati Bey (İzmir): "We cannot allow the persons who are the support of the nation to abandon us in this manner. Our honourable President must enlighten us. A Cabinet strong towards the interior as well as the exterior is an absolute necessity."

Fethi Bey, the President, believed it necessary to explain that the list was neither proceeding from me nor the Cabinet, but was elaborated by the Executive Committee.

Dr. Fikret Bey (Ertuğrul): "I join in the opinion of Vâsif Bey and Necati Bey. The country is not in a very calm state, and an election made at haphazard is inadmissible. A Cabinet must be elected which consists of personalities possessing authority."

Recep Bey: "Our colleagues must first finish the explanations which they have to give us, so that afterwards His Excellency the Gazi Paşa can speak." (I had not yet arrived.)

Ilyas Sami Bey (Muş): "We beg our honourable President to give us his views. It is better to avert the crisis on the day of its birth. To postpone the solution would result in accentuating the crisis still more. Let us elect a Prime Minister and grant him a Period of 24 hours for the election of his colleagues. We must have a strong Cabinet in power."

Abdurrahman Şeref Bey (the late delegate of İstanbul): "Some of our comrades are alarmed, although crises of this sort have occurred in all countries. The aim of all of us is the welfare of the country. It is true that we are not successful in creating a mechanism which can work according to our wish. But how shall we arrive at having a strong Government? How shall we find the reason for the evil? Let us study the Constitutional Law and determine the authorities of the Government. The Assembly must declare themselves with regard to their opinions and convictions. His Excellency, our President, will on his part tell us his views, so that we can come to a solution. Everybody is fit for work and must be used accordingly. Do not let us occupy ourselves with personalities. We are united in the higher aims. Let the Paşa-President give us his opinion."

Eyüp Sabri Efendi (Konya): "We see ourselves in any case under the pressure of an election. It is striking that the former Cabinet have decided not to take over the Government again, even through they were re-elected. The High Assembly must move the destruction of this resolution."

Recep Bey (Kütahya): "I am going to speak of three essential points: firstly, of the form; secondly, of the lack of activity; and thirdly, of the breach of our moral coherence. If the form is faulty, there is no satisfactory result. We are ignorant as to when and under what conditions the comrades of value, who are mentioned on the list, will work. The chief thing is that a person possessing authority should form a Government by indicating its members himself."

(Then Recep Bey gave long declarations especially with regard to the last point.)

Talât Bey (Ardahan): "Recep Bey and Abdurrahman Şeref Bey have well explained the situation. What is the task of the Prime Minister? We have not yet adopted the authorities and responsibilities of the Ministers. We beg the Gazi-Paşa to enlighten us."

Thereupon the President put the motion for the closing of the debate to the vote. Several motions were read, Kemalettin Sami Paşa's being adopted.

According to the contents of this motion I was commissioned by the General Assembly to solve the question in my capacity as President of the party.

During these discussions, I was at my house at Çankaya. Following Kemalettin Sami Paşa's motion I was called to the meeting. Immediately after my entrance into the hall I ascended the speaker's tribune and made the following short proposal:

"Gentlemen," I said, "you see that opinions regarding the question of the election of the Ministers are divided. Grant me an hour's time. I will then submit to you the form of the solution which I shall have found."

Fethi Bey, the President, put my proposal to the vote, and it was accepted.

Gentlemen, I used this hour of delay to convene in my room the persons who were in question, showed them the minutes of the draft of the law prepared in the night of the 28th October, and came to an understanding with them.

At 1.30 in the afternoon the party held another general meeting, again under the Presidency of Fethi Bey. I was the first to speak; ascending the platform, I gave the following declarations:

"Dear Comrades, I believe that all our colleagues are clear as to the reasons which have led to this difficult question which you have to solve. The fault, the evil, lies in the system and in the adopted form. It is a fact that each one of us finds himself obliged to participate in the election of the Cabinet and the Ministers every time we undertake to form a Cabinet according to our Constitutional Law.

"The moment has arrived to do away with the difficulties which we have to face in this regard. During the previous periods of legislation we had also felt the same difficulties. You see therefore that this system often gives rise to numerous disagreements.

"Your High Assembly having charged me with the solution of this difficulty, I have just now settled the form which I have arrived at guided by the conviction I have expressed before. I will submit it to you. If you approve of my proposal it will be possible to form a strong and solid Government. We must elucidate certain points of our Constitutional Law, which

determines the form and character of our State and the integral application of which is the aim of all of us. This is my proposal."

Then I left the platform handing over the draft to one of the secretaries to read. As soon as the contents of my motion were made known the discussion about it began.

Sabit Bey (Erzincan) said: "I am a supporter of the system of the Cabinet. But it is impossible to settle the present crisis through the proposition of modifying the Constitutional Law.

"Let us elect for the moment a President of the Cabinet. We shall later on think of this amendment."

Hâzîm Bey (Niğde) made the following observations: "Can we elaborate a Constitutional Law? I believe not. Even if we would be justified in doing so we could not proceed to do it within the Party. Nobody ventures to speak in public meeting when a question has already been discussed in it previously. I can by no means agree that the laws concerning the vital interests of the nation will be finally settled here. The subject must be discussed freely in public meeting. Above all we must solve the crisis."

Yunus Nadi Bey answered Hâzîm Bey as follows: "In all countries which had for the first time to elaborate a constitutional law a constituent assembly was formed, whilst it had not been foreseen by us to convene a constituent assembly in such case."

There have at all times been reasons for such amendments.

The Grand National Assembly which preceded us has worked to this end. We have a right to it. There is no time for hesitation on this point. We have left the trouble of solving the Ministerial crisis to His Excellency the President, and he puts before us this motion."

"All comrades, one after the other, have thought of the system which is recommended in this motion. The question now is to formulate it. By the way, such a formulated proposal is already in existence. We must give it greater clearness and a definite character."

Vehbi Bey (Karesi): "Up to the present moment we have not been informed of the Constitutional Law which is said has been discussed here. It is true that we have read such reports in the newspapers; but is that sufficient? We must therefore first of all solve the Ministerial crisis with the reservation of discussing the proposal later on *en bloc*."

Halil Bey: "It is our prerogative to elaborate a new Constitutional Law.

and to alter the existing one. But it depends on the discussions as to whether these alterations are actually of a nature to guarantee the welfare of our country and nation. The lawyers among our comrades must enlighten us on this point. As long as this question is not made clear I am not of the opinion that we can solve it at this meeting."

One of the members: "The Constitutional Law cannot be altered by a stroke of the pen."

Hamdullah Suphi Bey (Istanbul): "Four years ago I emphasised the inconveniences of individual elections. I repeat the same to-day. With regard to the motion of the Gazi-Paşa, the proposal is not new but contains rather clearer expression of a law which was adopted four years ago. Those who would like to contradict this assertion should explain their views. But time does not permit us to hesitate in long expectation."

Ragıp Bey (Kütahya): "The best laws are those which are made through events and necessities. The necessity has now arrived. We must perfect the Constitutional Law by making it clear."

"Let us enter immediately into a discussion about the proposal."

Seyit Bey (the deceased Minister of Justice): "The proposed form is nothing new; it only aims at giving more precision to the law. Necessities and not theories dictate laws. The time and events are stronger than everything. The law of evolution is an unalterable law. The proposed form does not include any innovation. When we render the already existing form clearer and more explicit, we shall surely have acted in a manner that more nearly corresponds to the interests of the country and the nation."

In reply to the observations of Seyit Bey, Abidin Bey (Saruhan) proposed first to solve the crisis.

Eyüp Sabri Efendi (Konya) was of the following opinion:

"We have elected His Excellency the Gazi as arbitrator. To say that we are deprived of the right to alter the Constitutional Law would be equal to admitting our illegitimacy. It is quite evident that the Assembly is competent for the alteration of this law. It is necessary that the form of our Government be a Republic."

Then İsmet Paşa spoke and expressed the following:

"It is absolutely necessary to accept the motion of the leader of the Party. Everybody knows that we are discussing the form of Government to be adopted. If we do not succeed in coming to the end of these discussions

and formulating the result, we shall perpetuate the crisis and the chaos. Allow me to tell you my experience. The European diplomats have drawn my attention to the following point: 'The State has no head,' they said; 'in the present form of your Government the President of the Assembly is the head, which means that you are waiting for another.'

"This is the point of view of Europe, but we ourselves do not see things in this light. The nation is actually mistress of her own destiny; it is sovereign. Why do we hesitate to give a legal expression to the real facts? The proposal of electing a Prime Minister of the Council without there being a President of the Republic would undoubtedly be illegal. The motion of His Excellency the Gazi must receive legal force so that the election of the Prime Minister can be made legal and possible. It is absurd to prolong this state of affairs which is causing the general weakness. The Party must act according to the requirements and the responsibilities which they have assumed towards the whole nation."

The declarations made by the late Abdurrahman Seref Bey, following Ismet Paşa, ended with the following words:

"It is useless to enumerate all the forms of Government which exist at a moment when you say that the sovereignty belongs to the nation without reserve or restriction. With whomsoever you speak he will answer you that this signifies the Republic. That is the real name of the new creation.

"What does it matter if this name displeases some of you?"

Yusuf Kemal Bey who followed him on the platform gave a long explanation of the necessity of bringing the motion immediately to the vote and proposed to endow it with the legal formalities.

In spite of the objection raised by Abdullah Azmi Efendi, who said that the question being evidently important the discussion must be continued, the latter was regarded as being sufficient.

The motion was then read and put to the vote, at first with regard to the whole of it, and afterwards article by article.

The sitting of the party was closed and the meeting of the Assembly immediately opened. It was six o'clock in the evening. Whilst the Commission of the Constitutional Law carefully examined the motion and prepared their report, the Assembly deliberated on certain other questions.

At last Ismet Bey, the Vice-President, who presided, declared:

"The Commission of the Constitutional Law urgently proposes to discuss the motion for the amendment of this law."

Shouts of approbation were heard; the report was read and put forward for discussion. Finally the law was accepted after speeches by different deputies who were greeted with shouts of "Long live the Republic!"

Thereupon the election of the President was put to the vote. İsmet Bey announced the result in the following words:

"One hundred and fifty-eight Deputies have participated in the election of the President of the Republic. By 158 votes they have unanimously elected His Excellency the Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Deputy for Ankara, President."

Gentlemen, you must have read in the protocols the declarations which I then made before the Assembly. I shall, however, repeat them here to recall to your memory this historic event. They were as follows:

"Honourable comrades, following the vote of the draft of the law submitted to your approbation by the competent commission for the purpose of making more clear certain articles of the Constitutional Law — a valuable document which actually confirms the awakening of our nation in view of extraordinary events of world-moving importance — the character of the Turkish State, which is already known and ought to be known to the whole world, shall be defined under a denomination to be universally spread. As a natural consequence of this event you entrust to me, under the title of President of the Republic, the same task which had already been imposed upon me in my capacity as President of the Assembly. On this occasion also you give me a new proof of the sincere affection and confidence which you have hitherto shown to me, and you manifest thereby the fact that you know how to appreciate highly the services rendered by me. With the deepest sincerity of my soul I express to you my cordial thanks for this sign of your affection.

"For several centuries the oppressed nation of the Orient, the innocent Turkish Nation, was considered as being without any of the inborn qualities which distinguish it.

"The capacity, the aptitude and the intelligence which our people have shown during these last years distinctly prove that those who judged them in this way were superficial and blind men, incapable of judging rightly. Thanks to the new title of their Government, our nation will better succeed in manifesting before the eyes of the civilised world the qualities and merits with which they are endowed. The Turkish Republic will know how to

demonstrate by deeds that they are worthy of the position they occupy among the nations.

"Comrades, the victory which the Turkish Nation, creator of this High Assembly, has been able to gain in the course of these last four years will also in the future bear multifold results. So that I may prove worthy of the confidence which I have just received, I think it necessary to emphasise one point which I regard as being very essential and which constitutes for me a great need.

"This need consists in the fact of perpetuating the confidence, the kindly feeling and the support of your Assembly towards me. It is only thereby that, with the help of God, I shall succeed in fulfilling the task with which you have entrusted me as well as that which you shall entrust me with in future.

"I shall work constantly and sincerely hand in hand with my comrades without for a single moment believing that I could dispense with their personal help. Supported by the love of the nation, we shall march forward together. The Turkish Republic will be happy, prosperous and victorious."

The resolution containing the proclamation of the Republic had been carried in the Assembly on the evening of the 29th October, 1923, at 8.30. Fifteen minutes later, that is to say, at 8.45, its President was elected. The event was brought to the knowledge of the whole country the same night and was announced after midnight everywhere by a salute of 101 guns.

As is known, the first Cabinet was formed by İsmet Paşa and Fethi Bey was elected President of the Assembly.

V.

The proclamation of the Republic was enthusiastically received by the nation. This enthusiasm was manifested everywhere by brilliant demonstrations.

Only two or three newspapers in Istanbul and a few persons who were still united in this town hesitated to participate in the sincere and general joy of the nation. They felt uneasy about it and began to criticise those who had intervened for the purpose of securing the Republic.

In order to recall to our memory the way in which the newspapers and persons to whom I have alluded received this proclamation, it is sufficient to take a glance at the publications at this time.

Even the articles which appeared under the heading of "Long live the Republic" affirmed that the way in which the Republic had been decided upon and proclaimed was strange, and that we had proceeded in a manner that meant it was rushed through.

The writer of this article expressed himself in the following way:

"... The fact that the Constitutional Law had been modified within a few hours and that it is said on the other hand that this or that would be done, constitutes — to use a very harmless expression — at least a very uncommon act."

Our conduct was not "the fruit of a reasoning born from the spirit of persons who had studied civilisation and acquired the necessary maturity for governing."

The Assembly was criticised because they had accepted the proclamation of the Republic by acclamation and the nation because they had celebrated it with the joyous salute of guns. "The Republic," they said, "could not live on acclamations, prayers, festivals and illuminations. It is not a talisman. The Assembly had been hypnotised and bewitched. It is not to be expected that things would arrange themselves in future, and that the remedy for all evil would present itself on its account."

Should alleged republicans speak and write in such a manner on the very day of the proclamation of the Republic?

Those who pretended to be convinced that the Republic is an ideal form of Government said now that they did not like the expression "Republic" as being an "idol." What did these words mean? What had they in view?

Pronouncing the false idea before public opinion that a Cabinet, even if in possession of the confidence of the Assembly, could be overthrown when the Assembly was not sitting, it was also pretended that this right "had even been refused to the Padisahs. Would it be accorded to the President of the Republic?" To whom was this question addressed? And what was the reason for it?

Was the aim pursued by the writer of these articles to get the public to love the Republic or to make them understand that it was not an adorable idol? "Will the Republic bring us a change of mentality simultaneously with the change of the governmental system? Will it endow every member of the Cabinet with the brains of a statesman?" Could it be that the alleged republicans were trying from the very beginning to discredit the Republic and to depreciate its value?

Was it possible that the creation which ought to have been protected from the slightest breeze was being tormented in this manner by those who pretended to promote it?

On another page of the newspaper which contained these contemplations was article under the heading of "The Proclamation of the Turkish Republic." Amongst others, the following passages appeared therein:

"The Turkish people have arrived at a point: will they be able to rest there and make a long halt?

"Will this point mean a source of strength, vitality, welfare and happiness for them?

"Will this point be suitable to form a compass that can comprise their entire social organism without entailing decay? Or will the Republic be nothing but a shelter behind which they can take refuge from the harshness of the events for lack of a better one?"

Was this a suitable moment for using such discouraging language?

This person doubted whether the Republic could give hope, rest and happiness.

What was the source from which they expected these blessings? How was it that the thought of the probability that the Republic would entail the decay of the social organism of our nation could take root in the mind of the supporters of the Republic?

Another journalist also began to sound the alarm. "You proceed too quickly, Gentlemen," he said, and he denounced us to the nation with the following words: "Instead of solving the crisis in a normal way by the election of a new Cabinet, this crisis, on the contrary, has had the effect of broaching in a positive, categoric and very hasty manner the question of the Republic, of which nobody believed that its proclamation was impending, in spite of all rumours which had been circulated during these last days.

"It was not only public opinion which did not believe in it. Certain official persons in Ankara in very important positions also did not think of it."

Through such articles they admitted that all the rumours of these last days had been circulated for the purpose of preventing the proclamation of the Republic. Those who pursued such an intention had naturally to be of the opinion that we had been too hasty "in coming to resolutions." But it was an error to believe that public opinion shared this view. The editor who

filled his newspaper with bad jokes and humdrum flashes of wit such as: "The balloon has been let loose! But apparently they have lost the string!... The wheels of the mill turned under the pressure of the water, but in which direction?" continues his criticism as follows: "You are right, Gentlemen, in giving the State a name; but will you be able in the same way to arrange its affairs?"

The lines which began with such diatribes ended as follows: "Our only desire is that one begins to work in the interest of the nation. If the dignitaries and the supporters of the Republic proclaimed yesterday believe themselves strong enough to realise this work, we shall say to them: May your Republic bring you luck, Gentlemen!"

The editor who congratulated us so ironically in this phrase did not make the Republic his own and declared that he had no share in it.

In a critical article published on the same occasion another journalist expressed himself as follows: "We are dejected with regard to our National leaders. Even strong souls have not been able to resist the temptation of acquiring personal power and authority."

And after having supported his thesis by quotations from my speeches, he related how Washington, the hero of American Independence, had retired to his farm, and he observed that the American Parliament, without regard to personality and only thinking of the general good, had worked out the Constitution in a period of six years in order to elect Washington President afterwards. The journalist disapproved of my having been the promoter of the alteration of our Constitutional Law to its present form.

We should be very simple minded if we believed that this journalist and his like were sincere in the criticisms to which they abandoned themselves for the purpose of emphasising the defects which they believed to have discovered either in the way the Republic was proclaimed or in the law settling the principles which referred to the Republic.

If these journalists had loyally accepted the Republic on the day of its proclamation instead of beginning with their alarm, if they had published articles which were aimed not at driving public opinion into uncertainty, but rather at inculcating the idea that the Republic was useful and that its proclamation was a wise measure, they would have been able to maintain the sincerity of their later criticisms. But their procedure was quite a different one.

At the same time, Rauf Bey also had an interview with the journalists. I had read in the "Vatan" of the 1st November, 1923, an interview with

him which gave his opinion of the Republic as well as his conceptions with regard to the National sovereignty.

Let us once more read some of the questions and answers exchanged during an interview between Rauf Bey and the proprietors and chief editors of the newspapers "Vatan" and "Tevhit."

On the question of the Republic, it appears that they had the impression of finding themselves face to face with an unexpected event, and in this case the electors of Rauf Bey would have had also the right to be informed of his views as Deputy for Istanbul and as a person who had previously occupied high offices.

Permit me, Gentlemen, to put a question also on our part to our interrogators.

In what way did they inform themselves about public opinion? Do the electors of Istanbul consist of two journalists? Or was it possible that all of them had entrusted these two the mandate of consulting the opinion of their deputy? And in addition, did they want to prepare a suitable soil to get Rauf Bey to say that he respectfully adjudged this right of interpellation to his electors; that he was grateful for the confidence which they had shown him during his election, that he would endeavour to prove worthy of this confidence, and that the electors could be sure that he would endeavour to the last limit of his strength to fulfill the mandate which they had entrusted to him, in every place and at every time?

It is true that such language very well befits a deputy who addresses his electors, under the condition, however, that it is done at the proper time and in a sincere spirit. On the other hand, the assurances that he will fulfill the mandate of the electors at every place and all times have no meaning if they constitute an answer to a question put for the purpose of insinuating that public opinion finds itself face to face with an unexpected event.

When I tell you of events which took place on the night of the 29th—30th in Istanbul, you will easily grasp the real feelings of the people of this town as well as those of the whole nation.

On the night of the proclamation of the Republic, Sükrü Naili Paşa, Commandant of Istanbul, had been invited to a banquet which the representatives of the people of Istanbul had organised in the municipal club of Fatih.

During the dinner the Paşa received an official communication from Ankara. Before applying himself to it, he read it to the honourable represen-

tatives for Istanbul. The communication contained the following: "The Grand National Assembly of Turkey have decided to proclaim the Republic. Will you announce it by a salute of 101 guns?" The representatives of the people of Istanbul received these good tidings with great joy and loud applause. They immediately congratulated the Paşa in the name of the entire population of Istanbul and also congratulated each other.

Under these conditions it required a good deal of audacity to make declarations and demonstrations in the name of Istanbul and misrepresent the true feelings of this honourable people.

Rauf Bey even refused to speak of a Republic. "For my part," he declared, "it would not be right to consider the question by putting emphasis on the word 'Republic.'" According to his conception "the most suitable system of government is the one that can best secure the welfare and independence of our nation and preserve the integrity of our dear country."

Are these words an answer to the question which was put to him? Was this question put for the purpose of hearing which form of government would be the most suitable?

If the question had been such the declaration of Rauf Bey would have been appropriate. But another question ought to have been put in addition: "Has the system of government which you describe no name? Is not the republican system of government the one that can best secure the welfare and independence of the nation? If this is so, tell us immediately and simply that you regard the republican system of government as the one most suitable, and spare us this senseless rot, for the point in question is that what the National Assembly has done and proclaimed is the Republic. If you aim at indicating and emphasising that there could be a better system of government, tell us so, and tell us too what would be the form of government you would prefer."

Rauf Bey avoided expressing his opinion clearly. Speaking of certain old and well-known theories, he declared his conviction that states could only move on two different planes, one of which was monarchy.

He reasoned on this question as follows:

"The monarch has, so to say, received the right of governing from God, and his rule has thereby received its lawful right. This system of Government having inconveniences, nations have revolted in order to restrict the rights of the sovereigns and to subject them to certain conditions . . . Our nation has also in these last years taken up the fight for the constitutional

system and has followed the aim of taking its affairs into its own hands, of seeing and deciding everything for itself.

"The Party of Union and Progress have forced the right of dissolving the Chamber of Sultan Mehmet V. for the purpose of absconding themselves from the despotism of the Chamber.

"Vahdettin has made use of this right in order to dissolve Parliament. The misfortunes which are known to us were the consequence of it. For this reason one ought not to be a supporter of autocracy and monarchy."

Then he declared that "the nation has considered it as unworthy of itself to entrust its fate to somebody else." He said that they had elected the Grand Assembly with the character of a constituent assembly practising the national sovereignty without restriction or reserve. He explained that this was the second plan of which he had previously spoken, and was at the same time the best and most healthy form of government. Then he added the following:

I do not believe that an alteration of the name could change or dissuade us from our design. Besides, a new system of government substituting another could only impose and maintain itself under one condition, namely, by proving that it corresponds to the wishes of the crushing majority of the people, that it secures the welfare of the nation, and that it safeguards the dignity and independence of the country.

"On the contrary, it would be a grave mistake to believe — especially after the bitter experiences of the quite recent past — that an alteration of the form in the higher places could satisfy the real needs."

Gentlemen, I should like to pause a little over the last declarations which Rauf Bey has made in explanation of his convictions. Rauf Bey is no partisan of an absolute monarchy which has the power of dissolving the National Assembly; he is for a system which permits the National Assembly to have the character of a constituent assembly which can practise the national sovereignty without restriction or reserve. Let us clearly define this system.

Rauf Bey wants to say that the most appropriate form of government is the one which existed before the proclamation of the Republic. What he tries to describe in copious explanations is the contents of Article 3 of the Constitutional Law of the 20th January, 1921. It reads as follows: "The Turkish State is directed by the Grand National Assembly. Its government bears the title 'Government of the Grand National Assembly.'"

It is known that according to the wording of this Constitutional Law

the President of the Assembly has the right to sign in the name of the Assembly. It has also been foreseen that the President is at the same time the natural President of the Council of Ministers, but it is not expressly stipulated that he is the head of the State.

Considering the conditions and conceptions which existed at the time when this Constitutional Law was elaborated, it is easy to understand that at that time the necessity existed for omitting an important and essential point in the law.

This omission resulted, up to the day of the proclamation of the Republic, in nourishing the hope of those who, in spite of the existence of the National Assembly and their Government, persisted in the belief that, after the abolition of the monarchy, the Caliph was the head of the State. According to the system which Rauf Bey pointed out to be the most eligible, he undoubtedly regarded the Caliph as the head of the State. The real reason for the alarm of Rauf Bey and his supporters after the proclamation of the Republic was the fact that the President had been endowed with the dignity of the head of the State.

We must indeed admit that those who tried to attribute special qualities and authorities to the Caliphate, and who were happy to regard his benevolence as a "Divine Grace," had every reason to be sorry for the disappointment caused to them by the stipulation of the law: "The President of the Republic is the head of the State."

Rauf Bey did not confess his hostility against the Republic. But does not the fact of his speaking of the necessity for certain conditions for its maintenance, on the very day of its proclamation, clearly show that he did not believe that the happiness of the nation could be assured through the Republic?

He pretended that it was essentially a question of an alteration of the name and a modification of the form in the highest place; and, he endeavoured to inculcate the idea that the proclamation of the Republic had been a foolish and precipitate action. He finally said that it would be a grave error to believe that the republican form of government would satisfy the real needs. Does he not show thereby his complete indifference towards this form of government and how far he is away from it?

To support his final conviction, Rauf Bey speaks of the "bitter experiences of the most recent past."

What did he mean public opinion to understand by such a warning?

Where is the danger against which he wants to protect the nation? I believe that it is not difficult to guess this.

Up to the time when success could have been secured in safeguarding the position of the head of the State to the Caliph, Rauf Bey did not wish that this place should be occupied by another under a different name; but, as this occupation had already taken place, Rauf Bey incited public opinion to a reaction for the purpose of annulling this measure.

Having pretended that a grave mistake had been committed through the adoption of the republican form of government, it was natural for him to believe that it would be a great benefit to return on the road of error, never mind how far one has gone already.

Speaking of the manner in which the Republic had been decided upon and proclaimed, Rauf Bey expressed himself in these terms: "Minds were confused and then, in a single day, the republican form of government was established, and the Republic proclaimed. This fact caused the people to believe and to fear that this form had been made an accomplished fact by irresponsible people. This excitement is very logical, and it can be stated with satisfaction that the nation, awakened by the trials which it had to pass through, had acquired a certain circumspection. I, personally, am satisfied about it."

Gentlemen, it is the Grand National Assembly which has decided upon and proclaimed the Republican form of Government; the same Assembly of which Rauf Bey himself has very justly said "it is the corner stone of our fight for independence and has given actual proof of its great capability in exercising the National sovereignty without reserve or restriction."

If, speaking of irresponsible persons, he thought of those who had caused the Assembly to proclaim the Republic and put a motion to this effect in front of them, then I would say that it was I who did all this and it would not be erroneous to admit that Rauf Bey was capable of giving an account of this fact better than anyone else.

If this presumption should be erroneous, we would have to come to the conclusion that Rauf Bey has never known me — he who declared that he had not only sentiments of comradeship and brotherhood towards me for many a year, but also feelings — which were reciprocated — of confidence and profound respect.

To interpret my actions as being of a nature to alarm the public and to express himself to this effect, by assuming the right of speaking in the name

of the people, who, however, had manifested their joy, meant nothing else than an attempt artificially to spread such alarm.

Rauf Bey, who declared himself to be "personally satisfied," must be reminded on this occasion of the following point: It is not in this way that one ought to express oneself about a man who has dedicated himself to the task of developing vigilance and circumspection in the nation. He had neither the right nor the authority any more than myself to express his satisfaction at ascertaining the manifestations of this sensibility in the people.

When accepting the stipulations of the armistice of Mudros as they were, relating to strategical questions which exposed the whole of the country to the enemy's occupation, did Rauf Bey not feel then how alarmed and dismayed the nation was?

This man, in whose favour his supporters led an organised campaign on the very day of the proclamation of the Republic by putting under his picture the ever-recurring inscription: "Rauf Bey, signatory of the armistice of Mudros, who has taken revenge at Lausanne," this man, I say, ought not to have driven things so far as to pretend that he understood the real aspirations and the innermost feeling of the nation better than we, nor that he had a more vital interest in these aspirations and feelings than ourself.

In another passage of his assertions, Rauf Bey said: "The responsible men will enlighten the nation and satisfy the people's minds by explaining these facts (the reasons for the proclamation of the Republic) through the channel of the Grand Assembly, which is the most competent authority to deliberate and decide. To know these facts is the undoubted right of public opinion."

These words are lacking in logic. Rauf Bey began by saying: "It is the Assembly which exercises the National sovereignty without reserve or restriction." Who are then these responsible men who ought to demand an explanation from them concerning the reasons why they have adopted a legitimate resolution of high importance and proclaimed this resolution, for the purpose of making them known to the people?

If the system of government in a country or in a social corporation is altered, there must be reasons for the alteration. But are those who make this revolution obliged to convince their adversaries who have no desire to understand anything?

The Republic had undoubtedly its supporters and its adversaries. Even if its supporters had tried to explain to the adversaries the considerations

they had in view when they thought it time to proclaim the Republic and to prove to them that they had been right in thinking and acting in this manner, can it be expected that they would have succeeded in breaking their intentional stupidity? It is evident that the supporters would have realised their ideal one way or another, if they were capable of doing so, be it by way of insurrection, revolution or law. This is the duty of everybody who nourishes a revolutionary ideal.

On the other hand, the adversaries would naturally raise protests, sound alarms, undertake reactionary attempts, as Rauf Bey and his supporters had done when the Republic was proclaimed.

At the same time, our Army Inspectors in Istanbul expressed their views and feelings in interviews with journalists and in speeches which they delivered during banquets organised for different occasions.

After the proclamation of the Republic there were also persons and journalists in Istanbul who had the idea of making the Caliph play a rôle. The newspapers published all sorts of rumours and contradictions about the dismissal of the Caliph which had already taken place or was going to. Finally the following was written:

"We learn that the question is not limited to such a rumour and cannot be solved by a simple contradiction. It is a certain fact that the proclamation of the Republic has raised once more the question of the Caliphate."

It was written that the Caliph, "sitting at his writing desk," had made a statement to an editor of the newspaper "Vatan," that the Caliph enjoyed great popularity amongst all believers; that he received thousands of letters and telegrams from the Mohamedan world, even from the remotest corners of Asia; that numerous delegations from many places came to him. The attempt was made of giving the people to understand that the authority of the Caliphate was not of a nature easily to be shaken. Then it was affirmed that the Caliph would not abdicate until Islam had declared itself against him. Simultaneously it was said:

"The Government, being absorbed in numerous interior questions, has not yet been able to occupy itself with the rights of the Caliphate."

"The world of Islam undoubtedly knows that the Government is very much occupied with interior questions and naturally finds that it has not yet been able to dedicate itself to the question of defining the rights of the Caliphate."

Requesting us in such phrases to define the rights of the Caliphate, to

a certain degree they threatened us by letting us know that the Mohamedan world, that had hitherto excused us, could act quite differently in future. On the other hand, they tried to attract the attention of Islam for the purpose of inducing it to influence us on this question.

This article, which appeared in the journal "Vatan" dated the 9th November, 1923, was followed by an open letter to the Caliph, which was published in the newspaper "Tanin" on the 10th of the same month. In order to prove the extent to which the nation was agitated by the rumours which were circulated about the dismissal of the Caliph, they had invented in this letter, which was signed by Lütfi Fikri Bey, an incident which was said to have happened on board ship. As soon as the passengers heard the rumours, they were seized by a feeling of unrest and sadness. Even those who did not know one another had given themselves up to long, frank discussions. A common anxiety had made them friends in a moment.

"I wish with all my heart," said Lütfi Fikri Bey, "and with all my soul that this rumour of dismissal were buried for ever; for such an event would be fatal to the whole world." Lütfi Fikri Bey also tried to instil the following thoughts in the minds of the nation: "We must state with surprise and regret that those who attack this moral treasure — (he means the Caliphate) — are neither strangers nor numbered among those Mohamedan nations who are jealous of the Turks. It is ourselves, the Turks, who are making attempts that will lead to the loss of this treasure for ever."

Strangers did not attack the Caliphate; it was the Turkish nation that could not protect itself from attacks. Those who attacked the Caliphate were not Mohamedan nations who were jealous of Turkey, but Mohamedan peoples who had fought under the flags of the English and French against the Turks at the Çanakkale, in Syria and the Irak.

For the purpose of easily attacking the Turkish nation, it was said that the abolition of the Caliphate, the maintenance of which they preferred, would be suicidal for the Turkish world, and they pretended that we Turks in proclaiming the Republic tried to abolish the Caliphate.

Such publications undoubtedly did not remain without effect.

Lütfi Fikri Bey's apprehensions expressed in his open letter in the "Tanin" were confirmed on the following day by the chief editor of the same journal.

When we read the leading article of the "Tanin" on the 11th November, 1923, under the heading "And Now the Question of the Caliphate," we

saw that those who could not have prevented the proclamation of the Republic were manoeuvring now in order to maintain the Caliphate at any cost. The "Tanin," which tried to win the minds of the people for the dynasty by publishing letters from Ottoman princes, alleges in this article that the rights of the dynasty had been the target for a mean attack and that the aggressors belonged to the élite of our party. The article, after having rattled off all that was necessary to discredit the Republic in the eyes of the nation, passed on to the rumour of the Caliph's dismissal and continued as follows: "We find ourselves facing a resolution taken in an underhanded way. It is indeed painful to state that the National Assembly is fettered to such a degree and is restricted to register the resolutions which are arrived at outside."

Their intention was to incite the Assembly against us and to assure the fact that, after the proclamation of the Republic had been decided upon, the Assembly would abstain at least from carrying through the abolition of the Caliphate.

The chief editor of the "Tanin" expressed his views and reflections concerning the Caliphate in the following lines:

"No great sagacity is necessary to understand that if we lose the Caliphate, the Turkish State, comprising between five and ten million souls*, would have no longer any weight in the Mohamedan world, and that we would degrade ourselves in addition in the eyes of European diplomacy to the rank of a small state without any importance."

"Is this a national way of thinking? Every Turk who really possesses national feeling must support the Caliphate with all his strength."

As I have already explained my views concerning the Caliphate, I believe it unnecessary to submit these statements to another analysis. I shall restrict myself simply to saying that great sagacity is by no means required to understand that a form of government demanding an unconditional adherence to the Caliphate could not be a republic.

I now draw your attention to some other passages of the leading article in the "Tanin."

"To endanger the Caliphate, the heirdom of the Ottoman dynasty acquired forever by Turkey, would apparently be an action which could by no means be in accord with reason, patriotism or national sentiment."

* According to the census of 1927 Turkey had nearly 14 million inhabitants.

The chief editor of the "Tanin" had declared himself a republican, but a republican who wanted to see at the head of the republican government a member of the dynasty as Caliph. Without this, he said, the accomplished fact would not be in accord with reason, patriotism or national sentiment.

According to his opinion, we were to protect the Caliphate in such a manner that would make it impossible for it ever to escape from us. The manœuvres undertaken in this spirit had been wrecked . . .

The significance of these articles and the aim of these reasonings are easy to explain to-day. To-morrow they will be understood still better. Do not suppose that the coming generations will be astonished that at the head of those who relentlessly attacked the Republic on the very day of its proclamation were exactly those who pretended to be republicans! On the contrary, the enlightened republican sons of Turkey will have no difficulty in analysing and penetrating into the real mentality of these pretended republicans. They will easily understand that it was impossible to maintain a form of government which, after having proclaimed itself a republic, would have undertaken the obligation of preserving under the title of Caliph at its head a rotten dynasty, and this in a manner which would never have made its removal possible.

In the newspapers of that time, two other questions were also brought forward. The one was my illness and the other the services rendered in Turkestan by Enver Paşa, who, it pretended, was still alive . . .

It appears that the latter, during his stay in foreign countries, worked for the cause of pan-Islamism; he used the title of "Son-in-law of the Caliph," and had this title even engraved on one side of a seal that he had made for himself in Turkestan.

These questions were naturally not constantly discussed without a certain aim in view.

The articles which I have just now quoted as well as the attitude of certain persons can briefly be defined as follows:

"The national sovereignty constitutes the basis. It is the developed form of the Republic. The Turkish people have realised the national sovereignty. It is therefore unnecessary to proclaim the Republic. This is an error. In Turkey exists the most suitable form of government in a constitutional régime with a member of the Ottoman dynasty as Chief of the State, under the maintenance, however, of the principle of national sovereignty, but without proclaiming a Republic."

"It is the same thing in England, where, in spite of the national sovereignty, a king who is also Emperor of India stands at the head of the State."

Those who had rallied around this principle had nearly all revealed themselves through their speeches, their attitude and their writings. It was only to be expected that Rauf Bey had been elected head of this group.

This party, which consisted of elements of different factions, believed it had found in the person of Rauf Bey the most suitable defender for assertion of their thoughts. They believed that they could find their greatest hopes on him.

Meanwhile Rauf Bey started for Ankara. According to the statements of the newspaper "Vatan," a great crowd accompanied him to the railway station, at the head of which were Kâzım Karabekir Pasa, Ali Fuat Paşa and Adnan Bey. Speaking of this, the "Vatan" announced to the nation the political attitude which Rauf Bey would take up at Ankara, in the midst of the Assembly. In a very clear manner it was said that Rauf Bey's activity would not be personal and negative but that he would have in view the welfare of the nation and the respect of the laws, that he would defend in the Assembly salutary principles by creating an element of order and discipline.

Undoubtedly, we ought not to concede the right to the proprietor of the newspaper "Vatan" of providing such information and assertions for himself.

Rauf Bey had been elected deputy in the name of our Party. He had to follow our programme and could not adopt an independent position before resigning from our party. Up till now, however, he had not revealed his deviating opinion. In his persistency to remain attached to the party, he had even stated that he had no intention of leaving it. There was no explanation for the personal policy he pursued of continuing to belong to the party but violating its discipline.

It was soon easy to discover the result he was trying to reach through this line of conduct. If you wish it, I will tell you about this.

After his arrival at Ankara, Rauf Bey entered as comrade into frequent conversations with the members of the party. It became, however, soon noticeable that all these conversations aimed at the realisation of an aim.

He began to arouse our comrades and the party against us by assertions such as the following: "The Republic has been very hurriedly proclaimed.

Irresponsible persons are the cause of it. We must examine the reasons for this conduct. The Assembly must be in a position to preserve the National sovereignty to its fullest extent. It could not be foreseen what the end would be if they were restricted to let themselves be guided by dark plans. What is the reason that necessitated the proclamation of the Republic? It must be proved that the latter is really useful and necessary for us."

Supplementary to his declarations made in Istanbul, Rauf Bey had said: "The Assembly and the Government must prove to the nation that this haste had a logical and legitimate reason, and they will do so." We understood therefore very well that the conversations which he had day and night aimed at instilling his views in the members of the Assembly and the party. As soon as he had succeeded in this effort he would try to bring the question of the proclamation of the Republic once again into discussion. The aim which he pursued in this was to force the Assembly and the Government to prove there was a convincing reason for the proclamation of the Republic.

According to his opinion and the conception of his adherents, it would be difficult to indicate this reason and, as soon as the errors committed had become evident, they would at once set to work to rectify them.

Gentlemen, a week sufficed to penetrate through the aims and intentions of Rauf Bey. It is natural that the Republicans could not suffer any longer an activity of this kind, whoever its promoter might be. Those who discovered the game which Rauf Bey was trying to play resolved to submit him to an examination at a meeting of the Party. You will remember this meeting. The discussions which took place there having been published in full, they must be known to you. I shall not enter into the details of these discussions. For the purpose of enlightening public opinion I believe it useful, however, and necessary to analyse the situation as it was at that time in order to explain the real meaning of the final result.

First of all, I must frankly say that Rauf Bey was attacked whilst he was still occupied with the completion of his own preparations for attack. It is true that the hostile articles of certain newspapers, the attitude which the Caliph and one of the princes had been assumed to take, the visits which Rauf Bey, Adnan Bey and some commanders had paid to the Caliph, as well as the outrageous criticisms which were directed against those who spoke or wrote against the Caliph and the prince, had not failed to cause a certain uncertainty in the country and to confuse people's minds.

But it appears that this had not been sufficient for launching on attack

at the National Assembly and that the necessity had been felt for working in Ankara on the members of the Assembly.

It was during the course of these preparations that the aims of Rauf Bey were anticipated. A motion was presented to the President of the Group of the Party. İsmet Paşa was their president. The motion was to the effect that "the declarations of Rauf Bey, published in the Istanbul newspapers, were of a nature to weaken the Republic by reason of their hostile character, and that the impression had been created that an opposition party was going to be formed around the originator of these declarations," and it contained the proposition that this fact should be submitted for the deliberations of the Group of the Party.

On the day of this sitting, namely the 22nd November, 1923, I was in the room which adjoined the hall where the discussion was going to take place. Rauf Bey came there and begged me not to intervene in the discussion because, as he said, it would be impossible for him to give me a reply.

I told him that I should not intervene in the discussion and that I had no intention of addressing the meeting, but that I should go into the meeting room to follow the course of the debate in my capacity as President of the Party. He begged me also not to enter the meeting room. This I refused.

What was the real reason for wanting to exclude my presence and my intervention in the debate? Was it really his respect for me which prevented him from declaring himself in my presence as my adversary? Should we believe this? Afterwards I understood Rauf Bey wanted to have İsmet Paşa as interlocutor and adversary. Besides, he presumed that in my absence there would be members of the group who would take his part.

The group of the party met under the Presidency of İsmet Paşa, who vacated the position to somebody else after having explained the object and the importance of the discussion, declaring that perhaps he would have to address the meeting.

Following the statements made by the proposer of the motion, Rauf Bey addressed the meeting with a long explanation. He said that a misunderstanding had arisen on account of his declarations in Istanbul and that he had spoken with his comrades in order to disperse them; then he added: "If there is a point which we should like to criticise, it is the work itself." I repeat his words verbally: "None of us, I believe, can contest the fact that the errors committed in the application of very firm principles — although this application was begun in full sincerity — could have had the result of

weakening these principles which have cost so many sacrifices." Let us stop for a moment at these two sentences. What is the work that Rauf Bey wants to criticise? Is it the Republic or its proclamation? The work is the Republic. Its proclamation would have taken place in one form or another.

And what is the firm principle of which he speaks? Is it that of the Republic? Is it the Republic which he fears to see crippled as a consequence of the errors committed in its application?

Gentlemen, it is the question of the Republic itself as well as of its proclamation.

The time elapsed had not been sufficient for anyone to be able to pretend that the phases of its application had given cause for disappointment. The disappointment which Rauf Bey expressed dates from the very next day to the proclamation of the Republic; he had already made his statements two or three days afterwards. Trying to interpret in his own way the meaning and spirit of each of his declarations, he said: "My feelings result in my being an adherent to no other form of government than that of a Republic." This admission of Rauf Bey's was accented with satisfaction and shouts of "Bravo!"

Was Rauf Bey sincere when he spoke of his "dear and sacred feelings"? Without hesitation I say no: for I know that it was Rauf Bey who, on his departure from Ankara, when Kâzım Paşa, President of the Assembly, spoke to him of the Republic, had replied in the following manner: "If you can prevent it, you will render a very great service to the country!"

Rauf Bey also tried to raise the belief in a misunderstanding when he said that he had meant some advisers and specialists when he referred to "irresponsible persons who had conceived and proclaimed the Republic."

"You must not arrive at the conclusion from this language that I meant to say that this or that person was responsible. It would be wrong for me to suggest such a statement."

It was evident that Rauf Bey, giving these well-premeditated explanations to the meeting, wanted to withdraw certain points in order to be able to explain his views by means of these subterfuges without raising the ill-feeling of the party against himself.

In fact, he had not abandoned his essential point of view. Notice, for instance, the following words: "You will remember that as answer to the question, 'Which is the form of the Turkish Government?' our eminent President had from this platform announced as a positive reply that the form

is the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 'Which form of government does this resemble?' he was asked. 'Ourselves,' he answered at that time, 'for we resemble ourselves. This is a form of government which is peculiar to ourselves.' This was an eloquent answer which has reassured my conscience.

"It is very difficult to raise an objection against it; I do not believe that either in the interior or in foreign countries there could be people who could rightly contest the justice of this assertion. But now, following these reassuring and elevating words, this form of government has been represented as not being able to maintain itself and this as a consequence of a Cabinet crisis. The name given to the Government has been replaced by that of the Republic, which, except for the name, means almost the same thing. Does that not signify the same as saying that a crisis has sufficed to show that the former *régime*, which had gained our confidence to such a high degree and which the people really believed in, was nevertheless imperfect and had to be replaced by another *régime*?

"Convinced that you will not judge those who are inspired by such feelings as being reactionaries, I should like to say that certain persons were in doubt and uncertainty and asked themselves whether this *régime* in its turn would not also be considered insufficient and whether there was not still another more perfect form.

"Shall we be sad or show ourselves satisfied when a nation that is for the Republic and desires to have it, and is convinced that the Republic is not in danger so long as the sovereignty remains in the hands of the nation, revolts and gets restless at the idea of finding itself in the presence of another form of government because it has not understood how to carry through that of a Republic?"

Gentlemen, to pass from the monarchical to the republican system of government we have gone, as you know, through a transition period. During this time, two ideas and conceptions constantly knocked against each other. One of them aimed at the maintenance of the monarchy. The supporters this idea are known. The other idea wanted to put end to the monarchy and carry the republican *régime* through. That idea was ours.

We hesitated clearly to announce our ideas. Consequently, we were forced to frustrate the application of the ideas professed by the monarchists whilst we reserved to ourselves the possibilities of application so as to arrive later at a suitable moment for their realisation.

At the promulgation of the new laws, and especially of the law of the Constitution, the Monarchists insisted on their demand to define the rights and prerogatives of the Sultan and Caliph, whilst we on our part believed it to be useful to pass this point in silence. We therefore said that the moment for it had not yet arrived and that there was no necessity to proceed to do this.

Without referring to the Republic, we began to organise the administration of the State according to the principles of national sovereignty and to give it a form that made its development into a republic possible. It was necessary persistently to preach that there was no higher authority than the Grand National Assembly and to prove the possibility of the country being governed without the monarchy and without the Caliphate.

Without giving the head of the State a name we had practically entrusted the President of the Assembly with his authorities and he effectively exercised them.

The real President of the Assembly was actually its Vice-President. A government existed, but it was called the "Government of the Grand National Assembly." We abstained from adopting the Cabinet system, because the monarchists would immediately have stood for the necessity of permitting the Padisah the use of his prerogatives.

During the phases of the struggles of the transition period, we were forced to adopt this form, this system of government of the Grand National Assembly.

Endeavouring to move us to call this form of government explicitly a constitutional *régime*, our adversaries were justified in finding that this form was imperfect, and they expressed their dissent in the following terms: "To whom and to which form of government does the one which you want to create resemble?" To such questions, which were put for the purpose of forcing us to explain ourselves, we had to give such answers as corresponded with the exigencies of the time, for the purpose of reducing them to silence.

Rauf Bey said that one of these answers seemed to him contestable and of a nature to reassure his conscience, and on this one he based his views and assertions.

"After these reassuring and elevating words," he will not admit that the form of the Grand National Assembly was imperfect. His argument was as follows: "If this form is imperfect there is reason to fear that those who imposed it upon us at that time will place us one day face to face with

another form of government because they believe the Republican system which they had forced upon us also to be imperfect and defective."

The lack of logic in this argument is evident. Would a person whose "sacred feelings forced him to be an adherent of no other form of government than that of a republic," a person who was well aware that the government of the Grand National Assembly was a necessity of the transition period, would this person cling to this *régime* as to a fixed idea and get disturbed at the thought that attempts would be made to try to find another form of government because the Republic was also regarded as an imperfect one?

What Rauf Bey understood under "another form which would follow the Republic" had its own significance. He wanted to say that those who had proclaimed the Republic, and thereby dethroned the Ottoman dynasty, had perhaps the idea of themselves occupying the throne and thus to restore the monarchical system.

Are examples of this kind unknown in history? Persons who put this question were worried about it.

At the end of his declaration he clearly expressed himself on the point I have just emphasised. Laying stress on the fact that the people wanted the Republic, he made the following strange declaration: "We want it, but perhaps we shall not be able to bring it into existence...."

Numerous speakers followed Rauf Bey and made interesting observations. Among others İsmet Paşa gave valuable detailed declarations. I will repeat some of İsmet Paşa's words here because the reading of them will always be profitable:

"When," he said, "the discussion concerns the fundamental form of the government, the views and sentiments expressed on this occasion will not remain within our circle. The whole world looks at and listens to us." Shortly afterwards he continued:

"The proclamation of the Republic has spread through the country like wildfire as the sacred ideal of the nation.

"Since the proclamation of the Republic we have witnessed manifestations of all descriptions confirming the ardour of the nation. If on the third or fifth day of the proclamation a prince deprived of his rights can come forward and take up a position, the world, and especially the world of thinkers, will doubt the power of this Republic."

Then Ismet Paşa explained the fatal consequence of the attitude observed in Istanbul following the proclamation of the Republic. Analysing Rauf Bey's explanations, he brought forward the following considerations: "We cannot help the fact that the words mean only one thing: namely, that Rauf Bey expressess his hesitation and uneasiness whilst he says simultaneously that the essential thing is the national sovereignty."

Then turning to Rauf Bey, he said:

"Rauf Bey, we make a policy. It is important that we should point out our mistakes, one after the other.

"Have you ever known the promotor of a commercial enterprise, from the very beginning risking his capital, believing that he will not succeed? A man starting an enterprise first assures himself that he will arrive at a successful issue and then begins to work. In transition times especially, it is not allowed to statesmen and political leaders to express any doubts. This would be a mistake, and you have committed this mistake, Rauf Beyefendi."

Ismet Paşa then replied to Rauf Bey's declarations in which the latter had said that it would be "a great error to believe that the interests of the State could be safeguarded and the public needs satisfied through alterations in the system of government in the highest places." Ismet Pasa said, "The actual error is to lead the moral and revolutionary forces to hesitation in such critical days when they need to be concentrated in these points. Great errors may be made intentionally or unintentionally."

Ismet Paşa asked Rauf Bey: "You meant to solve the question of the head of the State? How would you have solved? How many solutions were there for it?"

Replying to the statement that too great a hurry had been shown, Ismet Paşa declared: "Comrades, there can be no question of haste for a result which has been found to be quite natural. It is only in the case where an error is possible that one can speak of haste . . .

"To say that the Republic has been too hastily proclaimed might give rise to the idea that, had it been proclaimed six months later, it might then have perhaps taken another form, and this is exactly the meaning which was intended to be given to this observation."

In the course of his statements, Rauf Bey desired to compare our procedure in the proclamation of the Republic with the conduct of the former Central Committee.

In reply to this point İsmet Paşa observed: "The Central Committee in the newspapers defends its own point of view through the mediation of representatives who have permitted it to live in this country, and who have defended it through many years. They make use of Rauf Bey's opinions as a weapon. This is unfortunate."

In his further remarks Rauf Bey replied to these words as follows: "The 'Tanin' has made use of my allusions to the Central Committee as a weapon. It appears that the 'Tanin' and the 'Tevhidiefkâr' have used them, but I assure you that I know nothing about it."

Referring to the question of the visit which Rauf Bey paid to the Caliph, İsmet Paşa made the following observations:

"The question of the visit to the Caliph is the question of the Caliphate itself. As statemen, we ought never to forget that the armies of the Caliph have laid this country in ruins from one end to the other. We must never lose sight of the possibility of the creation of armies of the Caliphate... It is to the army of the Caliphate that the Turkish nation owes its most cruel sufferings. It will no longer allow this to happen."

"We shall never forget that it was a Fetva of the Caliph which threw us into the horror of the World War. We shall never forget that when the nation wanted to rise, a Fetva of the Caliph provoked against us a still more terrible assault than was that of the enemy."

"If at any time a Caliph takes it into his head to interfere with the destiny of this country, we shall not fail to execute him."

To these statements, which were received with applause and shouts of "Bravo!" İsmet Paşa added the following words:

"If, for reasons of tradition, be it implicitly or explicitly, any Caliph should assume the attitude of a man who seems to interest himself in the destinies of Turkey, or should have views which could raise the belief in him that he could treat Turkish statesmen in a benevolent or protecting manner, we should regard such conduct as being in absolute contradiction of the principles of the existence of this State. We should consider his attitude an act of high treason."

At the end of his remarks İsmet Paşa asked the following question: "Has Rauf Bey decided to withdraw those of his declarations which seem to be in absolute antagonism to us and to go forward with the People's Party? Or is he going to remain faithful to his ideas and make up his mind

to work outside the Party and take up an attitude against us in the Assembly? It is for him to decide."

Rauf Bey, after making a long defence of his position, declared that he would not form a new party nor leave the People's Party. He concluded his speech with words full of modesty which were intended to produce feelings of magnanimity and compassion from the Assembly, and then left with deciding to send a

The speakers remained without interlocutors. After Rauf Bey had recognised that he had made a mistake and had declared himself a republican, the debate was regarded as at an end. They contented themselves with deciding to send a *communiqué* to the Press for the purpose of removing the suspicions which had been created in the public mind and to have the speeches printed and distributed.

Now, Gentlemen, what does this decision mean?

Had the confused and ambiguous declarations of Rauf Bey in which he confirmed his republican mind actually satisfied the party? Had the conviction really been formed that he could work within the party with the same feelings and thoughts as we?

Was this decision of the party the decision which the actual result of the debates demanded? No.

What, in this case, were the factors which caused the members of the party to be satisfied with this decision?

I will explain this point to you very briefly. From the beginning to the end of his declarations Rauf Bey seemed by his attitude and language to have counted on the generosity and friendly feelings of the members of the party. On the other hand, he was so incoherent and disconnected that it was not easy for everybody to immediately recognise to what extent his speeches were sincere and serious. We must admit that, besides these reasons, a most important secret factor which had caused hesitation and half-heartedness in our feelings and thoughts was based on the hostile propaganda which was expressed in the words "accomplished fact," "irresponsible," "after the Republic."

It is quite certain that the frame of mind of those who attributed to the situation the importance of a conflict between Ismet Paşa and Rauf Bey, which had nothing to do with the question of the Republic, had promoted the adoption of a senseless decision.

Gentlemen, this decision gave to Rauf Bey and his friends the opportunity of still working for some time in the party to accomplish its overthrow.

On the other hand, the articles which were directed against the highest interests of the country and the Republic, and which were continually appearing in certain newspapers in Istanbul, created such an atmosphere in Istanbul that the Assembly believed it necessary to send an Independence Court there.

* * *

I shall again discuss the question of the Caliphate and the Caliph which appeared on its own accord in all problems which were raised and in each stage of our procedure.

In the beginning of the year 1924 it had been decided to undertake a military exercise of some importance. It was to take place in Izmir. For this reason I started for there in the beginning of January, 1924. I remained for nearly two months.

During my stay, I believed that the moment for the abolition of the Caliphate had arrived. I will try to follow the course of this affair as it actually happened.

On the 22nd January, 1924, I received from Ismet Pasa, Prime Minister, a telegram in cipher which I will read to you in full:

Telegram in cipher.

To His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic.

The First Secretary of the Caliph sends me the following: For some time there have been articles in the newspapers concerning the situation of the Caliphate and the person of the Caliph, which give rise to misunderstandings. The Caliph is very much concerned about the articles which seem to lower his authority without reason, and particularly the fact that the leaders of the Government coming from time to time to Istanbul, as well as the official corporations, avoid him. The Caliph had thought of making his feelings and wishes on this question known either by sending a Chamberlain to Ankara or by requesting that a trustworthy person should be sent to him, but he declares that he has abandoned this idea, because he was afraid that this step might be misinterpreted.

The General Secretary writes at length about the question of allocations, and asks that the question should be examined and the necessary steps taken in this matter, according to the communications of the Government of the 15th April, 1923, which stated that the Ministry of Finance would help if the expenses were beyond the means of the Treasury of the Caliphate or outside the obligations of the Caliphate. The question will be discussed in the Council of Ministers. I shall have the honour of informing Your Excellency of the result of the discussion.

(Signed) İsmet

In reply to this telegram, being myself by the side of the instrument, I sent the following reply to İsmet Paşa:

At the instrument.

Izmir.

To His Excellency İsmet Paşa, Prime Minister, Ankara.

Reply to the telegram in cipher of 22nd January, 1924.

It is to the attitude and manner of acting of the Caliph himself that the origin of the misunderstandings and the unfavourable interpretations regarding the Caliphate and the person of the Caliph must be attributed. In his private life and especially in his public appearances, the Caliph seems to follow the system of the Sultans, his ancestors. As a proof: the Friday ceremonies; the relations of the Caliph to foreign representatives to whom he sends officials; his drivings out in great pomp; his private life in the Palace, where he goes even so far as to receive dismissed officers to whose complaints he is listening, mixing his own tears with theirs. When the Caliph considers his situation, placing himself face to face with the Turkish Republic and the Turkish people, he must adopt as a measure of comparison the situation of the Caliphate and the Caliph towards the British Kingdom and the Mohamedan population of India, of the Government of Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan. The Caliph himself and the whole world must know in a catagoric manner that the Caliph and the office of the Caliph, as they are now maintained and exist, have in reality neither a religious nor a political meaning or any right of existence. The Turkish Republic cannot allow itself to be influenced by fallacies and cannot expose its independence and existence to danger.

To complete the analysis, the dignity of the Caliphate can have no other importance for us than that of an historical memory. The demand of the Caliph that the dignitaries of the Turkish Republic and the official cor-

porations should enter into connection with him constitutes a flagrant violation of the independence of the Republic. The fact that he wants to send his First Chamberlain to Ankara or to inform the Government of his feelings and his wishes through a trustworthy person sent to him shows likewise that he is taking up a position antagonistic to the Government of the Republic. He has no competency for doing this. It is also suggested that he should commission his First Secretary to act as mediator in the correspondence between him and the Government of the Republic. The First Secretary must be told that he must abstain from such impudence. Allocations inferior to those of the President of the Turkish Republic must suffice to secure the means of subsistence of the Caliph. Luxury and pomp are out of place. The question is only to secure a decent living for the Caliph. I do not understand what is meant by the "treasure of the Caliphate." The Caliphate has no treasure and ought not to have any. If this should be an inheritance of his ancestors, I request you to make inquiries and to give me official and clear information about this question. What are the obligations which the Caliph cannot fulfil with the allocations he receives, and what promises and declarations have been made to him through the communication of the Government dated the 15th April? I ask you to inform me of this. A duty which the Government ought to have fulfilled hitherto is to specify and fix the place of residence of the Caliph. There are a great number of palaces in Istanbul which have been built with the money raised from the bread of the people, containing furniture and valuable objects; in short, all is given over to destruction because the Government has not exactly defined the situation. Rumours are spread to the effect that persons who are attached to the Caliph are selling here and there at Beyoğlu the most precious objects of the palaces. The Government must take the treasures which still remain under its guard. If there is a reason for selling anything, it is for the Government to do so. It is necessary to submit the administrative functions of the Caliphate to a serious examination and reorganisation, for the fact that there are "First Chamberlains" and "First Secretaries" always will sustain the dream of power in the mind of the Caliph.

If the French to-day, a hundred years after the Revolution, are still of the opinion that it would be dangerous for their independence and sovereignty to allow members of the royal family and their confidants to come to France, we, on our part, in the attitude which we have to adopt in view of a dynasty and its confidants who are eager to see on the horizon the sun of absolute power rise again, cannot sacrifice the Republic for considerations of courtesy and sophism. The Caliph must be told exactly

who he is and what his office represents and must content himself with this situation. I ask you to proceed in such a manner that the Government takes fundamental and serious steps and to inform me of this.

(Signed) Gazi Mustafa Kemal
President of the Turkish Republic.

After this exchange of correspondence, İsmet Paşa and Kâzim Paşa, Minister of War, arrived at İzmir for the "exercises". Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, was already there. We agreed about the necessity of suppressing the Caliphate. We had decided at the same time to suppress also the Ministry for Religious Affairs and the "Evkaf" and to unify public instruction.

On the 1st March, 1924, I had to open the Assembly.

We had returned to Ankara on the 23rd February. I informed the competent authorities of my resolutions.

The discussion about the Budget began in the Assembly. This afforded us an opportunity of occupying ourselves for a short time with the question of the allocations to the members of the dynasty and the Budget of the Ministry for Religious Affairs and the Evkaf. My comrades began to make remarks and criticisms aiming at attaining the proposed aid. The debate was intentionally prolonged. In the speech which I delivered on the 1st March, the fifth anniversary of the opening of the Assembly, I especially emphasised the three following points:

1. The nation demands that now, in the future, for ever and unconditionally, the Republic shall be protected from every attack. The wish of the nation can be expressed through the fact that the Republic will be founded a moment earlier and completely on the whole of the positive principles which have been put to the test.

2. We declare that it is necessary without loss of time to apply the principle of unity of instruction and education which has been decided by the vote of the nation.

3. We also recognise that it is indispensable, in order to secure the revival of the Islamic Faith, to disengage it from the condition of being a political instrument, which it has been for centuries through habit.

The group of the Party was invited to a sitting on the 2nd March. The three points I have just mentioned were brought forward and discussed. We

were united in principle. Amongst other matters received, the following motions were read on the 3rd March during the first sitting of the Assembly:

1. Draft of the law of Seyh Saffet Efendi and fifty of his colleagues concerning the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the Ottoman dynasty from Turkish territory.
2. Draft of the law of Halil Hulki Efendi, deputy for Siirt, and fifty of his colleagues concerning the abolition of the Ministry for Religious Affairs, of the Evkaf and the Ministry of the General Staff.
3. Motion of Vâsif Bey, deputy for Saruhan, and fifty of his colleagues concerning the unification of instruction.

Fethi Bey, who presided, announced: "Gentlemen, there are proposals, with numerous signatures, demanding immediate discussion of these questions of law. I put this demand to the vote."

Without referring it to commissions, Fethi Bey immediately put the motions to the vote, and they were accepted.

The first objection was raised by Halit Bey, deputy for Kastamonu. One or two joined him in the course of the discussion. Numerous important speakers ascended the platform and gave long explanations in favour of the propositions. Besides the signatories of the motions, the late Seyyit Bey and Ismet Pasa also made convincing speeches which were of a highly scientific nature and which will always be worthy of being studied and remembered. The discussion lasted for nearly five hours. When the discussion closed at 6.45 p.m., the Grand National Assembly had promulgated Laws No. 429, 430 and 431.

By virtue of these laws the "Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Government formed by it is authorised to give legal form to the stipulations which are in force in the Turkish Republic with reference to public affairs and to carry through their application," "The Ministry for Religious Affairs and the Evkaf have been abolished."

All scientific and educational institutions in Turkish territory . . . all ecclesiastical schools, are transferred to the Ministry of Public Instruction.

The Caliph is declared deposed and the dignity abolished. All members of the deposed Ottoman dynasty are forever forbidden to reside within the frontiers of the territory of the Turkish Republic.

Certain persons who wrongly believed that it was necessary, for religious and political reasons, to maintain the Caliphate proposed, at the last moment

when the decisions were to be taken, that I should assume the office of the Caliphate.

I immediately gave a negative reply to these men.

Let me emphasise another point which arose: When the Grand National Assembly had abolished the Caliphate, Rasih Efendi, an ecclesiastic and deputy for Antalya, was president of the deputation of the Red Crescent which was in India. He came back to Ankara via Egypt. After soliciting an interview with me, he made statements to the effect that "the Mohamedans in the countries through which he had been travelling demanded that I should become Caliph, and competent Mohamedan bodies had commissioned him to inform me of this desire."

In the reply which I gave to Rasih Efendi, I expressed my thanks for the benevolence and affection which the Mohamedans had shown me and said: "You are a Doctor of Religious Right. You know that Caliph signifies Chief of the State. How can I accept the proposals and desires of people who are governed by kings and emperors? If I should declare myself ready to accept this office, would the sovereigns of those people consent to it? The orders of the Caliph must be obeyed and his interdictions submitted to. Are those who want to make me Caliph in a position to execute my orders? Consequently, would it not be ridiculous to delude myself and you with an illusionary rôle which has neither sense nor right of existence?"

Gentlemen, I must frankly and categorically declare that those who continue to occupy themselves with the chimera of the Caliphate, and thereby mislead the Mohamedan world, are nothing but enemies of the Mohamedan world and of Turkey. They are only ignorant or blind men who could attach hopes to such jugglery.

Is it from love of our faith that such people as Rauf Bey, Vehip Paşa Çerkes Reşit and Etem, all the "Hundred and Fifty"*, all members of the deposed dynasty of the Sultanate and the Caliphate with their adherents, all enemies of Turkey, are working with so much bitterness? Is the aim of those who are working so energetically against us, sheltering themselves under the words "holy revolution," but who use means such as murderous attempts and gangs of brigands, and who maintain organisation centres at our frontiers, who have always made the destruction of Turkey their aim — is this aim

* This refers to the so-called "150 undesirables" who were proven to be adversaries of National Turkey and who are forbidden as enemies of the country to remain in New Turkey.

actually a holy one? Indeed, to believe this would mean that we were possessed of unmitigated ignorance and boundless blindness.

From now onwards it will not be so easy to suppose that the Mohamedan peoples and the Turkish nation have fallen to such a low level as to continue in the debasement of the purity of the conscience and the tenderness of the sentiments of the Mohamedan world to criminal aims. Impudence has its limits.

*

* *

Now, Gentlemen, with your permission, I will tell you something about a great plot.

Late in the evening of the 26th October, 1924, I learned that the Inspector of the First Army had just resigned his office. The letter containing his resignation, which the General Inspector of the Army sent to the Chief of the General Staff, was verbally as follows:

26th October, 1924.

To the Chief of the General Staff.

I am extremely disappointed and discouraged that my reports, which I have presented after my inspections during the course of a year of my official activity, and my memoranda, which contain observations regarding the further development and strengthening of our Army, have not been taken in to consideration. I inform you that, having come to the conclusion that I could fulfil the duties imposed on me with greater tranquillity of conscience as a deputy, I tender my resignation as Inspector of the Army. This letter has also been communicated to the Ministry of National Defence.

(Signed) Kâzım Karabekir

Under this letter of resignation was written in coloured pencil the following:

"I have told him that I do not agree to his resignation. He has, however, persisted in his idea and informed me that he will return to his legislative functions as deputy to-morrow." These sentences had no signature. It is evident, however, that they had been written by the Chief of the General Staff.

Under these lines, again, the following note was written in red ink:

"I must see the reports and memoranda which have been presented. I shall see now what was written in the documents referred to, which questions were dealt with in these papers in reference to which something has been done and which have caused any steps to be taken." The date marked under these sentences is the 28th October.

Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's reports and memoranda were examined by the departments of the General Staff which were concerned. All that seemed worth accepting and carrying through was taken into consideration and put into practice. But naturally proposals which could not be applied by the means at the disposal of the General Staff, or which had no scientific value but were rather phantastic and arbitrary, were rejected.

It had not been considered necessary to send a *satisfecit* to Kâzım Karabekir after the receipt of his reports and memoranda.

Moreover, I was told on the 30th October that Ali Fuat Paşa, Inspector of the Second Army, had arrived from Konya. I invited him to dine with me at Çankaya. I waited till late at night, but he did not arrive. When I sent for him, I learned that on his arrival at Ankara he was received by Rauf Bey, who had met him at the railway station. He was afterwards at the War Ministry, had some short interviews with his comrades, and then had a conversation with Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff. Leaving the latter, he left the following letter with Fevzi Paşa's aide-de-camp.

30th October, 1924.

To the Chief the General Staff.

As I have to exercise my legislative functions as deputy, I have the honour of submitting my resignation as Inspector of the Second Army.

(Signed) Ali Fuat
Deputy for Ankara.

In addition, I learned that Rauf Bey had caused Refet Paşa to withdraw his resignation as deputy, which he had already announced to the President of the Assembly.

After the ceremony at Dumlupınar and a journey of a month and a half to Bursa, the Black Sea coast and the district of Erzurum, I returned to

Ankara on the 18th October. A great number of deputies and other comrades came to greet me. Rauf Bey and Adnan Bey, who were at Ankara, were not among them. I did not expect such conduct, which could very easily have been taken as a sign of resentment.

I did not hesitate for a moment to tell myself that I was face to face with a plot. The situation and the spectacle it offered can be explained as follows: A year before, that is to say since Rauf Bey had retired from the Presidency of the Cabinet, he had, together with Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, Ali Fuat Paşa, Refet Paşa and others, drafted a plan of campaign. They found that, in order to succeed, they must have the army on their side. For this purpose Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, after his appointment as Inspector of the First Army, was travelling about in the Eastern Provinces, the sphere of his former command, whilst Ali Fuat Paşa, pretending that he had no taste for a political life, and that he wanted to dedicate himself to military service, started for the inspection of the Second Army, to which office he had been promoted. These gentlemen expected that Cevat Paşa, Inspector of the Third Army, and Cafer Tayyar Paşa, commander of the Army Corps which belonged to this inspection, would participate in their plans. For a year they worked on the army to attain their object and imagined that they had won it to their ideas. Before handing in their resignations, they tried to get some of the commanders to make common cause with them. Certain acts which we had carried through in the course of the same year, such as the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, brought about a closer union between the originators of the concocted plan and drove them to undertake united action. It was in a political way that they had to proceed in this enterprise. They were awaiting the moment and the occasion. They regarded their preparations in the political sphere as well as in the army as being sufficient. Rauf Bey and his like, thanks to the situation which they had succeeded in maintaining inside the Party, actually found occasion during the months of the Parliamentary holidays to instruct the deputies in a sense hostile to us, and to mislead the whole nation, by making use of the adherents of the second group, who had not been successful in the new elections. They began with the formation of certain secret organisations and entered into league with various other enterprises of the same kind. They connected themselves with the newspapers "Vatan," "Tanin," "Tevhidiefkâr," "Son Telgraf" in Istanbul and with the "Tokswz," published by Abdülkadir Kemali Bey at Adana. Together with these papers they undertook what would be called an "anonymous offensive." They thereby provoked differences of opinion in the country. At that time, whilst our army was occupied

with the punishment of the Nestorians*, England addressed an ultimatum to the Government.** I convened an extraordinary sitting of the Assembly.

We replied to the English ultimatum in the manner known to you.

We had decided, if necessary, to enter into war. Well, now, just at this difficult moment when we might be exposed to the attack of a foreign power, the persons in question believed it to be easier to reach their aim by attacking us. Although it was their duty to keep their Army Corps in readiness for war, they left them without leaders and threw themselves into the political arena, which they had pretended at one time they did not like.

One question which had been put on the Order of the Day of the convened Assembly was of a nature to hasten their plans. On the 20th October, Hoca Esat Efendi actually presented a motion in which he put a certain number of questions to the competent Ministers concerning the exchange of the population and their finding accommodation for the number of exhibitioners which entered the evening schools as well as of the localities in which elementary schools were to be opened. These questions were very well calculated to raise criticisms of the Ministers concerned. There were points, especially on the question of the exchange of populations and their finding accomodations, which naturally occupied everybody. I myself had complained after I had followed the progress of affairs of this kind during my journey; I had proposed to the Government after my return to Ankara to abolish the Ministry concerned and to adopt a method which secured the application of all the resources of the Government for these purposes. An agreement had been arrived at on this subject. This question provided a subject for those who wanted to attack us by giving them a greater chance of winning a large number of adherents.

After this plot had been discovered, it was not difficult to find the necessary counter-measures. Let me tell you of the episode, phase by phase, starting from the point where we left off.

Hoca Esat Efendi's motion had been transformed on the 27th, that is to say the day after the resignation of Karabekir Paşa, into an interpellation.

* Syrian Christian sect on the Turco-Iracian border. As partisans of England at the time of the Turco-English Mossul question, the Nestorians produced unrest.

** The Mossul conflict was specially strained at that time. The ultimatum of England extending over a certain time included the danger of the outbreak of warlike activities.

The discussion on this interpellation began on the 30th October, the day of the resignation of Ali Fuat Paşa.

On the evening which I had invited Ali Fuat Paşa to dine with me, he did not arrive. İsmet Paşa, Prime Minister, and Kâzım Paşa, Minister of National Defence, were present.

A very short exchange of opinion enabled us to fix a plan of action against the plotters. Telephoning immediately to His Excellency Fevzi Paşa, Chief of the General Staff, who was at the same time a deputy, I asked him to announce his resignation to the President of the Assembly. The Paşa, who I knew had this intention — an idea which he had communicated to the Minister of National Defence — immediately fulfilled my request.

On the other hand, I sent to those commanders who were at the same time deputies the following telegram in cipher:

In cipher: at the instrument.

30th October, 1924.

To Their Excellencies:

Cevat Paşa, Inspector of the Third Army.

İzzettin Paşa, Commandant of the First Army Corps.

Ali Hikmet Paşa, Commandant of the Second Army Corps.

Şükrü Naili Paşa, Commandant of the Third Army Corps.

Fahrettin Paşa, Commandant of the Fifth Army Corps.

Cafer Tayyar Paşa, Commandant of the Seventh Army Corps.

1. Supported by the confidence and the friendship which you accord to me, I propose, inspired by grave necessity, that you should immediately by telegraph inform the President of the Assembly of your resignation as deputy. The reason which demands that you should sacrifice yourself unconditionally and unreservedly with heart and soul to your important military functions deserves to be taken very seriously into consideration.

2. His Excellency Marshal Fevzi Paşa, after the proposal I have made to him and which was based on this necessity, handed in his resignation.

3. Their Excellencies Cevat Paşa, Inspector of the Third Army, İzzettin Paşa, Ali Hikmet Paşa, Şükrü Naili Paşa, Fahrettin Paşa, Cafer Tayyar Paşa, commanding the First, Second, Third, Fifth and Seventh Army Corps respectively, have received the same communication.

4. I expect the communication of your resignation at the instrument.

(Signed) Gazi Mustafa Kemal
President of the Republic.

The replies which I received at the telegraph instrument on the morning of the 31st October, which arrived from İzzettin Paşa, commanding the First Army Corps at İzmir, Ali Hikmet Paşa, commanding the Second Army Corps at Karesi, Şükrü Naili Paşa, commanding the Third Army Corps at Pangaltı, Fahrettin Paşa, commanding the Fifth Army Corps at Adana, informed me that my proposal had literally and immediately been executed.

I believe it to be my duty to express here my gratitude to these excellent commanders for the confidence which they showed me on this occasion.

The replies which arrived from Diyarbakır, from the Inspector of the Third Army and from the officer commanding the Seventh Army Corps, literally ran as follows:

Diyarbakır, 30th October, 1924.

Reply of the Inspector of the Third Army:

To His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Republic.

Your Excellency can be sure of the affection I have for you and of the confidence I place in you. To avoid the responsibility and reproaches to which I might expose myself in the eyes of the nation and my electoral district, if I should renounce in haste something that is my patriotic duty, I beg Your Excellency respectfully to give the reason which necessitates my resignation.

(Signed) Cevat
Inspector of the Third Army.

Diyarbakır, 30th October, 1924.

Reply of the Commander of the Seventh Army Corps:

To His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Republic.

1. I beg Your Excellency to be convinced of the feelings of friendship and esteem which I feel for your person.

2. If I consented immediately to Your Excellency's proposal without consulting my electoral district, I should be regarded as irresponsible in the eyes of the nation.

3. If the interest of the country demands that I should immediately resign as deputy, I beg Your Excellency to enlighten me about the situation so that I can make a definite decision.

(Signed) Cafer Tayyar

Commanding the Seventh Army Corps.

Although the signatories of both telegrams give me the assurance of their friendship and confidence, they speak of their position towards their electoral district and ask the reason for my proposal.

Let me quote you my answer verbatim:

To His Excellency Cevat Paşa. Inspector of the Third Army.

To His Excellency Cafer Tayyar Paşa. Commanding the Seventh Army Corps.

Telegram in cipher.

31st October, 1924.

At the telegraph instrument.

I have come to the conclusion that, for the maintenance of discipline in the measure required in the army and for the exercise of the command, it is incompatible that commanders should be at the same time deputies. I have been supported in this opinion by the fact that the Inspectors of the First and Second Army have resigned their military functions and have returned to the Assembly, whereby their corps have remained without a leader at a moment which can scarcely be called a favourable one. The population of your electoral district could only be satisfied with a resolution which you take in the interest of the discipline of the army. Referring to my preceding communication, I beg you to inform me of your decision.

(Signed) Gazi Mustafa Kemal
President of the Republic.

Cevat Paşa's answer to this communication was as follows:

At the telegraph instrument.

Diyarbakır, 31st October 1924.

To His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Republic.

I join with all my heart in the convictions of Your Excellency in what concerns the incompatibility existing between the exercise of the mandate as deputy through commanders and the maintenance of discipline to the necessary degree in the exercise of the power of command. I beg Your Excellency to believe that from this very conviction I had begged Your Excellency during the elections to free me from the mandate of deputy. Nevertheless I am convinced that, when I resign to-day by order of Your Excellency, my resignation will not be well received either by the nation or by my electoral district. Under the pressure of this conviction which makes me aware of the fact that I can see myself forced to separate from

the army at this important moment, I feel the deepest grief. I have the honour of informing Your Excellency of this.

(Signed) Cevat
Commanding the Third Army Corps.

After Cevat Paşa had arrived at Ankara and had made himself acquainted with the situation, and after I had convinced him of the necessity to follow my proposal, he immediately resigned his mandate as deputy. To me it was evident that His Excellency had nothing to do with the intrigues which had been prepared. Although Kâzım Karabekir Paşa had informed a great number of commanders, among them Cevat Paşa, and had given exact indications as to the day and hour, this communication had had no other effect on Cevat Paşa while he was at Diyarbakır than to confuse him completely with regard to the true reason of my proposal.

Cafer Tayyar Paşa on his part sent the following reply:

At the telegraph instrument.

Diyarbakır, 31st October, 1924.

To His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Republic,
at Ankara.

In case that Your Excellency should find it necessary that we should resign one or the other of the two positions, the mandate as deputy or the command, I have the honour to respectfully inform you that I should give the preference to the mandate of deputy, regarding it as the most honourable of all duties towards the nation.

(Signed) Cafer Tayyar
Commanding the Seventh Army Corps.

After the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders who were also deputies had become aware of the difficulties which resulted from the presence of political elements in the army, and after they had accepted my proposal favourably and had proved their confidence in me, it became inadmissible that Cevat Paşa and Cafer Tayyar Paşa should continue to remain Inspector of the Army and Commander of the Corps. Consequently, an end was put to their military functions. Men who seemed better suited for these posts were appointed in their stead and the army was informed of it in a circular note by the Ministry of National Defence. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa and Ali Fuat Paşa, who had entered the Assembly, were asked to leave. Fuat Paşa returned to Konya to wind up the affairs of his command. Kâzım Karabekir Paşa was compelled to keep away from the Parliamentary

building and to wait for the arrival of his successor, who was to come from Sankamış.

The two commanders who wished to preserve their mandates of deputy had their connections with the army severed. In this manner the bluff of those who had hatched the plot and had tried to create for themselves, with the help of the army, a position in the Assembly had been made publicly known.

The 1st November, 1924, marked the beginning of the second year of the legislative period of the Assembly. On this occasion I opened the sitting with my usual speech. After I had left the Presidential platform, a list was read of the resignation of Fevzi Paşa, Fahrettin Paşa, İzzettin Paşa, Ali Hikmet Paşa, Sükrü Naili Paşa, as well as a note of the Prime Minister dated the 31st October, 1924, regarding the alterations in the army. The Assembly was adjourned till the 5th November.

Addressing himself to the President of the Assembly, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, in a note dated the 1st November, complained that he had been prevented from entering the Assembly by the Ministry of National Defence. In this note, which was read on the 5th November, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa said "Five days after my resignation (on the night of Friday, the 31th October, 1924) I received a communication from the Ministry of National Defence by which they tried to prevent me from entering the Assembly till the arrival of my successor." The note concluded with the words: "I expect, however, the decision of Your High Assembly, which is competent on this question."

On the same day, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa addressed a note to the Ministry of National Defence in which he said:

"I have been ordered by Your Excellency, under the pretext of the surrender of my service, that 'I must cease to exercise my mandate as deputy for an indefinite time.' On the day of my resignation, however, the question that I had to await my successor had not yet been put forward. I do not know why Your Excellency believes that he should make use of this pretext five days later. If, even only temporarily, I have joined the Assembly, the question as to whether I should take up a new office depended partly on my own wish and partly on the decision of the Grand National Assembly. For this reason I have informed the President of the Assembly of the matter."

The late Inspector of the Army, who said that he had presented his memorandum "for the progress and strengthening of the army" and who

was, according to his statement, "exceedingly afflicted and discouraged" because his memoranda had not been taken into consideration, did not seem to be aware how thoughtless and harmful to discipline his attitude was, (although discipline forms the necessary base to all progress and strengthening of the army) when, following the mood of the moment, he scribbled five lines on a piece of paper and thereby left a strong armed force, which comprised a third of our country, without a leader. The honourable Inspector, who declared that he had undertaken to accomplish in the Assembly — which had met in an extraordinary sitting on account of the ultimatum addressed to the State — the task which he was unable to fulfil through his reports and memoranda, which had presumably been neglected — this honourable Inspector, I say, could not understand what a sad example of anarchy he and his colleagues had set to the army through their procedure at a moment which could not have been more badly chosen. This individual, who had taken it amiss that his advice about the development of the army had not been appreciated, pretended to ignore the fact that the surrender of military service is a legally prescribed process and that he was obliged to proceed to this formality in the interests of the good administration and the discipline of the army. He did not take into consideration the point that the authority which had to inform the Assembly that his mission had come to an end had naturally to be the same authority which had transferred to him these military functions.

After Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's note to the President of the Assembly had been read, the communication of the Prime Minister with two additions was likewise read.

The Prime Minister explained to the Assembly Kâzım Karabekir's step towards the Ministry of National Defence and the answer which had been given to him.

After the Minister for National Defence had declared that all the complaints of Kâzım Karabekir Paşa as well as his opinions were wrong, he confirmed the order which he had given him to surrender to his successor his functions as Inspector and all the secret documents, after having informed the competent authorities. The question arises: Did the ex-inspector of the Army at last understand that the State had entrusted him with an important function and confidential documents referring to the defence of our country? It was a great mistake on his part to hand over to anybody his authority before the appointment of a responsible successor. Such a mistake deserves severe punishment. Had he understood that?

Those who were eager to receive Kâzım Karabekir Paşa in the Assembly again tried their utmost to frustrate our action. Feridun Fikri Bey, deputy for Dersim, hastened first into the arena. Vehbi Bey, Deputy for Karesi, began his speech and his denunciations with the words "Can a comrade who has been reintegrated by the Assembly be prevented by any power from participating in the debates? Is such a thing conceivable?" The honourable deputy, trying a moment previously to move his intellectual comrade into action, seemed to have forgotten that the power of the law is irresistible, especially backed by the firm resolution of men who had gained the confidence of the High Assembly and the nation and who were charged to make use of this power.

Ismet Paşa's declaration silenced the speakers. The discussion of this question was concluded. The Paşas were told to carry through the orders they had received to the letter. The Assembly passed to the general debate. The question which was treated was an interpellation addressed to the Ministry of Immigration*, of finding accommodation and reconstruction. Ismet Paşa, the Prime Minister, ascended the platform and made the following proposal: "Numerous speakers have referred to the questions of accommodation and reconstruction only under different pretexts with matters concerning the other Ministries. Some of the speakers have even manifested a desire that the Prime Minister should give extensive explanations with regard to the interior and exterior policy of the State. With restrictions, but with the greatest pleasure, shall fill these desires. The Minister for Immigration has been elected Vice-President by the Assembly. But I propose that the importance and bearing of the interpellation shall not be restricted for this reason in any way. I like appropriate tactics."

In this manner the Government lifted the curtain and expedited the representation of the play by those who had prepared it. The Government had accepted the fight and proceeded to an open and frontal attack.

About thirty speakers spoke for and against it. The Ministers of Justice and Instruction also made declarations. The debate lasted for five hours without result. The discussion of the interpellation was postponed to the next day.

That day the discussion re-opened at 2.30 p.m. The first to mount the platform was Recep Bey, Minister of the Interior and acting Minister

* The immigration of hundreds of thousands of Turks, who in exchange for the Greeks driven out of Turkey arrived from Greece, imposed on the Turkish Government at that time extraordinary financial and organisational difficulties.

of Immigration. He made long declarations and explanations. The members of the opposition made short attacks against him from their seats. At a certain point Recep Bey said: "Certain newspapers and people maintain that during the whole period of the Parliamentary holidays there is a Government at Ankara administering the country by all unlawful and irregular means possible . . . According to rumours, some comrades are said to be in possession of secret registers in which the unlawful actions committed by some Ministers are said to be regularly written down . . . A day will come when after the reunion of the Assembly the Government will be asked to render an account: then, the contents of these secret registers will serve for the purpose of putting the Government into the dock before the nation. Now, Gentlemen, this day has come. Might the contents of these registers be laid before the Nation?"

Feridun Fikri Bey, speaking in the plural, replied in the name of his comrades: "When the moment has arrived, we shall undertake our attack," he said. Recep Bey replied: "Do, Gentlemen; we are waiting for it. The Government, which is well aware of its responsibility and ready to take it upon itself in the face of nation, is before you." Then he added: "The country is not capable of suffering uncertainty, obscurity, indecision and hesitation. It is treason towards the country to withdraw from publicly performing the duty of criticism and to depict the horizon as being covered with dark clouds, whispering in corners in order to create the appearance that the life of the Republic, this young and fresh organism, is invaded by pernicious complications . . . Instead of trying to spread in corners and hiding-places, behind the side-scenes and in the corridors, a multitude of false ideas for the purpose of confusing public opinion, what everybody ought to do is to stand here, on the platform of the nation, which is accessible to everybody equally, and to declare the truth. If the truth is not told and if the dissemination of vain suggestions continues, I shall see a sign in it of a lack of serious and sincere interest for the destiny of the country. I personally think that this is so and that the nation will be of the same opinion. I invite these gentlemen to mount the platform . . . so that the nation may learn on which side is the truth and on which vain imaginations, insinuations and accusations."

Following Recep Bey's remarks, many speeches were made against the Government.

Hasan Bey, Minister of Commerce, deputy for Trabzon, and Kâzım Pasa, Minister of National Defence, replied to these. Among those who had

demanded to speak in order to attack the Government was Rauf Bey, whose turn then came. Although he found no reason for extending the interpellation concerning the Ministry of Immigration, Installation and Reconstructions to the whole of the Cabinet, he nevertheless was of the opinion that the conduct of the Prime Minister had something of the character of chivalry. He began his remarks with the following words:

"The Assembly has an aggressive rôle towards the Government which finds itself face to face with a plot." Yunus Nadi Bey interrupted him and said: "We have not understood this." Rauf Bey made further statements and added: "I see that those who have criticised the Government have assumed the attitude of people who act according to a premediated resolution and who are attacking the Government." Then Rauf Bey took up a benevolent attitude and advised the speakers to avoid strong expression and statements that would be of a nature to humiliate the Government. Thereupon he referred to Feridun Fikri Bey's proposal and defended him. This proposal concerned the institution of a Parliamentary inquiry. It was demanded that an urgent resolution should be taken to institute a "Parliamentary Commission of Investigation."

At this point, the motion of Feridun Fikri Bey was placed before us with another signed by Feridun Fikri Bey and sixteen of his comrades to put the first motion to nominal vote.

Rauf Bey said: "A corporation has been talked about to which I have given the name of 'Commission of Investigation.'"

The one who mentioned it was Feridun Fikri Bey. Rauf Bey then continued: "... The Ministers have attributed to the acceptance of such a Commission the meaning of a humiliation, of a stain from the point of view of the national and patriotic feelings which have hitherto been expressed in such a pure form." Yunus Nadi Bey interrupted Rauf Bey and said: "It is something like it." Rauf Bey continued: "I am speaking from the point of view that we are not all infallible and, believing the thing necessary, I am the first to demand its execution as one of the persons concerned." Whilst speaking, Rauf Bey apparently tried to find a pretext — attributing importance to the question — for showing himself exceedingly respectful towards the Assembly. Making the opportunity for this, he said: "Certain qualifications have been given to the laws worked out by the Assembly; 'corridor laws' have been spoken about." He concluded with the demand that more regard should be shown towards the Assembly.

He had apparently forgotten the slightly respectful attitude which he had assumed towards the law of the Proclamation of the Republic.

Mazhar Müfit Bey, Deputy for Denizli, then spoke and said: "Your honourable comrade Muhtar Beyefendi has said this before." This remark caused Rauf Bey to alter the direction of his thought. But Muhtar Bey took this amiss. Saip Bey, Deputy for Kozan, joined the discussion. Following an intervention and warnings from the Presidential tribune, Rauf Bey at last continued his speech.

After a thousand detours, Rauf Bey finally came to the fundamental question: "Our battle cry, our doctrine is the national sovereignty," he said. Here Yunus Nadi Bey's voice could be heard: "It is the Republic!" Rauf Bey did not answer. He completed the sentence which he had begun as follows: "The only place where the national sovereignty manifests itself is the Grand National Assembly." Shouts of: "It is the Republic!" filled the Assembly. "It is the Republic," repeated Ali Saip Bey, Deputy for Kozan. Rauf Bey began to argue with him. Ihsan Bey intervened and said: "What you say is not quite clear, Rauf Beyefendi." Rauf Bey replied: "It is very clear, I tell you, Ihsan Beyefendi . . ." Ihsan Bey "It is by no means so clear. It is a long time since we understood one another." Speaking of the sentiments of high justice which inspired Ihsan Bey, and mentioning the fact that he had been working as a judge, Rauf Bey said to him: "It is assumed *a priori* that a person is innocent until the contrary has been proved. It is unjust to leave one of the parties under the stigma of suspicion and to speak in this sense." Ihsan Bey replied: "The judge is completely justified in not trusting an accused man who does not tell the truth." This colloquy between Rauf Bey and Ihsan Bey lasted for some time. The President interfered. Rauf Bey continued and said: "In the Constitutional Law it is the question of elaborating a law concerning the authority and competence of the Ministers. Has this work been done? This is what I am asking for."

As it is quite natural that the laws should be elaborated by the Assembly, Rauf Bey addressed his question not to the Government but to the Assembly, to which he himself belonged. After Rauf Bey had touched the question of the organisation of the Council of State and had asked: "Have the laws for the suppression of brigandage and the law of the village communities been carried through?" he addressed a quick succession of questions to the Ministries of Public Works, of Commerce, of Agriculture, of National Defence, of Justice and of Public Instruction. It became evident that in formulating these questions he intended to attract the attention of the nation

and the army. Having read in the newspapers that steps had been taken concerning the forests of Karadere, he asked, for instance, how this affair had gone on. Then he said: "With a well-justified pride we have learned that our heroic and faithful army showed a conspicuous spirit of discipline and great calmness when after the War of Independence it passed from a state of war into that of peace. But can we in the same way be convinced that after the operation the situation of this glorious army will be the same from the point of view of lodging and nourishment? We request the Government to enlighten us on this subject."

This question of Rauf Bey's was put in a collective sense, as will be seen from the way it was expressed. He said: "We request." There was actually no reason not to expect that this question had been agreed upon with the two Inspectors of the Army, who, up till then, had been at the head of their corps.

Rauf Bey wanted to know whether the application of the modifications introduced in the organisation of Justice had secured its dispensation in the most effective manner.

He demanded explanations from the Ministry of Public Instruction concerning the reduction of time in primary instruction in contradiction to the law.

After having spoken of the nightly manoeuvre arranged by the Vali of Istanbul* and of the violation of the rights of the population of this town owing to its being administered by a prefecture**, he began to speak of the incident which occurred between Vasif Bey, the Minister of Public Instruction, and the Press***, and, at this point, touched the question of the teachers by saying: "Is it right that the army of teachers, the army of the enlightened people, should send forth publications in which they give preference to this or that party, thereby reinforcing it?"

After stating his opinion that this was not right, Rauf Bey concluded his speech with the following words: "May God preserve our country and all of us so long as we live under His holy protection."

After the applause following this sentence, the Minister of the Interior ascended the tribune. Zeki Bey, Deputy for Gümüşhane, demanded that he should be allowed to speak first. Vehbi Bey, turning towards the Presidential

* A surprising night alarm of the place which has been much talked about.

** The Prefect of Istanbul was directly appointed by the Government.

*** A lawsuit for an offence.

tribune, said: "Sir, this question has taken the form of an interpellation addressed to the Ministers of the Assembly." The President recalled the terms of the standing orders concerning the right of speech of the Ministers. After Recep Bey had declared that he would not contribute to the enlightenment of the truth in a case where the Ministers would be prevented from using their right of speech —a right confirmed by the standing orders— as they had to answer such an extensive interpellation, he replied to the questions concerning himself one after the other. Alluding to the attitude of mentor adopted previously by Rauf Bey, he said in the course of his speech: "This Assembly is by no means obliged to observe complete calm while acting. This is neither a school nor an academy of science." In addition, he drew the attention of the whole of the Assembly to the fact that on this occasion, also, Rauf Bey had shown a lack of clearness when he spoke from the tribune and that he had demanded the acceptance of Feridun Fikri Bey's proposal concerning the institution of a Parliamentary inquiry without mentioning name. This inquiry, which was to be the work of three Ministries for the period of one year, had been demanded in a senseless, unjust, illogical and illegal form, whilst it was at the same time of a nature to disturb the equilibrium of the Governmental machinery. From his seat, Feridun Fikri Bey raised objections of the expression "illogical" used by Recep Bey and demanded its withdrawal. Recep Bey replied: "I do not withdraw it. It is illogical, sir. The truth must be told as it is." Replying to a further observation of Feridun Fikri Bey: "I do not accept the expression 'illogical,'" Recep Bey said: "Feridun Fikri Bey, you are accustomed to accept much graver things."

Necati Bey, Minister of Justice, addressed still more serious observations to Feridun Fikri Bey, upon which the latter replied: "The Minister of Justice has withdrawn his words." Necati Bey jumped up and said: "I have not withdrawn my words." An uproar was raised. Finally the President said: "I request you to put an end to this tumult." Recep Bey continued his explanations and said: ". . . I had said that many persons are in the possession of indexes. After what Rauf Bey has said, we shall now find it necessary to get rid of the ten or fifteen questions which have been prepared in advance and which occur therein. Thus, Gentlemen, we shall throw a little light on the origin of the indexes."

Alluding to the expression "tactics" which Rauf Bey had used in his remarks, Recep Bey said: "Whilst Rauf Bey on the one hand brings forward this large number of questions, he declares on the other that he has no aim in view but to create the question of responsibility and to provoke the

overthrow of the Government. If, on interpellation day, a speaker ascends the tribune, he is for it or against it. If he is for it, he tries to keep the Government in office. If he is against it, he tries to overthrow them and he must say so openly and distinctly. Otherwise the words of Rauf Bey would have no meaning."

This sentence of Recep Bey's produced a short dialogue between him and Rauf Bey. They exchanged observations such as these: "You outspoke the measure," and "You, on your part, interfere in things which do not interest you." Finally Recep Bey resumed his explanations and said: "Honourable Gentlemen, a lot of senseless questions are put forward . . . Has Ahmet arrived? Has the law been carried out? . . . During an interpellation, the speaker's tribune in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is not the place for talking aimlessly and putting questions. These gentlemen come here, speak without interruption and say finally: I am speaking but only for the purpose of saying nothing. Under these circumstances there is no meaning to their words, and they can have no aim. This is the true definition of the situation."

Recep Bey continued in these terms: "I have been very attentive. When the occasion and the necessity were given to him, Rauf Bey mounted the tribune, but he has not used the word 'Republic,' preferring another expression. Honourable comrades, we do not joke. We have just passed through a great revolution. We are marching towards a brilliant aim, an aim all the conditions and rules of which are manifesting themselves with the greatest clearness. What is the meaning of Rauf Bey's sulkiness? Why does he insist on not saying this sacred word, when the moment to do so has arrived and when his comrades offer him the opportunity for so doing? But we must notice that this gentleman has roused a storm in Istanbul. He has used all his endeavours for this purpose. And then he presents himself to us, turns back on his way and affirms under oath that he is an adherent of the Republic. For this reason I distrust him to-day.

"If he attaches any importance to the fact of convincing us that this opinion is erroneous, he should come forwards and tell us from this speaker's tribune, or from any other platform, that there is no reason for such mistrust. If he does not do so, I shall continue to doubt whether Rauf Bey is attached to the Republic. This is the truth."

In conclusion, Recep Bey expressed himself as follows: "Honourable comrades, it is only after a blood bath that we have succeeded in bringing our cause to the heights on which it actually is. The principle of our cause

is ultimatum to safeguard the restoration of our sacred country. The greatest mistake we could commit now would be to drag along in hesitation, uncertainty and indecision. Nobody knows where this will lead."

When Recep Bey left the tribune, the President called upon Rauf Bey for the purpose of defending himself.

Rauf Bey said: "Must I entrench myself behind oaths every time you doubt me?"

Shouts were raised: "Indeed, you must do that."

Then Rauf Bey replied with the sentence: "No, Gentlemen, nobody has the right to doubt another." Then Ali Bey, Deputy for Karahisari Sahip, replied: "Then you will not be able to remain on this soil. You will have to go back to the country from whence your father and your ancestors came*. This soil demands that from you."

Thereupon Rauf Bey made declarations in which he tried to explain points which had provoked his opposition and said: We have been commissioned by the nation to establish an administration which is found without reserve on the national sovereignty; to create the foundation of a popular administration that is called democracy. A number of comrades who have been thinking differently have followed a direction which must lead to depriving the Assembly of this national right, of granting the right of dissolving the Assembly and of vetoing resolutions to some other authority. It is this fact which I have opposed." In reply to these words Recep Bey explained that Rauf Bey was already an opponent at a time when there was neither a question of the Constitution Act nor whether the right in question could or could not be accorded to a third authority. These questions were only raised many months afterwards. Recep Bey said: "Gentlemen, this is a false conclusion."

To explain the reasons for his opposition, Rauf Bey found it necessary to take refuge in certain explanations. "Gentlemen," he said, "I am neither an adherent of the Sultanate nor of the Caliphate. My opposition is directed against any authority which would attempt to seize the rights of these dignities."

He further declared *ipso facto* that he was hostile to the President of the Republic in his capacity of authority as well as his person. As I have had the opportunity to explain, Rauf Bey had at an earlier date insisted on the expression "Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey."

* Rauf Bey's father came from the Caucasus.

He wanted to preserve the character of the Governmental organisation even after the name had been altered, that is to say, after he had tolerated the name of Republic for it.

Why? Because the Presidential authority was said to have revealed the inclination of seizing rights which belonged to the position of a Caliph or Sultan!

Are the words which have fallen, presumably for a sentence to express a doctrine, anything else but senseless, as Recep Bey had said? Is the course of reasoning to which these explanations have served as basis anything but dogmatic? The activity and work to which Rauf Bey finds himself restricted to-day show very clearly the importance of this doctrine and this logic. Might these gentlemen not make us responsible for it?

The interpellations in question did not lead to any result, not even on the second day. Thereupon it was adjourned till the following day. In expectation of the discussion which was to take place on the 8th November, let us consider some publications referring to this question.

In the leading article of the newspaper "Vatan" of the 5th November, 1924, credit was given to the adherents of the opposition and to those who criticised the Government, whilst the friends of the Government were reproved. The chief editor said in this article: "Rumours are spread daily of a new attack on those who want to criticise but who have not yet even opened their mouths. It does not matter whom you meet belonging to the party of the Government, it is always the same utterance which you hear." He makes this assertion, and then quotes examples, continuing: "Every occasion has been used to silence from the very beginning all persons who do not blindly submit to given orders, persons who seek the truth and want to speak it. Arbitrary action assumes the character of a factor which is placed above the normal state and stability."

What is the warning that the editor wants to give to the nation when he uses expressions such as "secret order of the day" and "arbitrary action"? Who is it that gives secret orders of the day and is guilty of arbitrary action? The writer who makes these insinuations finally gives us the advice "to call the two parties together and to listen in the attitude of an impartial arbitrator." "This," he adds, "is the most important and most delicate task of the President of the Republic." He demands that this duty should be undertaken immediately, "for," he says, assuming a threatening tone, "to-morrow it might be too late."

Referring to my speech at the beginning of the year, the same editor says on the following day: "The exclusive political system which works with the intention of pushing aside from time to time those of our compatriots who are spiritually the most independent, has assumed the character of a hellish power of destruction for our progress and our development." This sentence constitutes an extremely unjust calumny of the governmental system practised by us. Then, in saying: "At a certain point an end must be put to this fatal procedure and a new road must be taken," he reminds us for a second time of our duty.

In a leading article the following day with the heading "The Man in the Street," the chief editor of the "Vatan" finishes with this sentence "It appears that nothing else is left to do but to say: With God's help everything will be arranged.

In a telegram from Ankara which was published in the "Vatan" on the 8th November, expressions such as the following were printed in heavy type: "The Assembly will not be able to overthrow the Cabinet without the approval of highly influential people," and further: "It is said that Rauf Bey in his speech of yesterday, in speaking of unimportant things which have no connection with the interpellation, has weakened the position of the supporters of the interpellation and of the cause to which it refers."

The special correspondent of the "Vatan" sent to Ankara showing, generally speaking, no special acuteness in his impressions, did not seem to be deceived with regard to the reason of the weakness of the endeavours on which the interpellation was based.

The chief editor of the "Tevhidiefkâr" in a series of leading articles likewise encouraged and strengthened the opposition.

He even did not want that the Government and the deputies favourable to it should defend themselves and speak. This chief editor said: "As long as deputies amuse themselves with silencing those who criticise, by suffocating the discussion of the important affairs by their noise, Ismet Paşa's Cabinet will surely receive a vote of confidence. But the true character of this vote will finally be expressed when a great number of white voting papers will be found in the ballot-box."

It is unnecessary to dwell on such fallacies.

Let us also catch a glance at the "Tanin." In a leading article in this paper under the heading of "Political Agitation" it is mentioned that it had come to their knowledge that "among the high personages worthy of esteem

and confidence who have distinguished themselves in the national fight, a united action has been set to work; and that the Press which entertained sincere relations with the People's Party and the Government had received the news very badly and had explained matters in a very disagreeable manner," and that "they had begun to develop opinions of a nature to discredit the future party already."

Alluding to the question of the programme and having emphasised the point that the People's Party had no programme, the article continues: "We ourselves are by no means satisfied with the People's Party, but we are quite in favour of the things which they say and manifest in the name of the principles of the People's Party." After having explained the meaning of the principles of the People's Party, the question is put: "But in reality is it so?"

The editor himself answers this question in the negative and says: "For the reason that we wish with all our heart to see a party of renovation and reform before us, we imagine a People's Party in the form which we recommend." Then the editor continues as follows: "The programme of the People's Party is one thing and the speeches they deliver and their methods are another. The democracy of the People's Party only consists of words."

In the first sentence the author of these opinions wants to say that, although they menaged this alteration, the People's Party had neither adopted in their programme nor announced anywhere the principle of the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate. In this he is right. But what he interpolated to the People's Party in his second sentence was not exact.

To the profusion of words which he used the writer added to the article the following, in order to prove the legitimacy of the endeavours of the opposition to form a government: "Has the virtue of acting and being inspired by the anxiety of our country only been accorded by Divine grace to those who are on power?"

In a leading article of the 4th November, under the heading of "The Army and Politics," the chief editor of the "Tanin" expresses the following opinions: "The form of the Government is the Republic. But there is no advantage in only changing the name. What must really be altered are the spirit and the principles. In America to-day, besides the United States, there are about twenty countries bearing the name of Republic. Even Haiti, which consists exclusively of negroes, is a Republic. But the difference

between a Republic and absolutism is very small in these countries. We see there a little tyrant who has become President of the Republic by force and who takes the place of a hereditary monarch. That is all. The autocrat bearing the name of President of the Republic governs according to his pleasure. As absolute sovereign he knows no other law than that of his caprice."

After having made an exception to Chile, the editor of the "Tanin," referring to the other American Republics, says: "None of these countries is to-day worthy of bearing the name of a true republic. For they are not founded on themselves . . . on democracy. The military leaders are the cause of the absolute system governing under the name of republic."

I should like to dwell on this point for a moment. This article deals with the subject of the dismissal of the commanders who were deputies. But it was written at a moment when the commanders of our armies, having abandoned their corps, came into the Assembly in order to overthrow the Government. The editor in question had, the previous day, filled column after column with the creations of his mind to prove the legitimacy of their desire to come into power. The editor who quotes examples in order to prove that a Republic need not necessarily differ from an absolute government, and indicates as a reason for this fact that it is not founded on democracy, is the same person who, on the other hand, asserts that "the attachment of the Governmental party to democratic principles only exist in words." The individual who says that such things happen because there are military leaders existing is at the same time the editor who knows that the President of the Turkish Republic is one of the military leaders. And it is again this same person who is steadfastly working to oppose this or that military leader becoming the President of the Turkish Republic; even the Turkish Prime Minister belongs likewise to the group of military leaders. To prove to the nation that the party he does not like must be overthrown, he quotes in addition examples which are presumably worthy of meditation and capable of serving for instruction. He says: "The general who can gather round himself the greatest number of revolters is the one who rises to the dignity of the President of the Republic." By entering into the fight with the chiefs of the brigands, they usurp the position of President.

Gentlemen, it is impossible not to understand the reason why these and similar words have been written and not to realize the regrettable

effects which these articles were bound to exercise on the members of the Assembly and on public opinion.

Indeed, the effect produced had unfortunately further repercussions in the practical sphere.

The same Republican journalist who seems to be affected by the fact that Refet Paşa, Kâzım Paşa and Ali Fuat Paşa had not been appointed to the Commission for National Defence disapproves this time of the fact that commanders of the army had not been elected to a commission which will have an influence over the armies.

On this point, however, he cannot abstain from adapting himself to the democratic principles for which, as he wants us to believe, he felt so much sympathy. Let us go together through the sentences in which these ideas are expressed.

Among the news which has been published in the political columns, the following sentence appears: "The Commission for National Defence constitutes a sphere of activity which is surely the least political one of the Assembly and which has even no relation to politics." The editor intends to ask thereby why and for what reason the Army Inspectors have not been given the opportunity of working in a sphere which has no relation to politics. We would answer this as follows:

It has not been done because, as surely as the Commission for National Defence is a sphere of activity which was to have no relation to politics, it would lead to disagreements to bring people into it who have entered the Cabinet with the very intention of occupying themselves with politics.

Then the editor continues:

"It is there where the laws are elaborated to direct, improve, reorganise and ameliorate the Army which is called upon to defend the honour and independence of the nation. For those whose only thought is of our country without letting themselves be governed by political passions, it is a duty of loyalty to confide this care to the most capable of our military commanders."

I want to dwell on these sentences for a moment.

It is in fact one the most important questions to direct, improve, reorganise and ameliorate the condition of the army. The authority entrusted with this task is the General Staff, to which our most prominent military leaders belong, as the editor himself points out.

Each time this great General Staff, which occupies itself with the administration, organisation and perfecting of the army, judges it necessary, it informs the Government of its proposals.

The questions reported on after mature deliberations by the great General Staff and the Ministry of National Defence, the head of which is a member of the Cabinet, are examined and reviewed by the Supreme War Council which meets annually. This Council consists of the Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of National Defence and of Marine and also the Army Inspectors.

After the questions have been examined by the Supreme War Council, those whose application is judged necessary are laid before the Government. Those which require the passing of a law the Government submits to the Assembly. After having passed in the regular way through the Commission of National Defence, and if the subjects requires it also through other commissions, the questions are discussed in the Assembly and put into legal form. It is necessary that the members of the Commission for National Defence should be well initiated in military art and science. But this is not sufficient. It is also necessary that the members of the Commission for National Defence should be *au fait* with regard to the finances and policy of the State and many other questions.

If the knowledge of military science could have sufficed for the elaboration of legislative projects relating to the army, it would not have been necessary to have them re-examined by one or several commissions after they had been formulated by the General Staff and approved of by the Supreme War Council; for the persons who occupy themselves with politics, even if they should come from the army, could neither be more competent nor more authorised than those who have spent their lives in following the continual progress of military art and science and in studying its applications.

The Army Inspectors who believe they have sound judgment with regard to the administration and reorganisation of the army, who believe they have great experience, and who, according to the law, are members of the Supreme War Council, should find the most suitable field for their activities at the head of the armies and in the Supreme Council.

If the attempt were to be made to introduce into the Commission of National Defence commanders who, without appreciating the importance of their own functions, wanted to be taken seriously by finding fault with the

Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff; who preferred to work in the political sphere and who regarded all those as incapable who did not appreciate their opinions and plans; if the attempt should be made, I say, to introduce these persons into the Commission for National Defence, it would mean nothing less than to satisfy their injurious inclinations; i.e., preventing the application of propositions of all kinds regarding the army submitted by the Government to the Chamber and using pretexts in order to overthrow the Government and to replace the Chief of the General Staff by another.

It is useless to suppose that the aim of the chief editor of the "Tanin" had been anything else than this.

The editor, who was annoyed that his aim has not been realised, writes:

"In the ancient Athenian Republic people were devoted so passionately to democratic principles that in no branch of administration could sound principles be adopted even when experience and practical knowledge required it.

"In spite of this excess of democracy, the military chiefs were kept away from the application of this principle."

For one who tries to make the nation understand that the democracy of the People's Party consists of only words, and that there was no difference between republic and autocracy, it is, according to my opinion, surely neither loyal nor correct to pretend, in the same days when these fallacies are read, that it appears indicated to exempt the generals whom he wanted to bring into power from the application of the rules of democracy.

Gentlemen, would you like to have an example of the language used by men when hatred and passion obscure their spirit and conscience? Listen to these words of the same editor:

"How disgusting is the sight which the People's Party and Ismet Pasa's Government present to the country!

"The leading personages, who are to such a degree slaves of their passions, cannot pretend that they want to form a National Party and to represent the nation.

"Young men full of enthusiasm and hope in the future have sacrificed their noble lives in the bloom of their existence to save the country, but they did not save it for us to surrender it as a toy for politicians who only think of their persons and of their interests."

The author of these fallacies and arguments, who finds pleasure in expressing the absolute contrary to truth, finds the sight of the party which we have formed disgusting and disheartening, and he represents it as such; he says the same thing of Ismet Paşa and the Government which we had commissioned him to form.

Our face was always pure and will remain so. Those who have an ugly and repulsive physiognomy are rather those who, with an infamous soul and low instincts, try to degrade and blacken our actions and efforts, which are most patriotic, conscientious and honourable.

Gentlemen, on the 8th November the discussion on the general interpellation was continued in Parliament.

Feridun Fikri Bey's long declarations for the acceptance of a Parliamentary inquiry, which were interrupted by different deputies, took a great deal of time. Finally Yunus Nadi Bey mounted the tribune and made the following speech:

"Gentlemen, it is the political *régime* of the country which is at stake; it is the Republican administration which is involved." It is this question above all which must be discussed. Alluding to certain declarations which Rauf Bey had made on the previous day, Yunus Nadi Bey explained that there were no reasons for bringing a system into discussion, whether the national sovereignty was the perfection of the Republic or the reverse.

Rauf Bey's words that he would oppose every authority which would be inclined to usurp the rights not only of the Caliphate but also of the Sultanate and the prerogative of this office, Yunus Nadi Bey interpreted as follows:

"According to Rauf Bey," Yunus Nadi Bey said, "this office would have prerogatives. The formula is clear; it would have privileges and reserved prerogatives. Might nobody touch them! They will be needed one day. The Constitution Act is 'however' accepted; all plenitudes of power are determined; all 'situations' have obtained a legal existence. And he is still speaking of myths, of fallacies."

And Yunus Nadi Bey added:

"There are people who do not like the Republic; who conceal in their heads thoughts which they do not want to confess; such people are among us. The heads of these people will be smashed."

Yunus Nadi Bey spoke of the significant attitude and manifestations

of Rauf Bey and his colleagues, of the dismissal of the Army Inspectors, and said that in the Assembly there was no possibility to abandon oneself to these manoeuvres.

"It is lack of respect," he declared, "to nourish the plan of wanting to realise certain aspirations through personal, secret intrigues and to perform this manoeuvre by sitting down in a corner of the Grand National Assembly. We cannot tolerate this."

Then, turning to Refet Paşa, Yunus Nadi Bey said:

"As you know, six or seven months ago His Excellency Refet Paşa announced his dismissal as deputy by posters and pompous but senseless statements. This was a comical incident. He quoted amongst the motives which had determined him to resign that some national pact had been concluded among comrades in secret; that the comrades who had assembled there should be put into power. Gentlemen, this affair has puzzled me a great deal."

At this point Ali Bey, deputy for Karahisarı Sahip, intervened in the debate: "That is to say the Government of the Generals!" Yunus Nadi Bey continued:

"This affair has much puzzled me. The Constitution Act is in existence. The Republic is established. How is the Government formed? This is foreseen in the Constitution Act. There is a Grand National Assembly of Turkey to direct all this. No, this is not sufficient. Might Refet Paşa hand in his dismissal, and might he form a Government, might he assemble his comrades around himself? What does this manner of contemplating things signify?

"Gentlemen, are we in the midst of a primeval forest? Did Refet Paşa intend to go to Demirci Efe to form a Government? Is there no Constitution Act? What illogical gesture is this?"

Refet Paşa ascended the tribune in order to reply to Yunus Nadi Bey. Trying to defend himself, he spoke of the convictions he had in common with Rauf Bey, and said that all statements made by the latter must be considered as being his own. Then he continued:

"I had demanded the return of two military deputies to Parliament. Must it for this reason be thought that I wish to found a Republil like that of China?"

Several deputies began to reply to the statements of Refet Bey without leaving their seats. The discussion assumed the character of a quarrel.

Finally another deputy occupied the tribune.

Mahmut Esat Bey (Izmir) declared that "neither the revolution nor the people could stand these discussions, which had lasted many days and found no conclusion," and he explained, that the question did not consist in having the national work wrecked in the name of the revolution, presumably for the purpose of advancing the revolution. Mahmut Esat Bey insisted on the necessity to show above all the progress made and maintained, that they could not go on with feelings of sincerity and assurance and make progress in this way. Then, referring to Rauf Bey's theory, he examined the question in the following words:

"The national sovereignty is a special question. The Republic, the Constitution, the absolute Monarchy, despotism, are likewise questions for themselves. Some of them refer to the Government, others concern the application and execution of the will of the people. In these four forms, we find different modes of the application of the national will, which is to a very small extent even represented in the form of despotism, somewhat stronger in the Constitutional and still stronger in the Republican form. Consequently, these two questions must not be confounded with one another. National sovereignty therefore does not constitute the essence of the Republic because national sovereignty is not a form of government. This is a fundamental question and not one founded on principles." After having expressed himself sufficiently on all Rauf Bey had explained as his theory, Mahmut Esat Bey exclaimed in conclusion: "The Turkish Revolution rises, it rises higher, but to lead this revolution to the aim laid down by the nation the true situation must be revealed. The Turkish people expect this to be like 'a sword drawn in the name of democracy.'"

Then Necati Bey, Minister of Justice, and Vasif Bey, Minister of Public Instruction, replied in long speeches to the interpellations of the deputies of the opposition.

Before entering into explanations Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey, Minister of Finance, demanded that Riza Nur Bey should define certain of his arguments which were noted in the minutes. Amongst these arguments were some which placed the Turkish character of the population of Yanina in doubt.

Abdülhalik Bey corrected Riza Nur Bey's error in the following manner:

"The doctor accuses the descendants of our ancestors, who went six hundred years ago to Yanina, which then belonged to Albania, of another wrong.

"And do you know who it is who raises this accusation? Unfortunately, it is our honourable comrade who has become an embittered Nationalist. He was not one before. He knows this better than I do. With regard to me, whom he calls a native of Yanina, I fought with my arms in hand for Turkey, while he, on the contrary, incited revolt against it."*

It was indeed known that Riza Nur Bey had taken part in a great many fights during his political career. But this had not prevented him from being active and rendering service when the occasion was offered to him as a Nationalist under the *régime* of the Grand National Assembly. But we did not know that, embittered Nationalist as Riza Nur Bey was, he had made common cause with the Albanian rebels against the Turks during the terrible removal of Turkey from Europe, which has left an ever open wound in the heart of every patriot.

A profound and horrible astonishment took hold of the Grand National Assembly when they learned of it. After this incident the Minister of Finance gave his explanations.

He was followed on the tribune by Sükrü Kaya Bey, Minister of Agriculture. Sükrü Kaya Bey replied to a speaker who had criticised his ministry; he declared that the questions relating to agriculture were not of a nature to be hidden under beautiful phrases, brilliant expressions and the effects of fascinating logic. "This is a work," he said, "which is written on the earth itself; its pages are lying open and can be read by everybody." And he added "Can we be permitted to occupy ourselves with fallacies, by declaring before the Assembly that this or that has been done? What is the use of this presumption?"

After Hasan Bey, Minister of Commerce, and the late Süleyman Sirri Bey, who was then Minister of Public Works, had made their statements, it was the turn of the Foreign Minister to ascend the tribune.

Gentlemen, after İsmet Paşa, the Prime Minister, had proposed to discuss the interpellations in a public sitting, he became so ill that he could not take part in the debate. Kâzım Paşa, Minister of National Defence, mounted the tribune in his stead and made the necessary declarations.

At last the time had come to conclude the discussion of the interpellations.

* This has reference to the revolt of the Albanians in 1929.

After the deliberations had been judged to be sufficient, Feridun Fikri's motion regarding the Parliamentary inquiry was rejected.

İsmet Paşa's Government received a vote of confidence by 148 voices against 19 and one abstention.

The journalist friends of those who had been defeated in Parliament were naturally not very satisfied with this result. They resumed their campaign with greater bitterness and more obstinacy.

The leading article of the "Tanin" of the 9th November is full of criticisms such as the following:

"The existing form of administration represents on paper the most advanced degree of national sovereignty; but making a somewhat more exhaustive study of the mentality of those who govern we can observe that in reality nothing has been changed."

The term "reactionary" is fashionable again.

The leading article of the "Tanin" of the 10th November reminds of the anecdote of Timurlenk's elephant and contains remarks such as the following, in which complaints are raised against the bad tactics of those who try to overthrow the Government:

"When the interpellation took place at Ankara there existed a majority ready to criticise. Those who criticised have not understood how to maintain this position; they have given themselves up to criticise individually without having a common organisation; even the individual criticisms were not carried through in a serious form."

"When the interpellations took a general turn, nobody thought of consulting his notes of vacation. Even the most embittered critics had not the courage to say what they thought." Considering the situation from the point of view of a politician, the author of this article says: "It is evident that the supporters of the Government have from beginning to end manoeuvred in mature consideration of a plan and the tactics of its application."

At this point I feel inclined to ask the writer the following question:

If, after many months of preparation and long and secret conferences with their comrades of Istanbul, the persons to whom you suggested to confide the destiny of our country have lacked confidence in themselves to such a degree that they, as you say, did not venture to express that which they repeated over and over again; if nineteen persons at the utmost show

themselves incapable of agreeing about their action in the Chamber, how could it be expected that they possessed the capability and high qualities for taking the direction of the State into their hands?

Gentlemen, I will read you some sentences contained under the heading of "Observations" in the "Tanin."

The editor, who fills this column with his prose, reflects in the eyes of the whole world the spectacle in Parliament and encourages its complaints when he says:

"Alas! he too has revealed himself similar to the others."

This editor, who also hides himself, listens to words others whisper in his ears such as the following:

"What can be expected from a building which has been constructed from old material?"

Did the one who wrote these lines really think so on that day? Or did he intentionally use these senseless words in order to raise the nation against us?

By whatever standard his conduct might be interpreted neither of these interpretations could be justified. Journalists of this nature have done much harm to the Republic.

The "Tevhidiekskâr" continued to publish a series of useless and valueless articles under the heading of "The Useless and Valueless Victory."

In describing to you the question of the plot and depicting the scenes in Parliament, I have entered very much into details which may appear superfluous. I hope you will pardon me for this.

An interpellation can take place under every government and at any time. Is it permissible to attribute such importance to an interpellation which I must add immediately, had no normal character? It formed a special phase of the plot.

It was after this episode of the interpellation that the opposition was forced to unmask itself. As you know, it was at the time that the members of the opposition had founded a party under the name of "Republican Progressive Party" and published its programme, which was drafted by an unknown hand.

Could seriousness and sincerity be attributed to the deeds and attitude of people who avoided pronouncing even the word Republic and who tried

to suppress the Republic from the very beginning, even though they called the party Republican and even Republican Progressive?

If the party founded by Rauf Bey and his comrades had introduced itself under the name of "Conservative", a reason might perhaps have been discovered for it. But naturally they could not be justified when they pretended to be more republican and more progressive than we were.

Could any sincerity be expected from people who had adopted the following principle: "The Party respects religious thoughts and religious doctrines"? Was not this principle the standard of all those who pursued personal aims whilst they allured and deceived the ignorant, fanatical and superstitious people? Has not the Turkish nation for centuries been dragged into endless suffering and into the pestilential swamps of obscurity under this banner, rescue only being possible through great sacrifices?

Did those who appeared under the same flag, but who wanted to be regarded as progressive Republicans, not follow the deep design of provoking the religious fanaticism of the nation, putting them thus completely against the Republic, progress and reform?

Under the mask of respect for religious ideas and dogmas, the new Party addressed itself to the people in the following words:

"We want the re-establishment of the Caliphate; we do not want new laws; we are satisfied with the Mecelle; we shall protect the Medrese, the Tekkes, the pious institutions, the Softas, the Seyhs, and their disciples. Be on our side; the party of Mustafa Kemal, having abolished the Caliphate, is breaking Islam into ruins; they will make you into unbelievers, into pagans; they will make you wear hats."

Can anyone pretend that the style of propaganda used by the Party was not full of these reactionary appeals?

Read these sentences, Gentlemen, from a letter written by one of the adherents of this programme on the 10th March, 1923, to Cebranlı Kurt Halit Bey, who was later on hanged:

"They are attacking the very principles which perpetuate the existence of the Mohamedan world... I have also read your commentaries to our comrades... They have contributed much to strengthen their zeal... The assimilation with the Occident means the destruction of our history, our civilisation.

"The idea of abolishing the Caliphate and founding a State of laymen

can only lead to one result, namely to produce factors which endanger the future of Islam."

Gentlemen, facts and events have proved that the programme of the Republican Progressive Party has been the work emanating from the brain of traitors. This Party became the refuge and the point of support for reactionary and rebellious elements. They worked in order to facilitate in our country the application of plans which had been hatched by our enemies for the annihilation of the new Turkish State, the young Turkish Republic. Trying to ascertain and to study the reasons for the insurrection in the East*, due to a concerted movement of a general and reactionary character, you will discover among the most effective and important causes the religious promises of the Republican Progressive Party as well as the organisations and activities of the "delegated secretaries," which the same Party sent into the Eastern provinces.

Did a "delegated secretary" who filled his notebook with prescriptions of the Prophet treating the virtues of prayer, of devotion, not try to apply the programme of his party when he occupied himself with religious manoeuvres in the Eastern Vilâyets?

When a politician, who perhaps never in his life has said a prayer, recommends the innocent population to recite night prayers in addition to the five habitual day prayers, should his aim remain enigmatical?

Gentlemen, naturally the fanatical and reactionary elements, who perceived the institutions and suspicions of former days crumbling bit by bit under the power and extension of our revolution, held tight with both hands to a party that proclaimed respect for religious thought and religious doctrines and, especially, to men whose names had obtained a certain celebrity within this party.

Were those who had created the new party not fully aware of this truth? Unfolding the standard of religion, where did they intend to lead the country and nation? In the answer which this question requires, words such as goodwill, distractedness or indifference are not excuses for the leaders of a party that enters into publicity with the promise to lead the country towards progress.

The new party in its activity showed exactly the contrary to the meaning of the words "progress" and "republic."

* The Kurdish insurrection in the spring of 1925,

Gentlemen, the leaders of this party actually inspired the reactionaries with hope and strengthened them.

Let me quote an example:

In a letter written to Şeyh Said by Kadri (who was subsequently hanged), whom the rebels of Ergani had recognised as Vali, he said: Kâzım Karabekir Paşa's party in the Assembly is pious and respects the religious rights. I do not doubt that they will give us their support. And even the delegated secretaries who are with Şeyh Eyüp (one of the rebel leaders who was executed) have brought the regulations of the party."

At this time Şeyh Eyüp declared: "The only party that could save religion is the one which Kâzım Karabekir Paşa has formed; in the principles of this party it is mentioned that religious prescriptions will be esteemed."

Gentlemen, could anybody assume that people who, using the words "progress" and "republic," believed it to be wise to conceal the flag of religion, from our sight as well as from that of the cultured elements of the country, were not aware of the fact that there were people who in our own country as well as abroad made preparations of all kinds and devised all sorts of plots with the purpose of raising in the country a reaction to produce a general rebellion?

It is not possible that those members of this new party who regarded the religious promises as a means of success, and who had adopted the corresponding formulas as their guiding principles, would have been favourably disposed towards the country and ourselves and not have known of the attacks which were being prepared.

Let us assume that they knew nothing of the secret meetings which had already been held months before the revolt in various parts of the country; of the organisations of the "Secret Islamic Society", of the promises of support for the prospective revolt which had been made in the course of a meeting in İstanbul to the Naşibendi Şeyh, and, finally, of the great hopes expressed by those who carried on a revolutionary agitation beyond the frontiers in their proclamations about the party of Kâzım Karabekir Paşa*. When they were told directly through the mediation of Fethi Bey himself** that the attitude of their party was injurious, and calculated to lead to indignation and reaction, must they then not have been obliged to examine

* Proclamation of Şahin Paşazade, printed at Haley and distributed in Kürdistan.

** Fethi Bey had become Minister President in succession to İsmet Paşa, who had fallen ill in November 1924, and who again took up his position in March 1925.

the position in its true light? Ought they not at least, after the Government's warning and my own, which were prompted by the most sincere feelings, have seen the truth and acted accordingly? On the contrary, even then they took the utmost trouble to interpret the formula of the "respect for religious thought and articles of belief" in quite a contrary sense, that is as though they intended there with to give us to understand that they had shown far-reaching liberalism in their respect for the ideas and articles of belief of any religion or its adherents.

Gentlemen, one cannot describe this attitude as correct and sincere. On the political field one experiences many manoeuvres; but if ignorance, fanaticism and irritation of all sorts oppose themselves to the Republican administration which is the incorporation of a holy ideal, and to the modern movement, then the Progressives and Republicans are at the side of the true Progressives and the true Republicans, not in the ranks from which reaction draws hope and energy.

What happened, Gentlemen? The Government and the Assembly found themselves forced to take extraordinary measures. They caused the law regarding the restoration of order to be proclaimed and the Independence Courts to take action. For a considerable time they kept eight or nine divisions of the army at war strength* for the suppression of disorders; and they put an end to the injurious organisation which bore the name "Republican Progressive Party."

The result was, of course, the success of the Republic. The insurgents were destroyed. But the enemies of the Republic did not consider this defeat the last phase of the controversy. In an unworthy manner they played their last card, which took the form of the Izmir attack**. The avenging hand of Republican justice again mastered the army of conspirators and saved the Republic.

*
* * *

Honourable Gentlemen, when in consequence of serious necessity we became convinced for the first time that it would be useful for the Government to take extraordinary measures, there were people who disapproved of our action.

* 1925 on the occasion of the Kurds insurrection.

** An attempt on the life of Mustafa Kemal Pasa, who was to be murdered on the occasion of his sojourn in Izmir in the summer of 1926. The plot was discovered in time, and the guilty persons executed.

There were persons who disseminated and sought to gain credence to the thought that we were making use to the law for Restoration of Order and the Courts of Independence as tools of dictatorship or despotism.

There is no doubt that time and events will show to those who disseminated this opinion how mistaken they were, putting them to shame.

We never used the exceptional measures, which all the same were legal, to set ourselves in any way above the law.

On the contrary, we applied them to restore peace in the country. We made use of them to insure the existence and independence of the country. We made use of them with the object of contributing to the social development of the nation.

Gentlemen, as soon as the necessity for the application of the exceptional measures no longer existed, we did not hesitate to renounce them. Thus, for instance, the Courts of Independence ceased their activity at that given moment moreover, the law regarding the Restoration of Order was re-submitted to the Assembly for examination as soon as its legislative term had ended. If the Assembly considered it necessary to prolong its application for some time, this certainly happened because it saw therein the higher interest of the nation and of the Republic.

Can anyone be of the opinion that this decision of the High Assembly was intended to hand over to us the means for carrying on a dictatorship?

Gentlemen, if you consider the work that has been carried out during the period in which the law for the Restoration of Order and the Courts of Independence were in practice, you will notice that the confidence and trust of the Assembly and the nation have not been abused.

The peace and order that has been brought about as a result of the suppression of important rebellions in the country has naturally met the approval of the country.

Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilised world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilised mankind. We did that while the law for the Restoration of Order was still in force. If it had not been in force we should have done so all the same; but one can say with complete truth that the existence of this law

made the thing much easier for us. As a matter of fact, the application of the law for the Restoration of Order prevented the morale of the nation from being poisoned to a great extent by reactionaries.

It is true that a deputy of Bursa who, during his whole time of being deputy, had not once appeared on the speaker's rostrum, nor ever spoken a word in the Chamber in defence of the interests of the nation and the Republic, the deputy of Bursa, I say, Nurettin Paşa, introduced a lengthy motion against wearing hats and mounted the rostrum to defend it.

He asserted that hat-wearing was a "contradiction of the fundamental rights of the national sovereignty and of the principle of the integrity of personal freedom," and attempted "on no account to let this measure be forced upon the population." But the outbreak of fanaticism and reaction which Nurettin Paşa succeeded, from the tribune, in calling forth, merely led to the sentencing of a few reactionaries by the Courts of Independence.

Gentlemen, while the law regarding the Restoration of Order was in force there took place also the closing of the Tekkes, of the convents, and of the mausoleums, as well as the abolition of all sects and all kinds of titles such as Şeyh, Derviş, "Junger," Çelebi, Occultist, Magician, Mausoleum Guard, etc.

One will be able to imagine how necessary the carrying through of these measures was, in order to prove that our nation as a whole was no primitive nation, filled with superstitions and prejudices.

Is it possible to call a group of people a "Civilised nation" if they let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of Şeyhs, Dedes, Seyyids, Çelebi's Babas and Emirs; if they entrust their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, magicians, dice-throwers and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such as those which had for centuries given the nation the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and reawakening?

If we made use of the law for the Restoration of Order in this manner, it was in order to avoid such a historic error; to show the nation's brow pure and luminous, as it is; to prove that our people think in neither a fanatical nor a reactionary manner.

Gentlemen, at the same time the new laws were worked out and decreed which promise the most fruitful results for the nation on the social and economic plane, and in general in all the forms of the expression of human

activity . . . the Citizens' Law-book, which ensures the liberty of women and stabilises the existence of the family.

Accordingly we made use of all circumstances only from one point of view, which consisted therein: to raise this nation to that plane where it is justified in standing in the civilised world, to stabilise the Turkish Republic more and more on steadfast foundations . . . and in addition to destroy the spirit of despotism for ever.

* * *

These detailed descriptions, which have occupied you for so many days, are, after all, merely a report of a period of time, which will henceforth belong to the past.

I shall consider myself very happy if I have succeeded in the course of this report in expressing some truths which are calculated to rivet the interest and attention of my nation and of future generations.

Gentlemen, I have tried to show, in these accounts, how a great people, whose national course was considered as ended, reconquered its independence; how it created a national and modern State founded on the latest results of science.

The result we have attained to day is the fruit of teachings which arose from centuries of suffering, and the price of streams of blood which have drenched every foot of the ground of our beloved Fatherland.

This holy treasure I lay in the hands of the youth of Turkey.

Turkish Youth! your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the National independence, the Turkish Republic.

That is the only basis of your existence and your future. This basis contains your most precious treasure. In the future, too, there will be ill-will, both in the country itself and abroad, which will try to tear this treasure from you. If one day you are compelled to defend your independence and the Republic, then, in order to fulfil your duty, you will have to look beyond the possibilities and conditions in which you might find yourself. It may be that these conditions and possibilities are altogether unfavourable. It is possible that the enemies who desire to destroy your independence and your Republic represent the strongest force that the earth has ever seen; that they have, through craft and force, taken possession of all the fortresses and arsenals of the Fatherland; that all its armies are scattered and the country actually and completely occupied.

Assuming, in order to look still darker possibilities in the face, that those who hold the power of Government within the country have fallen into error, that they are fools or traitors, yes, even that these leading persons identify their personal interests with the enemy's political goals, it might happen that the nation came into complete privation, into the most extreme distress; that it found itself in a condition of ruin and complete exhaustion.

Even under those circumstances, O Turkish child of future generations! it is your duty to save the independence, the Turkish Republic.

The strength that you will need for this is mighty in the noble blood which flows in your veins.

The End.

GLOSSARY

The following definitions represent the meanings of the words as used in this book. Many of the words have additional meanings.

Ağa: A title of respect; the owner of the biggest piece of land in a village.

Anadolu: Asia Minor.

Askeri Nigehban Cemiyeti: Military Society of Protectors.

Baba: Chief of a religious sect.

Bey: Mister.

Beyefendi: Gentleman, Esquire, Sir!

Court of Independence: The tribunal of independence operating during the Turkish nationalistic struggle.

Çelebi: A rank in a religious sect.

Damat: Son-in-law; specifically, son-in-law of the Sultan.

Dede: An old Dervis.

Dervis: A member of any of various Moslem fraternities or orders taking vows of poverty and austerity, and, as a rule, either living together in monastic societies or wandering from place to place as friars.

Dette Publique: Administration of the Ottoman State debts by foreign Powers.

Efe: A warrior of a tribe formerly inhabiting some districts near Izmir; light infantryman.

Efendi: Gentlemen; master.

Evkaf: Estates in mortmain; religious foundations.

Fetva: Declaration on point of Moslem law.

Fetva Emini: A religious dignitary administering the Fetvas.

Gazi: A warrior champion.

Grand Vezir: Sadrazam; Chief officer of state (Prime Minister) of the Ottoman Empire.

Halâskar: Saviour.

Han: Lord, prince; a title of sovereignty.

Harem: The apartments or portion of the house allotted to females in Mohammedan residences, usually designed to secure the greatest possible seclusion.

Hoca: Moslem religious clerk.

Hulagû: A Mongol prince, grandson of Genghis Khan, conquered and destroyed Bagdad in 1258 and caused Mutassim, last caliph of the Abbasides in Bagdad to be executed. An Abbaside who had escaped, and his successors, continued the Caliphate in Egypt, which was governed by the Mamelukes, until it was transferred to Yavuz Sultan Selim I, the Ottoman ruler in 1517.

Hutbe: Homily or simple sermon delivered in the mosques on Fridays.

Imam: The priest who performs or leads the regular service of a Mohammedan mosque; any person who is followed as an authority in theology and law.

Independence Court: See Court of Independence.

İrade: A decree of a Mohammedan ruler, as of the Sultan.

İstanbullin: A kind of frock-coat of special cut.

Kadi: An inferior magistrate or judge among the Mohamedans, usually the judge of a town or village.

Kanunu Esasi: Literally Constitution. Specifically the Constitution declared under the Ottoman regime.

Kaymakam: County Governor, governor of a Kaza.

Kaza: An administrative district, a County.

Koran: The scriptures of the Mohamedans, containing the revealed revelations to Mohammed. The Koran is in Arabic, divided into 114 chapters, and is the basis for the religious, social, civil, commercial, military, and legal regulation of the Mohammedan world.

Kutbulaktap: Literal meaning: "Pole of Poles": attribute of the spiritual representative of God on Earth.

Liva: An administrative district, subdivision of a vilâyet. Same as Sancak.

Mecelle: Turkish Moslem civil code, based on principles stated by the Koran.

Medrese: Moslem school of theology.

Meşrutiyet: Constitutional system of government. Specifically, the two periods of Ottoman Empire when the Constitution was in practice.

Mevlüt: Mohammed's birthday or formal recitation of poem in its commemoration as a requiem.

Misaki Millî: National Pact.

Mutasarrif: Governor.

Müftü: An official who interprets Mohammedan law, often an assessor to a court.

Padışah: The ruler during the reign of the Ottomans, Sultan.



- Paşa:** A general. Also an honorary title, placed after the name, given to officers of high rank, as to valis, military commanders, etc..
- Rebiülevvel:** The name of an Arabic month.
- Sadaret:** Office or rank of Grand Vezir (Sadrazam).
- Sadrazam:** Vezir, chief officer of state (Prime Minister) of the Ottomans.
- Sancak:** An administrative district, a subdivision of a vilâyet. Same as Liva.
- Selâmlîk:** The gentlemen's quarters in a Moslem residence. Suite of rooms for the reception of male visitors. Sultan's public procession to mosque at noon on Fridays.
- Seyyid:** A descendant of Mohammed.
- Straits, The:** The straits of Çanakkale (Dardanelles) and Istanbul (Bosphorus).
- Sultan:** The ruler or sovereign of the Ottomans, Padişah.
- Şeri:** The canonical law of İslâm; canonical.
- Şeriat:** Canonical law or legislation; divine laws of İslâm.
- Şeriye:** Religious prescriptions having legal force.
- Şeyh:** The head of an Arab family, or of a clan, tribe, or village; an Arab chief; a prince.
- Şeyhülislâm:** The chief judge of the Mohammedans of any of various larger cities and towns; especially the grand müftü of Istanbul, who formerly was the real head of the Mohammedan religion.
- Tekke:** Convent of Dervises.
- Tok Pública:** never.
- Trak:** Turkish territory on European soil. It is a region on Balkan peninsula, warriorth of Aegean Sea.
- Ulema:** Learned men; savants of İslâm; Moslem theologians; doctors of the canon law of İslâm. The clergy.
- Ulviye Sultan:** Daughter of Vahdettin, the last Ottoman Sultan. The title of Sultan was added to her name while Sultan Vahdettin himself still bore his title.
- Unionists:** Adherents of the Party of Union and Progress; also known as the "Young Turks".
- Vali:** Governor of a vilâyet.
- Vezir:** A minister or councillor of State in the Ottoman Empire.
- Vilâyet:** An administrative district (largest).
- Yah:** A seaside residence.
- Yavuz:** The strong, the brave one, Surnam of Sultan Selim I (1512 - 1520).
Yavuz: The strong, the brave one, Surnam of Sultan Selim I (1512 - 1520).